WINDS OF DOCTRINE

STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY OPINION

Critical Edition

Co-edited by
David E. Spiech, Martin A. Coleman,
and Faedra Lazar Weiss
Introduction by Paul Forster

Volume IX
THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA

George Santayana

The Works of George Santayana

VOLUME IX

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When you escape, as you love to do, to your forests and your sierras, I am sure again that you do not feel you made them, or that they were made for you. They have grown, as you have grown, only more massively and more slowly. In their non-human beauty and peace they stir the sub-human depths and the superhuman possibilities of your own spirit. It is no transcendental logic that they teach; and they give no sign of any deliberate morality seated in the world. It is rather the vanity and superficiality of all logic, the needlessness of argument, the relativity of morals, the strength of time, the fertility of matter, the variety, the unspeakable variety, of possible life. (*WD,* 142)

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BY

GEORGE SANTAYANA

Volume IX
The Works of George Santayana

Edited by
David E. Spiech, Martin A. Coleman, and Faedra Lazar Weiss
with an Introduction by Paul Forster

Critical Edition

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GEORGE SANTAYANA:
WINDS OF DOCTRINE

AN INTRODUCTION
BY PAUL FORSTER

Winds of Doctrine, Santayana's fifth book in philosophy, was published in 1913 at a pivotal time in his life. His reputation as a philosopher had long since been established: he was well known internationally, sought after as a lecturer, someone Harvard was keen to retain and other universities eager to recruit. Nevertheless, having for many years felt out of step with the institutional vision of Harvard's administration, the ethos of professionalized philosophy and even the tenor of American culture, Santayana resigned his teaching position in January of 1912 at the age of 48.[1] The move (made possible by savings accumulated over many years and an inheritance) marked the end both of his career as an academic and his residency in the United States. Though written for the most part while still a professor, *Winds of Doctrine* is the first book he published as an unaffiliated, itinerant, and, he would say, liberated, intellectual.[2]

Reviews of the book were largely positive, indeed effusive. In the *American Library Association Booklist* the book was judged to comprise "brilliant, original essays written by a philosopher who has the poet's vision and power of expression and uses both in revealing and sharply criticizing tendencies in modern thought."[3] In the literary journal *The Athenaeum*, the book was deemed "fresh and lively," one that "should be taken seriously, for its high spirits are the natural result of that feeling of enhanced power which accompanies the exercise of keen critical faculties."[4] The reviewer for *Catholic World* wrote that "in literary quality and mental distinction, there are few to equal [Santayana]" and went on to commend the "manner especially detached and impartial" by which he "reviews the various phases of religious and philosophical opinion just now popular in the English-speaking world."[5] In the British journal *The Spectator*, Santayana was said to possess an "independence of standpoint and a literary style of an excellence rare among philosophers."[6] A reviewer for *The Nation* found the book to contain "wit and subtlety" and singled out Santayana's essay on Bergson as particularly "important" and "brilliant."[7]

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[1] Of his reluctance to become an academic, Santayana writes: "The life of a wandering student, like those of the Middle Ages, had an immense natural attraction for me – so great, that I have never willingly led any other. When I had to choose a profession, the prospect of a quiet academic existence seemed the least of evils." *The Philosophy of George Santayana* [hereafter *PGS*], ed. Paul Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), 12.

[2] Santayana says that "in *Winds of Doctrine* and my subsequent books, a reader of my earlier writings may notice a certain change of climate…. It was not my technical philosophy that was principally affected, but rather the meaning and status of philosophy for my inner man" (*PGS,* 23).

Reviews in periodicals were no less enthusiastic. The critic for *Harper's* wrote that "a new book by George Santayana is always an event of importance to a few, because…it means that on some subjects of permanent value they have been helped along to a more finished understanding," and added that "this country now has no essayist who is his equal."[8] *Winds of Doctrine* was characterized as a "brilliant book about present-day conditions" and the reviewer surmised that "it will be a long time before a book is published with more general intelligence than this one contains."[9] Meanwhile, in *The New York Times* the work was judged "extraordinarily interesting" and Santayana was commended for his "acute and searching observation" and for stating his case "with such vigor in a style so cogent and even compelling that he holds the attention of even the least sympathetic."[10] *The Times* later included *Winds of Doctrine* in its list of the 100 best books of 1913, alongside Winston Churchill's *The Inside of the Cup*, Jack London's *John Barleycorn*, Thomas Hardy's *A Changed Man and Other Tales*, Edith

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[3] *A. L. A. Booklist* 10 (1913): 63.

[4] *The Athenaeum*, no. 4457 (March 29, 1913): 353.

[5] *Catholic World* 97 (July 1913): 534.

[6] *The Spectator*, March 1, 1913, 365.

[7] To be fair, the *Nation's* reviewer also said the essay on Russell, though "clear and analytical," is "somewhat scattering" and that in his essay on Bergson Santayana "allows his cleverness to run away with his pen" (*The Nation* 96, no. 2501 [June 5, 1913]: 574).

[8] *Harper's Weekly*, August 16, 1913, 27.

[9] Ibid.

[10] *New York Times*, June 1, 1913, 53.

Wharton's *The Custom of the Country*, Sir James Fraser's *The Golden Bough*—Part 6, G. K. Chesterton's *The Victorian Age in Literature,* and Josiah Royce's *The Problem of Christianity*.[11]

At first glance, the scope of *Winds of Doctrine* seems impossibly broad. In a few hundred pages Santayana endeavors to sum up the dominant intellectual currents of early twentieth-century thought and trace their implications for American culture, for ethics and religion, for arts and letters, and for philosophy. In the process he assesses the intellectual significance of modernism in Catholic thought, the philosophical work of Henri Bergson and Bertrand Russell, and the poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley (taking significant sidelong glances at the work of others along the way—Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and Walt Whitman among them). However, underlying this eclectic mix of themes and topics is a unifying philosophical orientation.

Santayana thinks it evident that human beings are a species of animal living in a material world. He thinks it equally obvious that the human animal is a spiritual creature—one "that, when he lives at all, lives for ideals."[12] He sees no insuperable difficulty in reconciling a materialist conception of human beings with a genuine appreciation of their spiritual nature. Materialism, for him, is a view about the causes and origins of things—that "matter is the only *substance, power,* or *agency* in the universe" and that it exists independently of human beings and for no particular purpose (*PGS,* 509). Conceptions of spiritual life, by contrast, "draw from reality materials for an image of that ideal to which reality ought to conform, and to make us citizens, by anticipation, in the world we crave."[13] They deal, not with what is the case, but rather with "the meanings and values of life, in its anticipation of perfection" (*IPR,* 3). For him, then, reconciling materialism and spirituality requires only the "expedient of recognizing facts as facts and accepting ideals as ideals" (*IPR,* 4).

On Santayana's view, factual questions are to be settled through empirical inquiry rather than *a priori* reflection. For him, it is clear when we reflect on how human beings are situated in the natural world that there is no evidence for knowledge other than sensory experience and no kinds of knowledge deeper or more secure than natural science and common sense. This is not to say that he thinks science and common sense yield beliefs that are literally true. To the contrary, he thinks such a claim presumptuous in light of the fact that the sources of information about the material world are, in the case of human beings, extremely limited and highly selective – confined to inputs falling within certain ranges of light, sound, odors, textures, and tastes. Moreover, the cognitive significance of sensory inputs depends on certain presuppositions – background assumptions, principles of reasoning, and interests – that cannot be verified in experience since they are assumed in any understanding of experience. The truth of these assumptions can be granted only as an instinctive act of "animal faith."[14]

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[11] Ibid., November 30, 1913, BR664.

[12] *Winds of Doctrine* [hereafter *WD*]: 4.

[13] *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* [hereafter *IPR*], The Works of George Santayana, vol. 3, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. and William G. Holzberger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 3.

Yet while maintaining that claims to know literal truth are unsustainable, Santayana does not think it either possible or reasonable to suspend belief altogether. The demands of life compel us to have views about the world and we are so constructed that "whatever picture of things we may carry about in our heads we are bound to regard as a map of reality" (*IPR,* 8). When it comes to evaluating beliefs in the absence of standards of literal truth "all we can do is, without abandoning the aspiration to knowledge…to control as best we may the formation of our conceptions; to arrange them according to their derivation and measure them by their applicability in life, so prudently watching over their growth that we may be spared the deepest of sorrows – to survive the offspring of our own thought" (*IPR,* 8).

In the case of common sense and science, Santayana thinks our views respond to, and are controlled by, experience. While seeing no way to show that the principles necessary for belief are literally true of reality, he thinks it reasonable to claim that, whatever the inherent nature of the material world may be, it is such that events occur in regular patterns. To the extent that common sense and scientific beliefs are shaped in response to causal input from the environment and issue in reliable predictions they tell us something of the world – namely, what it is like when judged from the perspective of human knowledge. Thus science and common sense "live in a world of expurgated mythology" and are rightly deemed factual, rather than fictional (*IPR,* 9).

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[14] "Five senses… to gather a small part of the infinite influences that vibrate in Nature, a moderate power of understanding to interpret those senses, and an irregular, passionate fancy to overlay that interpretation – such is the endowment of the human mind. And what is its ambition? Nothing less than to construct a picture of all reality, to comprehend its own origin and that of the universe, to discover the laws of both and prophesy their destiny. Is not the disproportion enormous? Are not confusions and profound contradictions to be looked for in any attempt to build so much out of so little?" (*IPR,* 8).

When it comes to spiritual ideals, however, Santayana insists our beliefs are only tenuously connected to the causal input of the environment we inhabit. Our conceptions of what the world ought to be transcend the limits of empirical verification and thus are no more than "fictions inspired by the moral imagination" (*PGS,* 497). However, the fact that spiritual ideals fall outside the scope of scientific knowledge does not imply that they are extraneous and to be purged from our system of belief. To the contrary, Santayana thinks spiritual ideals are "indispensable" (*IPR,* 11) and express our profoundest needs and hopes (*PGS,* 497). As he puts it, "to stimulate the imagination [to contemplate spiritual ideals] is to produce the deepest, the most pertinacious emotions" while "to repress it is to chill the soul, so that even the clearest perception of the truth remains without the joy and impetuosity of conviction" (*IPR,* 11). Thus it is, he thinks, that spiritual ideals, though of no use in science, "remain the inspiration of poetry and religion" (*IPR,* 4).[15]

For Santayana, failure to appreciate the difference between scientific discourse and religious–poetic discourse proves disastrous to both sorts of endeavor. Finding no spiritual consolation in materialism – since it “carries with it no commandments and no advice”[16]—some philosophers seek to reconceive nature in spiritual or ethical terms (e.g., by construing evolution as the progressive realization of certain ends, as in Santayana’s day, or, as in our own time, by positing spiritual forces operating at the level of quantum physics). On such an approach “the habits of imagination cloud science with passion, with fiction, with sentimental prejudice” (*IPR,* 12), while fostering the illusion of an objective ground for morality. On the other hand, to belittle or dismiss spiritual ideals on the grounds that science has shown matter to be indifferent to our higher purposes is to ignore the importance in a rational life of a conception of what it means to be human. To avoid both errors, Santayana insists that science ought to confine itself to discerning what the world is like (to whatever extent possible for human beings), while religion and poetry ought to surrender any claim to provide knowledge of what is the case and aim instead at uncovering those things that are most valuable to creatures with the sort of hopes, needs, fears, and capacities that human beings have.

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[15] As he explains: "A metaphysician who transcends the intellect by his reason can be conceived only as using his imagination to such good purpose as to divine by it the ideal laws of reality or the ultimate goals of moral effort. His reason is an imagination that succeeds, an intuition that guesses the principle of experience. But if this intuition were of such a nature that experience could verify it, then that higher reason or imagination would be brought down to the level of the understanding…. When the prophecies of faith are verified, the function of faith is gone. Faith and the higher reason of the metaphysicians are therefore forms of imagination believed to be avenues to truth … not because their necessary correspondence to truth can be demonstrated, for then they would be portions of science, but because a man dwelling on those intuitions is conscious of a certain moral transformation, of a certain warmth and energy of life. This emotion, heightening his ideas and giving them power over his will, he calls faith or high philosophy, and under its dominion he is able to face his destiny with enthusiasm, or at least with composure.

"The imagination, even when its premonitions are not wholly justified by subsequent experience, has thus a noble role to play in the life of man. Without it his thoughts would be not only far too narrow to represent, although it were symbolically, the greatness of the universe, but far too narrow even to render the scope of his own life and the conditions of his practical welfare. Without poetry and religion the history of mankind would have been darker than it is" (*IPR,* 10–11).

This conception of science and spirituality informs Santayana’s philosophical method and style. As he sees it, philosophy is lay religion and thus literary, rather than scientific, in nature. Philosophical argumentation serves to direct us to “a steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth” (*TPP,* 7). Philosophers *per se* do not seek to uncover facts about the world, such being the task of natural science. Rather they seek to supply a compelling and critically defensible interpretation of one’s place in it. Philosophy so understood is both intellectual and edifying—committed to a true understanding of human beings and their world and dedicated to fostering appreciation of what is intrinsically worthwhile.[17]

Santayana thinks a philosophical theory is rational to the extent that it unites the diverse aspects of human nature and provides a vision of life befitting creatures such as we are, given the world we live in. At the same time, however, he does not expect that philosophers' ideals of human fulfillment will necessarily match up. In philosophy, he thinks "a view becomes untenable only when seen to contradict some conviction ineradicable from one's own mind; and not the same convictions are ineradicable from all minds, at least not in mature years" (*PGS,* 605). In philosophy rigorous proof is out of the question. Faced with a disagreement over fundamentals, "you cannot refute a principle or rebut a preference, you can only indicate its consequences or present alluringly the charms of a rival doctrine" (*PGS,* 604). Such is the aim and purpose of *Winds of Doctrine.*

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[16] *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe* [hereafter *TPP*] (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2019), 20.

[17] “In philosophy itself investigation and reasoning are only preparatory and servile parts, means to an end. They terminate in insight, or what in the noblest sense of the word may be called *theory*, θεωρία—a steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth. Such contemplation is imaginative. No one can reach it who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart. A philosopher who attains it is, for the moment, a poet; and a poet who turns his practised and passionate imagination on the order of all things, or on anything in the light of the whole, is for that moment a philosopher” (*TPP,* 7).

In each of the book's six essays Santayana evaluates a prominent intellectual current or school of thought in light of what he takes to be fundamental needs and values that human beings share. Though he denies an objective ground for philosophy, he does not deem all philosophical views equally reasonable "since they are not equally conducive to human purposes or satisfactory to human demands" (*IPR,* 13). His critical discussions draw on science (where debates turn on questions of fact), logic (where questions of the coherence of ideas arise), moral considerations (where assessments of what is valuable are at issue), and aesthetic considerations (where the beauty of the ideals being proffered is in question).[18] In keeping with his view of philosophy, his style is rich in metaphor and free of technical debate. However, this does not mean his criticisms lack rigor or philosophical sophistication. Santayana writes as he does because his aim is to draw attention to what he thinks are the deeper motives and interests—the properly philosophical presuppositions about human beings and their place in the world—that give rise to technical debates in philosophy and give them their broader point and significance. He argues that the various philosophical perspectives he considers have profound limitations when construed as portraits of human life. What he ultimately hopes to put in their place is a comprehensive, true, and satisfying conception of the world and how to flourish in it.

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[18] As he puts it: "There will always be beauty, or a transport akin to the sense of beauty, in any high contemplative moment. And it is only in contemplative moments that life is truly vital, when routine gives place to intuition, and experience is synthesized and brought before the spirit in its sweep and truth. The intention of my philosophy has certainly been to attain, if possible, such wide intuitions, and to celebrate the emotions with which they fill the mind. If this object be æsthetic and merely poetical, well and good: but it is a poetry or æstheticism which shines by disillusion and is simply intent on the unvarnished truth" (*PGS,* 21).

I ~ The Intellectual Temper of the Age

In his opening essay, Santayana claims that the current age is confused morally and intellectually and argues that pragmatism is more a symptom of what ails contemporary culture than a remedy for it. He attributes the confusion to a clash of civilizations. On one hand, there is the fading culture of Christendom – based on devotion to established religious doctrine, academic art, duty toward local institutions, class hierarchy, and privilege based on lineage. On the other hand, there is an emerging commercial, industrial culture ushering in a "slow upward filtration of… an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy" (*WD,* 1). These worldviews have equal claim to authority inasmuch as each answers to something deep in our animal nature. The conflict between them is not a clash of disjoint factions but rather of incongruent value systems that lie within "the mind and heart of the average individual" (*WD,* 2).

What Santayana thinks is required to settle the contemporary mind is an intelligent, inclusive, and systematic vision around which diverse tendencies can be organized – a vision of the sort that accompanied the advent of ancient Greek culture and the birth of Christianity. No such organizing vision having emerged from the ashes of the French Revolution, contemporary culture remains adrift, without the sort of "integrating reform" (*WD,* 6) that "clarifies and brings to expression something which was potential in the rest of us, but which with our burden of flesh and circumstance we were too torpid to utter" (*WD,* 13).

Santayana sees signs of constructive reform in contemporary culture but thinks fine arts, religion, and philosophy "are still in full career towards disintegration" (*WD,* 7). While acknowledging that pragmatism is "a very interesting fresh movement" (*WD,* 8) in philosophy, he does not think it signals "a reawakening of any organising instinct" (*WD,* 8). To the contrary, he views it as "an extreme expression of romantic anarchy" (*WD,* 8). Rather than providing a rational conception of the world and our place in it, Santayana thinks pragmatism undermines reason as a source of insight into the way things are and ought to be.

On Santayana's reading, pragmatists (and here he has James and Bergson especially in mind) merely follow out the consequences of Berkeley's critique of the concept of substance and Kant's claim that talk of “things-in-themselves” lacks sense. They view experience not merely as the means by which we know the world, but as the very stuff of reality.

Santayana rejects this view because he thinks it leads to solipsism—the view that only the mind and its experiences exist. On his reading, pragmatists view experience as it is given—so-called pure experience—as a continuous stream of uncognized feelings. These feelings take on cognitive significance only insofar as they are interpreted by means of concepts. However, unlike feelings, concepts are discrete, unchanging, and abstract, bearing atemporal logical relations to one other. Thus, far from representing the character of pure experience, conceptual understanding inevitably distorts it (and by extension, distorts our conception of the nature of reality). Moreover, pragmatists deny any necessity to the conceptual interpretations of experience we give, urging that their authority “lies in the fact that they may be more or less congenial or convenient, by enriching the flying moment æsthetically, or helping it slip prosperously into the next moment” (*WD,* 8). On such a view, Santayana urges, claims that purport to represent things not found in pure experience or that imply a reality beyond pure experience—claims about events in the past and future, other minds, or things distant in space—must be either rejected as cognitively meaningless or viewed as mere tools for negotiating the flux of experience. Rather than accounting for knowledge of a material world—a world that includes much besides the experience of knowers—Santayana thinks pragmatists end up denying its possibility. As he puts it, “If all knowledge is of experience and experience cannot be knowledge of anything else, knowledge proper is evidently impossible. There can be only feeling; and the least self-transcendence, even in memory, must be an illusion” (*WD,* 9).

To reply that pragmatists are not committed to solipsism because they deny that experience consists of sensory contents lodged within an individual mind is to miss Santayana’s point. It is true that James, for example, takes experience to be neutral between mind and matter—one and the same stuff being mental when viewed in the context of a subject’s life and material when viewed in the context of public events. But if, as James says, interpretations are true or false in virtue of how experiences are connected to one another and there is no truth that isn’t in a sense “malleable” to human need, then it would seem to follow that the reality we know, and not just our understanding of it, is mind-dependent—that, in James's words, "the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything."[19] It is the failure to acknowledge the possibility of knowing something of a world that is altogether apart from our experience that Santayana finds indefensible. Instead of confuting the dichotomy between an idealism that locates the world in the mind and a realism that renders the world inaccessible because beyond the limits of experience, as pragmatists hope to do, Santayana thinks they end up with a view that implies that reality, insofar as it is an object of knowledge, is constituted by the subject's interpretations of it.[20]

Santayana further claims that the solipsism implied by pragmatism gives way to an unsatisfying "moral materialism" (*WD,* 10). The line of thought here is not made explicit but the suggestion seems to be that having taken intuitions of pure experience to be foundational in philosophy, pragmatists find—rightly, Santayana avers—that there is nothing more evident in experience than feelings of expectancy and anticipation. Accordingly, they take reality to be inherently dynamic and to manifest change, growth, action, and novelty. In light of this, pragmatists venerate innovation and technological control over traditional contemplative virtues and, thereby, lend aid and comfort to proponents of the emerging industrial culture.

Finding nothing in pure experience corresponding to the subject or ego, Santayana continues, pragmatists deny the existence of consciousness and view the mind as material in nature. They identify passions with certain bodily sensations, ignoring their traditional role in moral psychology as exemplifications of the virtues and vices that steer us to the good. On such a view, the moral subject—the nobler, cherished aspects of human nature—becomes identified with parts of the physical world and the esteem accorded human nature is transferred to mere matter in motion. In the process, appreciation for the value of the passions as expressions of the human spirit (expressions that, Santayana acknowledges, have material causes) is lost. Having "materialized" ethics and rejected the notion that the universe progresses towards fixed ends as an unempirical dogma, pragmatists have nothing in the way of moral inspiration to offer beyond faith in the idea of change itself. With no room for a conception of ultimate ends, and having limited knowledge to the discovery of practical means, pragmatists leave us without any reasonable account of what we ought to strive to become or achieve.

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[19] William James, *Pragmatism*, Vol. 1, The Works of William James, ed. F. Burkhardt *et al.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 37.

[20] Bergson, for example, writes: "The method we speak of alone permits us to go beyond idealism, as well as realism, to affirm the existence of objects inferior and superior (though in a certain sense interior) to us, to make them co-exist together without difficulty, and to dissipate gradually the obscurities that analysis accumulates round these great problems" (*An Introduction to Metaphysics* [hereafter *IM*], trans. T. E. Hulme [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912], 112). For Santayana, Bergson's claim to at once go beyond idealism and realism while holding that objects are in a sense interior to us is equivocal, if not incoherent.

As Santayana sees it, the pragmatists' turn toward pre-cognitive experience as fundamental in philosophy reflects the widespread notion that reason is something of a death force. Intelligence, on their view, is preoccupied with abstractions that are distant from vital matters and lack the intensity of lived experience. In light of this, pragmatism finds favor among those who seek to rein in the intellect in an effort to liberate an imagination no longer inspired by traditional religion and deadened by the daily grind of a culture governed by business interests, stale social conventions, and the pursuit of unrefined pleasures. But rather than liberate intelligence from its shackles, Santayana thinks pragmatists urge us to renounce detached contemplation of life and the world and immerse ourselves in immediate experience.

Santayana thinks the attempt to circumvent or restrain intelligence is as hopeless as it is dehumanizing. As he sees it, greatness requires an ideal vision of some possible order or organization. Yet in "an age when nobody trusts himself, or feels any confidence in reason" such greatness is impossible and so "there is none of it to-day" (*WD,* 14). Still, all is not gloom and doom for him. He thinks the current age remains intellectually active and open to new possibilities. On the one hand, modernism in religion and pragmatism in philosophy are attempts to rationalize the veneration of instinct, evolution, practical action, and novelty. On the other hand, romanticism (in Shelley's poetry) and Platonism (in Russell's philosophy) are attempts to find solace and guidance in the contemplation of a reality that is higher and more sublime than the mundane, material world. Both of these tendencies are "but gusts of doctrine; yet they prove that the spirit is not dead" (*WD,* 16). As to which, if any, will "carry the mind of the coming age," he thinks only time will tell.

II ~ Modernism and Christianity

Having argued that contemporary culture is torn between the worldview pragmatism promotes – a view that advances the values of the emerging industrial culture at the expense of compelling spiritual values integral to traditional religion – and Christianity – which advances religious values at odds with the scientific and democratic tendencies of the times – Santayana considers, in the second essay of *Winds of Doctrine*, the solution to this dilemma offered by Catholic modernism.[21]

Modernism emerged as a movement within the Catholic Church in the late nineteenth century. Its goal was to reform church doctrine and practices in light of contemporary knowledge and values.[22] Inspired by Kant and later by Bergson, modernists saw knowledge as confined within the limits of human experience and incapable of extending to the supernatural. Rather than take sacred texts literally – as the revealed word of God – modernists viewed them as human articulations of personal religious experience, experience rooted in pre-cognitive feeling or intuition. Modernism posed a challenge to the church because it legitimated the criticism of established dogma in light of new knowledge and changing values, made the institutional interpretation of religious dogma secondary to religious experience unmediated by ecclesiastical authority, and put all religions more or less on a par as legitimate, albeit diverse, expressions of personal religious sentiments. Santayana thinks the debate over modernism worthy of special attention because it carries the clash of civilizations described in his first essay to the very heart of what is "constitutionally the most stable of institutions" and "least inclined to revise its collective memory or established usages" (*WD,* 17), namely, the Catholic church.

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[21] Though apt to describe himself as a Catholic, Santayana says he always used the term as "a matter of sympathy and traditional allegiance, not of philosophy" (*PGS,* 7). He was never a practicing Catholic and maintained that his philosophy is religious in the Protestant sense of the term, meaning that it decries belief in the literal truth of traditional religious dogmas (*PGS,* 588). Still, he calls religion the "head and front of everything" (*PGS,* 7) in his philosophy and claims to have retained "an unspoken and sacrificial trust in an unfathomable power…" adding that "*faith* and *trust* in that universal dispensation are signs of healthy life in ourselves, of intelligence and mastery; they bring, if we are reasonably plastic, a justified assurance of fellowship with reality, partly by participation and partly by understanding" (*PGS,* 588).

[22] The leading modernists were Alfred Loisy (1857–1940), George Tyrrell (1861–1909), and Ernesto Buonaiuti (1881–1946). Edouard Le Roy (1870–1954), who served as an assistant to Bergson from 1914–1920, was also prominent in the movement.

Though Santayana says his essay on modernism is "patch-work… and I am afraid it shows it," its central argument is clear.[23] He thinks modernism offers an untenable mix of secular and religious doctrine. Modernists hope to revitalize Catholicism by purging it of doctrines and practices that do not square with findings in history, science, and philosophy. While allowing that Catholicism has always adapted itself to changing circumstances and that it is fair for modernists to question practices that have either lost their point or are inconsistent, Santayana argues that modernism is unstable inasmuch as it is at odds with basic tenets of Christianity.

On Santayana's view, Christianity, both in essence and origin, is a summons to renounce worldly goods and pursue a spiritual life in light of the prophecy that the world, being wicked, is destined to end. True Christians relinquish interest in such things as wealth, power, the gratification of desires, and concern for the opinions of others in order to evade the fate that awaits a corrupt world. They put their faith in a heavenly afterlife and devote their efforts in this life to ministering to the poor, the sick, and the downtrodden, and to preaching the word of God. Whether the destruction of the world is taken to involve its annihilation or merely the end of one's earthly life, the basic teachings are the same: the call to repent is urgent, the consequences for one's soul momentous, and the path to salvation otherworldly. The true Christian accords little ultimate significance to the mundane matters that fill the time leading up to the final judgment.

Santayana claims that Christianity (like Judaism and paganism before it) rests on a "supernatural physics" (*WD,* 23).[24] It requires belief in the existence of a higher power outside the forces of nature and allows that the "destiny which nature seems to prepare for us may be reversed… by an actual historical, physical transformation in the things themselves" (*WD,* 23). "While the church lives at all," he says, "it must live on the strength" of its "supernaturalism, [its] literal realism, [its] other-worldliness" (*WD,* 26).

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[23] *The Letters of George Santayana* [hereafter *LGS*] 2:111.

[24] Though nothing in his critique of modernism turns on it, it cannot be overlooked that in this essay Santayana betrays a view of Judaism that, as his biographer puts it, reflects a "prejudice unworthy of a man of his fineness in other matters, and scarcely comprehensible in the man who wrote *The Life of Reason* and *Realms of Being*" (John McCormick, *George Santayana: A Biography* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987], 359).

According to Santayana, this commitment to supernaturalism poses an inescapable dilemma for the church and its practitioners. To the extent that Christianity renounces the world and remains focused on purely spiritual pursuits, it lacks the means to effect change in the material world. On the other hand, to the extent it develops the capacity to bring about material change, it must, as an earthly institution, pursue the very sort of mundane interests it is pledged to renounce. In every age the church risks being corrupted by the tools it devises to promote itself and it is in its attempt to reconcile concern for supernatural salvation with concern for its survival as a worldly institution that the modernist debate is engaged.

As Santayana sees it, modernism does not represent a new way of thinking. It is driven by the same critical spirit that inspired the Renaissance and the emergence of Protestantism. Like thinkers of the Renaissance, modernists appeal to secular, rational standards of knowledge to scrutinize church dogma. For example, they view scriptures as historical documents the content of which is conditioned by the age in which they were produced and Biblical stories—such as the accounts of the incarnation and resurrection of Christ—as allegories, rather than literal records of events. Santayana has no quarrel with this approach to the critique of church dogma. Nor does he take issue with the conclusions to which it leads. For him, Christianity is important not because it is a true history or metaphysics. Its importance lies in its "*moral idealism*," "the expression it gives, under cover of legends, prophecies, or mysteries, of the effort, the tragedy, and the consolations of human life" (*WD,* 33).

What Santayana thinks modernists fail to see is that their attempt to divorce the Christian account of the past from Christianity's call for salvation and their rejection of God as an active force in the universe is "a *fundamental apostasy*" (*WD,* 23). In denying literal truth to Biblical lore, modernists end up replacing the traditional notion of sin with that of mere misfortune, rejecting revelation as a source of connection to a supernatural being, and undermining the urgency of the call to salvation by denying the reality of the final judgment. On the modernist view, the moral summons and prophecy of destruction that form "the soul of the gospel have lost all force... and become fables" (*WD,* 33). Christianity is reduced to a mere practice or convention. However much modernists claim to stay true to Catholicism, Santayana thinks they end up unable to believe any part of it "as it demands to be believed" (*WD,* 32).

In light of this, Santayana finds it unsurprising that modernism was condemned as heresy (in an encyclical by Pius X in 1907) and its leaders excommunicated. What is mystifying, he thinks, is that such learned scholars as the modernists were could have been so ignorant as to think their views consonant with Catholic doctrine. Santayana allows that modernists have an uncompromising respect for historical facts and a sincere need to revitalize their faith but he observes that, as Catholics, they are also bound to uphold a fixed creed that overlaps and even contradicts secular history, science, and philosophy. Modernism is a precarious position, Santayana insists, because these two tendencies pull in opposite directions.

Santayana argues that how one assigns relative probabilities to Biblical and secular accounts of history depends in part on one's own spiritual experience. To the true Christian, miracles seem anything but far-fetched and indeed are confirmed by the testimony of those that have borne witness to them, if not by one's own experience. Rather than follow modernists in debunking Biblical accounts of history and explaining miracles away, the true Christian is apt to challenge and explain away the modernist's disregard of the wealth of evidence for miracles provided through direct testimony. To reject miracles, as modernists do, on the grounds that they violate laws of nature, belief in which rests on our ability to predict and control events, is to appeal to non-Christian standards of evidence, standards that are rooted in practical and scientific knowledge rather than Biblical testimony or revelation. The true Christian sets aside this sort of profane knowledge precisely because it contradicts the revealed word of God and the supernatural physics that are the cornerstone of the faith. Christianity, Santayana insists, was never a religion for rationalists, having at its core a certain alienation from the world—the world disclosed by historians and scientists included. It thus remains stalwart in the face of any challenges based on secular learning in history and natural science that modernists offer.

Santayana attributes the modernists' blindness to their own heresy to their seminary training. Lacking knowledge of other religions with which to compare Catholicism, modernists failed to see what is essential to their faith. Moreover, having been taught in seminary that anything good or true is founded in the Catholic faith, the modernists naively assumed that all sincere religious inspiration points in the same direction. Faced with diverse interpretations of religious dogma, modernists opted to stretch traditional church teachings to accommodate differences rather than interpreting them strictly and rejecting alternative renderings as erroneous or heretical. This approach led the modernists to stray, not only from the teachings of the Catholic Church, but also from the doctrines that are essential to Christianity. At the end of the day, Santayana thinks, the modernists, however unwittingly, ended up as no more than “freethinker[s], with a sympathetic interest in religious illusions” (*WD,* 31) who purge religion of “its first principles, of its whole history, and of its sublime if chimerical ideal” (*WD,* 33).

Does the fact that church doctrine flies in the face of history, philosophy, and science doom it to irrelevance and extinction as the modernist fears? Santayana thinks not. He reckons that people alienated from life in this world will continue to be drawn to the Christian promise of salvation in the next. He also thinks that in the current age people are open to any sort of superstition and faith and are aided and abetted in this by philosophers who question the objectivity of science and history.

In the end, then, Santayana rejects the modernist view that the Catholic Church is necessarily weakened by its resistance to the intellectual currents of the age. Intellectual fashions come and go and while Santayana agrees it would be dishonest to insist on the literal truth of the Bible, he thinks it foolish to suppose that what is incredible to the contemporary mind could not some day prove edifying. “The imagination is suggestible and there is nothing men will not believe in matters of religion” (*WD,* 36). Science and history tell us something about the way the world is apart from us; however, Santayana believes, people’s experience of the vanity of the world, of sin and salvation, even of so-called miracles, is far more powerful and influential on their beliefs. Catholicism may be only one faith among many and beset with difficulties but it still offers advantages to its followers in the way of “charm,” “comprehensiveness,” “maturity,” “internal rationality,” and “external adaptability” (*WD,* 37). Thus there is no reason to doubt that people will be attracted to it in the future. The sole hope of the church, he advises, lies in retaining its “frank supernaturalism” and “tight clericalism” (*WD,* 37). To embrace modernism would be suicide for the church since modernism "concedes that everything in Christianity, as Christians hold it, is an illusion" (*WD,* 37).

III ~ The Philosophy of M. Henri Bergson

While Santayana rejects the modernist's response to the conflict between the industrial and Christian worldviews that he thinks besets contemporary culture, he does not reject the modernist critique of Christianity. He agrees with modernists that Christianity is false when taken as an account of historical events or the workings of nature and thinks any significance Christian teachings have is moral in nature, deriving from the meaningfulness of the conception of human life it promotes. Having intimated in his first essay that there is much to be said for the spiritual outlook of Christianity when compared to that of industrial civilization, he sets out in the third essay of *Winds of Doctrine* to examine in greater depth the philosophical views associated with industrial culture, views of which he thinks Henri Bergson's writings are "the most representative" (*WD,* 39).

When Santayana first read Bergson's work he was very much impressed. However, after meeting him, sometime in 1906–7, Santayana dramatically reversed his opinion. As he explains:

> I thought him a great man, one of those whom we admire without feeling called upon to agree or disagree, since they seem to be above controversy, like the poets. But when I saw Bergson, and felt what his inspiration was, that he was a little cowed advocate of irrational prejudices and stubborn misunderstandings, feigning and acting the part of an impartial, subtle, liberal thinker – then all the charm vanished even from his written words, and I hear the cracked voice of the sectary and the whine of the reactionary in every syllable. (*LGS*, 1:378)

Despite his low opinion of Bergson's work, Santayana seems to have devoted considerable attention to it, the essay in *Winds of Doctrine* having been culled from "reams" he had written on the subject (*LGS*, 2:111). While he appears to have second-guessed the essay's strident tone, he seems not to have doubted its cogency. He writes:

> Benda's capital book on Bergson…relieved me of all my qualms about my essay, which I feared might seem too severe.[25] When I read now some newspaper accounts of [Bergson's] visit to America...

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[25] Julien Benda, *Le Bergsonisme ou une philosophie de la mobilité* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1912).

> I begin to fear on the contrary that I have taken him too seriously. But the best way of discrediting a charlatan is perhaps not to call him one. (*LGS*, 2:128)

Bergson's thought defies simple summary. However, to appreciate Santayana's discussion two elements of it must be understood. The first is his view of the nature and limits of conceptual knowledge. The second is his reliance on immediate experience as a model for understanding reality.

Bergson distinguishes between discursive or symbolic knowledge – such as that provided by positive science – and intuition – for him, the stock and trade of metaphysics. Symbolic knowledge is relative – it provides an understanding of objects that is conventional, partial, and fashioned to serve some practical interest. Mechanics, for example, is conventional because it represents bodies using an agreed-upon frame of reference and a coordinate system for identifying the various positions in space. It is partial because it considers only those aspects of things relevant to calculating their motions and ignores everything else. It is practical since the aspects of reality it considers are singled out in light of an interest in predicting and controlling objects to satisfy needs and desires. In the final analysis, Bergson insists, every application of a concept characterizes what we are to do with some object or what that object may do for us.

Intuition, on the other hand, provides knowledge of things as they are in themselves, rather than as interpreted selectively through conventional forms of representation designed with practical interests in mind. Intuitive knowledge is absolute, rather than relative, since it discloses the intrinsic nature of things – what they are like apart from any connection to other things. It is gained, not by subsuming objects under concepts, as symbolic knowledge is, but rather by identifying with objects. As Bergson explains:

> By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols. (*IM,* 7)

To illustrate the distinction between symbolic knowledge—what he calls "analysis" in the passage just quoted—and intuition, Bergson contrasts knowledge of a character in a novel gained by reading the author's portrayal and the intuitive understanding of this same character gained through "intellectual sympathy." As he sees it, the former is deficient in at least three respects. First, since there is no limit to the conceivable traits of a human being, any description of the character is bound to be incomplete. Second, no description can convey the character's innermost essence. Being couched in general concepts, a description can only reveal traits the character possesses as a result of her connections to other things. To describe her as tall is to say how she stands compared to other people with respect to height, to say she is ebullient is to liken her to people with a certain energy and enthusiasm and to contrast her with people lacking such qualities, and likewise for any such characterization. In describing what the character is like in relation to other things, the author's portrayal fails to convey what she is inherently. Finally, Bergson thinks the author's description represents the life of the character as a series of discrete states—certain things are said to be true of her at some times and other things true of her at other times—and no collection of such states can capture the "duration" of her life (*IM,* 3–6).

"Duration," among the most difficult and fundamental of Bergson's technical concepts, connotes a continuous, evolving consciousness. Such consciousness involves the unfolding of an inner impulse, but in ways that are neither governed by fixed laws, as in mechanics, nor directed to fixed ends as final causes. The duration of the life of a character in a novel eludes description because it is concrete and particular, rather than abstract or general; dynamic, rather than static; continuous, rather than a series of discrete states; and independent of relations to things external to her. Being ineffable, duration is only grasped intuitively—by imaginatively projecting oneself into the character's stream of consciousness.

For Bergson, intuition is not only a method for understanding lived experience but also the proper route to knowledge in metaphysics. As it is intuited, duration is "the foundation of our being… the very substance of the world in which we live."[26] In the universe, duration involves the playing out of a cosmic impetus, or *élan vital.* This impetus is unfathomable in scientific terms, not least because its inner nature defies conceptual understanding. Still, Bergson claims, it is immanent in evolution—the progression from what is vague, homogeneous and simple to what is definite, diverse, and complex—and in the emergence of forms of being that are novel in the sense that they are not merely the result of the reconfiguration of antecedent elements, as mechanics would compel us to view them.

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[26] Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* [hereafter *CE*], trans. Arthur Mitchell (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975), 45.

In his essay, Santayana portrays Bergson as an anti-intellectual whose views are rooted in prejudice and confusion, rather than honest reflection about knowledge or reality. He takes issue with Bergson's reliance on intuitive knowledge as a basis from which to challenge the claims of science and common sense to know a world that is independent of experience. What is more, he scorns Bergson's use of intuitive knowledge as a foundation for metaphysics, accusing him of trading in pseudo-explanations and falsely projecting a conception of the meaning of life into the structure of the universe.

Santayana begins by suggesting that Bergson's notoriety is due more to the style of his writing than its substance. While Bergson talks at great length about the latest developments in science, Santayana claims he does so as an outsider—as someone suspicious of science and concerned to limit its reach, rather than as someone committed to its advance. Santayana attributes at least part of Bergson's failure to consider science in its own terms to his belief that evolution is progressive. He thinks Bergson (among others) slides from the undeniable claim that later things grow out of earlier ones to the patently false claim that later things are an improvement on what they emerge from. This error leads Bergson to view past ideas as significant only insofar as they anticipate contemporary views and to deny to thinkers of earlier times the same capacity for knowledge that he claims for himself. Bergson's view of progress imposes a deceptive narrative on the history of ideas and reduces questions about the worth of ideas to questions of their chronological order. Against this view, Santayana insists that it is the approach to truth—timeless and eternal—that determines the value of developments in the evolution of thought, not the place of ideas in the evolution of thought that determines the degree to which they approach the truth.

Santayana next claims that Bergson's views about science are tainted by his resistance to the notion that human beings are a small and insignificant part of a vast, impersonal, mechanical universe. The suggestion is that the sense of alienation Bergson derives from the mechanical view of nature drives his efforts to reconceive the universe in terms he finds more congenial—terms drawn from experience as it is immediately felt or lived. Santayana insists, however, that to impute any conception of the meaning of life to contemporary mathematical physics is to attribute to it "pretensions and extensions which it does not have" (*WD,* 43). In affirming that the laws of matter apply to everything in the universe, physicists do not claim that the ontology of physics exhausts reality. Nor in uncovering the material conditions of events and formulating precise laws to predict their occurrence do they imply that only those features of the world that figure in their calculations are real. Physics does not show that it is pointless or empty to reflect on and pursue ideals that lack grounding in our knowledge of the physical world. Nor is it an indictment of physical theory to maintain that there are such things as truth, beauty and goodness, love, art, music, and poetry about which physics has little, if anything, to say. Santayana thinks physicists can even grant Bergson's point that the freedom one experiences as an agent cannot be captured in scientific terms—precisely because it is an immediate feeling, rather than a relation among events of the sort that physics studies. As Santayana sees it, then, nothing in physics legitimates (or, for that matter, repudiates) the sort of ennui Bergson is concerned to avoid.

Bergson's view of mathematics is, according to Santayana, no less misguided than his view of physics. He is wary of mathematics in part because he takes its application in natural science to imply that the course of events is precisely determined by fixed laws, rather than evolving in ways that allow for creative redirection. However, Bergson fails to appreciate that if mathematics has proven useful in predicting the order of events, it is because events in the world really do unfold in calculable ways. Moreover, in claiming that mathematics subserves our interest in predicting and controlling events, Santayana thinks Bergson misses its true importance. Mathematicians, he insists, study ideal possibilities without regard for their application in science and life. In discovering new possibilities, mathematics expands the horizons of thought, rather than boxing it in, as Bergson suggests.

When discussing natural history and biology, Santayana thinks Bergson is right to observe that phenomena such as growth, reproduction, and nutrition are not easily explained by mechanical principles—not least because they are irreversible, unlike mechanical processes. But rather than drawing attention to these phenomena with a view to improving our scientific understanding of them, Bergson cites them in an effort to show that scientific understanding of them is impossible. Such a view, Santayana maintains, blocks intellectual progress. Instead of explaining these phenomena by appeal to processes that are well understood, Bergson mystifies them by attributing them to the "magic power of the *élan vital*"– an inscrutable agency that is not only inherently unpredictable but also far more obscure than the phenomena it is invoked to explain (*WD,* 45).

It is important to note that while he rejects Bergson's views about science, Santayana does not simply dismiss his contrast between conceptual understanding and intuition. To the contrary, he grants that it is an important distinction to note. Were Bergson only to be making the point that in the absence of conceptual interpretation immediate experience lacks cognitive significance and that, as a result, our conceptions of the natural world are nothing more than conjectures, Santayana would have no complaint. What he finds wrong-headed is Bergson's suggestion that inasmuch as science goes beyond immediate experience and claims to reveal something of what nature is like apart from appearances it is false and needs to be supplemented, perhaps supplanted, by a metaphysics grounded in intuition.

It is also important to recognize that Santayana does not reject Bergson's views simply because they cannot be squared with the mechanical explanations offered in physics. He grants that it is legitimate to question whether the laws governing biological phenomena can be subsumed under the laws of physics or whether, instead, they are autonomous. However, he thinks this question is very different from the question of whether *élan vital* is a legitimate explanatory notion. On Bergson's view, *élan vital* is a non-mechanical life force, one that cannot be subsumed under physical laws. In invoking it to account for biological phenomena, Santayana thinks Bergson denies the continuity between the physical and the biological and treats life as "an alien and ghostly madness descending into [material being]," rather than as an effect of material conditions (*WD,* 48). Bergson does not merely counsel caution in the face of overconfidence about the explanatory power of mechanics, as defenders of vitalism in biology do. He sets out to preempt the scientific understanding of life altogether. Unable to accept that he and his fellow creatures are material systems in a material world, Bergson jumps to the view that everything is a center of passion and sensation with which he can sympathetically identify. The result, according to Santayana, is an anthropomorphic view of nature better suited to Aesop's fables than a serious treatise.

Santayana does not deny that the method of imaginative sympathy that Bergson defends as a means to intuitive knowledge can yield important insights. He thinks it reasonable, for example, to discern other people's feelings or experiences by reflecting on one's own reactions in similar circumstances. However, he thinks this method is productive only where the knower and the known are significantly similar. Where there are vast differences of culture, for example, conclusions arrived at by intuition are apt to reveal more about the person straining to understand than the subjects he or she is seeking to comprehend. When it comes to applying the method to other species or to inorganic objects, Santayana thinks it stretches credulity past the breaking point to suppose that the conclusions Bergson comes to tell us much of anything about the world. If people find Bergson's account of the universe compelling, Santayana suggests, it is only because it is couched in terms that, having been drawn from immediate experience, have a familiar feel, not because they are rooted in the inner workings of things.

Taken as a contribution to subjective psychology, on the other hand, Santayana thinks Bergson's account of immediate experience is insightful. He grants, for example, that sensuous daydreams manifest the fluidity, continuity, and indeterminacy characteristic of duration and freedom, as Bergson understands these terms. He likewise thinks the experience of shooting pains and intestinal movements exemplifies the sort of continuity that Bergson insists cannot be represented spatially (since it does not involve a change of place within a homogeneous field comprising discrete points). And he agrees with Bergson that consciousness comes in "stretches," or "æsthetic wholes"—like "snatches of melody"— that "we should never be aware of anything were we not aware of something all at once" (*WD,* 53). But, unlike Bergson, Santayana sees nothing in such experiences to give science pause. He thinks it is one thing to reflect on unconceptualized experience and note how undetermined and fluid it is, quite another to deny that such experience has material conditions amenable to scientific explanation. In noting that immediate experience is unpredictable, that its flow is prior to what moves in it, that it lacks any separation between perceptions and the objects of perception, Santayana thinks Bergson makes a legitimate contribution to our understanding of animal sensibility. Bergson's mistakes arise from his taking ruminations on subjective experience to reveal the structure of the universe and dismissing any conception of the world that goes beyond immediate appearance as fictional.

To highlight the confusion underlying Bergson's way of proceeding, Santayana considers his discussion of creative writing. He applauds Bergson's characterization of the experience of a writer who projects herself into the lives of her characters and finds herself carried along by the internal momentum of the story she is crafting – "heighten the tone a little, and you might have a poem on those joyful pangs of gestation and parturition" (*WD,* 56). Yet, he insists, this characterization is a "literary confession," not serious science, relying as it does on data of introspection that are "casual and superficial" (*WD,* 56). Writers do not always strain to identify with their subject matter. The way they weave together the strands of their narratives, far from being inexplicable, is *post hoc* traceable to the "sensuous endowment of the literary man, his moral complexion, and his general circumstances" (*WD,* 56). Nor is there any reason to suppose the momentum writers sometimes experience to be anything other than the "discharge of many automatisms long imprinted on the system" (*WD,* 56). While Santayana thinks it hard to deny that Shakespeare, for example, planted himself in the lives of characters like Antony and Cleopatra – in the sense that he drew on historical information, imagined himself in their situation, and tried to make out their feelings – he thinks the suggestion that Shakespeare literally entered into their psyches to be nothing short of fantastic. "Here again,… we have … a piece of really wonderful introspection, spoiled by being projected into a theory of nature, which it spoils in its turn" (*WD,* 57).

Santayana recognizes that his criticisms draw on common sense and science, appeals that are apt to be unpersuasive given Bergson's insistence that in philosophy ineffable experience trumps discursive knowledge. He is well aware that Bergson views talk of a world outside the totality of possible experience as unintelligible and takes it to imply empty and pernicious dualisms between appearance and reality, between the heart (i.e., lived experience) and the head (i.e., the world of facts as it is rendered intellectually). However, Santayana makes clear that he speaks only as a proponent of the life of reason, his point being that from this point of view Bergson's deference to immediate experience over the intellect countenances immersion in dreams and delusions (i.e., appearances) at the expense of understanding. Unable to defend reason in other than intellectual terms, Santayana says, "All a critic can aim at is to understand these sentiments [behind Bergson's views] as existing facts, and to give them the place that belongs to them in the moral world" (*WD,* 59).

Having clarified his own critical standpoint, Santayana turns his attention to the model of evolution that Bergson advances. As he sees it, Bergson's view of evolution as the progressive development of complexity and heterogeneity out of simplicity and homogeneity is a metaphysical dogma. While granting that any account of the origins of things is speculative, Santayana considers it rash to conjecture on the basis of intuition that nature is ever simple—given that it is wider and richer than both our experience of it and our capacity to divine its structure. Bergson, he charges, moves from the fact that immediate experience lacks any inherent complexity (i.e., discriminated parts) and contains no clues as to the causal mechanisms that give rise to it to the view that complexity in the universe has evolved from a primal state in which it is utterly absent. Santayana's objection to this is not easy to make out but what he seems to suggest is that it is hard to fathom what there is in a purely homogeneous state that could give rise to complexity—how, that is, the primal state Bergson posits has the power to produce what, being homogenous, it does not contain, imply, or foreshadow. "Doubtless new things are always arising… but that the real cause of them should be simpler than they, that their Creator, if I may use this language, should be ignorant and give more than he has, who can stomach that?" (*WD,* 59–60).

On Bergson's view, complex forms of being emerge creatively (i.e., non-deterministically) through the interaction of *élan vital* and inert matter that resists and opposes it. But Santayana wonders why complexity should be expected to emerge from interactions of this sort. To say that it is simply a law that things progress from the simple to the complex is to restate what needs explaining, not to explain it. On the other hand, to account for the evolution of complexity by invoking a set of conditions from which it might plausibly be thought to emerge would be to show it to be a natural process, not the result of forces outside or beyond nature. Santayana acknowledges that it is presumptuous to suppose scientific knowledge is ultimate, if by this it is meant that science represents reality as it is inherently and apart from us. He thinks this because he sees no good reason to think the nature of reality is limited by, or mirrored in, forms of human understanding. However, he sees no reason to follow Bergson in claiming that scientific explanations are nothing more than useful tools and that they are in need of supplementation by metaphysics. For him, a scientific explanation is ultimate to the extent that it accounts for phenomena in ways that cannot be improved upon. All explanations come to an end and Santayana thinks any stopping point involves a connection between the phenomena being explained and their antecedent conditions. "If atoms and their collisions, by any chance, were the ultimate and inmost facts discoverable, they would supply the explanation of everything, in the only sense in which anything existent can be explained at all" (*WD,* 60). Just as it would not deepen our understanding of atoms to attribute their behavior to an underlying Will to collide in certain ways (or to the Will of God, for that matter), so too it does not deepen our understanding to follow Bergson in attributing evolution to an underlying cosmic life force.

To drive home his point, Santayana considers Bergson's discussion of the evolution of the eye. On Bergson's reading, Darwinian evolution occurs by accidental variations, some of which become pervasive and others of which disappear through the mechanism of natural selection. He thinks the odds of two independent series of accidental changes producing one and the same complex structure are astronomically long. Yet both vertebrates and mollusks have eyes, even though they have no common ancestors with vision. After rejecting as implausible the hypothesis that the eye emerged by a sudden leap, rather than by a gradual accumulation of small modifications, and also the hypothesis that the eye is created by the impingement of light on various organisms, Bergson concludes that the evolution of eyes cannot be explained as a confluence of material causes and must instead be attributed to an organizing principle—*élan vital*—working on and through matter.[27]

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[27] Bergson writes: "The more we reflect upon it, the more we shall see that this production of the same effect by two different accumulations of an enormous number of small causes is contrary to the principles of mechanistic philosophy… Every moment, right before our eyes, nature arrives at identical results, in sometimes neighboring species, by entirely different embryogenic

In countering this argument, Santayana urges that even if Bergson has the facts right, all that can reasonably be concluded is that eyes can be formed in different ways, just as puddles of water are formed both by rain and underground springs. Explaining the emergence of eyes in mollusks and vertebrates by appeal to a tendency to evolve vision is, for him, akin to invoking a tendency to evolve puddles to explain the various ways water pools. Even if no satisfactory scientific account of the emergence of eyes in mollusks and vertebrates were forthcoming, Santayana insists, Bergson's appeal to *élan vital* would no more be vindicated than the failure to uncover precise laws of weather vindicates the appeal to Neptune and Aeolus as the causes of storms. To attribute phenomena to *élan vital* is not to explain them but rather to accept them as the brute and arbitrary effects of a brute and arbitrary force.

Not only does Bergson fail to shed light on the question of how eyes came to be, Santayana adds, he raises a host of speculative questions: how does *élan vital* determine its end, how does it conceive of it in advance of attaining it, how does it select the means by which its end is achieved, and how does it act on and through matter without itself being material? In the absence of answers to such questions, Santayana thinks appeal to *élan vital* "illustrates the worst and most familiar vices of metaphysics. It marvels at some appearance, not to investigate it, but to give it an unctuous name. Then it turns this name into a power, that by its operation creates the appearance. This is simply verbal mythology or the hypostasis of words, and there would be some excuse for a rude person who should call it rubbish" (*WD,* 61–62).

Santayana considers Bergson's penchant for invoking traits of immediate experience to explain phenomena, instead of viewing them as in need of explanation, an abuse of psychology in metaphysics. He sees this sort of error as endemic to the Kantian tendency to discount the distinction between things as they are experienced or judged to be and things as they are in themselves apart from experience or judgment. Santayana recognizes the difficulty of persuading post-Kantian idealists that there is a world entirely independent of mind. Any examples of mind-independent objects that might be offered—hands, molecules, Ancient Greece, natural numbers no one has counted—are

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processes" (*CE,* 83–84). Thus, he adds: "Whether we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle in order to account for this convergence of effects" (*CE,* 85).

all too easily construed by idealists as things falling within the realm of possible experience and, as such, not truly independent of the mind. However, Santayana thinks such construals involve an illicit slide from the legitimate claim that knowledge of objects is rooted in experience to the dubious ontological claim that objects known through experience are parts of experience. Such a view is a counterintuitive combination of skepticism—the denial that things as they are apart from us can be known—and the claim that talk of things as they are is nothing more than talk of things as they are experienced or judged to be.

It might seem that Bergson sidesteps Santayana's critique of Kantian philosophy, since he views idealism and realism as rooted in a single error. According to him, idealists and realists agree that realism implies a world that is the way it is whether or not we can discover or describe it correctly. The difference is that idealists deny this concept of reality legitimately applies to the objects that we know and hold instead that all we take to be real is comprised of this or that bit of experience. Bergson thinks he can avoid both idealism and realism by holding that one and the same metaphysical tendency manifests itself as a world of subjective experience, on the one hand, and as a world of material objects set over against subjective experience, on the other. Rather than viewing mind and world as separate and independent domains of being, as realists and idealists traditionally have done, Bergson views them as different configurations of one and the same primal stuff—pure experience. On this view, idealists are right (and realists wrong) that there is no world beyond pure experience. However, realists are right (and idealists wrong) that objects exist outside, and independently of, the experience of individual knowers.

For Santayana, Bergson's resolution of the question of realism and idealism is a cheat. As he sees it, Bergson's account of the emergence of mind and matter out of pure experience is nothing more than a psychological explanation of how, given immediate experience, a mind might come to know the difference between mind and matter. Even if Bergson's account is true as a matter of psychology, Santayana thinks it cannot be taken to shed light on the nature of mind and matter without regarding the processes of knowing as somehow constitutive of the objects known. For Bergson, the contrast of mind and world remains a distinction between kinds of experiences, rather than between experience and what it is experience of. Moreover, Santayana insists that the pure experience with which Bergson identifies the world presupposes a mind in which such experience occurs. Bergson thus remains committed to idealism despite his protestations to the contrary.

Santayana acknowledges that Bergson's idealism differs from earlier versions inasmuch as he views the world of pure experience as a world in process—as something coming into being, rather than wrought once and for all according to timeless principles. However, he sees tensions in this view that Bergson does not consider. If (following William James) one stresses the temporal dimensions of Bergson's view of reality—the fact that reality unfolds—then one will build a metaphysics by tracing the consequences of the view that the universe is flux. If, on the other hand, one focuses on the immediacy of the experience out of which everything is constituted (as Bergson himself seems to), then one is forced to reduce the flux (i.e., the flow from past to future) to what is present (i.e., to the present image of what is past and the present anticipation of what is future). This latter view, far from being novel, harkens back to Plotinus's conception of the One and to Spinoza's notion of substance.

"Nor," according to Santayana, "is this the only point at which [Bergson's] philosophy … drops its mask of novelty and shows us a familiar face" (*WD,* 64). For all its alleged openness and indeterminacy, evolution, on Bergson's view, remains subject to certain constraints: it must create things in sequence, not all at once; unfold in only one sequence, not in all possible sequences at the same time; and proceed in a definite direction, rather than jumping incoherently from moment to moment or reversing itself. In traditional religion, these features of evolution would be traced to a supernatural deity and Santayana wonders if there are not religious motives behind Bergson's work—the implication being that it is Bergson's spiritual values that drive his conception of the facts, not the other way around.

Santayana rounds out his discussion of Bergson's philosophy by examining its implications for ethics. Although Bergson had not yet written on the subject when *Winds of Doctrine* appeared, Santayana thinks a system of ethics is implicit in the model of evolution he defends. As Santayana sees it, the view that *élan vital* unfolds freely and progressively implies that living things have a duty to persevere, labor, experiment, and propagate. They are also obliged to exercise their absolute freedom—their independence from antecedent causes—to act in ways that are continuous with, and hence loyal to, the past. Santayana considers this view to be ill-founded—since it is a normative view that is purported to be grounded in physical facts—and, even confused, inasmuch as it defines the ultimate good in terms of what unfolds in the future, rather than what is timeless and eternal. Still, philosophical foundations aside, he thinks it a view of ethics worthy of careful examination.

In evaluating Bergson's ethics, Santayana focuses on what it has to say about death. If, as Bergson claims, *élan vital* is the origin of all being, then matter is merely a manifestation of living experience—one of the ways the primordial life force expresses itself—and not a condition of the existence of life. On such a view, Santayana argues, there is nothing outside of or opposed to the life force that could bring life to an end. Santayana finds this view implausible, taking it to be obvious that there are genuine material threats to life. He observes, moreover, that on Bergson's account of evolution it is only in the face of inert obstacles that impede the life force that new and increasingly complex entities come into being. Given Bergson's claim that the material world is nothing more than a useful tool, it would seem to follow from this that any individual center of consciousness can be extinguished only through the creative efforts of other centers of consciousness who are pursuing their own interests in an effort to further *élan vital*. On this view, "Each mind sucks the world, so far as it can, into its own vortex… The one that succeeds in ruling that movement will live on; the other[s], I suppose, will die" (*WD,* 67). *Élan vital* carries on in whichever form of life wins out in the struggle among centers of consciousness and each death is to be viewed as worthwhile inasmuch as it prepares the way for the more advanced forms of life that emerge from it. Just as the death of grass makes possible the life of the sheep that eats it, the death of the sheep makes possible the life of the humans who eat it. But on this line of thinking, Santayana argues, it follows that if there should emerge a form of life more complex than human beings whose continuation requires the extinction of the human race, Bergson would have to view the destruction of humanity as right and good.

In addition to finding his ethical vision unpalatable, Santayana argues that Bergson has contradictory views concerning the prospects for human immortality. On one hand, Bergson's model of biological evolution precludes the immortality of individuals. On that view, *élan vital* persists throughout evolution – and is thus immortal – but only as something wholly general and undifferentiated. The centers of consciousness through which *élan vital* is carried forward are individual only as a result of being tied to a material body – something with a specific location in space and time, a definite set of sensory modalities, particular practical needs, all of which constitute its particular perspective on the world. Since individuality resides only in material conditions that *élan vital* continually leaves behind, it is impossible for an individual center of consciousness to be immortal.

On the other hand, Santayana thinks Bergson's discussion of *élan vital* in metaphysics allows for the possibility of individual immortality. On this view, *élan vital* is not a principle that operates in opposition to matter. It is rather the source of all being – organic and inorganic. If *élan vital* gives rise to centers of consciousness attached to material bodies, it must be because it is destined to do so from the start, there being nothing outside the life force to account for it. But there is nothing in the bare idea of *élan vital* working its way through individual centers of consciousness to preclude the immortality of individuals, so long as the bodily form necessary for a center of conscious to be individual also persists.

Santayana thinks Bergson fails to adhere consistently to either of these two views of immortality. He does not (and Santayana thinks cannot plausibly) preach the immortality of the body, as he must on the metaphysical view of *élan vital* – the view that allows immortality is possible. But neither does he abandon the idea of personal immortality, as he must if he adheres to the biological conception of *élan vital*. To the contrary, Bergson says "the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death" (*CE,* 295). Thus Bergson has no consistent position on immortality.

In closing his essay, Santayana condemns Bergson's work as nothing more than an assault on understanding rooted in a misguided love of primitive illusions (i.e., uninterpreted appearances). He attributes the favorable reception of Bergson's work to a widespread suspicion of science and the intellect more generally, and a propensity – especially prominent among those engaged in commerce – to subordinate intellectual interests to practical concerns. However well suited to the times Bergson's ideas may be, Santayana insists they lack an adequate foundation.

IV ~ The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell

Having dispatched the philosophy he associates with the emerging industrial culture, Santayana turns his attention in his next essay to what he considers to be a more constructive line of thought – the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. In "The Intellectual Temper of the Age," Santayana portrayed Russell as a defender of reason, swimming against the rising tide of pragmatism. In "The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell" he uses Russell's work as a jumping-off point to develop his own ideas. His discussion is of interest, not only for the light it sheds on the development of his thought, but also for its impact on Russell, who says "It was Santayana's criticism (in *Winds of Doctrine*) that caused me to abandon the belief in the objectivity of 'good'…," after which he embraced the view that value claims express subjective attitudes and preferences.[28]

Except for the opening paragraphs, which are new, the essay is a reprint of a three-part review of Russell's *Problems of Philosophy* and *Philosophical Essays* published in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods.*[29] Santayana's discussion is the culmination of conversations with Russell, and to a lesser extent G. E. Moore, dating back to 1896–97 when Santayana spent a sabbatical year in Cambridge.[30] Until about 1914, Santayana met regularly with Russell and Moore, finding them to be very helpful interlocutors. Their "views are near enough to mine to be stimulating to me, while the fact that they live in an atmosphere of controversy (which for myself I hate) renders them keenly alive to all sorts of objections and pitfalls which I need to be warned of, in my rather solitary and un-checked reasonings" (*LGS*, 2:95). Russell, he wrote, "is a logician and mathematician, strong where I am weakest, so that it is not always easy for us to understand each other… However, we feel sympathy even in our diversity" (*LGS*, 2:145).[31]

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[28] Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Santayana" (*PGS,* 470). Nicholas Griffin questions Russell's claim, citing a letter written in 1912 – before *Winds of Doctrine* appeared – in which he seems to favor an emotivist theory of ethics. Given that Santayana's review appeared in 1911 and Russell knew of it, the letter cited by Griffin is consistent with Russell's recollection. See Nicholas Griffin (ed.), *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I: The Private Years 1884–1914* [hereafter *SLBR*] (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 412.

[29] See George Santayana, "Russell's Philosophical Essays," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 8, nos. 3, 5, and 16 (1911): 57–63, 113–24, and 421–32, respectively.

[30] Santayana and Russell met in 1896, Russell having urged his brother Frank, with whom Santayana was good friends, to make the introduction. Later that year Russell wrote, "Santayana is really a nice person, genuinely cultivated through and through: Logan liked him very much, and so did I. His drawbacks are laziness and a tendency to aesthetic sentimentality" (*SLBR*, 175). Much later, Russell claimed to have "admired him [Santayana] as much as I disagreed with him" (*The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 1, 1872–1914* [Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951], 347), though in 1906 he wrote that he found "[Santayana's] temperament very repulsive" (*SLBR*, 300).

Santayana had already expressed much the same attitude directly to Russell when informing him of his forthcoming review:

> It is rather late to thank you for your "Philosophical Essays", but you may soon see unmistakable evidence of the great interest I have taken in them, as I am writing an elaborate review…You will not expect me to agree with you in everything, but, whatever you may think of my ideas, I always feel that yours, and Moore's too, make for the sort of reconstruction in philosophy which I should welcome. It is a great bond to dislike the same things, and dislike is perhaps a deeper indication of our real nature than explicit affections, since

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For his part, Santayana found Russell on first meeting to be "very clever and nice" (*LGS*, 1:168). Years later he wrote: "There is a strange mixture in [Russell], as in his brother, of great ability and great disability; prodigious capacity and brilliancy here – astonishing unconsciousness and want of perception there. They are like creatures of a species somewhat different from man" (*LGS*, 2:172). Santayana's respect for Russell persisted long after their working relationship ended. Upon learning that Russell had fallen on hard times, Santayana came to his financial aid, calling Russell "a perfectly ideal incumbent for that Fellowship [i.e., the pension Santayana paid him]… old and almost penniless, but still brimming with undimmed genius and suppressed immortal work's! [*sic*]" (*LGS*, 6:53). "I don't agree with him in politics or in philosophy," Santayana noted, "yet we are good intellectual friends" (*LGS*, 6:54). Commenting on his own largesse, Santayana wrote, "in one sense, no doubt, it is generous: but we are dealing with superior people and with work that may go down in history: somebody said in public not long ago that there were only three important names in the history of British Philosophy: Locke, Hume, & Russell. As to my own part in the matter, I make no sacrifice: *je ne me prive de rien*; and, except on paper, I sha'n't know the difference" (*LGS*, 6:61). Santayana counted Russell among the three best-educated people he had ever known (Santayana, *Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography* [hereafter *PP*], The Works of George Santayana, vol. 1, ed. William Holzberger and Herman Saatkamp Jr. [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986], 442) and as late as 1940 said that Russell was "a very old friend, apart from philosophical interests and we have always been good friends in spite of divergences in speculation and in politics. We can at least always laugh together" (*LGS*, 6:369).

[31] "I feel as if I agreed with [Russell] pretty thoroughly, in spite of all differences in temperament and in knowledge. At least, disagreements with Russell don't trouble me, because I feel them to be due to *additional* insights, now on his part now on mine: while disagreements with a haphazard person like James are more annoying, because they come from focussing things differently, from being schief [cockeyed]" (*LGS*, 1:379).

> the latter may be effects of circumstances, while dislike is a reaction against them (*LGS*, 2:28).[32]

In his essay, Santayana views Russell and Moore as allies in his campaign to counter idealism – a philosophical tradition he takes to be represented in contemporary philosophy by F. H. Bradley, J. M. E. McTaggart, Henri Bergson and William James.[33] Russell was an advocate of idealism when he and Santayana met in 1896 but changed his view sometime in 1898–99, as a result of Moore's influence and for technical reasons connected to his philosophy of mathematics, space, and time. Santayana credits Moore for initiating the break with idealism but takes Russell to be the more systematic thinker and, thus, the better spokesperson for the movement Moore initiated. While he thinks Russell's propensity to shift ground as he moves from one technical problem to the next makes any definitive assessment of his views premature, he also thinks it shows the vitality of Russell's mind and gives the lie to the claim, made by Bergson and others, that exact thinking deadens the soul.[34]

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[32] Whatever common ground Santayana and Russell shared when this letter was written soon shifted. Shortly after *Winds of Doctrine* appeared, Santayana wrote: "[Russell and I] are very far apart, however, farther than I had supposed, in outlook. He wants certainty, and the narrowest deepest possible foundations for thought; I want judicious opinions and a just balance in the imagination" (*LGS*, 2:156). As Russell came to embrace neutral monism, Santayana wrote that his "philosophy seems to have taken a new turn – to construct the universe out of sense-data. If this be realism, it is marvelously like empirical idealism. It has the same minimizing and 'nothing but' quality; it is a substitution of means for ends and of an analysis of knowledge for the object of it. Since I discovered this I have largely lost my interest in Russell as a thinker: but he is a very amusing person" (*LGS*, 2:172).

[33] It is worth noting that Santayana read Hegel with McTaggart, albeit to little effect: "We read aloud and discussed the beginning of the minor Logic, in the *Encyclopaedie der Wissenschaften*. I was then refractory to the transcendental point of view, and would continually transfer the matter in hand to the naturalistic plane, which MacTaggart [*sic*], with some contempt, called *psychological*. Nothing seemed to come of our effort, and we soon gave the thing up. He retained, however, a friendly attitude towards me (as Moore did not); and during my last visit to Cambridge, in 1923, he came one evening to sit next to me at dinner in Hall, and I soon found, when we began to talk about philosophy, that he had discovered that, apart from technicalities, I could be as transcendental as he. Only for me transcendentalism was a deliberate pose, a way of speaking, expressing a subjective perspective; whereas for him it revealed the metaphysical structure of all reality. He pinned his faith and hope of salvation on what I played with as an optical illusion, rendered harmless by being understood" (*PP,* 444–45).

[34] By the time of Santayana's essay, Russell had made substantial modifications to the views he had taken over from Moore. He had introduced and then abandoned his theory of denoting concepts in favor of his theory of descriptions, given up the view that all knowledge is by acquaintance in favor of the view that there is also knowledge by description, rejected his view of judgment as a dual relation between a mind and a proposition in favor of the view that judgment

Santayana takes four tenets to be basic to Russell's thought. First, Russell holds that the world is entirely independent of thought and experience. While it is unfair to say that idealists identify objects of experience and belief with experiences or beliefs themselves, they do insist that talk of objects presupposes the validity of certain principles that make cognitive experience and judgments possible. For them, talk of things-in-themselves—things as they are apart from the conditions under which they might be known or experienced—breaks the bounds of sense and is devoid of content. As a result, they take the conditions of objective judgment to enter into the very definition of what it is to be an object and what it is to be real. Russell rejects any such view because it implies that the nature of reality is in some sense dependent on the mind. He considers an object real only if it is self-subsistent—that is, if its being and nature are entirely independent of anything else, the judgments of knowers included. The reality of things-in-themselves is for him, then, a necessary condition of objectivity. To follow idealists in denying the possibility of knowing things-in-themselves is tantamount to denying knowledge altogether. But finding it easy to conceive of things persisting in the absence of minds, Russell maintains that the notion of things-in-themselves is neither an empty nor an incoherent notion.

The second tenet of Russell's philosophy that Santayana singles out is that certain general principles must be taken to concern, not only our thoughts, but also things apart from the mind. Russell has no quarrel with idealists who maintain that rational judgment is subject to principles that are necessary, universal, and *a priori,* and agrees with them, moreover, that the laws of logic are chief among these. What he disputes is the idealists' claim that the objective validity of the principles of rational judgment rests on their being essential to cognition, rather than being grounded in laws that govern the order of things apart from the mind. He takes idealism to imply that reality has a logical structure only because the mind cannot help judging things in a logical way and rejects this view, claiming it implies that the logical

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involves multiple relations between knowers and objects, and abandoned the view that truth and falsehood are simple and indefinable in favor of the view that truth is a relation between a judgment and a corresponding fact. Santayana does not take up any of these technical developments in Russell's work, nor does he discuss the problems they are intended to solve. Rather he criticizes certain of Russell's views in light of his own naturalistic conception of knowledge and reality.

structure of the world is merely a projection or fabrication. On the view he prefers, judgments have a logical form because they mirror a logical structure among things in the world. Indeed, it is because the laws of logic govern things – and are not merely laws of thought – that he thinks the logical analysis of judgments yields insight into the basic structure of reality.

The third basic tenet of Russell's philosophy, according to Santayana, is that relations are external to the things they concern. Russell thinks the philosophy of absolute idealism is derivable from the axiom that the identity of objects is constituted by the relations they enter into. Given this axiom, for example, it follows that each thing is what it is only by virtue of its relations to every other thing. This further implies that it is wrong to suppose that one bit of reality can subsist apart from the other bits – reality is an integrated whole. One reason Russell is inclined to reject this view is that objects of knowledge cannot be independent of the mind in the way he thinks objectivity requires if their nature is determined or constituted by their relations to knowers. Accordingly, he rejects the view that reality is a single, unanalyzable whole and holds instead that it comprises a plurality of independent (i.e., self-subsistent) individuals. Rather than falsifying the nature of reality, as idealists argue, he insists the method of analysis – the explanation of complex entities in terms of their self-subsistent parts – reveals the ultimate constituents of everything there is.

The final tenet of Russell's philosophy that Santayana notes is that questions about the nature of something are not to be confused with questions about its causal origins or about our beliefs concerning it. If, as Russell maintains, each object is what it is independently of every other thing, then uncovering the nature of an object is one thing and uncovering how it came to be – i.e., its relations to whatever caused it – is something else. Discerning the nature of an object is similarly different from discerning how it comes to be known. As noted, Russell thinks the only knowledge worthy of the name is knowledge of something as it is, unconditioned by the knowing mind. While knowers can only conceive objects falling within the scope of their understanding, to slide from this truism to the idealist's conclusion that the nature of objects is conditioned by the principles governing cognition is, for Russell, to conflate questions of ontology – questions about the nature of objects as they are apart from our knowledge of them – and questions of epistemology – questions of what makes knowledge of such objects possible.

As Santayana sees it, the chief consequences of Russell's views are:

> a) The mind is distinct from, and prior to, its thoughts. It can be identified neither with its various contents – ideas, feelings, or experiences – nor with the stream of consciousness taken in its entirety.
>
> b) There is a material world in space and time – a world beyond the mind and its contents.
>
> c) The substances in the material world – minds among them – comprise simple entities – entities with position and quality but no extension.
>
> d) There is an ideal world of objects (e.g., numbers, universals, logical laws) that are real and independent of the mind, though outside the actual world (i.e., the world of space and time). These objects are discovered, not created by us, and known by intellectual apprehension, rather than sensory perception.

In addition to endorsing Russell's basic outlook, Santayana praises the "scholastic rigor" of Russell's philosophical method: his insistence on the precise analysis of concepts and the logical relations among them and his penchant for the literal interpretation of truth claims. Here, presumably, he is alluding to Russell's view that the meaning of a judgment (or belief) is determined by the entities in the world that the judgment is about and not by the judger's thoughts, ideas, or mental contents (except in the case of judgments that are explicitly about thoughts, ideas, or mental contents). The entities that determine the meaning of the judgment that $2+2=4$ are the (mind-independent) numbers 2 and 4, the addition operation, and the relation of equality. The entities that determine the meaning of the judgment "Socrates is dead" are Socrates, death, and the relation of predication. Were there no entities corresponding to the verbal expressions – no numbers 2 or 4, no Socrates, no death, etc. – Russell maintains they would be meaningless noises or marks.[35] While allowing that it is often far from obvious which objects a given judgment means, Russell staunchly maintains that for any meaningful expression (e.g., word, phrase, or sentence) there is some real entity meant.

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[35] I am simplifying Russell's account somewhat. Numbers, for Russell, are not primitive entities. Rather, they are identified with certain kinds of sets. Moreover, on his account "Socrates is dead" means "There is a unique x such that x is a teacher of Plato, who lived in ancient Greece, etc. and x is dead (at present)." The name "Socrates" in this sentence does not pick out an entity – taken on its own it is a meaningless expression. The sentence containing the name is meaningful and indeed true in virtue of Socrates' death but Socrates himself is not among the entities in the world that determine its meaning – these entities being the predicates involved in

Santayana takes Russell's account of meaning to be a refreshing antidote to views that construe talk of objects—e.g., people, chairs, numbers—as talk of things other than those objects—as talk about our experiences, in the case of idealism, or the conceivable consequences of actions, in the case of pragmatism (*WD,* 75). Still, while acknowledging that Russell's account gives a compelling analysis of the meaning of judgments that have little connection to problems of living—the propositions of logic and mathematics, for example—he thinks it proves one-sided when applied to moral and aesthetic judgments.

In "The Elements of Ethics," Russell advances the view that the word "good," being meaningful, stands for an entity—one that is abstract, known by non-sensory acquaintance, and a thing-in-itself.[36] On this view, the truth or falsity of a judgment that something is good depends solely on the relation that the thing in question has to good (the entity). Since, for Russell, such relations hold whether or not they are apprehended, he considers the goodness of things to depend on facts that obtain independently of human beings and their attitudes and practices. It is this consequence of Russell's view that Santayana singles out for criticism.

Santayana agrees with Russell that "good" applies to objects categorically. That is, he thinks there is a genuine distinction between what is really good and what only appears or is deemed to be good. However, he maintains that in taking evaluations to be true or false apart from us, Russell ignores the naturalistic backdrop that gives ethical judgments their proper context and force. The point is not that Santayana thinks moral judgments can be derived from facts concerning psychology or biology. To the contrary, he considers such reasoning fallacious. The point is rather that, for him, questions about the good involve questions about ultimate ends and, contrary to what Russell maintains, whether an end is worth pursuing or not depends on the

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the definite description, death, the existential quantifier, the conjunction relation, and the variable *x.* Even taking all these technical complications into account, it remains the case that, for Russell, where there is no entity associated with a symbol or expression, there is no meaning.

[36] See Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* [hereafter *PE*] (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 13–59. Also see G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

nature of the creature being considered—its capacities and the conditions required to realize them. Moral skepticism being unlivable for human beings, Santayana thinks "to choose, to love and hate, to have a moral life, is inevitable" (*WD,* 77). However, he adds, "Even to express justly the aim of our own life we need to retain a constant sympathy with what is animal and fundamental in it, else we shall give a false place, and too loud an emphasis, to our definitions of the ideal" (*WD,* 77). As Santayana sees it, Russell's elimination of any reference to human capacities in his ethical reflections signals a failure to appreciate "the relative status of whatever is moral" (*WD,* 76). In claiming absolute truth for his ethical ideals, Santayana thinks Russell risks making his moral judgments "narrow, strident, and fanatical" (*WD,* 76).[37]

In the second section of his essay Santayana fleshes out his basic criticism by taking a closer look at the nature of concepts—or "essences" as he calls them.[38] He agrees with Russell on the need to posit such entities, arguing that "nothing can ever exist in nature or for consciousness which has not a prior and independent locus in the realm of essence" (*WD,* 79). This realm, he says, comprises all that is possible—distinguishable characteristics, objects, states of affairs, possible worlds, etc.—and these possibilities are neither created nor modified when contemplated by us. This realm is likewise eternal—abstract possibilities neither come into being nor cease to be—and distinct from both the mental and material worlds, since ontologically prior to, and more encompassing than, what is actual.

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[37] Santayana makes much the same point in connection with Moore's *Principia Ethica*. He writes, "I should more heartily agree with [Moore's] logic if it were backed by some sense of the conditions in which it operates, some knowledge of human nature. His points become cogent only when the speaker forgets himself and makes his assertions irresponsibly forthright and categorical. So taken—as ready-made accidental judgments—they may well be what Moore says they are in respect to their form. Their substance, however, needs to be transformed by experience and culture. How little *wisdom* these metaphysicians have, and how punctiform and scholastic their vision of things is apt to become when they live in colleges or dwell in an atmosphere of technical controversy. In its rather insignificant sphere, however, I agree with Moore's doctrine. Good is a unique predicate, quite distinct in meaning from pleasant, etc.; but its application is intelligible, and what things are good can be decided only by asking what things make a difference to somebody. The inanimate 'beautiful' universe Moore speaks of can be good only because it meets a *given* sense for harmony" (*LGS*, 1:275).

[38] Santayana says that Moore and Russell "helped me, in 1897, to grind fine and filter Platonic Ideas into my realm of essence" (*PGS,* 587). The current essay is the first published statement of his view.

As Santayana observes, Russell often characterizes the contemplation of essences in spiritual and aesthetic terms. He claims, for example, that philosophy is valuable, not because of the answers to questions it provides, but rather because it requires communion with things that are greater than oneself. He likens the world of logical and mathematical objects to a sanctuary, entry to which affords refuge from mundane concerns. He even goes so far as to claim that these objects are beautiful to contemplate.[39]

However, Santayana worries that Russell's way of speaking is apt to engender the same doubts about essences that atheists have about claims to absolute truth in religion. The suggestion is that those who deny absolute truth to value claims may be led not only to question the objectivity of Russell's appraisals but to doubt the reality of the essences being appraised. For Santayana, however, such a conclusion is hasty. As he sees it, there is no denying that when we contemplate a mathematical proof, the notion of truth, or a hypothetical situation, there is something beyond the mind being contemplated, even when it is nothing actual. That there are essences is, thus, for him, beyond question. What is doubtful, he thinks, is Russell's claim that the value or beauty of essences is inherent in them, rather than being a function of how their contemplation figures in a reasonable human life. Whereas Russell takes our ability to know eternal essences to be a singular accomplishment, Santayana thinks it is not particularly noteworthy. He claims we could not have an experience or thought that did not realize some possibility or other, each such possibility being an essence. Inasmuch as knowledge of eternal essences is part and parcel of having thoughts or experiences at all, it is a relatively trivial feat. On the other hand, to uncover the precise combination of essences manifested in the actual world is, for him, anything but trivial. He thinks physics does its best, but its subject matter – the material world – extends far beyond the limits of our sensory experience and our cognitive capacities, such that only hubris or dogmatism leads us to claim that science reveals the constitution of nature as it is, apart from all human interests.

Moreover, Santayana thinks that, contrary to Russell, the value of eternal knowledge depends on its contribution to the fulfillment of the interests and ideals we have as organisms in the natural world. "Eternal truth [as disclosed in mathematics or logic] is as disconsolate as it is consoling, and as dreary as it is interesting" (*WD,* 78), which is to say that in and of itself it is none of these things. As human beings, we inevitably take a selective interest in essences, finding some more worthy of contemplation than others. We do not and could not contemplate all the essences there are, nor do we or could we exhaustively study the essences we do consider. If mathematical essences hold a particular fascination it is because, so far as we can tell, the natural environment in which we live has a mathematical form. But even then, not everyone finds the same satisfaction in contemplating mathematical and logical objects that Russell does. For Santayana, the value of contemplating a given essence is as variable as each person's personal history and temperament. And even if certain essences are universally valued, it does not follow that their worth is inherent in them apart from all interests. The point Santayana is most concerned to stress, however, is that while there is every reason to be skeptical about Russell's claims to an objective footing for his appraisals, this should not lead us to question the reality of essences themselves.

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[39] See, for example, Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Philosophy," in *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 153–61.

In the third section of his essay, Santayana examines pragmatism in light of Russell's criticisms of it.[40] He views pragmatism, as he does Russell's philosophy, less as a systematic doctrine than as a loosely connected set of tendencies and methods. But whereas he is hopeful about the general direction of Russell's thought, he wonders whether a coherent system will ever emerge out of pragmatism.

As Santayana observes, Russell thinks pragmatism reflects certain tendencies characteristic of American culture. He finds, for example, a democratic tenor pervading James's writing—a suspicion of authority that is not subject to the consent of the individuals over which it is exercised. For example, in "The Will to Believe," Russell claims, James argues that it is reasonable not only to maintain religious beliefs in the absence of evidence for them, but also to deem them true in virtue of the emotional satisfaction they provide.[41] For Russell, such a view makes truth a matter of individual decision—the faith each person deems most satisfying is true and God's divinity rests on the reverence accorded him by believers, rather than that reverence being owed him on account of his divine nature.

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[40] Santayana's discussion is focused primarily on Russell's "Pragmatism" and "William James's Conception of Truth" in *PE,* 79–111 and 112–30, respectively.

[41] William James, "The Will to Believe," in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, The Works of William James, vol. 6, ed. F. Burkhardt *et al.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 13–33.

Rather than pursue Russell's reading of pragmatism, Santayana turns his attention to an important tension Russell finds in the pragmatists' use of psychology in philosophy. He agrees with Russell that pragmatists accord far too much importance to the theory of experience in metaphysics. Instead of concerning themselves with the nature of objects as they are apart from us, pragmatists insist that the nature of an object is to be defined in terms of its experiential effects on us. Yet Santayana thinks it is no more obvious that philosophers interested in the nature of reality should begin by studying human experience than physicists interested in the nature of the planets should. While acknowledging that pragmatists include facts, and not just our experience of them, among the determinants of rational belief, Santayana claims that on the pragmatists' view a fact is nothing more than a belief that we find ourselves compelled to hold. Since pragmatists maintain that beliefs are fixed in part by such things as temperament, interests, and values, it follows that their conception of facts makes essential reference to the psychology of belief. Thus, Santayana insists that when pragmatists defer to facts, they are really appealing to our conceptions of things, rather than to the things themselves.

Santayana does not dispute the pragmatist's claim that passions, interests, and values play a significant role in generating and fixing beliefs. Where he thinks pragmatists go wrong is in taking this fact to undermine the notion that inquiry aims at an understanding of objects as they exist apart from experiences, and not merely of their experiential effects. What are called facts in common parlance, and what we are most concerned to negotiate even in our everyday practices, is, he says, nonpsychological in nature. Unlike compulsory beliefs (i.e., what pragmatists call "facts"), facts are not subject to change as knowledge grows. The world did not become (roughly) round when its shape was discovered and historical events are not altered in the rewriting of our accounts of them. In giving priority to psychology in philosophy, however, pragmatists end up conflating facts and our conception of them.

At the same time, Santayana acknowledges that pragmatists do not always succumb to the confusion just identified. He allows that in at least some cases they focus on the experiential effects of objects because they are interested in tracing the conditions that have led to our current understanding of the world. Santayana has no problem with such a project; indeed, he pursued it in *The Life of Reason*.[42] However, he insists it assumes a natural world that is independent of our experience and is antithetical to any attempt to derive the order of the universe from the structure of human experience or thought. To determine how reality is known by means of experience is one thing; to argue that reality is constituted by, or built up out of, experience is something else. This latter view precludes objectivity and is at odds with the scientific view of the world.

Still, even when viewed charitably—as an attempt to account for knowledge in terms of natural processes—Santayana thinks pragmatists face serious unanswered questions. James, for example, denies there is a mind apart from the stream of individual consciousness and holds, moreover, that one object of experience knows another just in case it leads to, or is a reliable sign of, it. Instead of explaining the sort of connection between minds and objects that knowledge requires, Santayana thinks this view collapses the realm of thought and the realm of objects into a single realm of being—one constituted by relations among bits of experience. Santayana takes this to show that while pragmatists start by seeking to explain knowledge, they end up rejecting the world outside experience, taking the structure of the human mind to yield the structure of the world and viewing the nature of the world as dependent on experience, rather than experience being dependent on processes in a broader natural world.

In addition to highlighting confusions among pragmatists about the role of psychology in philosophy, Santayana thinks Russell also raises important questions about the scope of the pragmatic theory of truth. As Russell sees it, the pragmatic theory is based on an analysis of inductive methods of testing hypotheses. In the clearest cases, conjectures are tested by deriving experiential consequences from them, undertaking certain experimental procedures and verifying whether or not the predicted consequences occur. Hypotheses are accepted as true if predictive and so, the pragmatist holds, to claim a belief is true is, in the end, to claim that it meets with instrumental success in experimental tests. Russell argues that this account of truth fails as a general theory because the sort of inductive testing pragmatists take as the model of inquiry presupposes a notion of truth that cannot be explained in terms of the practical consequences of beliefs in test situations. As he sees it, pragmatists hold that the truth of a hypothesis *H* rests on claims about its predictive success – the claims that *H* implies a certain prediction *P* and that *P* is true. However, if the pragmatic theory is applied to every truth claim, then a vicious regress results. The truth of *H* depends on the truth of *P* but the truth of *P* in turn depends on the truth of claims about its predictive consequences – the claims that *P* implies *P′* and that *P′* is the case, where *P′* is some predicted event. The truth of these latter claims presupposes further claims about their predictive consequences and so on endlessly. *H* can never be verified on this view because its truth has an endless series of conditions and because these conditions concern events in the future – events to which we have no direct experiential access. In light of this, Russell concludes that it is possible to verify a hypothesis by appeal to its predictive powers only if there is some knowledge that is not attained through inductive testing and this knowledge must be true in some sense other than that required by the pragmatic theory of truth.

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[42] *The Life of Reason, or, The Phases of Human Progress*, The Works of George Santayana, vol. 7, ed. Marianne Wokeck and Martin Coleman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).

In contrast to Russell, Santayana thinks pragmatists do allow that there is knowledge that is not subject to the pragmatic account of truth and inquiry – specifically, knowledge of the logical relations among concepts (i.e., relations among essences) and knowledge of concrete facts immediately observed. However, he thinks pragmatists wrongly downplay the significance of these exceptions to their theory. He argues that the reliability of memory is presupposed both in the immediate apprehension of facts and in the experimental testing of hypotheses that pragmatists take to be the hallmark of truth. In the cases of immediate observation, what is known must be correctly categorized as similar to or different from phenomena previously experienced and correctly recalled. And in the case of experiments, an observation cannot test a hypothesis unless it is compared to a prior expectation that is accurately remembered. But if pragmatists must grant that both immediate knowledge and knowledge of the past (i.e., memory) are presupposed in testing the practical consequences of hypotheses, “this amounts to enough knowledge to make up a tolerable system of the universe, without invoking pragmatic verification or ‘truth’ at all” (*WD,* 87). Indeed, Santayana urges, if immediate knowledge is taken to include knowledge of all facts directly perceived by any human being, then all of human history lies beyond the scope of the pragmatist account of inquiry and truth.

Santayana agrees with Russell that the pragmatic theory of truth works best in cases of beliefs that are open to doubt and thought to require verification through inductive testing—cases involving scientific laws or philosophical generalizations that are far from settled, for example. Pragmatists hold that the content of such beliefs is given by their practical consequences (i.e., the consequences that follow on the performance of experimental tests) and that believing a claim is a matter of being prepared to act on it—a matter of basing one's conduct on expectations rooted in the predictions it affords. However, Russell argues that this notion of belief fails to distinguish cases in which one acts in the knowledge that a hypothesis is true and cases in which one adopts a belief as a working hypothesis without any firm evidence of its truth. In support of Russell's point, Santayana observes that it is not always clear whether an idea is a fiction that is relied upon because it has proven useful to the believer—as in the case of the atomic theory in the nineteenth century or of people who cling to superstitions—or whether the idea is held because it is rooted in facts that any inquirer who lands on the truth must come to know. Both sorts of belief might well guide conduct reliably and thus meet the pragmatic test for truth but only in the latter sort of case are the instrumentally reliable beliefs properly true.

The confusion at the heart of the pragmatist's view of belief mirrors a similar confusion in their claim to offer an analysis of theoretical knowledge. "Theory" might be applied to pictures or models of the world adopted in the absence of knowledge. Alternatively, the term might be applied to a systematic body of knowledge that has already been verified. Santayana claims that the pragmatist account of truth applies only to the first sort of case—cases in which a belief is adopted for its value in guiding conduct and relied upon until such time as (if ever) it is replaced by genuine knowledge. However, to view the criteria appropriate to the adoption of useful fictions—such as religious myths or speculative hypotheses in natural science—as criteria of truth in general is to deny knowledge an objective footing and embrace the very sort of subjectivism pragmatists claim to decry.

Santayana concedes that it seems odd to suppose pragmatists would use cases of beliefs held without warrant as a basis for their account of truth. However, he thinks this is not entirely unprecedented. Religions, he thinks, have long claimed that their metaphysical fictions are true and construed truth in light of them. Moreover, he thinks the pragmatists' confusion rests on a clear line of thought, however indefensible. Having come to the conclusion that eternal truth is impossible, he thinks pragmatists focus on the conditions for fixing beliefs, rather than for attaining truth, as the key to knowledge. Given this shift, they transfer both the term "true" and its honorific associations to warranted beliefs and shift the determinants of truth from objective facts – which they deem unknowable – to psychological determinants of beliefs that operate in the absence of knowledge of how things really are. The result, Santayana claims, is to conflate the conditions of truth with the conditions of belief or justification.

According to Santayana, the pragmatist's errors about truth are compounded by an ambiguity in their use of the term "science," an ambiguity related to their use of the term "theory." The word "science" is sometimes used to refer to knowledge that is firmly established. At other times, it refers to the theories scientists work with pending verification. Taken the first way, the scientific content of, say, Darwin's theory comprises his observations about organisms and their ancestry but excludes his conjecture that variation and natural selection explain these data. The theory of natural selection does not describe a process that is directly observed. It is rather a hypothesis offered to systematize, and fill gaps in, observed data. Santayana thinks science is so readily identified with speculative hypotheses of the latter sort that when someone like Henri Poincaré points out the paucity of the data underlying them, he is taken to show not merely that the higher reaches of scientific thought serve an instrumental function but rather that science has no claim to discern the way things are. He thinks pragmatists succumb to a similar confusion in mistaking an analysis of the instrumental value of speculative hypotheses in science and religious ideals for a proper analysis of the nature of truth.

In the final section of his essay, Santayana returns to Russell's account of the basic notions of ethics. Russell, he observes, characterizes the good independently of human conduct – good conduct, for him, being conduct that is a means to things good on their own account. This view highlights – rightly, Santayana thinks – that ethics is concerned with all values, not only those relating to morals or duties and that values inhere in a great variety of things and relations, all of which we are obliged to respect and establish to whatever extent possible. Russell thinks philosophers run afoul of this latter point by oversimplifying the range of values in an effort to reduce ethics to one or two principles, while moralists ignore the former point in focusing on the value of actions as means to ends and ignoring the value of ends themselves.

Santayana sees Russell's critique of the tradition as opening the way for a moral philosophy that recognizes all the various sorts of values and reveals, moreover, which combinations of values are coherent. He thinks that unlike the ethical systems proffered in the past, an ethics of this sort, properly developed in light of the actual interests of human beings, stands a good chance of exerting influence over human conduct.

Much to Santayana's disappointment, however, Russell does not pursue this sort of ethical theory but rather focuses on the question of how "good" is to be defined. Not that Santayana has any problem with Russell's answer to this question; to the contrary, he accepts Russell's claim that "good" is indefinable. Definitions of the good in terms of what satisfies our desires, what yields the greatest happiness of the greatest number, what we have a duty to bring about, etc., cannot be right, he thinks, because the questions of whether it is good to satisfy our desires, whether it is good to bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number, whether it is good to do our duty, etc., are substantive and not of the form "Is A, A?" These definitions are, at best, descriptions of properties shared by good things, not characterizations of good itself. However, Santayana sees no route from this point—a point he deems obvious, even trivial—to Russell's further claim that good is something real apart from us. He argues that "green" too is an indefinable quality, one that is known only through direct experience, and yet the things in which it inheres are not green absolutely but only under certain conditions—it being a common occurrence that one and the same thing is both green and not green at the same time, from different points of view. Taken as an essence—an abstract concept—being green precludes being not green. Yet an object in nature can be both green and not green, when circumstances are taken into account. The same holds, Santayana insists, of good and evil. Though good excludes evil conceptually, one and the same thing in nature can be both good and evil depending on the circumstances—nothing is good unconditionally.

In defending the objectivity of value claims, Russell makes much of the fact that in disagreements over what is good we are apt to consider one or both parties wrong, rather than conclude, as we do in cases where something appears both green and not green, that both are right given the circumstances. Were there no facts about what is good, independently of all interests, attitudes, and opinions, Russell claims it would no more be possible to reason with others about what is right and wrong than it is to reason with someone about whether or not oysters are tasty. For Russell, then, the very fact of moral reasoning shows that ethical claims, like claims in logic and physics, are true or false independently of us.

In response to this argument, Santayana acknowledged that the truth or falsity of evaluative claims can legitimately be debated when the value of something as a means to a given end is in question. In such cases, the issue turns on facts about cause and effect or the necessary connections among events in the world. But he insists that in debates of this kind certain ends are assumed as given. Disagreements about ultimate goods, by contrast, cannot be adjudicated objectively and claims about them do not have truth values. On his view, ultimate goods are chosen, found, aimed at, but not asserted to be true. Our basic ethical convictions arise out of feelings that it is neither right nor wrong to feel. We may pursue our ideals with more or less reasonableness and be more or less tolerant of those with preferences different from our own—people may be unable to endure another's religious practices, while turning a blind eye to their failure to appreciate oysters. But that we show any tolerance at all—even tolerance of another's taste for beef or shellfish, for example—is a relatively recent phenomenon in human history, one that Santayana hopes his view will encourage.

Santayana defends his view that values are rooted in ungrounded feelings against Russell's objection that the good cannot be analyzed in terms of what is desired, since the notion of a bad desire is not contradictory. Santayana notes, first of all, that Russell himself concedes that differences about ultimate ends arise and although he nevertheless maintains that value claims are absolutely true or false, the only evidence he offers for this view is that people deem values at odds with their own to be incorrect. All this shows, Santayana insists, is that people tend to dismiss values they find uncongenial and are blind to the virtues of contrary ways of living. Such tendencies speak to the intolerance of human beings, rather than to the objectivity of their evaluative judgments.

Moreover, Santayana insists that the notion of a bad desire can be made sense of even on a view that denies an objective footing for ultimate goods. Organisms may have desires that contradict their other interests. They may also have passing fancies that are inimical to interests and ideals associated with their sense of worth and dignity. But even when desires are deemed bad because self-defeating in these ways, it does not follow that their value is inherent in them. To the contrary, they are bad only when judged in light of other values. For Santayana, it makes no more sense to judge something good or bad apart from some set of interests or other than it does to think of something being inherently nutritious or intoxicating, apart from the constitution of some organism or other.

Santayana further argues that far from precluding debate about values, as Russell assumes, the view that values are relative to interests and capacities makes reasoned debate about them possible. As he sees it, values can be judged false only in light of some sort of evaluative criterion. Absent any reference to a set of interests and capacities, there is no criterion for assessing worth and so only brute force could make someone come to consider a value authoritative.

Finally, Santayana claims that Russell's way of arguing specific ethical claims itself betrays the relativity of value. In distinguishing the good from pleasure, for example, Russell asks whether a life of mindless pleasure would be better than the life of a rational human being and expects his readers to answer "no." He then takes the fact that we so readily agree on this to show that the human condition is inherently and self-evidently superior to a life that, however pleasing, lacks the capacity for such things as memory and reflection. Santayana sees this example differently, however. He thinks it is one thing to say a form of life is unfulfilling by human standards—that it is not befitting a human being—but quite another to say that it is inherently unfulfilling. If we are quick to condemn the sort of unreflective life Russell asks us to consider it is only because it fails to satisfy interests and ambitions that humans typically have. Santayana agrees an unreflective life is far from ideal given the capacities that human beings possess but there could well be an organism so constituted that such a life fulfills its highest capabilities and as such is good for it.

According to Santayana, Russell's failure to take the natural conditions of human life into account in ethics is particularly significant in his discussion of egoism in "A Free Man's Worship."[43] Russell argues that if egoism were true, then his good is the only good and anyone who fails to acknowledge this fact is mistaken. Yet, he observes, most people would readily agree that all things being equal it is better if two people's desires be satisfied than only one person's and, likewise, better to secure a greater good for one person than to secure a lesser good for someone else. Since these principles are deemed acceptable regardless of which people are being considered, Russell concludes that it wrong to think that his desires are the only goods and egoism is false.

Santayana thinks Russell is on solid ground as a matter of logic. He agrees, for example, that if two goods are of equal value, then it does not matter from a moral point of view whose goods they are. But there remains the question of how the value of things is to be determined in the first place. On Santayana's view, goods are appraised by examining their implications for some way of life or other. Whether we consider a set of values reasonable or not depends on our ability to sympathize with the broader life to which they contribute. As the capacity for such sympathy varies among people, so too do moral evaluations. This is not to say that agreement in values, even universal agreement, is impossible. It is merely to say that the grounds of moral consensus are not, as Russell's view implies, lying in wait apart from their being worked out or negotiated. Nor is agreement guaranteed to emerge. To the contrary, it is impossible for some creatures to cultivate sympathy for all forms of life—were a tiger, for example, to do this, it would cease to be ferocious and thereby surrender what for tigers is a preeminent virtue. In light of this, Santayana thinks an irreducible diversity of values is to be expected.

Far from being an antidote to egoism, Santayana fears Russell's view that moral claims are true or false independent of particular points of view will exacerbate it. There is nothing in Russell's case for the objectivity of values to prevent the egoist from thinking that his values have absolute authority and are binding on all others. Santayana suggests that even Moore and Russell manifest intolerance towards other people's values "and one trembles to think what it [this intolerance] may become in the mouths of their disciples. Intolerance is a form of egoism, and to condemn egoism intolerantly is to share it" (*WD,* 99).

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[43] In Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1950), 46–57.

Santayana thinks his view, by contrast, would undermine intolerance. Each of us would still operate with his or her personal sense of justice, there being no higher duty to pursue and no choice but to live some way or other. But rather than view dissenters as vile and blind to facts, we would view them as moral agents on a par with us. Conflicts with others would be viewed as obstacles to overcome and negotiate. But even were such conflicts to prove unresolvable, Santayana thinks we would at least be chivalrous and acknowledge the sense of justice that inspires our opponents. The notion that our ideals have an absolute right to be realized is, for him, a vain indulgence, and to give up the right to condemn absolutely those who would destroy what we value is to appreciate that they have ideals of their own to achieve.

In closing his discussion of Russell's philosophy, Santayana reflects on the moral vision he thinks it implies. The notion that good is independent of what exists has traditionally been linked to belief in a divine creator or prime mover who is the origin of everything. Russell is no theist, however, and does not embrace the myth that good and evil have causal powers. However, he does imply that certain essences are inherently good and that these ought to exist (or, at least, that anything that does exist ought to conform to them). On Santayana's view, however, what exists is neither good nor evil and hence is "deaf to this moral emphasis in the eternal" (*WD,* 100). There is no purpose in nature—things do not exist because they ought to or because they fulfill some divine end. To think otherwise does not make existence more intelligible or less arbitrary; it merely shifts the locus of arbitrariness from what exists to the creator's choice of purposes. Russell retains belief in an absolute good but dispatches the idea of a god who directs the course of events and punishes those who are not good. He thus leaves it up to human beings to redeem the world. For Santayana, this view frees Russell's theodicy from the sanctimony and hypocrisy of traditional theism but in preserving the objectivity of values it maintains the rigidity of traditional theism. To this extent, Santayana thinks Russell's view of human life is a dramatic expression of the very sort of religious views he seeks to displace.

In rejecting Russell's claim to absolute knowledge of the good, Santayana makes clear that he is not out to decry the values that

Russell upholds. He focuses on the error of hypostasizing the good in order to separate Russell's genuine insights from his flawed account of their ontological and epistemological foundation. When we consider things from the moral point of view, Santayana thinks Russell is right to maintain that some things are more valuable than others, there are many such valuable things, their combinations yield values not belonging to their parts severally, and these values are both more specific than pleasure writ large and more diffuse than an individual life. These insights, he insists, are important and worth preserving even if they are wrongly founded in Russell's philosophy.

V ~ Shelley: or the Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles

To this point Santayana has considered and rejected Catholic modernism, Bergson's attempt to ground values in a progressive evolutionary metaphysics, and Russell's objectification of values as timeless, mind-independent entities. Against these views he has pressed the notion that values are expressions of human interests and aspirations, rather than representations of an objective good. The fact that ethics and religion do not issue in knowledge of the world as it is apart from us does not, for him, make them any less important to the life of reason. To the contrary, he thinks there is no more vital task than sorting out the spiritual ideals that best promote meaningful lives. On his view, however, the task of exploring and fashioning moral ideals falls to the poet, not the natural scientist or metaphysician. It is in light of this understanding of the connection between ethics and poetry that he takes up the work of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822).

Santayana's views about Shelley took shape during the school year of 1910–1911, when the reading group of Harvard undergraduates he was in the habit of organizing devoted its attention to Shelley's work "from beginning to end, except [Shelley's play] *The Cenci*" (*PP,* 345). As for the essay itself, Santayana says, "It was a terrible piece of work getting it off, and took me all summer [of 1911]" (*LGS*, 2:111; see also *WD,* 316). He then presented it at Columbia University and Bowdoin, Bryn Mawr, and Williams Colleges before publishing the final version in *Winds of Doctrine.*[44]

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[44] Although he did not follow through on the idea, he also contemplated republishing the essay in a collection of essays alongside "The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare," "Hamlet," "The Poetry of Barbarism," and "Dickens" (*LGS*, 1:195).

Santayana opens the essay by claiming that appraisals of art—like all other value judgments—lack a basis in fact. There is, he says, no refuting a person who deems art good so long as someone takes pleasure in it, no matter what sort or for what reasons. However, anarchy of taste is untenable in practice. Artists must make decisions about what is better or worse in order to create at all. And to have lasting value, Santayana insists, art must speak to the deepest needs of human nature. For him, "technical proficiency, and brilliancy of fancy or execution… may dazzle for a moment, but they cannot absolve an artist from the need of having an important subject-matter and a sane humanity" (*WD,* 103).

In light of this principle of criticism, Santayana thinks Shelley poses something of a problematic case. On the one hand, Santayana agrees with Matthew Arnold's characterization of Shelley as depraved and humorless[45] though, unlike Arnold, he considers such weaknesses typical of revolutionaries who, like Shelley, reject traditional values in favor of what they consider to be heroic ideals. In attempting to rid themselves of established conventions, they tend to lose sight of the fact that a stable tradition is necessary in order for art—and the life of reason more generally—to thrive. On the other hand, Santayana thinks Shelley's poetry is a superb expression of the humanistic values that led to the Renaissance and continue to shape culture to this day. Shelley's opposition to established authorities—the monarchy and church chief among them—his defense of free love and atheism and his abhorrence of violence and oppression in all its forms reflect a firm conviction in the perfectibility of human nature. In light of these assessments, it might seem that we must either agree with Arnold that Shelley's work is second-rate, since he lacks the seriousness and "sane humanity" of a great artist, or count him a brilliant poet but consider him an exception to the principle that seriousness and humanity are essential to great art.

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[45] Arnold condemned Shelley for leaving his first wife and child in order to pursue Mary [Wollstonecraft] Godwin and took exception to Shelley's defense of atheism and free love. In a well-known passage, Arnold wrote: "The man Shelley, in very truth, is not entirely sane, and Shelley's poetry is not entirely sane either. The Shelley of actual life is a vision of beauty and radiance, indeed, but availing nothing, effecting nothing. And in poetry, no less than in life, he is 'a beautiful *and ineffectual* angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain'" (Matthew Arnold, *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* [London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1913], 251–52). Arnold's assessment is not idiosyncratic. While admiring Shelley's style and imagery, the poet Francis Thompson said that he had an immature, indeed childish, mind (see his *Shelley: An Essay* [London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1914]). The critic F. R. Leavis said, "The effect of Shelley's eloquence is to hand poetry over to a sensibility that has no more dealings with intelligence than it can help; to a 'poetic faculty' that… demands that active intelligence shall be, as it were, switched off" ("Revaluations [VIII]: Shelley," *Scrutiny* 4, no. 2 [September 1935]: 163). It is worth noting, however, that D. H. Lawrence considered Shelley to be among the greatest English poets and "a million thousand times more beautiful than Milton" (*The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, ed. James Boulton, vol. 1 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 654, 120).

Santayana rejects both of the options just canvassed in favor of a third view. He maintains Shelley is a great poet—one with all the humanity and seriousness of a brilliant artist. But, while granting Arnold's point that Shelley's behavior was far from exemplary, he disputes Arnold's claim that this shows a serious moral failing in Shelley, attributing it instead to the lack of a congenial culture in which to flourish.

According to Santayana, Shelley's genius is the product of an intense devotion to moral ideals combined with an equally intense horror at their failure to be realized. As Santayana observes, Shelley's moral sense developed early on. At a very young age he was insubordinate to authority figures and dismissive of religious dogma and social convention. These tendencies proved impervious to modification through schooling and personal experience. Rather than adapt his ideals to circumstances, Shelley devoted himself to crafting visions of how things ought to be and protesting any obstinacy that he thought stood in the way of a better world. He was, in Santayana's estimation, too sensitive and unaccepting to be at home in the world in which he lived but also too highly endowed for it.

Despite his contempt for contemporary culture, Shelley, Santayana notes, does not view reform as a lost cause. Nor, like some reformers, does he reject the status quo without giving thought to what should replace it. Shelley is, rather, a "utopian or visionary" moralist (*WD,* 106), one who views goodness as a force that is capable of overcoming any obstacle to its realization. Unlike those Hegelians who view imperfection as necessary to the goodness of reality as a whole, Shelley refuses to accept corruption and injustice as inevitable. Evil, for him, is inexplicable and unnatural, the result of forces that are arbitrary, accidental, and temporary. His poetic imagery is calculated both to vent outrage at the madness of war, famine, greed, and cruelty (which he condemns with an intensity that, Santayana thinks, risks inciting pessimism) and inspire the conviction that suffering and oppression can be overcome and life rendered perfect. For Shelley, love kindled by the force of reason is sufficiently powerful to transform society and even human nature.

Santayana contends, however, that Shelley's attraction to human perfection leaves him unable to understand things as they are. He views any obstacle to his ideals, however immovable, as unnatural or perverse and is, in light of this, naive about the prospects for reform. Moreover, Shelley commits the cardinal sin of mistaking his vision of what human beings ought to become for an account of what, deep down, they truly are. But even in succumbing to these illusions, Santayana thinks Shelley proves no more sentimental than any other modern poet. As he sees it, "all other poets also have been poets of illusion. The distinction of Shelley is that his illusions are so wonderfully fine, subtle, and palpitating; that they betray passions and mental habits so singularly generous and pure" (*WD,* 112).

Contrary to Arnold, then, Santayana believes Shelley has a serious subject-matter. The images he offers up are not idle fancies. Nor are they aimed, as Francis Thompson argues, at dressing up nature in beautiful verse. To the contrary, Shelley is driven by a vision of what is supremely important in life and the beauty and force of his work derive from the depth of his insight. If Shelley's poetry is at all ineffectual, as Arnold claims it is, it is because it projects an ideal to be attained, rather than considering the means by which it is to be realized.

Still, Santayana thinks it is one thing to admire Shelley's poetry as an expression of human values, quite another to view it, as Shelley himself did, as an account of human nature. As noted, Santayana insists that unlike perceptual and theoretical knowledge poetry does not purport to describe what is the case. He thinks Shelley has a gift for expressing the best human ideals but determining which among our capacities and needs are most worthy of development and fulfillment is, from the point of view of an indifferent material world, a contingent, arbitrary, and *a priori* matter. When, following Shelley, imagined ideals are mistaken for descriptions of fact, "fiction becomes deception, poetry illusion, morals fanaticism, and religion bad science" (*WD,* 113). For Santayana, Shelley's claim to objectivity for his ideals is dogmatic. It leaves him unable to view sympathetically the lives of people who do not share his vision and blinds him to the cruelty that arises from this intolerance.

To illustrate his point, Santayana cites Shelley's discussion of selfishness and evil. Drawing on Russell's case against egoism, Santayana claims that, all other things being equal, it is better to secure a great good for one person than a lesser good for another and that this is so no matter who the people are. This, for him, is tantamount to claiming that we should love our neighbors as we do ourselves because their good is not any less good simply in virtue of being theirs and not ours. Santayana agrees with Shelley that if such a principle were to be taken to heart, the evils of our competitive society would melt away. Being unable to imagine why this sort of love is not pervasive, Shelley can only grieve and rage at the irrationality of his contemporaries. For him, the persistence of selfishness, being a violation of the true nature of human beings, is monstrous and unintelligible. Indeed, on his way of thinking, Santayana insists, evil can only ever be viewed as senseless and gratuitous.

Against this view, Santayana argues that selfishness is neither inexplicable nor the result of groundless malice in the human heart. It is, he claims, to be expected where there is insufficient room and resources for all things to prosper simultaneously. Under such conditions, what is necessary to the flourishing of one creature constitutes an evil to any creature for whom that flourishing spells defeat. While Shelley seems to acknowledge that evil arises where the pursuit of different lives proves irreconcilable, Santayana thinks he fails to draw the proper conclusion from this. Given that human beings are animals in the natural world, Santayana thinks it is unreasonable to expect them to be entirely void of self-interest. While people are certainly capable of personal sacrifice – for the sake of their religious convictions, their communities, their children, etc. – they are not capable of sacrificing themselves to something in which they have no interest at all. In taking the pursuit of one's interests to be perverse, Shelley shows his ignorance of human beings and ends up protesting against nature. At the same time, however, Santayana claims that the more Shelley resists facts about human nature, the more he reveals about his own deepest needs and the more truly do his political vision, his brief in behalf of the power of love, and his judgments of other people express his true inner nature. Had Shelley understood reality better, Santayana surmises, he would not have written as he did and we would all be the worse for it, since Shelley's "was…the purest, tenderest, richest, most rational nature ever poured forth in verse" (*WD,* 116).

Having concluded that Shelley's subject-matter is worthy of first-rate poetry, Santayana considers whether Shelley meets his second criterion for greatness in art—whether he has the "sane humanity" that artistic genius requires (*WD,* 103). If sanity requires acuteness of external perception, adaptability to circumstances, and regard for matters of fact, Santayana thinks Shelley fails to make the grade. But Santayana does not view Shelley's imperviousness to fact as a personal shortcoming or eccentricity. He insists that Shelley's logic is that of a visionary, not a lunatic—one who dreams so that others may strive for something better. As Santayana sees it, it is commentators like Arnold who are more apt to distort their inner natures, since their imagination is stunted as a result of their acceptance of what is perverse because it has become the norm. Practical souls—those who reconcile themselves to the way things are—are insightful as reflections of the times in which they live but, in Santayana's estimation, they are "wretched expression[s]" of the possibilities open to human beings (*WD,* 116). However obtuse about facts of human nature Shelley may be, he "shows us the perfect but naked body of human happiness" (*WD,* 117).

Given a world so staunchly opposed to his ideals, Santayana thinks it unsurprising that Shelley would view freedom as a panacea. The freedom Shelley craves, however, is not merely political—freedom of the press and participation in free elections, Santayana avers, "do not greatly help us in living after our own mind, which is, I suppose, the only positive sort of liberty" (*WD,* 117). True freedom, for Shelley, involves the chance to thrive in a congenial community, as opposed to being forced to live in circumstances one cannot abide. Viewed in this light, his advocacy of free love, to which Arnold objects so vociferously, is but a reflection of his general impatience with imperfection and his conviction that the spontaneous pursuit of love liberates the spirit.

For Santayana, however, the difficulties of practicing free love are evident in Shelley's own life. Though Shelley married his first wife to save her from domestic abuse, rather than for love, he still took exception when his best friend set his sights on her.[46] Moreover, when Shelley practiced what he preached and left his first wife to marry Mary

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[46] As suggested by various writers, such as Edward Dowden (*The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* 2 vols. [London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886]).

Godwin, his abandoned spouse was driven to suicide. Mary Shelley, as his wife, had to cope with Shelley's attraction to other women. Free love, Santayana concludes, is not freedom from difficulty, jealousy, or tragedy. However ripe for reform conventions may be, Santayana insists, *pace* Shelley, that they are indispensable. And while free love inspires sublime poetry, it is not a policy suited to this world.

As for the alleged depravity of Shelley's atheism, Santayana thinks the case far from clear. While Shelley denied the existence of a personal god who created the universe and presides over it as legislator and judge, Santayana claims he was nevertheless drawn to Christian ideals whenever they were presented to him as moral insights, rather than as dogmatic pronouncements. Thus Shelley's renunciation of Christianity is not as wholesale as it first appears to be.

As for those who view Shelley as some sort of pantheist, Santayana thinks they go too far. While Shelley views reality as fluid and vital, rather than mechanical, he does not hold, as pantheists do, that the world has a conscious plan, that events unfold by logical necessity, that the individual is subordinate to the greater good of the cosmos, or that ideals should be sacrificed in the face of physical necessity. Moreover, Shelley departs from pantheism in taking the seat of moral authority to be internal, even though it is diffused among all individuals and stems from a natural love of beauty and goodness that persists even in the face of obdurate reality.

This is not say, Santayana is careful to point out, that Shelley's atheism is of the narrow materialistic sort. For all his godlessness, Shelley retains a Platonic view of the eternal—his ideals being timeless and enduring—and his condemnation of religious idolatry and hypocrisy are rooted in sentiments that are themselves deeply spiritual, not mundane.

As noted, Santayana acknowledges Shelley's lack of appreciation for the world as it is. His poetry has nothing to say about history or nature or human psychology. His critical stance is informed, not by patient attention to the details of human life and its social and natural conditions, but rather by ideals that have never been realized and are not apt ever to be. To those, like Arnold, who insist good literature requires insight into real life, Shelley's utopian views are seriously flawed and lack any solid footing. But Santayana rejects this conception of artistic merit. Music, he thinks, can hardly be viewed as a commentary on the conditions of life yet it still touches us and "stimulates…the formal and emotional possibilities of living which lie in the spirit" (*WD,* 121).

Moreover, Santayana sees no good reason to think the conditions of human life exhaust the conditions in which spirituality might flourish. He does not see how the possibility that there are organisms in the universe engaged in spiritual pursuits of which human beings are utterly ignorant can be ruled out. Nor does he think we can preclude the possibility that in the future there will be forms of life that we have yet to imagine or consider. There is no call for artists to reflect on such possible life forms. Even if they could, the only reason for doing so would be to improve the lot of human beings by guiding them to attainable goods.

For Santayana, investigation of the material circumstances of life reveals nothing more than the means by which certain lives are lived. However, the path to human fulfillment lies, not in the acquisition of such knowledge, but rather in the fullest expression of the human spirit. One cannot hope to improve life by means of the sort of criticism Arnold defends unless one's judgments about the worth of various pursuits are guided by an ideal conception of human fulfillment. Contrary to what Arnold supposes, poetry is no more a reflection on the circumstances of life than music is a commentary on the instruments through which it is played. The poet's aim is to open us up to the contemplation of ideal worlds that transcend the material limits of human life and challenge our tendency to make human affairs the measure of all value. On this view, artists are in league with saints, mystics, and prophets. Their primary aim is not to describe life. It is rather to imagine it as it might be, to explore possibilities in the realm of essence. Contemplating such ideals is valuable, not because it issues in reliable predictions of what will come to pass and not because ideal essences are embodied in divinities that stand in judgment of us and control our destinies. Ideal essences are nothing more than possibilities that lie in wait for anyone who seeks to consider them. Those we find inspiring are those that resonate with our deepest hopes and needs. They are the ones that great poets draw attention to so that people of a like mind and spirit may delight in their contemplation. In Shelley's case, his poetic visions are "so purely ideal and so deeply human" that Santayana thinks he merits "the epitaph which a clear-sighted friend wrote upon his tomb: *cor cordium*, the heart of hearts" (*WD,* 123).

VI ~ The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy

In his discussion of Shelley, Santayana defended the importance of contemplating spiritual ideals for their own sake, independent of their practical benefits, even though they lack grounding in facts that are independent of our natures. With this view of the status and significance of spiritual values in hand, Santayana returns, in the last chapter of *Winds of Doctrine*, to the topic that opened the book: the state of philosophy in the United States.

"The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" is a reprint of an address given to the Philosophical Union of the University of California on August 25, 1911, and published shortly afterwards.[47] Delivered just months before Santayana left the United States for good, the essay is something of a swan song. It is also the jumping-off point for his book *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, a work that drew considerable attention in philosophical circles when it appeared.[48]

The main theme of this essay is the lack of fit between the moral tradition the United States inherited from European philosophy – what Santayana calls "the genteel tradition" – and its emerging, homegrown morality. The United States, he thinks, is caught between the ossified, old-world ideals that prevail in intellectual domains – religion, literature, and academic philosophy – and the spontaneous, newer moral vision that dominates practical affairs – industry, enterprise, and social organization. He undertakes to trace the roots of this split in American culture and discern its trajectory.

On Santayana's analysis, America's genteel tradition is the progeny of Calvinism – the dominant philosophy of America's earliest settlers – and post-Kantian idealism. The root of Calvinism, as he defines it, is an "agonised conscience" resulting from the conviction that while human beings are sinful and will be punished, it is beautiful that sin should exist to be punished inasmuch as it makes evident the superiority and purity of the infinite and drives home the importance of living as we ought to. To be a Calvinist in this sense is to tack back and forth between lamenting one's degraded state as a human being and delighting in the perfection and holiness that this depravity makes manifest (*WD,* 127).

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[47] See *The University of California Chronicle* 13 (1911): 357–80.

[48] New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: "The Adelphi," 1931.

Santayana thinks Calvinism was well suited to early America, where communities were small and isolated and survival required strict adherence to social norms. Once the early colonies established themselves and the pressures of meeting basic material needs eased, however, Calvinism gave way to “the second and native-born American mentality” (*WD,* 128). The concept of sin “totally evaporated” (*WD,* 128). People remained honest and helpful but more out of common sense than respect for strict principles or the sanctity of law. Nature, meanwhile, came to be seen as not only abundant but beautiful and worthy of reverence, and human beings were viewed as inherently good-natured, cooperative, and naturally blameless, rather than as enemies of God. With the advent of this new outlook, Calvinism lost its foothold in the ordinary lives of Americans.

Although Calvinist ideas continued to be influential, some intellectuals began to search for a philosophy more in tune with real life—among them, America’s foremost literary minds: Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Finding the ideals of the genteel tradition too far removed from their experience and finding little else in early American culture to feed their souls, these writers turned their attention inward. They explored their idiosyncratic inner lives, rather than their place in history or the broader culture. While distancing themselves from the genteel tradition, their writing remained personal and, as a result, it did not issue in a public morality to displace the genteel tradition.

Nor was anything new in the way of a moral philosophy forthcoming from America’s churches. They dealt with the widening gap between the genteel tradition and ordinary life by repackaging Calvinism, rather than replacing it. Talk of hell-fire and damnation was downplayed and “a Christian tenderness and a hope of grace for the individual” were emphasized instead (*WD,* 129). Still, the basic outlook of the genteel tradition remained intact.

Santayana claims that the genteel tradition was bolstered by the rise to dominance of transcendental idealism in American academic circles. To properly appreciate the impact of idealism, Santayana thinks it crucial to distinguish between transcendentalism as a method—a view about how philosophy is to be done—and transcendentalism as a metaphysical view—a theory of the nature of reality.

The transcendental method, Santayana says, is “the critical logic of science” (*WD,* 130). It involves the examination of the scope and limits of the principles and concepts that make it possible for human beings to develop a systematic view of the world. By reflecting critically on human subjectivity, proponents of this method uncover presuppositions that, while necessary for knowledge, are grounded in human nature, rather than in features of the world as it is in itself.[49] This method is not only "correct" in Santayana's estimation but also "the chief contribution made in modern times to speculation" (*WD,* 130).

As a metaphysical view, however, Santayana thinks transcendentalism is seriously flawed. For him, it is a deep confusion to take the presuppositions of human knowledge to imply a "transcendental logic"—an inventory of principles governing the order of things in the universe. Such an approach wrongly assumes that nature is constrained or determined by the conditions of human understanding. It turns genuine insights about human subjectivity gained through transcendental reflection into "transcendental myth" about evolution or history and thereby transforms a "conscientious critique of knowledge" into "a sham system of nature" (*WD,* 131).

Santayana thinks it unsurprising that transcendentalism in both its forms—the method of critical reflection he admires and the metaphysics he rejects—found a welcome audience in America. For one thing, transcendental idealism seemed to provide a metaphysical foundation for the genteel tradition. Kant himself exploited transcendental idealism to limit science so as to make room for his faith—a faith Santayana claims is Calvinist to the core. By construing empirical facts as human constructions, Kant hoped to keep religious views isolated from the corrosive influence of empirical knowledge. For proponents of the genteel tradition in the United States, transcendental idealism offered a means of defending Calvinism in the face of its growing detachment from the lives of ordinary Americans. Indeed, Santayana takes the rise to dominance of idealism as an indication that the heirs to the genteel tradition felt it to be weak and in need of support.

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[49] As he later explains, "Transcendental logic serves to render articulate certain special perspectives necessarily confined to the subjective or poetic sphere. Whether it shall have any validity or appropriateness in relation to further facts remains an open question.… Whether, in any instance, this logic corresponds at all to the articulation of events or even to the history of ideas, can never be discovered by this logic from the inside.… That this logic should claim to be a *universal law*…betrays its non-logical origin" (*PGS,* 506–7). *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923) is Santayana's main contribution to the transcendental critique of knowledge.

Quite apart from its metaphysical implications, Santayana thinks the transcendental method fit with the individualistic and revolutionary character of American culture. He thinks pursuit of the method leads to the view that morality and faith are matters involving the determination of the Will—the root of action—rather than the Intellect—the basis of cognitive understanding. Moreover, the method puts reflection on one's present situation ahead of appeals to established authority and historical precedent as the main source of philosophical insight. Both of these tendencies, Santayana claims, "are truly American" and form the core of what Emerson called "self-trust" (or "self-reliance") (*WD,* 131–32).

Santayana considers Emerson an important figure in American philosophy because he "practised the transcendental method in all its purity" and "more, perhaps, than anybody that has ever lived" (*WD,* 132). Avoiding the idealist's error of mistaking principles of human understanding for principles of nature, Emerson's reflections are personal and not to be viewed as resting on scientific facts. Rather than construct a philosophical system, he merely records how various things in experience, history, poetry, and natural science strike him. Any insights he has are offered up as poetic myths—expressions of human imagination comprising a "human soliloquy," rather than as discoveries of the workings of things as they are apart from us (*WD,* 133). Still, for all his focus on subjectivity, Emerson retains a deep commitment to truth. Although concerned with matters that are deeply personal, his reflections remain "detached, unworldly, contemplative" (*WD,* 133). Recognizing that "our dignity is not in what we do, but in what we understand," Emerson "[breaks] away from all conditions of age or country and represent[s] nothing except intelligence itself" (*WD,* 133).

It might seem hard to square Emerson's view of nature as something worthy of reverence with commitment to the transcendental method, as Santayana characterizes it. However, Santayana rejects the suggestion of any tension in Emerson's views. He allows that Emerson was "particularly ingenious and clear-sighted" in expressing his spiritual connection to the natural world and even claims that this is the "most genuine and spontaneous part of modern taste, and especially of American taste" (*WD,* 134). However, he insists that there remains all the difference in the world between expressing a spiritual connection to nature and grounding that expression in a theory of reality. Since Emerson's attitudes toward nature have no metaphysical underpinning, Santayana claims they are not beset by the confusions that pervade transcendental idealism.

Although Emerson was proficient in the transcendental method, Santayana claims he did not entirely free himself from the grip of the genteel tradition. On Santayana's view, poetry and religion have their roots in a deep human need for consolation in a morally challenging and dispiriting world – they are the product of "an unhappiness that confesses itself" (*WD,* 134). He thinks proponents of the genteel tradition dismiss any grounds for human dissatisfaction when they insist that what seems to be evil or imperfect proves on deeper analysis to be necessary to the perfection of the universe as a whole and thus only apparently bad. Such a view, he claims, forbids and even stigmatizes the open expression of human unhappiness and in so doing cuts people off from serious poetry and profound religion. The imagination is redirected to reflection on one's place in the grand scheme of things, reflection that occurs at a level so abstract that "human circumstances are lost sight of, and human problems dissolve in a purer medium" (*WD,* 134). To Santayana's way of thinking, such a view seeks to ease human disquiet by diverting attention from it, rather than by understanding and coming to terms with it. To know oneself is "the classic form of consolation," whereas to "elude oneself" is the romantic form (*WD,* 134). Though it is free of metaphysical underpinnings, Santayana thinks Emerson's spiritual devotion to nature is in the end romantic and, as such, allied to the genteel tradition.

Has any American writer completely broken with the genteel tradition? Santayana thinks perhaps not. However, he suggests that there are indications that a new, "truly native philosophy and poetry" lies on the horizon (*WD,* 134). He observes that certain humorists – Mark Twain, perhaps also Josh Billings and Artemus Ward – are adept at pointing out incongruences between the ideals of the genteel tradition and facts of American life. They have not broken entirely free of this tradition – their humor relies on a certain respect for it – but the fact that they find these incongruences comic, rather than tragic or disconcerting, suggests that they have a critical distance from it. Their work suggests that the genteel tradition, though "present pervasively," is "everywhere weak" (*WD,* 135).

Santayana cites the work of Walt Whitman as further evidence that the dominance of the genteel tradition is waning. He thinks Whitman's work is so at odds with this tradition that many view it as entirely unrepresentative of American culture. Whitman, he says, is a consummate democrat in psychology and morals. He considers all emotions, moods, and feelings to be of equal value and puts the commonplace moments of life on a moral par with all others. Indeed, Whitman goes so far as to accord human and non-human creatures equal moral status. In leveling moral perspectives in this way, Whitman challenges the notion – central to the genteel tradition – that there is an overarching or transcendental moral authority.

Still, Santayana thinks that for all his importance as a critic of conventional morality, Whitman fails to supply a positive moral vision to rival that of the genteel tradition. He grants that "an American in the nineteenth century who completely disregarded the genteel tradition could hardly have done more" than Whitman did but insists that his rebellion did not issue in "the reconstruction that alone can justify revolution" (*WD,* 136).

Santayana ranks William James alongside Whitman as an important critic of the genteel tradition and, moreover, the best representative of the homegrown American morality. While starting from ideas drawn from the genteel tradition, Santayana thinks James ends up with a view that is radically at odds with it. He is thus to be credited with finally breaking the stranglehold of the genteel tradition on American intellectual culture.

On Santayana's reading, James begins somewhat like proponents of the genteel tradition by defending faith from challenges rooted in secular experience and science. However, in stark contrast to the genteel tradition, his notion of faith is expansive and pluralistic. He treats with great sympathy all manner of "sentimentalists, mystics, spiritualists, wizards, cranks, quacks, and impostors" and as a result is the spokesman in academic circles for anyone disaffected from the genteel tradition (*WD,* 137).

At the same time, James's pragmatism finds favor with people immersed in the morality of everyday American life, the morality that Santayana opposes to the genteel tradition – especially, anti-intellectualists and those who take material well-being to be of paramount importance. For James, intelligence is like any other biological capacity or organ. It arises as a practical adaptation to the natural environment and evolves in directions that prove beneficial. Cognition does not copy or mirror reality; rather, it uncovers connections among things that can be exploited to practical advantage. Theory is thus an extension of practice, rather than entirely apart from it. True ideas—religious as well as scientific—are those that facilitate conduct and subserve practical ends.

Santayana thinks James's account of intelligence is seriously flawed. As he sees it, James mistakes an analysis of the causes and conditions of theorizing for an analysis of its content and function. While he thinks James is right to view intelligence as a natural capacity, he also thinks James ignores the fact that intelligence includes the capacity for pure contemplation, independent of practical concerns. Still, whatever the problems with James's view, it is clear that in questioning the value of detached reflection, he departs radically from the genteel tradition.

James is also at odds with the genteel tradition in rejecting mind-body dualism in favor of the view that cognitive capacities reside in physical organisms alongside other natural processes. Here, too, Santayana expresses reservations. He thinks James's notion that cognition is a means of fulfilling an organism's practical interests commits him to the view that at least some natural processes are directed to the realization of ends. Taken alongside the claim that the mind is ontologically on a par with the body, this view implies the "vitalistic" doctrine that matter acts in behalf of certain purposes (*WD,* 138).

If Santayana's analysis is correct and James is committed to the view that reality unfolds to realize certain ideals, it might seem that he ought to be viewed as defending the sort of transcendental idealism that proponents of the genteel tradition promote, rather than as a critic of it. However, Santayana rejects this suggestion. As he observes, James denies that the universe tends towards fixed, timeless, "self-unfolding destinies" (*WD,* 139). The ideals operative in James's universe are concrete aims of finite creatures, creatures acting to transform their environment in ways they find congenial, while adapting their interests to the effects of the environment in which they act. For James, such purposes as there are in the world are contingent, incomplete, indeterminate, and subject to renegotiation and redirection. In contrast to the transcendental idealist, James denies the world has a fixed or ultimate end. "It embodies no formula or statable law.… What a day may bring forth is…uncertain even to God" (*WD,* 139). On his view, God is a poet—acting spontaneously and creatively—rather than an accountant calculating outcomes according to formulae. God can work miracles – the laws of nature admitting of exceptions – but he is not omnipotent (there being no other way to excuse his failure to obliterate evil). Though a defender of faith, the faith James defends is apt to be viewed by members of the genteel tradition as thin and disconcerting.

Santayana does not try to determine whether James's philosophy of religion is closer to the truth than orthodox Christianity or transcendental idealism is. For him, all three of these views are poetic myths and in deciding among them the question is not which is most probable but rather which is most worthy of pursuit. But rather than enter into a detailed comparison of these views, Santayana rests content with observing that the importance of James's view lies, not in its truth – there being no way to establish this – nor in its having obliterated the ideals of the genteel tradition – there being corners of American culture in which they still thrive. Its importance lies rather in its providing an alternative that ends the genteel tradition's "illegitimate monopoly… over what ought to be assumed and what ought to be hoped for" (*WD,* 141).

In light of his analysis, Santayana thinks philosophy in the United States is entering a new phase. The influence of Calvinism has been progressively weakened by the shift in values accompanying changes in the conditions of workaday life. At the same time, the influence of transcendental idealism has been diminished both in the broader culture, by a growing preoccupation with science and technology, and in academic circles, by the intellectual revolution begun by Emerson and Whitman and brought to fruition in the work of James. Given these developments, Santayana thinks America is poised to reject the egotism and anthropocentrism of the genteel tradition once and for all.

As Santayana sees it, the focus of contemporary American culture on efforts to transform nature to suit its purposes makes it harder to view reality as constituted by human understanding and created ready-made to suit human needs. The experience of catastrophic natural disasters – the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, for example – also drives home the view that human beings are only a part of the world, not its source. Finally, experience of vast natural landscapes makes evident nature's "non-human beauty" and its indifference to human concerns (*WD,* 142). Rather than supplying evidence of "deliberate morality seated in the world," they speak to the superficiality of claims to literal understanding, to the vanity of the idealist view that human reason and values are the center and pivot of the universe and to the great diversity of the forms of flourishing that nature allows. “It is,” he predicts, “the irresistible suasion of this daily spectacle… so different from the verbal discipline of the schools, that will, I trust, inspire the philosophy of [America’s] children” (*WD,* 142–43).

For Santayana, casting aside the genteel tradition in favor of the view that humanity is part of nature does not require that traditional values be deemed unworthy of respect. To deny that human values can be grounded in terms of a broader cosmic purpose is not to deny their seriousness or importance in our lives. It does, however, require that humanity’s sense of its own importance give way to the recognition of its modest place in the “wild, indifferent, non-censorious infinity of nature” (*WD,* 143). On his view, human actions must be seen as counting for very little in the grand scheme of nature. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that what sets human beings apart from the rest of nature is their capacity for speculation and contemplation. To Santayana’s way of thinking, it is “the interest and beauty of this inward landscape, rather than any fortunes that may await [man’s] body in the outer world, [that] constitute his proper happiness” (*WD,* 143).

True to his philosophy, Santayana thinks his view of the place and value of speculative thought in human life is itself a poetic ideal—an imaginative conception of ends worthy of human striving. This ideal is neither subject to proof nor derivable from a metaphysical view about the ends reality is destined to achieve. It is rather to be defended by thinking through its implications in light of critical reflection on human beings and their place in nature and critically comparing it with alternative views. Having exposed the limitations of rival accounts throughout *Winds of Doctrine*, Santayana closes his book with an injunction to pursue the line of thought he has developed, to be “frankly human” and “content to live in the mind” (*WD,* 143).

In *Winds of Doctrine* Santayana presents a careful and perceptive critique of the major philosophical currents of its day. While none of the views he considers now has anything like the influence on philosophy that it had in 1913, it would be a mistake to think that his discussion of them is *passé.* The questions associated with realism, idealism, and pragmatism; fact and value; reason and faith; science and art that he engages are hardly peripheral in philosophy. Nor are they specific to the figures he discusses or the product of a bygone era. What is more, Santayana does far more than expose hitherto unnoticed problems with philosophical doctrines prominent in the early twentieth century. He also develops a systematic philosophy of his own and demonstrates its originality, breadth, and power. The lines of thought—both critical and constructive—that Santayana pursues in *Winds of Doctrine* contain a wealth of insights, not only important to the thought of his day, but to ours as well.

PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

THIS book belongs to another age; it was written before the war. To bring it up to date would hardly be possible; a revision would destroy whatever quiet justice or sympathetic insight those observations may have had in the past, without availing to measure the force of direction of the much rougher winds that are now blowing. Moreover, in respect to the chapters on Shelley, on Modernism, and on the Philosophy of Henri Bergson, there would be nothing to alter: in so far as events could affect my judgments at all, they seem to have confirmed them. On the other hand, what I may have said of the Bertrand Russell of that time has little application to the Bertrand Russell of to-day. On the relativity of morals, which I then defended against him, I understand that he now agrees with me; but we put our common theory in practice by cultivating opposite preferences. In natural philosophy, too, he is now intent on constructing a system which is that of John Stuart Mill under a new name, reducing nature to a compound of appearances most of which do not appear. Thus in lieu of hypostatic ethics we have hypostatic psychology. In Mr. Russell's analysis of facts, whether physical or historical, I confess I have little confidence: it is when he derides the existent or plays with the non-existent that I find him admirable.

It may be an illusion of memory, lending an idyllic simplicity to a past which when present was quite confused and prosaic; but it seems now as if before the war we had been living in a lull of expectancy, in a conscious pause. That comfortable liberal world was like a great tree with the trunk already sawed quite through, but still standing with all its leaves quietly rustling, and with us dozing under its shade. We were inexpressibly surprised when it fell and half crushed us; some of us are talking of setting it up again safely on its severed roots. Others, stunned by the shock, warn us of the *Crise de l'Esprit* or of the *Untergang des Abendlandes;* but illusions and fashions, being nothing more, are always lapsing and always springing up. Their ruin does not interrupt the steady movement of substance beneath, the silent concatenation of material circumstances. Nor does it upset the philosophy of those whose philosophy is ancient and true. We are impressionists, and all seems to us anarchy on the surface; we must wait for the true child of natural selection to manifest his identity, and clear away his rivals. We need not say to him tragically, *morituri te salutamus;* for if the spirit in us is at all quick and plastic it will find in him a reincarnation of itself. Spirit is not the pursuit of this good or that beauty, but of the beautiful and the good.

G. S.

Rome, 1926

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WINDS OF DOCTRINE

I

THE INTELLECTUAL TEMPER OF THE AGE

THE present age is a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilisation characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilisation has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of religious faith; we still appreciate the pompous arts of our forefathers; we are brought up on academic architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music. We still love monarchy and aristocracy, together with that picturesque and dutiful order which rested on local institutions, class privileges, and the authority of the family. We may even feel an organic need for all these things, cling to them tenaciously, and dream of rejuvenating them. On the other hand the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with their equal authority. Our whole life and mind is saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit—that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy.

These epithets may make us shudder; but what they describe is something positive and self-justified, something deeply rooted in our animal nature and inspiring to our hearts, something which, like every vital impulse, is pregnant with a morality of its own. In vain do we deprecate it; it has possession of us already through our propensities, fashions, and language. Our very plutocrats and monarchs are at ease only when they are vulgar. Even prelates and missionaries are hardly sincere or conscious of an honest function, save as they devote themselves to social work; for willy-nilly the new spirit has hold of our consciences as well. This spirit is amiable as well as disquieting, liberating as well as barbaric; and a philosopher in our day, conscious both of the old life and of the new, might repeat what Goethe said of his successive love affairs—that it is sweet to see the moon rise while the sun is still mildly shining.

Meantime our bodies in this generation are generally safe, and often comfortable; and for those who can suspend their irrational labours long enough to look about them, the spectacle of the world, if not particularly beautiful or touching, presents a rapid and crowded drama and (what here concerns me most) one unusually intelligible. The nations, parties, and movements that divide the scene have a known history. We are not condemned, as most generations have been, to fight and believe without an inkling of the cause. The past lies before us; the history of everything is published. Every one records his opinion, and loudly proclaims what he wants. In this Babel of ideals few demands are ever literally satisfied; but many evaporate, merge together, and reach an unintended issue, with which they are content. The whole drift of things presents a huge, good-natured comedy to the observer. It stirs not unpleasantly a certain sturdy animality and hearty self-trust which lie at the base of human nature.

A chief characteristic of the situation is that moral confusion is not limited to the world at large, always the scene of profound conflicts, but that it has penetrated to the mind and heart of the average individual. Never perhaps were men so like one another and so divided within themselves. In other ages, even more than at present, different classes of men have stood at different levels of culture, with a magnificent readiness to persecute and to be martyred for their respective principles. These militant believers have been keenly conscious that they had enemies; but their enemies were strangers to them, whom they could think of merely as such, regarding them as blank negative forces, hateful black devils, whose existence might make life difficult but could not confuse the ideal of life. No one sought to understand these enemies of his, nor even to conciliate them, unless under compulsion or out of insidious policy, to convert them against their will; he merely pelted them with blind refutations and clumsy blows. Every one sincerely felt that the right was entirely on his side, a proof that such intelligence as he had moved freely and exclusively within the lines of his faith. The result of this was that his faith was intelligent, I mean, that he understood it, and had a clear, almost instinctive perception of what was compatible or incompatible with it. He defended his walls and he cultivated his garden. His position and his possessions were unmistakable.

When men and minds were so distinct it was possible to describe and to count them. During the Reformation, when external confusion was at its height, you might have ascertained almost statistically what persons and what regions each side snatched from the other; it was not doubtful which was which. The history of their respective victories and defeats could consequently be written. So in the eighteenth century it was easy to perceive how many people Voltaire and Rousseau might be alienating from Bossuet and Fénelon. But how shall we satisfy ourselves now whether, for instance, Christianity is holding its own? Who can tell what vagary or what compromise may not be calling itself Christianity? A bishop may be a modernist, a chemist may be a mystical theologian, a psychologist may be a believer in ghosts. For science, too, which had promised to supply a new and solid foundation for philosophy, has allowed philosophy rather to undermine its foundation, and is seen eating its own words, through the mouths of some of its accredited spokesmen, and reducing itself to something utterly conventional and insecure. It is characteristic of human nature to be as impatient of ignorance regarding what is not known as lazy in acquiring such knowledge as is at hand; and even those who have not been lazy sometimes take it into their heads to disparage their science and to outdo the professional philosophers in psychological scepticism, in order to plunge with them into the most vapid speculation. Nor is this insecurity about first principles limited to abstract subjects. It reigns in politics as well. Liberalism had been supposed to advocate liberty; but what the advanced parties that still call themselves liberal now advocate is control, control over property, trade, wages, hours of work, meat and drink, amusements, and in a truly advanced country like France control over education and religion; and it is only on the subject of marriage (if we ignore eugenics) that liberalism is growing more and more liberal. Those who speak most of progress measure it by quantity and not by quality; how many people read and write, or how many people there are, or what is the annual value of their trade; whereas true progress would rather lie in reading or writing fewer and better things, and being fewer and better men, and enjoying life more. But the philanthropists are now preparing an absolute subjection of the individual, in soul and body, to the instincts of the majority – the most cruel and unprogressive of masters; and I am not sure that the liberal maxim, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," has not lost whatever was just or generous in its intent and come to mean the greatest idleness of the largest possible population.

Nationality offers another occasion for strange moral confusion. It had seemed that an age that was levelling and connecting all nations, an age whose real achievements were of international application, was destined to establish the solidarity of mankind as a sort of axiom. The idea of solidarity is indeed often invoked in speeches, and there is an extreme socialistic party that—when a wave of national passion does not carry it the other way—believes in international brotherhood. But even here, black men and yellow men are generally excluded; and in higher circles, where history, literature, and political ambition dominate men's minds, nationalism has become of late an omnivorous all-permeating passion. Local parliaments must be everywhere established, extinct or provincial dialects must be galvanised into national languages, philosophy must be made racial, religion must be fostered where it emphasises nationality and denounced where it transcends it. Man is certainly an animal that, when he lives at all, lives for ideals. Something must be found to occupy his imagination, to raise pleasure and pain into love and hatred, and change the prosaic alternative between comfort and discomfort into the tragic one between happiness and sorrow. Now that the hue of daily adventure is so dull, when religion for the most part is so vague and accommodating, when even war is a vast impersonal business, nationality seems to have slipped into the place of honour. It has become the one eloquent, public, intrepid illusion. Illusion, I mean, when it is taken for an ultimate good or a mystical essence, for of course nationality is a fact. People speak some particular language and are very uncomfortable where another is spoken or where their own is spoken differently. They have habits, judgments, assumptions to which they are wedded, and a society where all this is unheard of shocks them and puts them at a galling disadvantage. To ignorant people the foreigner as such is ridiculous, unless he is superior to them in numbers or prestige, when he becomes hateful. It is natural for a man to like to live at home, and to live long elsewhere without a sense of exile is not good for his moral integrity. It is right to feel a greater kinship and affection for what lies nearest to oneself. But this necessary fact and even duty of nationality is accidental; like age or sex it is a physical fatality which can be made the basis of specific and comely virtues; but it is not an end to pursue or a flag to flaunt or a privilege not balanced by a thousand incapacities. Yet of this distinction our contemporaries tend to make an idol, perhaps because it is the only distinction they feel they have left.

Anomalies of this sort will never be properly understood until people accustom themselves to a theory to which they have always turned a deaf ear, because, though simple and true, it is materialistic: namely, that mind is not the cause of our actions but an effect, collateral with our actions, of bodily growth and organisation. It may therefore easily come about that the thoughts of men, tested by the principles that seem to rule their conduct, may be belated, or irrelevant, or premonitory; for the living organism has many strata, on any of which, at a given moment, activities may exist perfect enough to involve consciousness, yet too weak and isolated to control the organs of outer expression; so that (to speak geologically) our practice may be historic, our manners glacial, and our religion palæozoic. The ideals of the nineteenth century may be said to have been all belated; the age still yearned with Rousseau or speculated with Kant, while it moved with Darwin, Bismarck, and Nietzsche: and to-day, in the half-educated classes, among the religious or revolutionary sects, we may observe quite modern methods of work allied with a somewhat antiquated mentality. The whole nineteenth century might well cry with Faust: “Two souls, alas, dwell in my bosom!” The revolutions it witnessed filled it with horror and made it fall in love romantically with the past and dote on ruins, because they were ruins; and the best learning and fiction of the time were historical, inspired by an unprecedented effort to understand remote forms of life and feeling, to appreciate exotic arts and religions, and to rethink the blameless thoughts of savages and criminals. This sympathetic labour and retrospect, however, was far from being merely sentimental; for the other half of this divided soul was looking ahead. Those same revolutions, often so destructive, stupid, and bloody, filled it with pride, and prompted it to invent several incompatible theories concerning a steady and inevitable progress in the world. In the study of the past, side by side with romantic sympathy, there was a sort of realistic, scholarly intelligence and an adventurous love of truth; kindness too was often mingled with dramatic curiosity. The pathologists were usually healers, the philosophers of evolution were inventors or humanitarians or at least idealists: the historians of art (though optimism was impossible here) were also guides to taste, quickeners of moral sensibility, like Ruskin, or enthusiasts for the irresponsibly beautiful, like Pater and Oscar Wilde.

Everywhere in the nineteenth century we find a double preoccupation with the past and with the future, a longing to know what all experience might have been hitherto, and on the other hand to hasten to some wholly different experience, to be contrived immediately with a beating heart and with flying banners. The imagination of the age was intent on history; its conscience was intent on reform.

Reform! This magic word itself covers a great equivocation. To reform means to shatter one form and to create another; but the two sides of the act are not always equally intended nor equally successful. Usually the movement starts from the mere sense of oppression, and people break down some established form, without any qualms about the capacity of their freed instincts to generate the new forms that may be needed. So the Reformation, in destroying the traditional order, intended to secure truth, spontaneity, and profuseness of religious forms; the danger of course being that each form might become meagre and the sum of them chaotic. If the accent, however, could only be laid on the second phase of the transformation, reform might mean the creation of order where it did not sufficiently appear, so that diffuse life should be concentrated into a congenial form that should render it strong and self-conscious. In this sense, if we may trust Mr. Gilbert Murray, it was a great wave of reform that created Greece, or at least all that was characteristic and admirable in it—an effort to organise, train, simplify, purify, and make beautiful the chaos of barbaric customs and passions that had preceded. The danger here, a danger to which Greece actually succumbed, is that so refined an organism may be too fragile, not inclusive enough within, and not buttressed strongly enough without against the flux of the uncivilised world. Christianity also, in the first formative centuries of its existence, was an integrating reform of the same sort, on a different scale and in a different sphere; but here too an enslaved rabble within the soul claiming the suffrage, and better equipped intellectual empires rising round about, seem to prove that the harmony which the Christian system made for a moment out of nature and life was partial and insecure. It is a terrible dilemma in the life of reason whether it will sacrifice natural abundance to moral order, or moral order to natural abundance. Whatever compromise we choose proves unstable, and forces us to a new experiment.

Perhaps in the century that has elapsed since the French Revolution the pendulum has had time to swing as far as it will in the direction of negative reform, and may now begin to move towards that sort of reform which is integrating and creative. The veering of the advanced political parties from liberalism to socialism would seem to be a clear indication of this new tendency. It is manifest also in the love of nature, in athletics, in the new woman, and in a friendly medical attitude towards all the passions.

In the fine arts, however, and in religion and philosophy, we are still in full career towards disintegration. It might have been thought that a germ of rational order would by this time have penetrated into fine art and speculation from the prosperous constructive arts that touch the one, and the prosperous natural and mathematical sciences that touch the other. But as yet there is little sign of it. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century painting and sculpture have passed through several phases, representatives of each naturally surviving after the next had appeared. Romanticism, half lurid, half effeminate, yielded to a brutal pursuit of material truth, and a pious preference for modern and humble sentiment. This realism had a romantic vein in it, and studied vice and crime, tedium and despair, with a very genuine horrified sympathy. Some went in for a display of archæological lore or for exotic *motifs;* others gave all their attention to rediscovering and emphasising abstract problems of execution, the highway of technical tradition having long been abandoned. Beginners are still supposed to study their art, but they have no masters from whom to learn it. Thus, when there seemed to be some danger that art should be drowned in science and history, the artists deftly eluded it by becoming amateurs. One gave himself to religious archaism, another to Japanese composition, a third to barbaric symphonies of colour; sculptors tried to express dramatic climaxes, or inarticulate lyrical passion, such as music might better convey; and the latest whims are apparently to abandon painful observation altogether, to be merely decorative or frankly mystical, and to be satisfied with the childishness of hieroglyphics or the crudity of caricature. The arts are like truant children who think their life will be glorious if they only run away and play for ever; no need is felt of a dominant ideal passion and theme, nor of any moral interest in the interpretation of nature. Artists have no less talent than ever; their taste, their vision, their sentiment are often interesting; they are mighty in their independence and feeble only in their works.

In philosophy there are always the professors, as in art there are always the portrait painters and the makers of official sculpture; and both sorts of academicians are often very expert and well-educated. Yet in philosophy, besides the survival of all the official and endowed systems, there has been of late a very interesting fresh movement, largely among the professors themselves, which in its various hues may be called irrationalism, vitalism, pragmatism, or pure empiricism. But this movement, far from being a reawakening of any organising instinct, is simply an extreme expression of romantic anarchy. It is in essence but a franker confession of the principle upon which modern philosophy has been building – or unbuilding – for these three hundred years, I mean the principle of subjectivity. Berkeley and Hume, the first prophets of the school, taught that experience is not a partial discovery of other things but is itself the only possible object of experience. Therefore, said Kant and the second generation of prophets, any world we may seem to live in, even those worlds of theology or of history which Berkeley or Hume had inadvertently left standing, must be an idea which our present experience suggests to us and which we frame as the principles of our mind allow and dictate that we should. But then, say the latest prophets – Avenarius, William James, M. Bergson – these mental principles are no antecedent necessities or duties imposed on our imagination; they are simply parts of flying experience itself, and the ideas – say of God or of matter – which they lead us to frame have nothing compulsory or fixed about them. Their sole authority lies in the fact that they may be more or less congenial or convenient, by enriching the flying moment æsthetically, or helping it to slip prosperously into the next moment. Immediate feeling, pure experience, is the only reality, the only *fact:* if notions which do not reproduce it fully as it flows are still called true (and they evidently ought not to be) it is only in a pragmatic sense of the word, in that while they present a false and heterogeneous image of reality they are not practically misleading; as, for instance, the letters on this page are no true image of the sounds they call up, nor the sounds of the thoughts, yet both may be correct enough if they lead the reader in the end to the things they symbolise. It is M. Bergson, the most circumspect and best equipped thinker of this often scatter-brained school, who has put this view in a frank and tenable form, avoiding the bungling it has sometimes led to about the “meaning of truth.” Truth, according to M. Bergson, is given only in intuitions which prolong experience just as it occurs, in its full immediacy; on the other hand, all representation, thought, theory, calculation, or discourse is so much mutilation of the truth, excusable only because imposed upon us by practical exigences. The world, being a feeling, must be felt to be known, and then the world and the knowledge of it are identical; but if it is talked about or thought about it is denaturalised, although convention and utility may compel the poor human being to talk and to think, exiled as he is from reality in his Babylon of abstractions. Life, like the porcupine when not ruffled by practical alarms, can let its fretful quills subside. The mystic can live happy in the droning consciousness of his own heart-beats and those of the universe.

With this we seem to have reached the extreme of self-concentration and self-expansion, the perfect identity and involution of everything in oneself. And such indeed is the inevitable goal of the malicious theory of knowledge, to which this school is committed, remote as that goal may be from the boyish naturalism and innocent intent of many of its pupils. If all knowledge is of experience and experience cannot be knowledge of anything else, knowledge proper is evidently impossible. There can be only feeling; and the least self-transcendence, even in memory, must be an illusion. You may have the most complex images you will; but nothing pictured there can exist outside, not even past or alien experience, if you picture it.[1] Solipsism has always been the evident implication of idealism; but the idealists, when confronted with this consequence, which is dialectically inconvenient, have never been troubled at heart by it, for at heart they accept it. To the uninitiated they have merely murmured, with a pitying smile and a wave of the hand: What! are you still troubled by that? Or if compelled to be so scholastic as to labour the point they have explained, as usual, that oneself cannot be the absolute because the *idea* of oneself, to arise, must be contrasted with other ideas. Therefore, you cannot well have the idea of a world in which nothing appears but the *idea* of yourself. This explanation, in pretending to refute solipsism, of course assumes and confirms it; for all these *cans* and *musts* touch only your idea of yourself, not your actual being, and there is no thinkable world that is not within you, as you exist really. Thus idealists are wedded to solipsism irrevocably; and it is a happy marriage, only the name of the lady has to be changed.

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[1] Perhaps some unsophisticated reader may wonder if I am not trying to mislead him, or if any mortal ever really maintained anything so absurd. Strictly the idealistic principle does not justify a denial that independent things, by chance resembling my ideas, may actually exist; but it justifies the denial that these things, if they existed, could be those I know. My past would not be my past if I did not appropriate it; my ideas would not refer to their objects unless both were ideas identified in my mind. In practice, therefore, idealists feel free to ignore the gratuitous possibility of existences lying outside the circle of objects knowable to the thinker, which, according to them, is the circle of his ideas. In this way they turn a human method of approach into a charter for existence and non-existence, and their point of view becomes the creative power. When the idealist studies astronomy, does he learn anything about the stars that God made? Far from him so naïve a thought! His astronomy consists of two activities of his own (and he is very fond of activity): star-gazing and calculation. When he has become quite proficient he knows all about star-gazing and calculation; but he knows nothing of any stars that God made; for there are no stars except his visual images of stars, and there is no God but himself. It is true that to soften this hard saying a little he would correct me and say his *higher* self; but as his lower self is only the idea of himself which he may have framed, it is his higher self that is himself simply: although whether he or his idea of himself is really the higher might seem doubtful to an outsider.

Nevertheless, lest peace should come (and peace nowadays is neither possible nor desired), a counter-current at once overtakes the philosophy of the immediate and carries it violently to the opposite pole of speculation—from mystic intuition to a commercial cult of action and a materialisation of the mind such as no materialist had ever dreamt of. The tenderness which the pragmatists feel for life in general, and especially for an accelerated modern life, has doubtless contributed to this revulsion, but the speculative consideration of the immediate might have led to it independently. For in the immediate there is marked expectancy, craving, prayer; nothing absorbs consciousness so much as what is not quite given. Therefore it is a good reading of the immediate, as well as a congenial thing to say to the contemporary world, that reality is change, growth, action, creation. Similarly the sudden materialisation of mind, the unlooked-for assertion that consciousness does not exist, has its justification in the same quarter. In the immediate what appears is the thing, not the mind to which the thing appears. Even in the passions, when closely scanned introspectively, you will find a new sensitiveness or ebullition of the body, or a rush of images and words; you will hardly find a separate object called anger or love. The passions, therefore, when their moral essence is forgotten, may be said to be literally nothing but a movement of their organs and their objects, just as ideas may be said to be nothing but fragments or cross-threads of the material world. Thus the mind and the object are rolled into one moving mass; motions are identified with passions, things are perceptions extended, perceptions are things cut down. And, by a curious revolution in sentiment, it is things and motions that are reputed to have the fuller and the nobler reality. Under cover of a fusion or neutrality between idealism and realism, moral materialism, the reverence for mere existence and power, takes possession of the heart, and ethics becomes idolatrous. Idolatry, however, is hardly possible if you have a cold and clear idea of blocks and stones, attributing to them only the motions they are capable of; and accordingly idealism, by way of compensation, has to take possession of physics. The idol begins to wink and drop tears under the wistful gaze of the worshipper. Matter is felt to yearn, and evolution is held to be more divinely inspired than policy or reason could ever be.

Extremes meet, and the tendency to practical materialism was never wholly absent from the idealism of the moderns. Certainly, the tumid respectability of Anglo-German philosophy had somehow to be left behind; and Darwinian England and Bismarckian Germany had another inspiration as well to guide them, if it could only come to consciousness in the professors. The worship of power is an old religion, and Hegel, to go no farther back, is full of it; but like traditional religion his system qualified its veneration for success by attributing success, in the future at least, to what could really inspire veneration; and such a master in equivocation could have no difficulty in convincing himself that the good must conquer in the end if whatever conquers in the end is the good. Among the pragmatists the worship of power is also optimistic, but it is not to logic that power is attributed. Science, they say, is good as a help to industry, and philosophy is good for correcting whatever in science might disturb religious faith, which in turn is helpful in living. What industry or life are good for it would be unsympathetic to inquire: the stream is mighty, and we must swim with the stream. Concern for survival, however, which seems to be the pragmatic principle in morals, does not afford a remedy for moral anarchy. To take firm hold on life, according to Nietzsche, we should be imperious, poetical, atheistic; but according to William James we should be democratic, concrete, and credulous. It is hard to say whether pragmatism is come to emancipate the individual spirit and make it lord over things, or on the contrary to declare the spirit a mere instrument for the survival of the flesh. In Italy, the mind seems to be raised deliriously into an absolute creator, evoking at will, at each moment, a new past, a new future, a new earth, and a new God. In America, however, the mind is recommended rather as an unpatented device for oiling the engine of the body and making it do double work.

Trustful faith in evolution and a longing for intense life are characteristic of contemporary sentiment; but they do not appear to be consistent with that contempt for the intellect which is no less characteristic of it. Human intelligence is certainly a product, and a late and highly organised product, of evolution; it ought apparently to be as much admired as the eyes of molluscs or the antennæ of ants. And if life is better the more intense and concentrated it is, intelligence would seem to be the best form of life. But the degree of intelligence which this age possesses makes it so very uncomfortable that, in this instance, it asks for something less vital, and sighs for what evolution has left behind. In the presence of such cruelly distinct things as astronomy or such cruelly confused things as theology it feels *la nostalgie de la boue.* It was only, M. Bergson tells us, where dead matter oppressed life that life was forced to become intelligence; for this reason intelligence kills whatever it touches; it is the tribute that life pays to death. Life would find it sweet to throw off that painful subjection to circumstance and bloom in some more congenial direction. M. Bergson's own philosophy is an effort to realise this revulsion, to disintegrate intelligence and stimulate sympathetic experience. Its charm lies in the relief which it brings to a stale imagination, an imagination from which religion has vanished and which is kept stretched on the machinery of business and society, or on small half-borrowed passions which we clothe in a mean rhetoric and dot with vulgar pleasures. Finding their intelligence enslaved, our contemporaries suppose that intelligence is essentially servile; instead of freeing it, they try to elude it. Not free enough themselves morally, but bound to the world partly by piety and partly by industrialism, they cannot think of rising to a detached contemplation of earthly things, and of life itself and evolution; they revert rather to sensibility, and seek some by-path of instinct or dramatic sympathy in which to wander. Having no stomach for the ultimate, they burrow downwards towards the primitive. But the longing to be primitive is a disease of culture; it is archaism in morals. To be so preoccupied with vitality is a symptom of anæmia. When life was really vigorous and young, in Homeric times for instance, no one seemed to fear that it might be squeezed out of existence either by the incubus of matter or by the petrifying blight of intelligence. Life was like the light of day, something to use, or to waste, or to enjoy. It was not a thing to worship; and often the chief luxury of living consisted in dealing death about vigorously. Life indeed was loved, and the beauty and pathos of it were felt exquisitely; but its beauty and pathos lay in the divineness of its model and in its own fragility. No one paid it the equivocal compliment of thinking it a substance or a material force. Nobility was not then impossible in sentiment, because there were ideals in life higher and more indestructible than life itself, which life might illustrate and to which it might fitly be sacrificed. Nothing can be meaner than the anxiety to live on, to live on anyhow and in any shape; a spirit with any honour is not willing to live except in its own way, and a spirit with any wisdom is not over-eager to live at all. In those days men recognised immortal gods and resigned themselves to being mortal. Yet those were the truly vital and instinctive days of the human spirit. Only when vitality is low do people find material things oppressive and ideal things unsubstantial. Now there is more motion than life, and more haste than force; we are driven to distraction by the ticking of the tiresome clocks, material and social, by which we are obliged to regulate our existence. We need ministering angels to fly to us from somewhere, even if it be from the depths of protoplasm. We must bathe in the currents of some non-human vital flood, like consumptives in their last extremity who must bask in the sunshine and breathe the mountain air; and our disease is not without its sophistry to convince us that we were never so well before, or so mightily conscious of being alive.

When chaos has penetrated so far into the moral being of nations they can hardly be expected to produce great men. A great man need not be virtuous, nor his opinions right, but he must have a firm mind, a distinctive, luminous character; if he is to dominate things, something must be dominant in him. We feel him to be great in that he clarifies and brings to expression something which was potential in the rest of us, but which with our burden of flesh and circumstance we were too torpid to utter. The great man is a spontaneous variation in humanity; but not in any direction. A spontaneous variation might be a mere madness or mutilation or monstrosity; in finding the variation admirable we evidently invoke some principle of order to which it conforms. Perhaps it makes explicit what was preformed in us also; as when a poet finds the absolutely right phrase for a feeling, or when nature suddenly astonishes us with a form of absolute beauty. Or perhaps it makes an unprecedented harmony out of things existing before, but jangled and detached. The first man was a great man for this latter reason; having been an ape perplexed and corrupted by his multiplying instincts, he suddenly found a new way of being decent, by harnessing all those instincts together, through memory and imagination, and giving each in turn a measure of its due; which is what we call being rational. It is a new road to happiness, if you have strength enough to castigate a little the various impulses that sway you in turn. Why then is the martyr, who sacrifices everything to one attraction, distinguished from the criminal or the fool, who do the same thing? Evidently because the spirit that in the martyr destroys the body is the very spirit which the body is stifling in the rest of us; and although his private inspiration may be irrational, the tendency of it is not, but reduces the public conscience to act before any one else has had the courage to do so. Greatness is spontaneous; simplicity, trust in some one clear instinct, are essential to it; but the spontaneous variation must be in the direction of some possible sort of order; it must exclude and leave behind what is incapable of being moralised. How, then, should there be any great heroes, saints, artists, philosophers, or legislators in an age when nobody trusts himself, or feels any confidence in reason, in an age when the word *dogmatic* is a term of reproach? Greatness has character and severity, it is deep and sane, it is distinct and perfect. For this reason there is none of it to-day.

There is indeed another kind of greatness, or rather largeness of mind, which consists in being a synthesis of humanity in its current phases, even if without prophetic emphasis or direction: the breadth of a Goethe, rather than the fineness of a Shelley or a Leopardi. But such largeness of mind, not to be vulgar, must be impartial, comprehensive, Olympian; it would not be greatness if its miscellany were not dominated by a clear genius and if before the confusion of things the poet or philosopher were not himself delighted, exalted, and by no means confused. Nor does this presume omniscience on his part. It is not necessary to fathom the ground or the structure of everything in order to know what to make of it. Stones do not disconcert a builder because he may not happen to know what they are chemically; and so the unsolved problems of life and nature, and the Babel of society, need not disturb the genial observer, though he may be incapable of unravelling them. He may set these dark spots down in their places, like so many caves or wells in a landscape, without feeling bound to scrutinise their depths simply because their depths are obscure. Unexplored they may have a sort of lustre, explored they might merely make him blind, and it may be a sufficient understanding of them to know that they are not worth investigating. In this way the most chaotic age and the most motley horrors might be mirrored limpidly in a great mind, as the Renaissance was mirrored in the works of Raphael and Shakespeare; but the master's eye itself must be single, his style unmistakable, his visionary interest in what he depicts frank and supreme. Hence this comprehensive sort of greatness too is impossible in an age when moral confusion is pervasive, when characters are complex, undecided, troubled by the mere existence of what is not congenial to them, eager to be not themselves; when, in a word, thought is weak and the flux of things overwhelms it.

Without great men and without clear convictions this age is nevertheless very active intellectually; it is studious, empirical, inventive, sympathetic. Its wisdom consists in a certain contrite openness of mind; it flounders, but at least in floundering it has gained a sense of possible depths in all directions. Under these circumstances, some triviality and great confusion in its positive achievements are not unpromising things, nor even unamiable. These are the *Wanderjahre* of faith; it looks smilingly at every new face, which might perhaps be that of a predestined friend; it chases after any engaging stranger; it even turns up again from time to time at home, full of a new tenderness for all it had abandoned there. But to settle down would be impossible now. The intellect, the judgment are in abeyance. Life is running turbid and full; and it is no marvel that reason, after vainly supposing that it ruled the world, should abdicate as gracefully as possible, when the world is so obviously the sport of cruder powers—vested interests, tribal passions, stock sentiments, and chance majorities. Having no responsibility laid upon it, reason has become irresponsible. Many critics and philosophers seem to conceive that thinking aloud is itself literature. Sometimes reason tries to lend some moral authority to its present masters, by proving how superior they are to itself; it worships evolution, instinct, novelty, action, as it does in modernism, pragmatism, and the philosophy of M. Bergson. At other times it retires into the freehold of those temperaments whom this world has ostracised, the region of the non-existent, and comforts itself with its indubitable conquests there. This happened earlier to the romanticists (in a way which I have tried to describe in the subjoined paper on Shelley) although their poetic and political illusions did not suffer them to perceive it. It is happening now, after disillusion, to some radicals and mathematicians like Mr. Bertrand Russell, and to others of us who, perhaps without being mathematicians or even radicals, feel that the sphere of what happens to exist is too alien and accidental to absorb all the play of a free mind, whose function, after it has come to clearness and made its peace with things, is to touch them with its own moral and intellectual light, and to exist for its own sake.

These are but gusts of doctrine; yet they prove that the spirit is not dead in the lull between its seasons of steady blowing. Who knows which of them may not gather force presently and carry the mind of the coming age steadily before it?

II

MODERNISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Prevalent winds of doctrine must needs penetrate at last into the cloister. Social instability and moral confusion, reconstructions of history and efforts after reform, are things characteristic of the present age; and under the name of modernism they have made their appearance even in that institution which is constitutionally the most stable, of most explicit mind, least inclined to revise its collective memory or established usages—I mean the Catholic church. Even after this church was constituted by the fusion of many influences and by the gradual exclusion of those heresies—some of them older than explicit orthodoxy—which seemed to misrepresent its implications or spirit, there still remained an inevitable propensity among Catholics to share the moods of their respective ages and countries, and to reconcile them if possible with their professed faith. Often these cross influences were so strong that the profession of faith was changed frankly to suit them, and Catholicism was openly abandoned; but even where this did not occur we may detect in the Catholic minds of each age some strange conjunctions and compromises with the *Zeitgeist*. Thus the morality of chivalry and war, the ideals of foppishness and honour, have been long maintained side by side with the maxims of the gospel, which they entirely contradict. Later the system of Copernicus, incompatible at heart with the anthropocentric and moralistic view of the world which Christianity implies, was accepted by the church with some lame attempt to render it innocuous; but it remains an alien and hostile element, like a spent bullet lodged in the flesh. In more recent times we have heard of liberal Catholicism, the attitude assumed by some generous but divided minds, too much attached to their traditional religion to abandon it, but too weak and too hopeful not to glow also with enthusiasm for modern liberty and progress. Had those minds been, I will not say intelligently Catholic but radically Christian, they would have felt that this liberty was simply liberty to be damned, and this progress not an advance towards the true good of man, but a lapse into endless and heathen wanderings. For Christianity, in its essence and origin, was an urgent summons to repent and come out of just such a worldly life as modern liberty and progress hold up as an ideal to the nations. In the Roman empire, as in the promised land of liberalism, each man sought to get and to enjoy as much as he could, and supported a ponderous government neutral as to religion and moral traditions, but favourable to the accumulation of riches; so that a certain enlightenment and cosmopolitanism were made possible, and private passions and tastes could be gratified without encountering persecution or public obloquy, though not without a general relaxation of society and a vulgarising of arts and manners. That something so self-indulgent and worldly as this ideal of liberalism could have been thought compatible with Christianity, the first initiation into which, in baptism, involves renouncing the world, might well astonish us, had we not been rendered deaf to moral discords by the very din which from our birth they have been making in our ears.

But this is not all. Primitive Christianity was not only a summons to turn one's heart and mind away from a corrupt world; it was a summons to do so under pain of instant and terrible punishment. It was the conviction of pious Jews since the days of the Prophets that mercilessness, avarice, and disobedience to revealed law were the direct path to ruin; a world so wicked as the liberal world against which St. John the Baptist thundered was necessarily on the verge of destruction. Sin, although we moderns may not think so, seemed to the ancient Jews a fearful imprudence. The hand of the Lord would descend on it heavily, and very soon. The whole Roman civilisation was to be overthrown in the twinkling of an eye. Those who hoped to be of the remnant and to be saved, so as to lead a clarified and heavenly life in the New Jerusalem, must hasten to put on sackcloth and ashes, to fast and to pray, to watch with girded loins for the coming of the kingdom; it was superfluous for them to study the dead past or to take thought for the morrow. The cataclysm was at hand; a new heaven and a new earth—far more worthy of study—would be unrolled before that very generation.

There was indeed something terribly levelling, revolutionary, serious, and expectant about that primitive gospel; and in so far as liberalism possessed similar qualities, in so far as it was moved by indignation, pity, and fervent hope, it could well preach on early Christian texts. But the liberal Catholics were liberals of the polite and governmental sort; they were shocked at suffering rather than at sin, and they feared not the Lord but the movement of public opinion. Some of them were vaguely pious men, whose conservativism in social and moral matters forbade them to acquiesce in the disappearance of the church altogether, and they thought it might be preserved, as the English church is, by making opportune concessions. Others were simply aristocrats, desirous that the pacifying influence of religion should remain strong over the masses. The clergy was not, in any considerable measure, tossed by these opposing currents; the few priests who were liberals were themselves men of the world, patriots, and orators. Such persons could not look forward to a fierce sifting of the wheat from the tares, or to any burning of whole bundles of nations, for they were nothing if not romantic nationalists, and the idea of faggots of any sort was most painful to their minds. They longed rather for a sweet cohabitation with everybody, and a mild tolerance of almost everything. A war for religion seemed to them a crime, but a war for nationality glorious and holy. No wonder that their work in nation-building has endured, while their sentiments in religion are scattered to the winds. The liberalism for the sake of which they were willing to eviscerate their Christianity has already lost its vitality; it survives as a pale parliamentary tradition, impotent before the tide of socialism rising behind its back. The Catholicism which they wished to see gently lingering is being driven out of national life by official spoliations and popular mockeries. It is fast becoming what it was in the beginning, a sect with more or less power to alienate the few who genuinely adhere to it from the pagan society in which they are forced to live.

The question what is true or essential Christianity is a thorny one, because each party gives the name of genuine Christianity to what it happens to believe. Thus Professor Harnack, not to mention less distinguished historians, makes the original essence of Christianity coincide – what a miracle! – with his own Lutheran and Kantian sentiments. But the essence of Christianity, as of everything else, is the whole of it; and the genuine nature of a seed is at least as well expressed by what it becomes in contact with the earth and air as by what it seems in its primitive minuteness. It is quite true, as the modernists tell us, that in the beginning Christian faith was not a matter of scholastic definitions, nor even of intellectual dogmas. Religions seldom begin in that form, and paganism was even less intellectual and less dogmatic than early Christianity. The most primitive Christian faith consisted in a conversion of the whole man – intellect, habits, and affections – from the life of the world to a new mystical life, in answer to a moral summons and a prophecy about destiny. The moral summons was to renounce home, kindred, possessions, the respect of men, the hypocrisies of the synagogue, and to devote oneself to a wandering and begging life, healing, praying, and preaching. And preaching what? Preaching the prophecy about destiny which justified that conversion and renunciation; preaching that the world, in its present constitution, was about to be destroyed on account of its wickedness, and that the ignorant, the poor, and the down-trodden, if they trusted this prophecy, and turned their backs at once on all the world pursues, would be saved in the new deluge, and would form a new society, of a more or less supernatural kind, to be raised on the ruins of all present institutions. The poor were called, but the rich were called also, and perhaps even the heathen; for there was in all men, even in all nature (this is the one touch of speculative feeling in the gospel), a precious potentiality of goodness. All were essentially amiable, though accidentally wretched and depraved; and by the magic of a new faith and hope this soul of goodness in all living things might be freed from the hideous incubus of circumstance that now oppresses it, and might come to bloom openly as the penetrating eye of the lover, even now, sees that it could bloom. Love, then, and sympathy, particularly towards the sinful and diseased, a love relieved of sentimentality by the deliberate practice of healing, warning, and comforting; a complete aversion from all the interests of political society, and a confident expectation of a cataclysm that should suddenly transfigure the world – such was Christian religion in its origin. The primitive Christian was filled with the sense of a special election and responsibility, and of a special hope. He was serene, abstracted, incorruptible, his inward eye fixed on a wonderful revelation. He was as incapable of attacking as of serving the state; he despised or ignored everything for which the state exists, labour, wealth, power, felicity, splendour, and learning. With Christ the natural man in him had been crucified, and in Christ he had risen again a spiritual man, to walk the earth, as a messenger from heaven, for a few more years. His whole life was an experience of perpetual graces and miracles.

The prophecy about the speedy end of this wicked world was not fulfilled as the early Christians expected; but this fact is less disconcerting to the Christian than one would suppose. The spontaneous or instinctive Christian—and there is such a type of mind, quite apart from any affiliation to historic Christianity—takes a personal and dramatic view of the world; its values and even its reality are the values and reality which it may have for him. It would profit him nothing to win it, if he lost his own soul. That prophecy about the destruction of nature springs from this attitude; nature must be subservient to the human conscience; it must satisfy the hopes of the prophet and vindicate the saints. That the years should pass and nothing should seem to happen need not shatter the force of this prophecy for those whose imagination it excites. This world must actually vanish very soon for each of us; and this is the point of view that counts with the Christian mind. Even if we consider posterity, the kingdoms and arts and philosophies of this world are short lived; they shift their aims continually and shift their substance. The prophecy of their destruction is therefore being fulfilled continually; the need of repentance, if one would be saved, is truly urgent; and the means of that salvation cannot be an operation upon this world, but faith in another world that, in the experience of each soul, is to follow upon it. Thus the summons to repent and the prophecy about destiny which were the root of Christianity, can fully retain their spirit when for "this wicked world" we read "this transitory life" and for "the coming of the Kingdom" we read "life everlasting." The change is important, but it affects the application rather than the nature of the gospel. Morally there is a loss, because men will never take so hotly what concerns another life as what affects this one; speculatively, on the other hand, there is a gain, for the expectation of total transformations and millenniums on earth is a very crude illusion, while the relation of the soul to nature is an open question in philosophy, and there will always be a great loftiness and poetic sincerity in the feeling that the soul is a stranger in this world and has other destinies in store.

What would make the preaching of the gospel utterly impossible would be the admission that it had no authority to proclaim what has happened or what is going to happen, either in this world or in another. A prophecy about destiny is an account, however vague, of events to be actually experienced, and of their causes. The whole inspiration of Hebraic religion lies in that. It was not metaphorically that Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed. The promised land was a piece of earth. The kingdom was an historical fact. It was not symbolically that Israel was led into captivity, or that it returned and restored the Temple. It was not ideally that a Messiah was to come. Memory of such events is in the same field as history; prophecy is in the same field as natural science. Natural science too is an account of what will happen, and under what conditions. It too is a prophecy about destiny. Accordingly, while it is quite true that speculations about nature and history are not contained explicitly in the religion of the gospel, yet the message of this religion is one which speculations about nature and reconstructions of history may extend congruously, or may contradict and totally annul. If physical science should remove those threats of destruction to follow upon sin which Christian prophecy contains, or if it should prove that what brings destruction is just that unworldly, prayerful, all-forgiving, idle, and revolutionary attitude which the gospel enjoins, then physical science would be incompatible with Christianity; not with this or that text of the Bible merely, about the sun standing still or the dead rising again, but with the whole foundation of what Christ himself, with John the Baptist, St. Paul, St. James, and St. John, preached to the world.

Even the pagan poets, when they devised a myth, half believed in it for a fact. What really lent some truth—moral truth only—to their imaginations was indeed the beauty of nature, the comedy of life, or the groans of mankind, crushed between the upper and the nether millstones; but being scientifically ignorant they allowed their pictorial wisdom to pass for a revealed science, for a physics of the unseen. If even among the pagans the poetic expression of human experience could be mistaken in this way for knowledge of occult existences, how much more must this have been the case among a more ignorant and a more intense nation like the Jews? Indeed, *events* are what the Jews have always remembered and hoped for; if their religion was not a guide to events, an assured means towards a positive and experimental salvation, it was nothing. Their theology was meagre in the description of the Lord's nature, but rich in the description of his ways. Indeed, their belief in the existence and power of the Lord, if we take it pragmatically and not imaginatively, was simply the belief in certain moral harmonies in destiny, in the sufficiency of conduct of a certain sort to secure success and good fortune, both national and personal. This faith was partly an experience and partly a demand; it turned on history and prophecy. History was interpreted by a prophetic insight into the moral principle, believed to govern it; and prophecy was a passionate demonstration of the same principles, at work in the catastrophes of the day or of the morrow.

There is no doubt a Platonic sort of religion, a worship of the ideal apart from its power to realise itself, which has entered largely into the life of Christians; and the more mystical and disinterested they were, the more it has tended to take the place of Hebraism. But the Platonists, too, when left to their instincts, follow their master in attributing power and existence, by a sort of cumulative worship and imaginative hyperbole, to what in the first place they worship because it is good. To divorce, then, as the modernists do, the history of the world from the story of salvation, and God's government and the sanctions of religion from the operation of matter, is a *fundamental apostasy* from Christianity. Christianity, being a practical and living faith in a possible eventual redemption from sin, from the punishment for sin, from the thousand circumstances that make the most brilliant worldly life a sham and a failure, essentially involves a faith in a supernatural physics, in such an economy of forces, behind, within, and around the discoverable forces of nature, that the destiny which nature seems to prepare for us may be reversed, that failures may be turned into successes, ignominy into glory, and humble faith into triumphant vision: and this not merely by a change in our point of view or estimation of things, but by an actual historical, physical transformation in the things themselves. To believe this in our day may require courage, even a certain childish simplicity; but were not courage and a certain childish simplicity always requisite for Christian faith? It never was a religion for the rationalist and the worldling; it was based on alienation from the world, from the intellectual world no less than from the economic and political. It flourished in the Oriental imagination that is able to treat all existence with disdain and to hold it superbly at arm's length, and at the same time is subject to visions and false memories, is swayed by the eloquence of private passion, and raises confidently to heaven the cry of the poor, the bereaved, and the distressed. Its daily bread, from the beginning, was hope for a miraculous change of scene, for prison-walls falling to the ground about it, for a heart inwardly comforted, and a shower of good things from the sky.

It is clear that a supernaturalistic faith of this sort, which might wholly inspire some revolutionary sect, can never wholly inspire human society. Whenever a nation is converted to Christianity, its Christianity, in practice, must be largely converted into paganism. The true Christian is in all countries a pilgrim and a stranger; not his kinsmen, but whoever does the will of his Father who is in heaven is his brother and sister and mother and his real compatriot. In a nation that calls itself Christian every child may be pledged, at baptism, to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil; but the flesh will assert itself notwithstanding, the devil will have his due, and the nominal Christian, become a man of business and the head of a family, will form an integral part of that very world which he will pledge his children to renounce in turn as he holds them over the font. The lips, even the intellect, may continue to profess the Christian ideal; but public and social life will be guided by quite another. The ages of faith, the ages of Christian unity, were such only superficially. When all men are Christians only a small element can be Christian in the average man. The thirteenth century, for instance, is supposed to be the golden age of Catholicism; but what seems to have filled it, if we may judge by the witness of Dante? Little but bitter conflicts, racial and religious; faithless rebellions, both in states and in individuals, against the Christian regimen; worldliness in the church, barbarism in the people, and a dawning of all sorts of scientific and æsthetic passions, in themselves quite pagan and contrary to the spirit of the gospel. Christendom at that time was by no means a kingdom of God on earth; it was a conglomeration of incorrigible rascals, intellectually more or less Christian. We may see the same thing under different circumstances in the Spain of Philip II. Here was a government consciously labouring in the service of the church, to resist Turks, convert pagans, banish Moslems, and crush Protestants. Yet the very forces engaged in defending the church, the army and the Inquisition, were alien to the Christian life; they were fit embodiments rather of chivalry and greed, or of policy and jealous dominion. The ecclesiastical forces also, theology, ritual, and hierarchy, employed in spreading the gospel were themselves alien to the gospel. An anti-worldly religion finds itself in fact in this dilemma: if it remains merely spiritual, developing no material organs, it cannot affect the world; while if it develops organs with which to operate on the world, these organs become a part of the world from which it is trying to wean the individual spirit, so that the moment it is armed for conflict such a religion has two enemies on its hands. It is stifled by its necessary armour, and adds treason in its members to hostility in its foes. The passions and arts it uses against its opponents are as fatal to itself as those which its opponents array against it.

In every age in which a supernaturalistic system is preached we must accordingly expect to find the world standing up stubbornly against it, essentially unconverted and hostile, whatever name it may have been christened with; and we may expect the spirit of the world to find expression, not only in overt opposition to the supernaturalistic system, but also in the surviving or supervening worldliness of the faithful. Such an insidious revulsion of the natural man against a religion he does not openly discard is what, in modern Christendom, we call the Renaissance. No less than the Revolution (which is the later open rebellion against the same traditions) the Renaissance is radically inimical to Christianity. To say that Christianity survives, even if weakened or disestablished, is to say that the Renaissance and the Revolution are still incomplete. Far from being past events they are living programmes. The ideal of the Renaissance is to restore pagan standards in polite learning, in philosophy, in sentiment, and in morals. It is to abandon and exactly reverse one's baptismal vows. Instead of forsaking this wicked world, the men of the Renaissance accept, love, and cultivate the world, with all its pomp and vanities; they believe in the blamelessness of natural life and in its perfectibility; or they cling at least to a noble ambition to perfect it and a glorious ability to enjoy it. Instead of renouncing the flesh, they feed, refine, and adorn it; their arts glorify its beauty and its passions. And far from renouncing the devil – if we understand by the devil the proud assertion on the part of the finite of its autonomy, autonomy of the intellect in science, autonomy of the heart and will in morals – the men of the Renaissance are possessed by the devil altogether. They worship nothing and acknowledge authority in nothing save in their own spirit. No opposition could be more radical and complete than that between the Renaissance and the anti-worldly religion of the gospel.

"I see a vision," Nietzsche says somewhere, "so full of meaning, yet so wonderfully strange – Cæsar Borgia become pope! Do you understand? Ah, that would verily have been the triumph for which I am longing to-day. Then Christianity would have been done for." And Nietzsche goes on to accuse Luther of having spoiled this lovely possibility, which was about to be realised, by frightening the papacy out of its mellow paganism into something like a restoration of the old acrid Christianity. A dream of this sort, even if less melodramatic than Nietzsche's, has visited the mind of many a neo-Catholic or neo-pagan. If the humanistic tendencies of the Renaissance could have worked on unimpeded, might not a revolution from above, a gradual rationalisation, have transformed the church? Its dogma might have been insensibly understood to be nothing but myth, its miracles nothing but legend, its sacraments mere symbols, its Bible pure literature, its liturgy just poetry, its hierarchy an administrative convenience, its ethics an historical accident, and its whole function simply to lend a warm mystical aureole to human culture and ignorance. The Reformation prevented this euthanasia of Christianity. It re-expressed the unenlightened absolutism of the old religion; it insisted that dogma was scientifically true, that salvation was urgent and fearfully doubtful, that the world, and the worldly paganised church, were as Sodom and Gomorrah, and that sin, though natural to man, was to God an abomination. In fighting this movement, which soon became heretical, the Catholic church had to fight it with its own weapons, and thereby reawakened in its own bosom the same sinister convictions. It did not have to dig deep to find them. Even without Luther, convinced Catholics would have appeared in plenty to prevent Cæsar Borgia, had he secured the tiara, from being pope in any novel fashion or with any revolutionary result. The supernaturalism, the literal realism, the other-worldliness of the Catholic church are too much the soul of it to depart without causing its dissolution. While the church lives at all, it must live on the strength which these principles can lend it. And they are not altogether weak. Persons who feel themselves to be exiles in this world—and what noble mind, from Empedocles down, has not had that feeling?—are mightily inclined to believe themselves citizens of another. There will always be spontaneous, instinctive Christians; and when, under the oppression of sin, salvation is looked for and miracles are expected, the supernatural scheme of salvation which historical Christianity offers will not always be despised. The modernists think the church is doomed if it turns a deaf ear to the higher criticism or ignores the philosophy of M. Bergson. But it has outlived greater storms. A moment when any exotic superstition can find excitable minds to welcome it, when new and grotesque forms of faith can spread among the people, when the ultimate impotence of science is the theme of every cheap philosopher, when constructive philology is reefing its sails, when the judicious grieve at the portentous metaphysical shams of yesterday and smile at those of to-day—such a moment is rather ill chosen for prophesying the extinction of a deep-rooted system of religion because your own studies make it seem to you incredible; especially if you hold a theory of knowledge that regards all opinions as arbitrary postulates, which it may become convenient to abandon at any moment.

Modernism is the infiltration into minds that begin by being Catholic and wish to remain so of two contemporary influences: one the rationalistic study of the Bible and of church history, the other modern philosophy, especially in its mystical and idealistic forms. The sensitiveness of the modernists to these two influences is creditable to them as men, however perturbing it may be to them as Catholics; for what makes them adopt the views of rationalistic historians is simply the fact that those views seem, in substance, convincingly true; and what makes them wander into transcendental speculations is the warmth of their souls, needing to express their faith anew, and to follow their inmost inspiration, wherever it may lead them. A scrupulous honesty in admitting the probable facts of history, and a fresh upwelling of mystical experience, these are the motives, creditable to any spiritual man, that have made modernists of so many. But these excellent things appear in the modernists under rather unfortunate circumstances. For the modernists to begin with are Catholics, and usually priests; they are pledged to a fixed creed, touching matters both of history and of philosophy; and it would be a marvel if rationalistic criticism of the Bible and rationalistic church history confirmed that creed on its historical side, or if irresponsible personal speculations, in the manner of Ritschl or of M. Bergson, confirmed its metaphysics.

I am far from wishing to suggest that an orthodox Christian cannot be scrupulously honest in admitting the probable facts, or cannot have a fresh spiritual experience, or frame an original philosophy. But what we think probable hangs on our standard of probability and of evidence; the spiritual experiences that come to us are according to our disposition and affections; and any new philosophy we frame will be an answer to the particular problems that beset us, and an expression of the solutions we hope for. Now this standard of probability, this disposition, and these problems and hopes may be those of a Christian or they may not. The true Christian, for instance, will begin by regarding miracles as probable; he will either believe he has experienced them in his own person, or hope for them earnestly; nothing will seem to him more natural, more in consonance with the actual texture of life, than that they should have occurred abundantly and continuously in the past. When he finds the record of one he will not inquire, like the rationalist, how that false record could have been concocted; but rather he will ask how the rationalist, in spite of so many witnesses to the contrary, has acquired his fixed assurance of the universality of the commonplace. An answer perhaps could be offered of which the rationalist need not be ashamed. We might say that faith in the universality of the commonplace (in its origin, no doubt, simply an imaginative presumption) is justified by our systematic mastery of matter in the arts. The rejection of miracles *a priori* expresses a conviction that the laws by which we can always control or predict the movement of matter govern that movement universally; and evidently, if the material course of history is fixed mechanically, the mental and moral course of it is thereby fixed on the same plan; for a mind not expressed somehow in matter cannot be revealed to the historian. This may be good philosophy, but we could not think so if we were good Christians. We should then expect to move matter by prayer. Rationalistic history and criticism are therefore based, as Pius X. most accurately observed in his Encyclical on modernism, on rationalistic philosophy; and we might add that rationalistic philosophy is based on practical art, and that practical art, by which we help ourselves, like Prometheus, and make instruments of what religion worships, when this art is carried beyond the narrowest bounds, is the essence of pride and irreligion. Miners, machinists, and artisans are irreligious by trade. Religion is the love of life in the consciousness of impotence.

Similarly, the spontaneous insight of Christians and their new philosophies will express a Christian disposition. The chief problems in them will be sin and redemption; the conclusion will be some fresh intuition of divine love and heavenly beatitude. It would be no sign of originality in a Christian to begin discoursing on love like Ovid or on heaven like Mohammed, or stop discoursing on them at all; it would be a sign of apostasy.

Now the modernists' criterion of probability in history or of worthiness in philosophy is not the Christian criterion. It is that of their contemporaries outside the church, who are rationalists in history and egotists or voluntarists in philosophy. The biblical criticism and mystical speculations of the modernists call for no special remark; they are such as any studious or spiritual person, with no inherited religion, might compose in our day. But what is remarkable and well-nigh incredible is that even for a moment they should have supposed this non-Christian criterion in history and this non-Christian direction in metaphysics compatible with adherence to the Catholic church. That seems to presuppose, in men who in fact are particularly thoughtful and learned, an inexplicable ignorance of history, of theology, and of the world.

Everything, however, has its explanation. In a Catholic seminary, as the modernists bitterly complain, very little is heard of the views held in the learned world outside. It is not taught there that the Christian religion is only one of many, some of them older and superior to it in certain respects; that it itself is eclectic and contains inward contradictions; that it is and always has been divided into rancorous sects; that its position in the world is precarious and its future hopeless. On the contrary, everything is so presented as to persuade the innocent student that all that is good or true anywhere is founded on the faith he is preparing to preach, that the historical evidences of its truth are irrefragable, that it is logically perfect and spiritually all-sufficing. These convictions, which no breath from the outside is allowed to ruffle, are deepened in the case of pensive and studious minds, like those of the leading modernists, by their own religious experience. They understand in what they are taught more, perhaps, than their teachers intend. They understand how those ideas originated, they can trace a similar revelation in their own lives. This (which a cynic might expect would be the beginning of disillusion) only deepens their religious faith and gives it a wider basis; report and experience seem to conspire. But trouble is brewing here; for a report that can be confirmed by experience can also be enlarged by it, and it is easy to see in traditional revelation itself many diverse sources; different temperaments and different types of thought have left their impress upon it. Yet other temperaments and other types of thought might continue the task. Revelation seems to be progressive; a part may fall to us also to furnish.

This insight, for a Christian, has its dangers. No doubt it gives him a key to the understanding and therefore, in one sense, to the acceptance of many a dogma. Christian dogmas were not pieces of wanton information fallen from heaven; they were imaginative views, expressing now some primordial instinct in all men, now the national hopes and struggles of Israel, now the moral or dialectical philosophy of the later Jews and Greeks. Such a derivation does not, of itself, render these dogmas necessarily mythical. They might be ideal expressions of human experience and yet be literally true as well, provided we assume (what is assumed throughout in Christianity) that the world is made for man, and that even God is just such a God as man would have wished him to be, the existent ideal of human nature and the foregone solution to all human problems. Nevertheless, Christian dogmas are definite,[1] while human inspirations are potentially limitless; and if the object of the two is identical either the dogmas must be stretched and ultimately abandoned, or inspiration which does not conform to them must be denounced as illusory or diabolical.

At this point the modernist first chooses the path which must lead him away, steadily and for ever, from the church which he did not think to desert. He chooses a personal, psychological, variable standard of inspiration; he becomes, in principle, a Protestant. Why does he not become one in name also? Because, as one of the most distinguished modernists has said, the age of partial heresy is past. It is suicidal to make one part of an organic system the instrument for attacking another part; and it is also comic. What you appeal to and stand firmly rooted in is no more credible, no more authoritative, than what you challenge in its name. In vain will you pit the church against the pope; at once you will have to pit the Bible against the church, and then the New Testament against the Old, or the genuine Jesus against the New Testament, or God revealed in nature against God revealed in the Bible, or God revealed in your own conscience or transcendental self against God revealed in nature; and you will be lucky if your conscience and transcendental self can long hold their own against the flux of immediate experience. Religion, the modernists feel, must be taken broadly and sympathetically, as a great human historical symbol for the truth. At least in Christianity you should aspire to embrace and express the whole; to seize it in its deep inward sources and follow it on all sides in its vital development. But if the age of partial heresy is past, has not the age of total heresy succeeded? What is this whole phenomenon of religion but human experience interpreted by human imagination? And what is the modernist, who would embrace it all, but a freethinker, with a sympathetic interest in religious illusions? Of course, that is just what he is; but it takes him a strangely long time to discover it. He fondly supposes (such is the prejudice imbibed by him in the cradle and in the seminary) that all human inspirations are necessarily similar and concurrent, that by trusting an inward light he cannot be led away from his particular religion, but on the contrary can only find confirmation for it, together with fresh spiritual energies. He has been reared in profound ignorance of other religions, which were presented to him, if at all, only in grotesque caricature; or if anything good had to be admitted in them, it was set down to a premonition of his own system or a derivation from it—a curious conceit, which seems somehow not to have wholly disappeared from the minds of Protestants, or even of professors of philosophy. I need not observe how completely the secret of each alien religion is thereby missed and its native accent outraged: the most serious consequence, for the modernist, of this unconsciousness of whatever is not Christian is an unconsciousness of what, in contrast to other religions, Christianity itself is. He feels himself full of love—except for the pope—of mysticism, and of a sort of archæological piety. He is learned and eloquent and wistful. Why should he not remain in the church? Why should he not bring all its cold and recalcitrant members up to his own level of insight?

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[1] At least in their devotional and moral import. I suggest this qualification in deference to M. Le Roy's interesting theory of dogma, viz., that the verbal or intellectual definition of a dogma may be changed without changing the dogma itself (as a sentence might be translated into a new language without altering the meaning) provided the suggested conduct and feeling in the presence of the mystery remained the same. Thus the definition of transubstantiation might be modified to suit an idealistic philosophy, but the new definition would be no less orthodox than the old if it did not discourage the worship of the consecrated elements or the sense of mystical union with Christ in the sacrament.

The modernist, like the Protestants before him, is certainly justified in contrasting a certain essence or true life of religion with the formulas and practices, not all equally well-chosen, which have crystallised round it. In the routine of Catholic teaching and worship there is notoriously a deal of mummery: phrases and ceremonies abound that have lost their meaning, and that people run through without even that general devout attitude and unction which, after all, is all that can be asked for in the presence of mysteries. Not only is all sense of the historical or moral basis of dogma wanting, but the dogma itself is hardly conceived explicitly; all is despatched with a stock phrase, or a quotation from some theological compendium. Ecclesiastical authority acts as if it felt that more profundity would be confusing and that more play of mind might be dangerous. This is that "Scholasticism" and "Mediævalism" against which the modernists inveigh or under which they groan; and to this intellectual barrenness may be added the offences against taste, verisimilitude, and justice which their more critical minds may discern in many an act and pronouncement of their official superiors. Thus both their sense for historical truth and their spontaneous mysticism drive the modernists to contrast with the official religion what was pure and vital in the religion of their fathers. Like the early Protestants, they wish to revert to a more genuine Christianity; but while their historical imagination is much more accurate and well-fed than that of any one in the sixteenth century could be, they have no hold on the Protestant principle of faith. The Protestants, taking the Bible as an oracle which personal inspiration was to interpret, could reform tradition in any way and to any extent which their reason or feeling happened to prompt. But so long as their Christianity was a positive faith, the residue, when all the dross had been criticised and burned away, was of divine authority. The Bible never became for them merely an ancient Jewish encyclopædia, often eloquent, often curious, and often barbarous. God never became a literary symbol, covering some problematical cosmic force, or some ideal of the conscience. But for the modernist this total transformation takes place at once. He keeps the whole Catholic system, but he believes in no part of it as it demands to be believed. He understands and shares the moral experience that it enshrines; but the bubble has been pricked, the painted world has been discovered to be but painted. He has ceased to be a Christian to become an amateur, or if you will a connoisseur, of Christianity. He believes—and this unquestioningly, for he is a child of his age—in history, in philology, in evolution, perhaps in German idealism; he does not believe in sin, nor in salvation, nor in revelation. His study of history has disclosed Christianity to him in its evolution and in its character of a myth; he wishes to keep it in its entirety precisely because he regards it as a convention, like a language or a school of art; whereas the Protestants wished, on the contrary, to reduce it to its original substance, because they fondly supposed that that original substance was so much literal truth. Modernism is accordingly an ambiguous and unstable thing. It is the love of all Christianity in those who perceive that it is all a fable. It is the historic attachment to his church of a Catholic who has discovered that he is a pagan.

When the modernists are pressed to explain their apparently double allegiance, they end by saying that what historical and philological criticism conjectures to be the facts must be accepted as such; while the Christian dogmas touching these things – the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, for instance – must be taken in a purely symbolic or moral sense. In saying this they may be entirely right; it seems to many of us that Christianity is indeed a fable, yet full of meaning if you take it as such; for what scraps of historical truth there may be in the Bible or of metaphysical truth in theology are of little importance; whilst the true greatness and beauty of this, as of all religions, is to be found in its *moral idealism,* I mean, in the expression it gives, under cover of legends, prophecies, or mysteries, of the effort, the tragedy, and the consolations of human life. Such a moral fable is what Christianity is in fact; but it is far from what it is in intention. The modernist view, the view of a sympathetic rationalism, revokes the whole Jewish tradition on which Christianity is grafted; it takes the seriousness out of religion; it sweetens the pang of sin, which becomes misfortune; it removes the urgency of salvation; it steals empirical reality away from the last judgment, from hell, and from heaven; it steals historical reality away from the Christ of religious tradition and personal devotion. The moral summons and the prophecy about destiny which were the soul of the gospel have lost all force for it and become fables.

The modernist, then, starts with the orthodox but untenable persuasion that Catholicism comprehends all that is good; he adds the heterodox though amiable sentiment that any well-meaning ambition of the mind, any hope, any illumination, any science, must be good, and therefore compatible with Catholicism. He bathes himself in idealistic philosophy, he dabbles in liberal politics, he accepts and emulates rationalistic exegesis and anti-clerical church history. Soon he finds himself, on every particular point, out of sympathy with the acts and tendencies of the church to which he belongs; and then he yields to the most pathetic of his many illusions – he sets about to purge this church, so as not to be compelled to abandon it; to purge it of its first principles, of its whole history, and of its sublime if chimerical ideal.

The modernist wishes to reconcile the church and the world. Therein he forgets what Christianity came into the world to announce and why its message was believed. It came to announce salvation from the world; there should be no more need of just those things which the modernist so deeply loves and respects and blushes that his church should not be adorned with – emancipated science, free poetic religion, optimistic politics, and dissolute art. These things, according to the Christian conscience, were all vanity and vexation of spirit, and the pagan world itself almost confessed as much. They were vexatious and vain because they were bred out of sin, out of ignoring the inward and the revealed law of God; and they would lead surely and quickly to destruction. The needful salvation from these follies, Christianity went on to announce, had come through the cross of Christ; whose grace, together with admission to his future heavenly kingdom, was offered freely to such as believed in him, separated themselves from the world, and lived in charity, humility, and innocence, waiting lamp in hand for the celestial bridegroom. These abstracted and elected spirits were the true disciples of Christ and the church itself.

Having no ears for this essential message of Christianity, the modernist also has no eyes for its history. The church converted the world only partially and inessentially; yet Christianity was outwardly established as the traditional religion of many nations. And why? Because, although the prophecies it relied on were strained and its miracles dubious, it furnished a needful sanctuary from the shames, sorrows, injustices, violence, and gathering darkness of earth; and not only a sanctuary one might fly to, but a holy precinct where one might live, where there was sacred learning, based on revelation and tradition, to occupy the inquisitive, and sacred philosophy to occupy the speculative; where there might be religious art, ministering to the faith, and a new life in the family or in the cloister, transformed by a permeating spirit of charity, sacrifice, soberness, and prayer. These principles by their very nature could not become those of the world, but they could remain in it as a leaven and an ideal. As such they remain to this day, and very efficaciously, in the Catholic church. The modernists talk a great deal of development, and they do not see that what they detest in the church is a perfect development of its original essence; that monachism, scholasticism, Jesuitism, ultramontanism, and Vaticanism are all thoroughly apostolic; beneath the overtones imposed by a series of ages they give out the full and exact note of the New Testament. Much has been added, but nothing has been lost. Development (though those who talk most of it seem to forget it) is not the same as flux and dissolution. It is not a continuity through changes of any sort, but the evolution of something latent and preformed, or else the creation of new instruments of defence for the same original life. In this sense there was an immense development of Christianity during the first three centuries, and this development has continued, more slowly, ever since, but only in the Roman church; for the Eastern churches have refused themselves all new expressions, while the Protestant churches have eaten more and more into the core. It is a striking proof of the preservative power of readjustment that the Roman church, in the midst of so many external transformations as it has undergone, still demands the same kind of faith that John the Baptist demanded, I mean faith in another world. The *mise-en-scène* has changed immensely. The gospel has been encased in theology, in ritual, in ecclesiastical authority, in conventional forms of charity, like some small bone of a saint in a gilded reliquary; but the relic for once is genuine, and the gospel has been preserved by those thick incrustations. Many an isolated fanatic or evangelical missionary in the slums shows a greater resemblance to the apostles in his outer situation than the pope does; but what mind-healer or revivalist nowadays preaches the doom of the natural world and its vanity, or the reversal of animal values, or the blessedness of poverty and chastity, or the inferiority of natural human bonds, or a contempt for lay philosophy? Yet in his palace full of pagan marbles the pope actually preaches all this. It is here, and certainly not among the modernists, that the gospel is still believed.

Of course, it is open to any one to say that there is a nobler religion possible without these trammels and this officialdom, that there is a deeper philosophy than this supernaturalistic rationalism, that there is a sweeter life than this legal piety. Perhaps: I think the pagan Greeks, the Buddhists, the Mohammedans would have much to say for themselves before the impartial tribunal of human nature and reason. But they are not Christians and do not wish to be. No more, in their hearts, are the modernists, and they should feel it beneath their dignity to pose as such; indeed the more sensitive of them already feel it. To say they are not Christians at heart, but diametrically opposed to the fundamental faith and purpose of Christianity, is not to say they may not be profound mystics (as many Hindus, Jews, and pagan Greeks have been), or excellent scholars, or generous philanthropists. But the very motive that attaches them to Christianity is worldly and un-Christian. They wish to preserve the continuity of moral traditions; they wish the poetry of life to flow down to them uninterruptedly and copiously from all the ages. It is an amiable and wise desire; but it shows that they are men of the Renaissance, pagan and pantheistic in their pro-founder sentiment, to whom the hard and narrow realism of official Christianity is offensive just because it presupposes that Christianity is true.

Yet even in this historical and poetical allegiance to Christianity I suspect the modernists suffer from a serious illusion. They think the weakness of the church lies in its not following the inspirations of the age. But when this age is past, might not that weakness be a source of strength again? For an idea ever to be fashionable is ominous, since it must afterwards be always old-fashioned. No doubt it would be dishonest in any of us now, who see clearly that Noah surely did not lead all the animals two by two into the Ark, to say that we believe he did so, on the ground that stories of that kind are rather favourable to the spread of religion. No doubt such a story, and even the fables essential to Christian theology, are now incredible to most of us. But on the other hand it would be stupid to assume that what is incredible to you or me now must always be incredible to mankind. What was foolishness to the Greeks of St. Paul's day spread mightily among them one or two hundred years later; and what is foolishness to the modernist of to-day may edify future generations. The imagination is suggestible and there is nothing men will not believe in matters of religion. These rational persuasions by which we are swayed, the conventions of unbelieving science and unbelieving history, are superficial growths; yesterday they did not exist, to-morrow they may have disappeared. This is a doctrine which the modernist philosophers themselves emphasise, as does M. Bergson, whom some of them follow, and say the Catholic church itself ought to follow in order to be saved—for prophets are constitutionally without a sense of humour. These philosophers maintain that intelligence is merely a convenient method of picking one's way through the world of matter, that it is a falsification of life, and wholly unfit to grasp the roots of it. We may well be of another opinion, if we think the roots of life are not in consciousness but in nature, which intelligence alone can reveal; but we must agree that in life itself intelligence is a superficial growth, and easily blighted, and that the experience of the vanity of the world, of sin, of salvation, of miracles, of strange revelations, and of mystic loves is a far deeper, more primitive, and therefore probably more lasting human possession than is that of clear historical or scientific ideas.

Now religious experience, as I have said, may take other forms than the Christian, and within Christianity it may take other forms than the

Catholic; but the Catholic form is as good as any intrinsically for the devotee himself, and it has immense advantages over its probable rivals in charm, in comprehensiveness, in maturity, in internal rationality, in external adaptability; so much so that a strong anti-clerical government, like the French, cannot safely leave the church to be overwhelmed by the forces of science, good sense, ridicule, frivolity, and avarice (all strong forces in France), but must use violence as well to do it. In the English church, too, it is not those who accept the deluge, the resurrection, and the sacraments only as symbols that are the vital party, but those who accept them literally; for only these have anything to say to the poor, or to the rich, that can refresh them. In a frank supernaturalism, in a tight clericalism, not in a pleasant secularisation, lies the sole hope of the church. Its sole dignity also lies there. It will not convert the world; it never did and it never could. It will remain a voice crying in the wilderness; but it will believe what it cries, and there will be some to listen to it in the future, as there have been many in the past. As to modernism, it is suicide. It is the last of those concessions to the spirit of the world which half-believers and double-minded prophets have always been found making; but it is a mortal concession. It concedes everything; for it concedes that everything in Christianity, as Christians hold it, is an illusion.

III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. HENRI BERGSON

THE most representative and remarkable of living philosophers is M. Henri Bergson. Both the form and the substance of his works attract universal attention. His ideas are pleasing and bold, and at least in form wonderfully original; he is persuasive without argument and mystical without conventionality; he moves in the atmosphere of science and free thought, yet seems to transcend them and to be secretly religious. An undercurrent of zeal and even of prophecy seems to animate his subtle analyses and his surprising fancies. He is eloquent, and to a public rather sick of the half-education it has received and eager for some inspiriting novelty he seems more eloquent than he is. He uses the French language (and little else is French about him) in the manner of the more recent artists in words, retaining the precision of phrase and the measured judgments which are traditional in French literature, yet managing to envelop everything in a penumbra of emotional suggestion. Each expression of an idea is complete in itself; yet these expressions are often varied and constantly metaphorical, so that we are led to feel that much in that idea has remained unexpressed and is indeed inexpressible.

Studied and insinuating as M. Bergson is in his style, he is no less elaborate in his learning. In the history of philosophy, in mathematics and physics, and especially in natural history he has taken great pains to survey the ground and to assimilate the views and spirit of the most recent scholars. He might be called outright an expert in all these subjects, were it not for a certain externality and want of radical sympathy in his way of conceiving them. A genuine historian of philosophy, for instance, would love to rehearse the views of great thinkers, would feel their eternal plausibility, and in interpreting them would think of himself as little as they ever thought of him. But M. Bergson evidently regards Plato or Kant as persons who did or did not prepare the way for some Bergsonian insight. The theory of evolution, taken enthusiastically, is apt to exercise an evil influence on the moral estimation of things. First the evolutionist asserts that later things grow out of earlier, which is true of things in their causes and basis, but not in their values; as modern Greece proceeds out of ancient Greece materially but does not exactly crown it. The evolutionist, however, proceeds to assume that later things are necessarily better than what they have grown out of: and this is false altogether. This fallacy reinforces very unfortunately that inevitable esteem which people have for their own opinions, and which must always vitiate the history of philosophy when it is a philosopher that writes it. A false subordination comes to be established among systems, as if they moved in single file and all had the last, the author's system, for their secret goal. In Hegel, for instance, this conceit is conspicuous, in spite of his mastery in the dramatic presentation of points of view, for his way of reconstructing history was, on the surface, very sympathetic. He too, like M. Bergson, proceeded from learning to intuition, and feigned at every turn to identify himself with what he was describing, especially if this was a philosophical attitude or temper. Yet in reality his historical judgments were forced and brutal: Greece was but a stepping-stone to Prussia, Plato and Spinoza found their higher synthesis in himself, and (though he may not say so frankly) Jesus Christ and St. Francis realised their better selves in Luther. Actual spiritual life, the thoughts, affections, and pleasures of individuals, passed with Hegel for so much moonshine; the true spirit was "objective," it was simply the movement of those circumstances in which actual spirit arose. He was accordingly contemptuous of everything intrinsically good, and his idealism consisted in forcing the natural world into a formula of evolution and then worshipping it as the embodiment of the living God. But under the guise of optimism and belief in a cosmic reason this is mere idolatry of success—a malign superstition, by which all moral independence is crushed out and conscience enslaved to chronology; and it is no marvel if, somewhat to relieve this subjection, history in turn was expurgated, marshalled, and distorted, that it might pass muster for the work of the Holy Ghost.

In truth the value of spiritual life is intrinsic and centred at every point. It is never wholly recoverable. To recover it at all, an historian must have a certain detachment and ingenuousness; knowing the dignity and simplicity of his own mind, he must courteously attribute the same dignity and simplicity to others, unless their avowed attitude prevents; this is to be an intelligent critic and to write history like a gentleman. The truth, which all philosophers alike are seeking, is eternal. It lies as near to one age as to another; the means of discovery alone change, and not always for the better. The course of evolution is no test of what is true or good; else nothing could be good intrinsically nor true simply and ultimately; on the contrary, it is the approach to truth and excellence anywhere, like the approach of tree tops to the sky, that tests the value of evolution, and determines whether it is moving upward or downward or in a circle.

M. Bergson accordingly misses fire when, for instance, in order utterly to damn a view which he has been criticising, and which may be open to objection on other grounds, he cries that those who hold it "*retardent sur Kant*"; as if a clock were the compass of the mind, and he who was one minute late was one point off the course. Kant was a hard honest thinker, more sinned against than sinning, from whom a great many people in the nineteenth century have taken their point of departure, departing as far as they chose; but if a straight line of progress could be traced at all through the labyrinth of philosophy, Kant would not lie in that line. His thought is essentially excentric and sophisticated, being largely based on two inherited blunders, which a truly progressive philosophy would have to begin by avoiding, thus leaving Kant on one side, and weathering his philosophy, as one might Scylla or Charybdis. The one blunder was that of the English malicious psychology which had maintained since the time of Locke that the ideas in the mind are the only objects of knowledge, instead of being the knowledge of objects. The other blunder was that of Protestantism that, in groping after that moral freedom which is so ineradicable a need of a pure spirit, thought to find it in a revision of revelation, tradition, and prejudice, so as to be able to cling to these a little longer. How should a system so local, so accidental, and so unstable as Kant's be prescribed as a sort of catechism for all humanity? The tree of knowledge has many branches, and all its fruits are not condemned to hang for ever from that one gnarled and contorted bough. M. Bergson himself "lags behind" Kant on those points on which his better insight requires it, as, for instance, on the reality of time; but with regard to his own philosophy I am afraid he thinks that all previous systems empty into it, which is hardly true, and that all future systems must flow out of it, which is hardly necessary.

The embarrassment that qualifies M. Bergson's attainments in mathematics and physics has another and more personal source. He understands, but he trembles. Non-human immensities frighten him, as they did Pascal. He suffers from cosmic agoraphobia. We might think empty space an innocent harmless thing, a mere opportunity to move, which ought to be highly prized by all devotees of motion. But M. Bergson is instinctively a mystic, and his philosophy deliberately discredits the existence of anything except in immediacy, that is, as an experience of the heart. What he dreads in space is that the heart should be possessed by it, and transformed into it. He dreads that the imagination should be fascinated by the homogeneous and static, hypnotised by geometry, and actually lost in *Auseinandersein*. This would be a real death and petrifaction of consciousness, frozen into contemplation of a monotonous infinite void. What is warm and desirable is rather the sense of variety and succession, as if all visions radiated from the occupied focus or hearth of the self. The more concentration at this habitable point, with the more mental perspectives opening backwards and forwards through time, in a word, the more personal and historical the apparition, the better it would be. Things must be reduced again to what they seem; it is vain and terrible to take them for what we find they are. M. Bergson is at bottom an apologist for very old human prejudices, an apologist for animal illusion. His whole labour is a plea for some vague but comfortable faith which he dreads to have stolen from him by the progress of art and knowledge. There is a certain trepidation, a certain suppressed instinct to snap at and sting the hated oppressor, as if some desperate small being were at bay before a horrible monster. M. Bergson is afraid of space, of mathematics, of necessity, and of eternity; he is afraid of the intellect and the possible discoveries of science; he is afraid of nothingness and death. These fears may prevent him from being a philosopher in the old and noble sense of the word; but they sharpen his sense for many a psychological problem, and make him the spokesman of many an inarticulate soul. Animal timidity and animal illusion are deep in the heart of all of us. Practice may compel us to bow to the conventions of the intellect, as to those of polite society; but secretly, in our moments of immersion in ourselves, we may find them a great nuisance, even a vain nightmare. Could we only listen undisturbed to the beat of protoplasm in our hearts, would not that oracle solve all the riddles of the universe, or at least avoid them?

To protect this inner conviction, however, it is necessary for the mystic to sally forth and attack the enemy on his own ground. If he refuted physics and mathematics simply out of his own faith, he might be accused of ignorance of the subject. He will therefore study it conscientiously, yet with a certain irritation and haste to be done with it, somewhat as a Jesuit might study Protestant theology. Such a student, however, is apt to lose his pains; for in retracing a free inquiry in his servile spirit, he remains deeply ignorant, not indeed of its form, but of its nature and value. Why, for instance, has M. Bergson such a horror of mechanical physics? He seems to think it a black art, dealing in unholy abstractions, and rather dangerous to salvation, and he keeps his metaphysical exorcisms and antidotes always at hand, to render it innocuous, at least to his own soul. But physical science never solicited of anybody that he should be wholly absorbed in the contemplation of atoms, and worship them; that we must worship and lose ourselves in reality, whatever reality may be, is a mystic aberration, which physical science does nothing to foster. Nor does any critical physicist suppose that what he describes is the whole of the object; he merely notes the occasions on which its sensible qualities appear, and calculates events. Because the calculable side of nature is his province, he does not deny that events have other aspects—the psychic and the moral, for instance—no less real in their way, in terms of which calculation would indeed be impossible. If he chances to call the calculable elements of nature her substance, as it is proper to do, that name is given without passion; he may perfectly well proclaim with Goethe that it is in the accidents, in the *farbiger Abglanz,* that we have our life. And if it be for his freedom that the mystic trembles, I imagine any man of science would be content with M. Bergson's assertion that true freedom is the *sense* of freedom, and that in any intelligible statement of the situation, even the most indeterministic, this freedom disappears; for it is an immediate experience, not any scheme of relation between events.

The horror of mechanical physics arises, then, from attributing to that science pretensions and extensions which it does not have; it arises from the habits of theology and metaphysics being imported inopportunely into science. Similarly when M. Bergson mentions mathematics, he seems to be thinking of the supposed authority it exercises—one of Kant's confusions—over the empirical world, and trying to limit and subordinate that authority, lest movement should somehow be removed from nature, and vagueness from human thought. But nature and human thought are what they are; they have enough affinity to mathematics, as it happens, to suggest that study to our minds, and to give those who go deep into it a great, though partial, mastery over things. Nevertheless a true mathematician is satisfied with the hypothetical and ideal cogency of his science, and puts its dignity in that. Moreover, M. Bergson has the too pragmatic notion that the use of mathematics is to keep our accounts straight in this business world; whereas its inherent use is emancipating and Platonic, in that it shows us the possibility of other worlds, less contingent and perturbed than this one. If he allows himself any excursus from his beloved immediacy, it is only in the interests of practice; he little knows the pleasures of a liberal mind, ranging over the congenial realm of internal accuracy and ideal truth, where it can possess itself of what treasures it likes in perfect security and freedom. An artist in his workmanship, M. Bergson is not an artist in his allegiance; he has no respect for what is merely ideal.

For this very reason, perhaps, he is more at home in natural history than in the exact sciences. He has the gift of observation, and can suggest vividly the actual appearance of natural processes, in contrast to the verbal paraphrase of these processes which is sometimes taken to explain them. He is content to stop at habit without formulating laws; he refuses to assume that the large obvious cycles of change in things can be reduced to mechanism, that is, to minute included cycles repeated *ad libitum*. He may sometimes defend this refusal by sophistical arguments, as when he says that mechanism would require the last stage of the universe to be simultaneous with the first, forgetting that the unit of mechanism is not a mathematical equation but some observed typical event. The refusal itself, however, would be honest scepticism enough were it made with no *arrière pensée,* but simply in view of the immense complexity of the facts and the extreme simplicity of the mechanical hypothesis. In such a situation, to halt at appearances might seem the mark of a true naturalist and a true empiricist not misled by speculative haste and the human passion for system and simplification. At the first reading, M. Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice* may well dazzle the professional naturalist and seem to him an illuminating confession of the nature and limits of his science; yet a second reading, I have good authority for saying, may as easily reverse that impression. M. Bergson never reviews his facts in order to understand them, but only if possible to discredit others who may have fancied they understood. He raises difficulties, he marks the problems that confront the naturalist, and the inadequacy of explanations that may have been suggested. Such criticism would be a valuable beginning if it were followed by the suggestion of some new solution; but the suggestion only is that no solution is possible, that the phenomena of life are simply miraculous, and that it is in the tendency or vocation of the animal, not in its body or its past, that we must see the ground of what goes on before us.

With such a philosophy of science, it is evident that all progress in the understanding of nature would cease, as it ceased after Aristotle. The attempt would again be abandoned to reduce gross and obvious cycles of change, such as generation, growth, and death, to minute latent cycles, so that natural history should offer a picturesque approach to universal physics. If for the magic power of types, invoked by Aristotle, we substituted with M. Bergson the magic power of the *élan vital,* that is, of evolution in general, we should be referring events not to finer, more familiar, more pervasive processes, but to one all-embracing process, unique and always incomplete. Our understanding would end in something far vaguer and looser than what our observation began with. Aristotle at least could refer particulars to their specific types, as medicine and social science are still glad enough to do, to help them in guessing and in making a learned show before the public. But if divination and eloquence—for science is out of the question—were to invoke nothing but a fluid tendency to grow, we should be left with a flat history of phenomena and no means of prediction or even classification. All knowledge would be reduced to gossip, infinitely diffuse, perhaps enlisting our dramatic feelings, but yielding no intellectual mastery of experience, no practical competence, and no moral lesson. The world would be a serial novel, to be continued for ever, and all men mere novel-readers.

Nothing is more familiar to philosophers nowadays than that criticism of knowledge by which we are thrown back upon the appearances from which science starts, upon what is known to children and savages, whilst all that which long experience and reason may infer from those appearances is set down as so much hypothesis; and indeed it is through hypothesis that latent being, if such there be, comes before the mind at all. Now such criticism of knowledge might have been straightforward and ingenuous. It might have simply disclosed the fact, very salutary to meditate upon, that the whole frame of nature, with the minds that animate it, is disclosed to us by intelligence; that if we were not intelligent our sensations would exist for us without meaning anything, as they exist for idiots. The criticism of knowledge, however, has usually been taken maliciously, in the sense that it is the idiots only that are not deceived; for any interpretation of sensation is a mental figment, and while experience may have any extent it will it cannot possibly, they say, have expressive value; it cannot reveal anything going on beneath. Intelligence and science are accordingly declared to have no penetration, no power to disclose what is latent, for nothing latent exists; they can at best furnish symbols for past or future sensations and the order in which they arise; they can be seven-league boots for striding over the surface of sentience.

This negative dogmatism as to knowledge was rendered harmless and futile by the English philosophers, in that they maintained at the same time that everything happens exactly *as if* the intellect were a true instrument of discovery, and *as if* a material world underlay our experience and furnished all its occasions. Hume, Mill, and Huxley were scientific at heart, and full of the intelligence they dissected; they seemed to cry to nature: Though thou dost not exist, yet will I trust in thee. Their idealism was a theoretical scruple rather than a passionate superstition. Not so M. Bergson; he is not so simple as to invoke the malicious criticism of knowledge in order to go on thinking rationalistically. Reason and science make him deeply uncomfortable. His point accordingly is not merely that mechanism is a hypothesis, but that it is a wrong hypothesis. Events do not come as if mechanism brought them about; they come, at least in the organic world, as if a magic destiny, and inscrutable ungovernable effort, were driving them on.

Thus M. Bergson introduces metaphysics into natural history; he invokes, in what is supposed to be science, the agency of a power, called the *élan vital,* on a level with the "Will" of Schopenhauer or the "Unknowable Force" of Herbert Spencer. But there is a scientific vitalism also, which it is well to distinguish from the metaphysical sort. The point at issue between vitalism and mechanism in biology is whether the living processes in nature can be resolved into a combination of the material. The material processes will always remain vital, if we take this word in a descriptive and poetic sense; for they will contain a movement having a certain idiosyncrasy and taking a certain time, like the fall of an apple. The movement of nature is never dialectical; the first part of any event does not logically imply the last part of it. Physics is descriptive, historical, reporting after the fact what are found to be the habits of matter. But if these habits are constant and calculable we call the vitality of them mechanical. Thus the larger processes of nature, no matter how vital they may be and whatever consciousness may accompany them, will always be mechanical if they can be calculated and predicted, being a combination of the more minute and widespread processes which they contain. The only question therefore is: Do processes such as nutrition and reproduction arise by a combination of such events as the fall of apples? Or are they irreducible events, and units of mechanism by themselves? That is the dilemma as it appears in science. Both possibilities will always remain open, because however far mechanical analysis may go, many phenomena, as human apprehension presents them, will always remain irreducible to any common denominator with the rest; and on the other hand, wherever the actual reduction of the habits of animals to those of matter may have stopped, we can never know that a further reduction is impossible.

The balance of reasonable presumption, however, is not even. The most inclusive movements known to us in nature, the astronomical, are calculable, and so are the most minute and pervasive processes, the chemical. These are also, if evolution is to be accepted, the earliest processes upon which all others have supervened and out of which, as it were, they have grown. Apart from miraculous intervention, therefore, the assumption seems to be inevitable that the intermediate processes are calculable too, and compounded out of the others. The appearance to the contrary presented in animal and social life is easily explicable on psychological grounds. We read inevitably in terms of our passions those things which affect them or are analogous to what involves passion in ourselves; and when the mechanism of them is hidden from us, as is that of our bodies, we suppose that these passions which we find on the surface in ourselves, or read into other creatures, are the substantial and only forces that carry on our part of the world. Penetrating this illusion, dispassionate observers in all ages have received the general impression that nature is one and mechanical. This was, and still remains, a general impression only; but I suspect no one who walks the earth with his eyes open would be concerned to resist it, were it not for certain fond human conceits which such a view would rebuke and, if accepted, would tend to obliterate. The psychological illusion that our ideas and purposes are original facts and forces (instead of expressions in consciousness of facts and forces which are material) and the practical and optical illusion that everything wheels about us in this world—these are the primitive persuasions which the enemies of naturalism have always been concerned to protect.

One might indeed be a vitalist in biology, out of pure caution and conscientiousness, without sharing those prejudices; and many a speculative philosopher has been free from them who has been a vitalist in metaphysics. Schopenhauer, for instance, observed that the cannon-ball which, if self-conscious, would think it moved freely, would be quite right in thinking so. The "Will" was as evident to him in mechanism as in animal life. M. Bergson, in the more hidden reaches of his thought, seems to be a universal vitalist; apparently an *élan vital* must have existed once to deposit in inorganic matter the energy stored there, and to set mechanism going. But he relies on biology alone to prove the present existence of an independent effort to live; this is needed to do what mechanism, as he thinks, could never do; it is not needed to do, as in Schopenhauer, what mechanism does. M. Bergson thus introduces his metaphysical force as a peculiar requirement of biology; he breaks the continuity of nature; he loses the poetic justification of a metaphysical vitalism; he asks us to believe that life is not a natural expression of material being, but an alien and ghostly madness descending into it—I say a ghostly madness, for why should disembodied life wish that the body should live? This vitalism is not a kind of biology more prudent and literal than the mechanical kind (as a scientific vitalism would be), but far less legitimately speculative. Nor is it a frank and thorough mythology, such as the total spectacle of the universe might suggest to an imaginative genius. It is rather a popular animism, insisting on a sympathetic interpretation of nature where human sympathy is quick and easy, and turning this sympathy into a revelation of the absolute, but leaving the rest of nature cold, because to sympathise with its movement there is harder for anxious, self-centred mortals, and requires a disinterested mind. M. Bergson would have us believe that mankind is what nature has set her heart on and the best she can do, for whose sake she has been long making very special efforts. We are fortunate that at least her darling is all mankind and not merely Israel.

In spite, then, of M. Bergson's learning as a naturalist and his eye for the facts—things Aristotle also possessed—he is like Aristotle profoundly out of sympathy with nature. Aristotle was alienated from nature and any penetrating study of it by the fact that he was a disciple of Socrates, and therefore essentially a moralist and a logician. M. Bergson is alienated from nature by something quite different; he is the adept of a very modern, very subtle, and very arbitrary art, that of literary psychology. In this art the imagination is invited to conceive things as if they were all centres of passion and sensation. Literary psychology is not a science; it is practised by novelists and poets; yet if it is to be brilliantly executed it demands a minute and extended observation of life. Unless your psychological novelist had crammed his memory with pictures of the ways and aspects of men he would have no starting-point for his psychological fictions; he would not be able to render them circumstantial and convincing. Just so M. Bergson's achievements in psychological fiction, to be so brilliantly executed as they are, required all his learning. The history of philosophy, mathematics, and physics, and above all natural history, had to supply him first with suggestions; and if he is not really a master in any of those fields, that is not to be wondered at. His heart is elsewhere. To write a universal biological romance, such as he has sketched for us in his system, he would ideally have required all scientific knowledge, but only as Homer required the knowledge of seamanship, generalship, statecraft, augury, and charioteering, in order to turn the aspects of them into poetry, and not with that technical solidity which Plato unjustly blames him for not possessing. Just so M. Bergson's proper achievement begins where his science ends, and his philosophy lies entirely beyond the horizon of possible discoveries or empirical probabilities. In essence, it is myth or fable; but in the texture and degree of its fabulousness it differs notably from the performances of previous metaphysicians. Primitive poets, even ancient philosophers, were not psychologists; their fables were compacted out of elements found in practical life, and they reckoned in the units in which language and passion reckon—wooing, feasting, fighting, vice, virtue, happiness, justice. Above all, they talked about persons or about ideals; this man, this woman, this typical thought or sentiment was what fixed their attention and seemed to them the ultimate thing. Not so M. Bergson: he is a microscopic psychologist, and even in man what he studies by preference is not some integrated passion or idea, but something far more recondite; the minute texture of sensation, memory, or impulse. Sharp analysis is required to distinguish or arrest these elements, yet these are the predestined elements of his fable; and so his anthropomorphism is far less obvious than that of most poets and theologians, though no less real.

This peculiarity in the terms of the myth carries with it a notable extension in its propriety. The social and moral phenomena of human life cannot be used in interpreting life elsewhere without a certain conscious humour. This makes the charm of avowed writers of fable; their playful travesty and dislocation of things human, which would be puerile if they meant to be naturalists, render them piquant moralists; for they are not really interpreting animals, but under the mask of animals maliciously painting men. Such fables are morally interesting and plausible just because they are psychologically false. If Æsop could have reported what lions and lambs, ants and donkeys, really feel and think, his poems would have been perfect riddles to the public; and they would have had no human value except that of illustrating, to the truly speculative philosopher, the irresponsible variety of animal consciousness and its incommensurable types. Now M. Bergson's psychological fictions, being drawn from what is rudimentary in man, have a better chance of being literally true beyond man. Indeed what he asks us to do, and wishes to do himself, is simply to absorb so completely the aspect and habit of things that the soul of them may take possession of us: that we may know by intuition the *élan vital* which the world expresses, just as Paolo, in Dante, knew by intuition the *élan vital* that the smile of Francesca expressed.

The correctness of such an intuition, however, rests on a circumstance which M. Bergson does not notice, because his psychology is literary and not scientific. It rests on the possibility of imitation. When the organism observed and that of the observer have a similar structure and can imitate one another, the idea produced in the observer by intent contemplation is like the experience present to the person contemplated. But where this contagion of attitude, and therefore of feeling, is impossible, our intuition of our neighbours' souls remains subjective and has no value as a revelation. Psychological novelists, when they describe people such as they themselves are or might have been, may describe them truly; but beyond that limit their personages are merely plausible, that is, such as might be conceived by an equally ignorant reader in the presence of the same external indications. So, for instance, the judgment which a superficial traveller passes on foreign manners or religions is plausible to him and to his compatriots just because it represents the feeling that such manifestations awaken in strangers and does not attempt to convey the very different feeling really involved for the natives; had the latter been discovered and expressed the traveller's book would have found little understanding and no sale in his own country. This plausibility to the ignorant is present in all spontaneous myth. Nothing more need be demanded of irresponsible fiction, which makes no pretensions to be a human document, but is merely a human entertainment.

Now, a human psychology, even of the finest grain, when it is applied to the interpretation of the soul of matter, or of the soul of the whole universe, obviously yields a view of the irresponsible and subjective sort; for it is not based on any close similarity between the observed and the observer: man and the ether, man and cosmic evolution, cannot mimic one another, to discover mutually how they feel. But just because merely human, such an interpretation may remain always plausible to man; and it would be an admirable entertainment if there were no danger that it should be taken seriously. The idea Paul has of Peter, Spinoza observes, expresses the nature of Peter less than it betrays that of Paul; and so an idea framed by a man of the consciousness of things in general reveals the mind of that man rather than the mind of the universe; but the mind of the man too may be worth knowing, and the illusive hope of discovering everything may lead him truly to disclose himself. Such a disclosure of the lower depths of man by himself is M. Bergson's psychology; and the psychological romance, purporting to describe the inward nature of the universe, which he has built out of that introspection, is his metaphysics.

Many a point in this metaphysics may seem strange, fantastic, and obscure; and so it really is, when dislocated and projected metaphysically; but not one will be found to be arbitrary; not one but is based on attentive introspection and perception of the immediate. Take, for example, what is M. Bergson's starting-point, his somewhat dazzling doctrine that to be is to last, or rather to feel oneself endure. This is a hypostasis of "true" (*i.e.* immediately felt) duration. In a sensuous daydream past feelings survive in the present, images of the long ago are shuffled together with present sensations, the roving imagination leaves a bright wake behind it like a comet, and pushes a rising wave before it, like the bow of a ship; all is fluidity, continuity without identity, novelty without surprise. Hence, too, the doctrine of freedom: the images that appear in such a day-dream are often congruous in character with those that preceded, and mere prolongations of them; but this prolongation itself modifies them, and what develops is in no way deducible or predictable out of what exists. This situation is perfectly explicable scientifically. The movement of consciousness will be self-congruous and sustained when it rests on continuous processes in the same tissues, and yet quite unpredictable from within, because the direct sensuous report of bodily processes (in nausea, for instance, or in hunger) contains no picture of their actual mechanism. Even wholly new features, due to little crises in bodily life, may appear in a dream to flow out of what already exists, yet freely develop it; because in dreams comparison, the attempt to be consistent, is wholly in abeyance, and also because the new feature will come imbedded in others which are not new, but have dramatic relevance in the story. So immediate consciousness yields the two factors of Bergsonian freedom, continuity and indetermination.

Again, take the somewhat disconcerting assertion that movement exists when there is nothing that moves, and no space that it moves through. In vision, perhaps, it is not easy to imagine a consciousness of motion without some presentation of a field, and of a distinguishable something in it; but if we descend to somatic feelings (and the more we descend, with M. Bergson, the closer we are to reality), in shooting pains or the sense of intestinal movements, the feeling of a change and of a motion is certainly given in the absence of all idea of a *mobile* or of distinct points (or even of a separate field) through which it moves; consciousness begins with the sense of change, and the terms of the felt process are only qualitative limits, bred out of the felt process itself. Even a more paradoxical tenet of our philosopher's finds its justification here. He says that the units of motion are indivisible, that they are acts; so that to solve the riddle about Achilles and the tortoise we need no mathematics of the infinitesimal, but only to ask Achilles how he accomplishes the feat. Achilles would reply that in so many strides he would do it; and we may be surprised to learn that these strides are indivisible, so that, apparently, Achilles could not have stumbled in the middle of one, and taken only half of it. Of course, in nature, in what non-Bergsonians call reality, he could: but not in his immediate feeling, for if he had stumbled, the real stride, that which he was aware of taking, would have been complete at the stumbling-point. It is certain that consciousness comes in stretches, in breaths: all its data are æsthetic wholes, like visions or snatches of melody; and we should never be aware of anything were we not aware of something all at once.

When a man has taught himself—and it is a difficult art—to revert in this way to rudimentary consciousness and to watch himself live, he will be able, if he likes, to add a plausible chapter to speculative psychology. He has unearthed in himself the animal sensibility which has thickened, budded, and crystallised into his present somewhat intellectual image of the world. He has touched again the vegetative stupor, the multiple disconnected landscapes, the "blooming buzzing confusion" which his reason has partly set in order. May he not have in all this a key to the consciousness of other creatures? Animal psychology, and sympathy with the general life of nature, are vitiated both for naturalists and for poets by the human terms they must use, terms which presuppose distinctions which non-human beings probably have not made. These distinctions correct the illusions of immediate appearance in ways which only a long and special experience has imposed upon us, and they should not be imported into other souls. We are old men trying to sing the loves of children; we are wingless bipeds trying to understand the gods. But the data of the immediate are hardly human; it is probable that at that level all sentience is much alike. From that common ground our imagination can perhaps start safely, and follow such hints as observation furnishes, until we learn to live and feel as other living things do, or as nature may live and feel as a whole. Instinct, for instance, need not be, as our human prejudice suggests, a rudimentary intelligence; it may be a parallel sort of sensibility, an imageless awareness of the presence and character of other things, with a superhuman ability to change oneself so as to meet them. Do we not feel something of this sort ourselves in love, in art, in religion? M. Bergson is a most delicate and charming poet on this theme, and a plausible psychologist; his method of accumulating and varying his metaphors, and leaving our intuition to itself under that artful stimulus, is the only judicious and persuasive method he could have employed, and his knack at it is wonderful. We recover, as we read, the innocence of the mind. It seems no longer impossible that we might, like the wise men in the story-books, learn the language of birds; we share for the moment the siestas of plants; and we catch the quick consciousness of the waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates, each throb forgotten as the next follows upon it; and we may be tempted to play on Shakespeare and say:

> "Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
> So do *their spirits* hasten to their end."

Some reader of M. Bergson might say to himself: All this is ingenious introspection and divination; grant that it is true, and how does that lead to a new theory of the universe? You have been studying surface appearances and the texture of primitive consciousness; that is a part of the internal rumble of this great engine of the world. How should it loosen or dissolve that engine, as your philosophy evidently professes that it must? That nature exists we perceive whenever we resume our intellectual and practical life, interrupted for a moment by this interesting reversion to the immediate. The consciousness which in introspection we treat as an object is, in operation, a cognitive activity: it demonstrates the world. You would never yourself have conceived the minds of ethereal vibrations, or of birds, or of ants, or of men suspending their intelligence, if you had known of no men, ants, birds, or ether. It is the material objects that suggest to you their souls, and teach you how to conceive them. How then should the souls be substituted for the bodies, and abolish them?

Poor guileless reader! If philosophers were straightforward men of science, adding each his mite to the general store of knowledge, they would all substantially agree, and while they might make interesting discoveries, they would not herald each his new transformation of the whole universe. But philosophers are either revolutionists or apologists, and some of them, like M. Bergson, are revolutionists in the interests of apologetics. Their art is to create some surprising inversion of things, some system of the universe contrary to common apprehension, or to defend some such inverted system, propounded by poets long ago, and perhaps consecrated by religion. It would not require a great man to say calmly: Men, birds, even ether-waves, if you will, feel after this and this fashion. The greatness and the excitement begin when he says: Your common sense, your practical intellect, your boasted science have entirely deceived you; see what the real truth is instead! So M. Bergson is bent on telling us that the immediate, as he describes it, is the sole reality; all else is unreal, artificial, and a more or less convenient symbol in discourse – discourse itself being taken, of course, for a movement in immediate sensibility, which is what it is existentially, but never for an excursion into an independent logical realm, which is what it is spiritually and in intent. So we must revise all our psychological observations, and turn them into metaphysical dogmas. It would be nothing to say simply: *For immediate feeling* the past is contained in the present, movement is prior to that which moves, spaces are many, disconnected, and incommensurable, events are indivisible wholes, perception is in its object and identical with it, the future is unpredictable, the complex is bred out of the simple, and evolution is creative, its course being obedient to a general tendency or groping impulse, not to any exact law. No, we must say instead: *In the universe at large* the whole past is preserved bodily in the present; duration is real and space is only imagined; all is motion, and there is nothing substantial that moves; times are incommensurable; men, birds, and waves are nothing but the images of them (our perceptions, like their spirits, being some compendium of these images); chance intervenes in the flux, but evolution is due to an absolute Effort which exists *in vacuo* and is simplicity itself; and this Effort, without having an idea of what it pursues, nevertheless produces it out of nothing.

The accuracy or the hollowness of M. Bergson's doctrine, according as we take it for literary psychology or for natural philosophy, will appear clearly in the following instance. "Any one," he writes,[1] "who has ever practised literary composition knows very well that, after he has devoted long study to the subject, collected all the documents, and taken all his notes, one thing more is needful before he can actually embark on the work of composition; namely, an effort, often a very painful one, to plant himself all at once in the very heart of the subject, and to fetch from as profound a depth as possible the momentum by which he need simply let himself be borne along in the sequel. This momentum, as soon as it is acquired, carries the mind forward along a path where it recovers all the facts it had gathered together, and a thousand other details besides. The momentum develops and breaks up of itself into particulars that might be retailed *ad infinitum*. The more he advances the more he finds; he will never have exhausted the subject; and nevertheless if he turns round suddenly to face the momentum he feels at his back and see what it is, it eludes him; for it is not a thing but a direction of movement, and though capable of being extended indefinitely, it is simplicity itself."

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[1] "Introduction à la Métaphysique." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,* Janvier, 1903.

This is evidently well observed: heighten the tone a little, and you might have a poem on those joyful pangs of gestation and parturition which are not denied to a male animal. It is a description of the *sensation* of literary composition, of the *immediate experience* of a writer as words and images rise into his mind. He cannot summon his memories explicitly, for he would first have to remember them to do so; his consciousness of inspiration, of literary creation, is nothing but a consciousness of pregnancy and of a certain "direction of movement," as if he were being wafted in a balloon; and just in its moments of highest tension his mind is filled with mere expectancy and mere excitement, without images, plans, or motives; and what guides it is inwardly, as M. Bergson says, simplicity itself. Yet excellent as such a description is psychologically, it is a literary confession rather than a piece of science; for scientific psychology is a part of natural history, and when in nature we come upon such a notable phenomenon as this, that some men write and write eloquently, we should at once study the antecedents and the conditions under which this occurs; we should try, by experiment if possible, to see what variations in the result follow upon variations in the situation. At once we should begin to perceive how casual and superficial are those data of introspection which M. Bergson's account reproduces. Does that painful effort, for instance, occur always? Is it the moral source, as he seems to suggest, of the good and miraculous fruits that follow? Not at all: such an effort is required only when the writer is overworked, or driven to express himself under pressure; in the spontaneous talker or singer, in the orator surpassing himself and overflowing with eloquence, there is no effort at all; only facility, and joyous undirected abundance. We should further ask whether *all* the facts previously gathered are recovered, and all correctly, and what relation the "thousand other details" have to them; and we should find that everything was controlled and supplied by the sensuous endowment of the literary man, his moral complexion, and his general circumstances. And we should perceive at the same time that the momentum which to introspection was so mysterious was in fact the discharge of many automatisms long imprinted on the system, a system (as growth and disease show) that has its internal vegetation and crises of maturity, to which facility and error in the recovery of the past, and creation also, are closely attached. Thus we should utterly refuse to say that this momentum was capable of being extended indefinitely or was simplicity itself. It may be a good piece of literary psychology to say that simplicity precedes complexity, for it precedes complexity in consciousness. Consciousness dwindles and flares up most irresponsibly, so long as its own flow alone is regarded, and it continually arises out of nothing, which indeed is simplicity itself. But it does not arise without real conditions outside, which cannot be discovered by introspection, nor divined by that literary psychology which proceeds by imagining what introspection might yield in others.

There is a deeper mystification still in this passage, where a writer is said to "plant himself in the very heart of the subject." The general tenor of M. Bergson's philosophy warrants us in taking this quite literally to mean that the field from which inspiration draws its materials is not the man's present memory nor even his past experience, but the subject itself which that experience and this memory regard: in other words, what we write about and our latent knowledge are the same thing. When Shakespeare was composing his *Antony and Cleopatra,* for instance, he planted himself in the very heart of Rome and of Egypt, and in the very heart of the Queen of Egypt herself; what he had gathered from Plutarch and from elsewhere was, according to M. Bergson's view, a sort of glimpse of the remote reality itself, as if by telepathy he had been made to witness some part of it; or rather as if the scope of his consciousness had been suddenly extended in one direction, so as to embrace and contain bodily a bit of that outlying experience. Thus when the poet sifts his facts and sets his imagination to work at unifying and completing them, what he does is to pierce to Egypt, Rome, and the inner consciousness of Cleopatra, to fetch *thence* the profound momentum which is to guide him in composition; and it is there, not in the adventitious later parts of his own mind, that he should find the thousand other details which he may add to the picture.

Here again, in an exaggerated form, we have a transcript of the immediate, a piece of really wonderful introspection, spoiled by being projected into a theory of nature, which it spoils in its turn. Doubtless Shakespeare, in the heat of dramatic vision, lived his characters, transported himself to their environment, and felt the passion of each, as we do in a dream, dictating their unpremeditated words. But all this is in imagination; it is true only within the framework of our dream. In reality, of course, Shakespeare never pierced to Rome nor to Egypt;

his elaborations of his data are drawn from his own feelings and circumstances, not from those of Cleopatra. This transporting oneself into the heart of a subject is a loose metaphor: the best one can do is to transplant the subject into one's own heart and draw *from oneself* impulses as profound as possible with which to vivify tradition and make it over in one's own image. Yet I fear that to speak so is rationalism, and would be found to involve, to the horror of our philosopher, that life is cognitive and spiritual, but dependent, discontinuous, and unsubstantial. What he conceives instead is that consciousness is a stuff out of which things are made, and has all the attributes, even the most material, of its several objects; and that there is no possibility of knowing, save by becoming what one is trying to know. So perception, for him, lies where its object does, and is some part of it; memory is the past experience itself, somehow shining through into the present; and Shakespeare's Cleopatra, I should infer, would have to be some part of Cleopatra herself–in those moments when she spoke English.

It is hard to be a just critic of mysticism because mysticism can never do itself justice in words. To conceive of an external actual Cleopatra and an external actual mind of Shakespeare is to betray the cause of pure immediacy; and I suspect that if M. Bergson heard of such criticisms as I am making, he would brush them aside as utterly blind and scholastic. As the mystics have always said that God was not far from them, but dwelt in their hearts, meaning this pretty literally: so this mystical philosophy of the immediate, which talks sometimes so scientifically of things and with such intimacy of knowledge, feels that these things are not far from it, but dwell literally in its heart. The revelation and the sentiment of them, if it be thorough, is just what the things are. The total aspects to be discerned in a body *are* that body; and the movement of those aspects, when you enact it, *is* the spirit of that body, and at the same time a part of your own spirit. To suppose that a man's consciousness (either one's own or other people's) is a separate fact over and above the shuffling of the things he feels, or that these things are anything over and above the feeling of them which exists more or less everywhere in diffusion–that, for the mystic, is to be once for all hopelessly intellectual, dualistic, and diabolical. If you cannot shed the husk of those dead categories–space, matter, mind, truth, person–life is shut out of your heart. And the mystic, who always speaks out of experience, is certainly right in this, that a certain sort of life is shut out by reason, the sort that reason calls dreaming or madness; but he forgets that reason too is a kind of life, and that of all the kinds—mystical, passionate, practical, æsthetic, intellectual—with their various degrees of light and heat, the life of reason is that which some people may prefer. I confess I am one of these, and I am not inclined, even if I were able, to reproduce M. Bergson's sentiments as he feels them. He is his own perfect expositor. All a critic can aim at is to understand these sentiments as existing facts, and to give them the place that belongs to them in the moral world. To understand, in most cases, is intimacy enough.

Herbert Spencer says somewhere that the yolk of an egg is homogeneous, the highly heterogeneous bird being differentiated in it by the law of evolution. I cannot think what assured Spencer of this homogeneity in the egg, except the fact that perhaps it all tasted alike, which might seem good proof to a pure empiricist. Leibnitz, on the contrary, maintained that the organisation of nature was infinitely deep, every part consisting of an endless number of discrete elements. Here we may observe the difference between good philosophy and bad. The idea of Leibnitz is speculative and far outruns the evidence, but it is speculative in a well-advised, penetrating, humble, and noble fashion; while the idea of Spencer is foolishly dogmatic, it is a piece of ignorant self-sufficiency, like that insular empiricism that would deny that Chinamen were real until it had actually seen them. Nature is richer than experience and wider than divination; and it is far rasher and more arrogant to declare that any part of nature is simple than to suggest the sort of complexity that perhaps it might have. M. Bergson, however, is on the side of Spencer. After studiously examining the egg on every side—for he would do more than taste it—and considering the source and destiny of it, he would summon his intuition to penetrate to the very heart of it, to its spirit, and then he would declare that this spirit was a vital momentum without parts and without ideas, and was simplicity itself. He would add that it was the free and original creator of the bird, because it is of the essence of spirit to bestow more than it possesses and to build better than it knows. Undoubtedly actual spirit is simple and does not know how it builds; but for that very reason actual spirit does not really create or build anything, but merely watches, now with sympathetic, now with shocked attention, what is being created and built for it. Doubtless new things are always arising, new islands, new persons, new philosophies; but that the real cause of them should be simpler than they, that their Creator, if I may use this language, should be ignorant and give more than he has, who can stomach that?

Let us grant, however, since the thing is not abstractly inconceivable, that eggs really have no structure. To what, then, shall we attribute the formation of birds? Will it follow that evolution, or differentiation, or the law of the passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, or the dialectic of the concept of pure being, or the impulse towards life, or the vocation of spirit is what actually hatches them? Alas, these words are but pedantic and rhetorical cloaks for our ignorance, and to project them behind the facts and regard them as presiding from thence over the course of nature is a piece of the most deplorable scholasticism. If eggs are really without structure, the true causes of the formation of birds are the last conditions, whatever they may be, that introduce that phenomenon and determine its character—the type of the parents, the act of fertilisation, the temperature, or whatever else observation might find regularly to precede and qualify that new birth in nature. These facts, if they were the ultimate and deepest facts in the case, would be the ultimate and only possible terms in which to explain it. They would constitute the mechanism of reproduction; and if nature were no finer than that in its structure, science could not go deeper than that in its discoveries. And although it is frivolous to suppose that nature ends in this way at the limits of our casual apprehension, and has no hidden roots, yet philosophically that would be as good a stopping place as any other. Ultimately we should have to be satisfied with some factual conjunction and method in events. If atoms and their collisions, by any chance, were the ultimate and inmost facts discoverable, they would supply the explanation of everything, in the only sense in which anything existent can be explained at all. If somebody then came to us enthusiastically and added that the Will of the atoms so to be and move was the true cause, or the Will of God that they should move so, he would not be reputed, I suppose, to have thrown a bright light on the subject.

Yet this is what M. Bergson does in his whole defence of metaphysical vitalism, and especially in the instance of the evolution of eyes by two different methods, which is his palmary argument. Since in some molluscs and in vertebrates organs that coincide in being organs of vision are reached by distinct paths, it cannot have been the propulsion of mechanism in each case, he says, that guided the developments, which, being divergent, would never have led to coincident results, but the double development must have been guided by a common *tendency towards vision.* Suppose (what some young man in a laboratory may by this time have shown to be false) that M. Bergson's observations have sounded the facts to the bottom; it would then be of the ultimate nature of things that, given light and the other conditions, the two methods of development will end in eyes; just as, for a peasant, it is of the ultimate nature of things that puddles can be formed in two quite opposite ways, by rain falling from heaven and by springs issuing from the earth; but as the peasant would not have reached a profound insight into nature if he had proclaimed the presence in her of a *tendency to puddles,* to be formed in inexplicably different ways; so the philosopher attains to no profound insight when he proclaims in her a *tendency to vision.* If those words express more than ignorance, they express the love of it. Even if the vitalists were right in despairing of further scientific discoveries, they would be wrong in offering their verbiage as a substitute. Nature may possibly have only a very loose hazy constitution, to be watched and understood as sailors watch and understand the weather; but Neptune and Æolus are not thereby proved to be the authors of storms. Yet M. Bergson thinks if life could only be safely shown to arise unaccountably, that would prove the invisible efficacy of a mighty tendency to life. But would the ultimate contexture and miracle of things be made less arbitrary, and less a matter of brute fact, by the presence behind them of an actual and arbitrary effort that such should be their nature? If this word "effort" is not a mere figure of rhetoric, a name for a movement in things of which the end happens to interest us more than the beginning, if it is meant to be an effort actually and consciously existing, then we must proceed to ask: Why did this effort exist? Why did it choose that particular end to strive for? How did it reach the conception of that end, which had never been realised before, and which no existent nature demanded for its fulfilment? How did the effort, once made specific, select the particular matter it was to transform? Why did this matter respond to the disembodied effort that it should change its habits? Not one of these questions is easier to answer than the question why nature is living or animals have eyes. Yet without seeking to solve the only real problem, namely, how nature is actually constituted, this introduction of metaphysical powers raises all the others, artificially and without occasion. This side of M. Bergson's philosophy illustrates the worst and most familiar vices of metaphysics. It marvels at some appearance, not to investigate it, but to give it an unctuous name. Then it turns this name into a power, that by its operation creates the appearance. This is simply verbal mythology or the hypostasis of words, and there would be some excuse for a rude person who should call it rubbish.

The metaphysical abuse of psychology is as extraordinary in modern Europe as that of fancy ever was in India or of rhetoric in Greece. We find, for instance, Mr. Bradley murmuring, as a matter almost too obvious to mention, that the existence of anything not sentience is unmeaning to him; or, if I may put this evident principle in other words, that nothing is able to exist unless something else is able to discover it. Yet even if discovered the poor candidate for existence would be foiled, for it would turn out to be nothing but a modification of the mind falsely said to discover it. Existence and discovery are conceptions which the malicious criticism of knowledge (which is the psychology of knowledge abused) pretends to have discarded and outgrown altogether; the conception of immediacy has taken their place. This malicious criticism of knowledge is based on the silent assumption that knowledge is impossible. Whenever you mention anything, it baffles you by talking instead about your idea of what you mention; and if ever you describe the origin of anything it substitutes, as a counter-theory, its theory of the origin of your description. This, however, would not be a counter-theory at all if the criticism of knowledge had not been corrupted into a negative dogma, maintaining that ideas of things are the only things possible and that therefore only ideas and not things can have an origin. Nothing could better illustrate how deep this cognitive impotence has got into people's bones than the manner in which, in the latest schools of philosophy, it is being disavowed; for unblushing idealism is distinctly out of fashion. M. Bergson tells us he has solved a difficulty that seemed hopeless by avoiding a fallacy common to idealism and realism. The difficulty was that if you started with self-existent matter you could never arrive at mind, and if you started with self-existent mind you could never arrive at matter. The fallacy was that both schools innocently supposed there was an existing world to discover, and each thought it possible that its view should describe that world as it really was. What now is M. Bergson's solution? That no articulated world, either material or psychical, exists at all, but only a tendency or enduring effort to evolve images of both sorts; or rather to evolve images which in their finer texture and vibration are images of matter, but which grouped and foreshortened in various ways are images of minds. The idea of nature and the idea of consciousness are two apperceptions or syntheses of the same stuff of experience. The two worlds thus become substantially identical, continuous, and superposable; each can merge insensibly into the other. “To perceive all the influences of all the points of all bodies would be to sink to the condition of a material object.”[2] To perceive some of these influences, by having created organs that shut out the others, is to be a mind.

This solution is obtained by substituting, as usual, the ideas of things for the things themselves and cheating the honest man who was talking about objects by answering him as if he were talking about himself. Certainly, if we could limit ourselves to feeling life flow and the whole world vibrate, we should not raise the question debated between realists and idealists; but not to raise a question is one thing and to have solved it is another. What has really been done is to offer us a history, *on the assumption of idealism,* of the idea of mind and the idea of matter. This history may be correct enough psychologically, and such as a student of the life of reason might possibly come to; but it is a mere evasion of the original question concerning the relation of this mental evolution to the world it occurs in. In truth, an enveloping world is assumed by these hereditary idealists not to exist; they rule it out *a priori,* and the life of reason is supposed by them to constitute the whole universe. To be sure, they say they transcend idealism no less than realism, because they mark the point where, by contrast or selection from other objects, the mind has come to be distinguished: but the subterfuge is vain, because by “mind” they mean simply the idea of mind, and they give no name, except perhaps experience, to the mind that forms that idea. Matter and mind, for these transcendentalists posing as realists, merge and flow so easily together only because both are images or groups of images in an original mind presupposed but never honestly posited. It is in this forgotten mind, also, as the professed idealists urge, that the relations of proximity and simultaneity between various lives can alone subsist, if to subsist is to be experienced.

There is, however, one point of real difference, at least initially, between the idealism of M. Bergson and that of his predecessors. The universal mind, for M. Bergson, is in process of actual transformation.

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[2] *Matière et Mémoire,* p. 38.

It is not an omniscient God but a cosmic sensibility. In this sensibility matter, with all its vibrations felt in detail, forms one moving panorama together with all minds, which are patterns visible at will from various points of view in that same woof of matter; and so the great experiment crawls and shoots on, the dream of a giant without a body, mindful of the past, uncertain of the future, shuffling his images, and threading his painful way through a labyrinth of cross-purposes.

Such at least is the notion which the reader gathers from the prevailing character of M. Bergson's words; but I am not sure that it would be his ultimate conclusion. Perhaps it is to be out of sympathy with his spirit to speak of an ultimate conclusion at all; nothing comes to a conclusion and nothing is ultimate. Many dilemmas, however, are inevitable, and if the master does not make a choice himself, his pupils will divide and trace the alternative consequences for themselves in each direction. If they care most for a real fluidity, as William James did, they will stick to something like what I have just described; but if they care most for immediacy, as we may suspect that M. Bergson does, they will transform that view into something far more orthodox. For a real fluidity and an absolute immediacy are not compatible. To believe in real change you must put some trust in representation, and if you posit a real past and a real future you posit independent objects. In absolute immediacy, on the contrary, instead of change taken realistically, you can have only a feeling of change. The flux becomes an idea in the absolute, like the image of a moving spiral, always flowing outwards or inwards, but with its centre and its circumference always immovable. Duration, we must remember, is simply the sense of lasting; no time is real that is not lived through. Therefore various lives cannot be dated in a common time, but have no temporal relations to one another. Thus, if we insist on immediacy, the vaunted novelty of the future and the inestimable freedom of life threaten to become (like all else) the given *feeling* of novelty or freedom, in passing from a given image of the past to a given image of the future—all these terms being contained in the present; and we have reverted to the familiar conception of absolute immutability in absolute life. M. Bergson has studied Plotinus and Spinoza; I suspect he has not studied them in vain.

Nor is this the only point at which this philosophy, when we live a while with it, suddenly drops its mask of novelty and shows us a familiar face. It would seem, for instance, that beneath the drama of creative evolution there was a deeper nature of things. For apparently creative evolution (apart from the obstacle of matter, which may be explained away idealistically) has to submit to the following conditions: first, to create in sequence, not all at once; second, to create some particular sequence only, not all possible sequences side by side; and third, to continue the one sequence chosen, since if the additions of every new moment were irrelevant to the past, no sequence, no vital persistence or progress would be secured, and all effort would be wasted. These are compulsions; but it may also, I suppose, be thought a *duty* on the part of the vital impulse to be true to its initial direction and not to halt, as it well might, like the self-reversing Will of Schopenhauer, on perceiving the result of its spontaneous efforts. Necessity would thus appear behind liberty and duty before it. This summons to life to go on, and these conditions imposed upon it, might then very plausibly be attributed to a Deity existing beyond the world, as is done in religious tradition; and such a doctrine, if M. Bergson should happen to be holding it in reserve, would perhaps help to explain some obscurities in his system, such, for instance, as the power of potentiality to actualise itself, of equipoise to become suddenly emphasis on one particular part, and of spirit to pursue an end chosen before it is conceived, and when there is no nature to predetermine it.

It has been said that M. Bergson's system precludes ethics: I cannot think that observation just. Apart from the moral inspiration which appears throughout his philosophy, which is indeed a passionate attempt to exalt (or debase) values into powers, it offers, I should say, two starting-points for ethics. In the first place, the *élan vital* ought not to falter, although it can do so: therefore to persevere, labour, experiment, propagate, must be duties, and the opposite must be sins. In the second place, freedom, in adding uncaused increments to life, ought to do so in continuation of the whole past, though it might do so frivolously: therefore it is a duty to be studious, consecutive, loyal; you may move in any direction but you must carry the whole past with you. I will not say this suggests a sound system of ethics, because it would be extracted from dogmas which are physical and incidentally incredible; nor would it represent a mature and disillusioned morality, because it would look to the future and not to the eternal; nevertheless it would be deeply ethical, expressing the feelings that have always inspired Hebraic morality.

A good way of testing the calibre of a philosophy is to ask what it thinks of death. Philosophy, said Plato, is a meditation on death, or rather, if we would do justice to his thought, an aspiration to live disembodied; and Schopenhauer said that the spectacle of death was the first provocation to philosophy. M. Bergson has not yet treated of this subject; but we may perhaps perceive for ourselves the place that it might occupy in his system.[3] Life, according to him, is the original and absolute force. In the beginning, however, it was only a potentiality or tendency. To become specific lives, life had to emphasise and bring exclusively to consciousness, here and there, special possibilities of living; and where these special lives have their chosen boundary (if this way of putting it is not too Fichtean) they posit or create a material environment. Matter is the view each life takes of what for it are rejected or abandoned possibilities of living. This might show how the absolute will to live, if it was to be carried out, would have to begin by evoking a sense of dead or material things about it; it would not show how death could ever overtake the will itself. If matter were merely the periphery which life has to draw round itself, in order to be a definite life, matter could never abolish any life; as the ring of a circus or the sand of the arena can never abolish the show for which they have been prepared. Life would then be fed and defined by matter, as an artist is served by the matter he needs to carry on his art.

Yet in actual life there is undeniably such a thing as danger and failure. M. Bergson even thinks that the facing of increased dangers is one proof that vital force is an absolute thing; for if life were an equilibrium, it would not displace itself and run new risks of death, by making itself more complex and ticklish, as it does in the higher organisms and the finer arts.[4] Yet if life is the only substance, how is such a risk of death possible at all? I suppose the special life that arises about a given nucleus of feeling, by emphasising some of the relations which that feeling has in the world, might be abolished if a greater emphasis were laid on another set of its relations, starting from some other nucleus. We must remember that these selections, according to M. Bergson, are not apperceptions merely. They are creative efforts. The future constitution of the flux will vary in response to them. Each mind sucks the world, so far as it can, into its own vortex. A cross apperception will then amount to a contrary force. Two souls will not be able to dominate the same matter in peace and friendship. Being forces, they will pull that matter in different ways. Each soul will tend to devour and to direct exclusively the movement influenced by the other soul. The one that succeeds in ruling that movement will live on; the other, I suppose, will die, although M. Bergson may not like that painful word. He says the lower organisms store energy for the higher organisms to use; but when a sheep appropriates the energy stored up in grass, or a man that stored up in mutton, it looks as if the grass and the sheep had perished. Their *élan vital* is no longer theirs, for in this rough world to live is to kill. Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, save helped by the death of some other thing. Of course, this is no defeat for the *élan vital* in general; for according to our philosopher the whole universe from the beginning has been making for just that supreme sort of consciousness which man, who eats the mutton, now possesses. The sheep and the grass were only things by the way and scaffolding for our precious humanity. But would it not be better if some being should arise nobler than man, not requiring abstract intellect nor artificial weapons, but endowed with instinct and intuition and, let us say, the power of killing by radiating electricity? And might not men then turn out to have been mere explosives, in which energy was stored for convenient digestion by that superior creature? A shocking thought, no doubt, like the thought of death, and more distressing to our vital feelings than is the pleasing assimilation of grass and mutton in our bellies. Yet I can see no ground, except a desire to flatter oneself, for not crediting the *élan vital* with some such digestive intention. M. Bergson's system would hardly be more speculative if it entertained this possibility, and it would seem more honest.

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[3] M. Bergson has shown at considerable length that the idea of non-existence is more complex, psychologically, than the idea of existence, and posterior to it. He evidently thinks this disposes of the reality of non-existence also: for it is the reality that he wishes to exorcise by his words. If, however, non-existence and the idea of non-existence were identical, it would have been impossible for me not to exist before I was born: my non-existence then would be more complex than my existence now, and posterior to it. The initiated would not recoil from this consequence, but it might open the eyes of some catechumens. It is a good test of the malicious theory of knowledge.

[4] This argument against mechanism is a good instance of the difficulties which mythological habits of mind import unnecessarily into science. An equilibrium would not displace itself! But an equilibrium is a natural result, not a magical entity. It is continually displaced, as its constituents are modified by internal movements or external agencies; and while many a time the equilibrium is thereby destroyed altogether, sometimes it is replaced by a more elaborate and perilous equilibrium; as glaciers carry many rocks down, but leave some, here and there, piled in the most unlikely pinnacles and pagodas.

The vital impulse is certainly immortal; for if we take it in the naturalistic exoteric sense, for a force discovered in biology, it is an independent agent coming down into matter, organising it against its will, and stirring it like the angel the pool of Bethesda. Though the ripples die down, the angel is not affected. He has merely flown away. And if we take the vital impulse mystically and esoterically, as the *only* primal force, creating matter in order to play with it, the immortality of life is even more obvious; for there is then nothing else in being that could possibly abolish it. But when we come to immortality for the individual, all grows obscure and ambiguous. The original tendency of life was certainly cosmic and not distinguished into persons: we are told it was like a wireless message sent at the creation which is being read off at last by the humanity of to-day. In the naturalistic view, the diversity of persons would seem to be due to the different material conditions under which one and the same spiritual purpose must fight its way towards realisation in different times and places. It is quite conceivable, however, that in the mystical view the very sense of the original message should comport this variety of interpretations, and that the purpose should always have been to produce diverse individuals.

The first view, as usual, is the one which M. Bergson has prevailingly in mind, and communicates most plausibly; while he holds to it he is still talking about the natural world, and so we still know what he is talking about. On this view, however, personal immortality would be impossible; it would be, if it were aimed at, a self-contradiction in the aim of life; for the diversity of persons would be due to impediments only, and souls would differ simply in so far as they mutilated the message which they were all alike trying to repeat. They would necessarily, when the spirit was victorious, be reabsorbed and identified in the universal spirit. This view also seems most consonant with M. Bergson's theory of primitive reality, as a flux of fused images, or a mind lost in matter; to this view, too, is attributable his hostility to intelligence, in that it arrests the flux, divides the fused images, and thereby murders and devitalises reality. Of course the destiny of spirit would not be to revert to that diffused materiality; for the original mind lost in matter had a very short memory; it was a sort of cosmic trepidation only, whereas the ultimate mind would remember all that, in its efforts after freedom, it had ever superadded to that trepidation or made it turn into. Even the abstract views of things taken by the practical intellect would, I fear, have to burden the universal memory to the end. We should be remembered, even if we could no longer exist.

On the other more profound view, however, might not personal immortality be secured? Suppose the original message said: Translate me into a thousand tongues! In fulfilling its duty, the universe would then continue to divide its dream into phantom individuals; as it had to insulate its parts in the beginning in order to dominate and transform them freely, so it would always continue to insulate them, so as not to lose its cross-vistas and its mobility. There is no reason, then, why individuals should not live for ever. But a condition seems to be involved which may well make belief stagger. It would be impossible for the universe to divide its images into particular minds unless it preserved the images of their particular bodies also. Particular minds arise, according to this philosophy, in the interests of practice: which means, biologically, to secure a better adjustment of the body to its environment, so that it may survive. Mystically, too, the fundamental force is a half-conscious purpose that practice, or freedom, should come to be; or rather, that an apparition or experience of practice and freedom should arise; for in this philosophy appearance is all. To secure this desirable apparition of practice special tasks are set to various nuclei in felt space (such, for instance, as the task to *see*), and the image of a body (in this case that of an eye) is gradually formed, in order to execute that task; for evidently the Absolute can see only if it looks, and to look it must first choose a point of view and an optical method. This point of view and this method posit the individual; they fix him in time and space, and determine the quality and range of his passive experience: they are his body. If the Absolute, then, wishes to retain the individual not merely as one of its memories but as one of its organs of practical life, it must begin by retaining the image of his body. His body must continue to figure in that landscape of nature which the absolute life, as it pulses, keeps always composing and recomposing. Otherwise a personal mind, a sketch of things made from the point of view and in the interests of that body, cannot be preserved.

M. Bergson, accordingly, should either tell us that our bodies are going to rise again, or he should not tell us, or give us to understand, that our minds are going to endure. I suppose he cannot venture to preach the resurrection of the body to this weak-kneed generation; he is too modern and plausible for that. Yet he is too amiable to deny to our dilated nostrils some voluptuous whiffs of immortality. He asks if we are not "led to suppose" that consciousness passes through matter to be tempered like steel, to constitute distinct personalities, and prepare them for a higher existence. Other animal minds are but human minds arrested; men at last (what men, I wonder?) are "capable of remembering all and willing all and controlling their past and their future," so that "we shall have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life." Elsewhere he says, in a phrase already much quoted and perhaps destined to be famous, that in man the spirit can "spurn every kind of resistance and break through many an obstacle, perhaps even death." Here the tenor has ended on the inevitable high note, and the gallery is delighted. But was that the note set down for him in the music? And has he not sung it in falsetto?

The immediate knows nothing about death; it takes intelligence to conceive it; and that perhaps is why M. Bergson says so little about it, and that little so far from serious. But he talks a great deal about life, he feels he has penetrated deeply into its nature; and yet death, together with birth, is the natural analysis of what life is. What is this creative purpose, that must wait for sun and rain to set it in motion? What is this life, that in any individual can be suddenly extinguished by a bullet? What is this *élan vital,* that a little fall in temperature would banish altogether from the universe? The study of death may be out of fashion, but it is never out of season. The omission of this, which is almost the omission of wisdom from philosophy, warns us that in M. Bergson's thought we have something occasional and partial, the work of an astute apologist, a party man, driven to desperate speculation by a timid attachment to prejudice. Like other terrified idealisms, the system of M. Bergson has neither good sense, nor rigour, nor candour, nor solidity. It is a brilliant attempt to confuse the lessons of experience by refining upon its texture, an attempt to make us halt, for the love of primitive illusions, in the path of discipline and reason. It is likely to prove a successful attempt, because it flatters the weaknesses of the moment, expresses them with emotion, and covers them with a feint at scientific speculation. It is not, however, a powerful system, like that of Hegel, capable of bewildering and obsessing many who have no natural love for shams. M. Bergson will hardly bewilder; his style is too clear, the field where his just observations lie—the immediate—is too well defined, and the mythology which results from projecting the terms of the immediate into the absolute, and turning them into powers, is too obviously verbal. He will not long impose on any save those who enjoy being imposed upon; but for a long time he may increase their number. His doctrine is indeed alluring. Instead of telling us, as a stern and contrite philosophy would, that the truth is remote, difficult, and almost undiscoverable by human efforts, that the universe is vast and unfathomable, yet that the knowledge of its ways is precious to our better selves, if we would not live befooled, this philosophy rather tells us that nothing is truer or more precious than our rudimentary consciousness, with its vague instincts and premonitions, that everything ideal is fictitious, and that the universe, at heart, is as palpitating and irrational as ourselves. Why then strain the inquiry? Why seek to dominate passion by understanding it? Rather live on; work, it matters little at what, and grow, it matters nothing in what direction. Exert your instinctive powers of vegetation and emotion; let your philosophy itself be a frank expression of this flux, the roar of the ocean in your little sea-shell, a momentary posture of your living soul, not a stark adoration of things reputed eternal.

So the intellectual faithlessness and the material servility of the age are flattered together and taught to justify themselves theoretically. They cry joyfully, *non peccavi,* which is the modern formula for confession. M. Bergson's philosophy itself is a confession of a certain mystical rebellion and atavism in the contemporary mind. It will remain a beautiful monument to the passing moment, a capital film for the cinematograph of history, full of psychological truth and of a kind of restrained sentimental piety. His thought has all the charm that can go without strength and all the competence that can go without mastery. This is not an age of mastery; it is confused with too much business; it has no brave simplicity. The mind has forgotten its proper function, which is to crown life by quickening it into intelligence, and thinks if it could only prove that it accelerated life, that might perhaps justify its existence; like a philosopher at sea who, to make himself useful, should blow into the sail.

IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

I. A NEW SCHOLASTICISM

In its chase after idols this age has not wholly forgotten the gods, and reason and faith in reason are not left without advocates. Some years ago, at Trinity College, Cambridge, Mr. G. E. Moore began to produce a very deep impression amongst the younger spirits by his powerful and luminous dialectic. Like Socrates, he used all the sharp arts of a disputant in the interests of common sense and of an almost archaic dogmatism. Those who heard him felt how superior his position was, both in rigour and in force, to the prevailing inversions and idealisms. The abuse of psychology, rampant for two hundred years, seemed at last to be detected and challenged; and the impressionistic rhetoric that philosophy was saturated with began to be squeezed out by clear questions, and by a disconcerting demand for literal sincerity. German idealism, when we study it as a product of its own age and country, is a most engaging phenomenon; it is full of afflatus, sweep, and deep searchings of heart; but it is essentially romantic and egotistical, and all in it that is not soliloquy is mere system-making and sophistry. Therefore when it is taught by unromantic people *ex cathedra,* in stentorian tones, and represented as the rational foundation of science and religion, with neither of which it has any honest sympathy, it becomes positively odious—one of the worst impostures and blights to which a youthful imagination could be subjected. It is chiefly against the incubus of this celestial monster that Mr. Moore dared to lift up his eyes; and many a less courageous or less clear-sighted person was thankful to him for it. But a man with such a mission requires a certain narrowness and concentration of mind; he has to be intolerant and to pound a good deal on the same notes. We need not wonder if Mr. Moore has written rather meagrely, and with a certain vehemence and want of imagination.

All this, however, was more than made up for by the powerful ally who soon came to his aid. Mr. Bertrand Russell began by adopting Mr. Moore's metaphysics, but he has given as much as he has received. Apart from his well-known mathematical attainments, he possesses by inheritance the political and historical mind, and an intrepid determination to pierce convention and look to ultimate things. He has written abundantly and, where the subject permits, with a singular lucidity, candour, and charm. Especially his *Philosophical Essays* and his little book on *The Problems of Philosophy* can be read with pleasure by any intelligent person, and give a tolerably rounded picture of the tenets of the school. Yet it must be remembered that Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore, is still young and his thoughts have not assumed their ultimate form. Moreover, he lives in an atmosphere of academic disputation which makes one technical point after another acquire a preponderating influence in his thoughts. His book on *The Problems of Philosophy* is admirable in style, temper, and insight, but it hardly deserves its title; it treats principally, in a somewhat personal and partial way, of the relation of knowledge to its objects, and it might rather have been called "The problems which Moore and I have been agitating lately." Indeed, his philosophy is so little settled as yet that every new article and every fresh conversation revokes some of his former opinions, and places the crux of philosophical controversy at a new point. We are soon made aware that exact thinking and true thinking are not synonymous, but that one exact thought, in the same mind, may be the exact opposite of the next. This inconstancy, which after all does not go very deep, is a sign of sincerity and pure love of truth; it marks the freshness, the vivacity, the self-forgetfulness, the logical ardour belonging to this delightful reformer. It may seem a paradox, but at bottom it is not, that the vitalists should be oppressed, womanish, and mystical, and only the intellectualists keen, argumentative, fearless, and full of life. I mention this casualness and inconstancy in Mr. Russell's utterances not to deride them, but to show the reader how impossible it is, at this juncture, to give a comprehensive account of his philosophy, much less a final judgment upon it.

The principles most fundamental and dominant in his thought are perhaps the following: That the objects the mind deals with, whether material or ideal, are what and where the mind says they are, and independent of it; that some general principles and ideas have to be assumed to be valid not merely for thought but for things; that relations may subsist, arise, and disappear between things without at all affecting these things internally; and that the nature of everything is just what it is, and not to be confused either with its origin or with any opinion about it. These principles, joined with an obvious predilection for Plato and Leibnitz among philosophers, lead to the following doctrines, among others: that the mind or soul is an entity separate from its thoughts and pre-existent; that a material world exists in space and time; that its substantial elements may be infinite in number, having position and quality, but no extension, so that each mind or soul might well be one of them; that both the existent and the ideal worlds may be infinite, while the ideal world contains an infinity of things not realised in the actual world; and that this ideal world is knowable by a separate mental consideration, a consideration which is, however, empirical in spirit, since the ideal world of ethics, logic, and mathematics has a special and surprising constitution, which we do not make but must attentively discover.

The reader will perceive, perhaps, that if the function of philosophy is really, as the saying goes, to give us assurance of God, freedom, and immortality, Mr. Russell's philosophy is a dire failure. In fact, its author sometimes gives vent to a rather emphatic pessimism about this world; he has a keen sense for the manifold absurdities of existence. But the sense for absurdities is not without its delights, and Mr. Russell's satirical wit is more constant and better grounded than his despair. I should be inclined to say of his philosophy what he himself has said of that of Leibnitz, that it is at its best in those subjects which are most remote from human life. It needs to be very largely supplemented and much ripened and humanised before it can be called satisfactory or wise; but time may bring these fulfilments, and meantime I cannot help thinking it auspicious in the highest degree that, in a time of such impressionistic haste and plebeian looseness of thought, scholastic rigour should suddenly raise its head again, aspiring to seriousness, solidity, and perfection of doctrine: and this not in the interests of religious orthodoxy, but precisely in the most emancipated and unflinchingly radical quarter. It is refreshing and reassuring, after the confused, melodramatic ways of philosophising to which the idealists and the pragmatists have accustomed us, to breathe again the crisp air of scholastic common sense. It is good for us to be held down, as the

Platonic Socrates would have held us, to saying what we really believe, and sticking to what we say. We seem to regain our intellectual birthright when we are allowed to declare our genuine intent, even in philosophy, instead of begging some kind psychologist to investigate our "meaning" for us, or even waiting for the flux of events to endow us with what "meaning" it will. It is also instructive to have the ethical attitude purified of all that is not ethical and turned explicitly into what, in its moral capacity, it essentially is: a groundless pronouncement upon the better and the worse.

Here a certain one-sidedness begins to make itself felt in Mr. Russell's views. The ethical attitude doubtless has no *ethical* ground, but that fact does not prevent it from having a *natural* ground; and the observer of the animate creation need not have much difficulty in seeing what that natural ground is. Mr. Russell, however, refuses to look also in that direction. He insists, rightly enough, that good is predicated categorically by the conscience; he will not remember that all life is not moral bias merely, and that, in the very act of recognising excellence and pursuing it, we may glance back over our shoulder and perceive how our moral bias is conditioned, and what basis it has in the physical order of things. This backward look, when the hand is on the plough, may indeed confuse our ethical self-expression, both in theory and in practice; and I am the last to deny the need of insisting, in ethics, on ethical judgments in all their purity and dogmatic sincerity. Such insistence, if we had heard more of it in our youth, might have saved many of us from chronic entanglements; and there is nothing, next to Plato, which ought to be more recommended to the young philosopher than the teachings of Messrs. Russell and Moore, if he wishes to be a moralist and a logician, and not merely to seem one. Yet this salutary doctrine, though correct, is inadequate. It is a monocular philosophy, seeing outlines clear, but missing the solid bulk and perspective of things. We need binocular vision to quicken the whole mind and yield a full image of reality. Ethics should be controlled by a physics that perceives the material ground and the relative status of whatever is moral. Otherwise ethics itself tends to grow narrow, strident, and fanatical; as may be observed in asceticism and puritanism, or, for the matter of that, in Mr. Moore's uncivilised leaning towards the doctrine of retributive punishment, or in Mr. Russell's intolerance of selfishness and patriotism, and in his refusal to entertain any pious reverence for the nature of things. The quality of wisdom, like that of mercy, is not strained. To choose, to love and hate, to have a moral life, is inevitable and legitimate in the part; but it is the function of the part as part, and we must keep it in its place if we wish to view the whole in its true proportions. Even to express justly the aim of our own life we need to retain a constant sympathy with what is animal and fundamental in it, else we shall give a false place, and too loud an emphasis, to our definitions of the ideal. However, it would be much worse not to reach the ideal at all, or to confuse it for want of courage and sincerity in uttering our true mind; and it is in uttering our true mind that Mr. Russell can help us, even if our true mind should not always coincide with his.

In the following pages I do not attempt to cover all Mr. Russell's doctrine (the deeper mathematical parts of it being beyond my comprehension), and the reader will find some speculations of my own interspersed in what I report of his. I merely traverse after him three subjects that seem of imaginative interest, to indicate the inspiration and the imprudences, as I think them, of this young philosophy.

II. THE STUDY OF ESSENCE

"The solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably," says Mr. Russell, "the greatest achievement of which our own age has to boast. . . . It was assumed as self-evident, until Cantor and Dedekind established the opposite, that if, from any collection of things, some were taken away, the number of things left must always be less than the original number of things. This assumption, as a matter of fact, holds only of finite collections; and the rejection of it, where the infinite is concerned, has been shown to remove all the difficulties that hitherto baffled human reason in this matter." And he adds in another place: "To reconcile us, by the exhibition of its awful beauty, to the reign of Fate . . . is the task of tragedy. But mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform; and even here it builds a habitation, or rather finds a habitation eternally standing, where our ideals are fully satisfied and our best hopes are not thwarted. It is only when we thoroughly understand the entire independence of ourselves, which belongs to this world that reason finds, that we can adequately realise the profound importance of its beauty."

Mathematics seems to have a value for Mr. Russell akin to that of religion. It affords a sanctuary to which to flee from the world, a heaven suffused with a serene radiance and full of a peculiar sweetness and consolation. "Real life," he writes, "is to most men a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful laws of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world." This study is one of "those elements in human life which merit a place in heaven." "The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry."

This enthusiastic language might have, I should think, an opposite effect upon some readers to that which Mr. Russell desires. It might make them suspect that the claim to know an absolute ideal necessity, so satisfying to one of our passionate impulses, might be prompted by the same conceit, and subject to the same illusion, as the claim to know absolute truth in religion. Beauty, when attributed to necessary relations between logical entities, casts a net of subjectivity over them; and at this net the omnivorous empiricist might be tempted to haul, until he fancied he had landed the whole miraculous draught of fishes. The fish, however, would have slipped through the meshes; and it would be only his own vital emotion, projected for a moment into the mathematical world, that he would be able to draw back and hug to his bosom. Eternal truth is as disconsolate as it is consoling, and as dreary as it is interesting: these moral values are, in fact, values which the activity of contemplating that sort of truth has for different minds; and it is no congruous homage offered to ideal necessity, but merely a private endearment, to call it beautiful or good. The case is not such as if we were dealing with existence. Existence is arbitrary; it is a questionable thing needing justification; and we, at least, cannot justify it otherwise than by taking note of some affinity which it may show to human aspirations. Therefore our private endearments, when we call some existing thing good or beautiful, are not impertinent; they assign to this chance thing its only assignable excuse for being, namely, the service it may chance to render to the spirit. But ideal necessity or, what is the same thing, essential possibility has its excuse for being in itself, since it is not contingent or questionable at all. The affinity which the human mind may develop to certain provinces of essence is adventitious to those essences, and hardly to be mentioned in their presence. It is something the mind has acquired, and may lose. It is an incident in the life of reason, and no inherent characteristic of eternal necessity.

The realm of essence contains the infinite multitude of Leibnitz's possible worlds, many of these worlds being very small and simple, and consisting merely of what might be presented in some isolated moment of feeling. If any such feeling, however, or its object, never in fact occurs, the essence that it would have presented if it had occurred remains possible merely; so that nothing can ever exist in nature or for consciousness which has not a prior and independent locus in the realm of essence. When a man lights upon a thought or is interested in tracing a relation, he does not introduce those objects into the realm of essence, but merely selects them from the plenitude of what lies there eternally. The ground of this selection lies, of course, in his human nature and circumstances; and the satisfaction he may find in so exercising his mind will be a consequence of his mental disposition and of the animal instincts beneath. Two and two would still make four if I were incapable of counting, or if I found it extremely painful to do so, or if I thought it naïve and pre-Kantian of these numbers not to combine in a more vital fashion, and make five. So also, if I happen to enjoy counting, or to find the constancy of numbers sublime, and the reversibility of the processes connecting them consoling, in contrast to the irrevocable flux of living things, all this is due to my idiosyncrasy. It is no part of the essence of numbers to be congenial to me; but it has perhaps become a part of my genius to have affinity to them.

And how, may I ask, has it become a part of my genius? Simply because nature, of which I am a part, and to which all my ideas must refer if they are to be relevant to my destiny, happens to have mathematical form. Nature had to have some form or other, if it was to exist at all; and whatever form it had happened to take would have had its prior place in the realm of essence, and its essential and logical relations there. That particular part of the realm of essence which nature chances to exemplify or to suggest is the part that may be revealed to me, and that is the predestined focus of all my admirations. Essence as such has no power to reveal itself, or to take on existence; and the human mind has no power or interest to trace all essence. Even the few essences which it has come to know, it cannot undertake to examine exhaustively; for there are many features nestling in them, and many relations radiating from them, which no one needs or cares to attend to. The implications which logicians and mathematicians actually observe in the terms they use are a small selection from all those that really obtain, even in their chosen field; so that, for instance, as Mr. Russell was telling us, it was only the other day that Cantor and Dedekind observed that although time continually eats up the days and years, the possible future always remains as long as it was before. This happens to be a fact interesting to mankind. Apart from the mathematical puzzles it may help to solve, it opens before existence a vista of perpetual youth, and the vital stress in us leaps up in recognition of its inmost ambition. Many other things are doubtless implied in infinity which, if we noticed them, would leave us quite cold; and still others, no doubt, are inapprehensible with our sort and degree of intellect. There is of course nothing in essence which an intellect postulated *ad hoc* would not be able to apprehend; but the kind of intellect we know of and possess is an expression of vital adjustments, and is tethered to nature.

That a few eternal essences, then, with a few of their necessary relations to one another, do actually appear to us, and do fascinate our attention and excite our wonder, is nothing paradoxical. This is merely what was bound to happen, if we became aware of anything at all; for the essence embodied in anything is eternal and has necessary relations to some other essences. The air of presumption which there might seem to be in proclaiming that mathematics reveals what has to be true always and everywhere, vanishes when we remember that everything that is true of any essence is true of it always and everywhere. The most trivial truths of logic are as necessary and eternal as the most important; so that it is less of an achievement than it sounds when we say we have grasped a truth that is eternal and necessary.

This fact will be more clearly recognised, perhaps, if we remember that the cogency of our ideal knowledge follows upon our intent in fixing its object. It hangs on a virtual definition, and explicates it. We cannot oblige anybody or anything to reproduce the idea which we have chosen; but that idea will remain the idea it is whether forgotten or remembered, exemplified or not exemplified in things. To penetrate to the foundation of being is possible for us only because the foundation of being is distinguishable quality; were there no set of differing characteristics, one or more of which an existing thing might appropriate, existence would be altogether impossible. The realm of essence is merely the system or chaos of these fundamental possibilities, the catalogue of all exemplifiable natures; so that any experience whatsoever must tap the realm of essence, and throw the light of attention on one of its constituent forms. This is, if you will, a trivial achievement; what would be really a surprising feat, and hardly to be credited, would be that the human mind should grasp the *constitution of nature;* that is, should discover which is the particular essence, or the particular system of essences, which actual existence illustrates. In the matter of physics, truly, we are reduced to skimming the surface, since we have to start from our casual experiences, which form the most superficial stratum of nature, and the most unstable. Yet these casual experiences, while they leave us so much in the dark as to their natural basis and environment, necessarily reveal each its ideal object, its specific essence; and we need only arrest our attention upon it, and define it to ourselves, for an eternal possibility, and some of its intrinsic characters, to have been revealed to our thought.

Whatever, then, a man's mental and moral habit might be, it would perforce have affinity to some essence or other; his life would revolve about some congenial ideal object; he would find some sorts of form, some types of relation, more visible, beautiful, and satisfying than others. Mr. Russell happens to have a mathematical genius, and to find comfort in laying up his treasures in the mathematical heaven. It would be highly desirable that this temperament should be more common; but even if it were universal it would not reduce mathematical essence to a product of human attention, nor raise the "beauty" of mathematics to part of its essence. I do not mean to suggest that Mr. Russell attempts to do the latter; he speaks explicitly of the *value* of mathematical study, a point in ethics and not directly in logic; yet his moral philosophy is itself so much assimilated to logic that the distinction between the two becomes somewhat dubious; and as Mr. Russell will never succeed in convincing us that moral values are independent of life, he may, quite against his will, lead us to question the independence of essence, with that blind gregarious drift of all ideas, in this direction or in that, which is characteristic of human philosophising.

III. THE CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

The time has not yet come when a just and synthetic account of what is called pragmatism can be expected of any man. The movement is still in a nebulous state, a state from which, perhaps, it is never destined to issue. The various tendencies that compose it may soon cease to appear together; each may detach itself and be lost in the earlier system with which it has most affinity. A good critic has enumerated "Thirteen Pragmatisms"; and besides such distinguishable tenets, there are in pragmatism echoes of various popular moral forces, like democracy, impressionism, love of the concrete, respect for success, trust in will and action, and the habit of relying on the future, rather than on the past, to justify one's methods and opinions. Most of these things are characteristically American; and Mr. Russell touches on some of them with more wit than sympathy. Thus he writes: "The influence of democracy in promoting pragmatism is visible in almost every page of William James's writing. There is an impatience of authority, an unwillingness to condemn widespread prejudices, a tendency to decide philosophical questions by putting them to a vote, which contrast curiously with the usual dictatorial tone of philosophic writings. . . . A thing which simply *is* true, whether you like it or not, is to him as hateful as a Russian autocracy; he feels that he is escaping from a prison, made not by stone walls but by 'hard facts,' when he has humanised truth, and made it, like the police force in a democracy, the servant of the people instead of their master. The democratic temper pervades even the religion of the pragmatists; they have the religion they have chosen, and the traditional reverence is changed into satisfaction with their own handiwork. 'The prince of darkness,' James says, 'may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman.' He is rather, we should say, conceived by pragmatists as an elected president, to whom we give a respect which is really a tribute to the wisdom of our own choice. A government in which we have no voice is repugnant to the democratic temper. William James carries up to heaven the revolt of his New England ancestors: the Power to which we can yield respect must be a George Washington rather than a George III."

A point of fundamental importance, about which pragmatists have been far from clear, and perhaps not in agreement with one another, is the sense in which their psychology is to be taken. "The facts that fill the imaginations of pragmatists," Mr. Russell writes, "are psychical facts; where others might think of the starry heavens, pragmatists think of the perception of the starry heavens; where others think of God, pragmatists think of the belief in God, and so on. In discussing the sciences, they never think, like scientific specialists, about the facts upon which scientific theories are based; they think about the theories themselves. Thus their initial question and their habitual imaginative background are both psychological." This is so true that unless we make the substitution into psychic terms instinctively, the whole pragmatic view of things will seem paradoxical, if not actually unthinkable. For instance, pragmatists might protest against the accusation that "they never think about the facts upon which scientific theories are based," for they lay a great emphasis on facts. Facts are the cash which the credit of theories hangs upon. Yet this protest, though sincere, would be inconclusive, and in the end it would illustrate Mr. Russell's observation, rather than refute it. For we should presently learn that these facts can be made by thinking, that our faith in them may contribute to their reality, and may modify their nature; in other words, these facts are our immediate apprehensions of fact, which it is indeed conceivable that our temperaments, expectations, and opinions should modify. Thus the pragmatist's reliance on facts does not carry him beyond the psychic sphere; his facts are only his personal experiences. Personal experiences may well be the basis for no less personal myths; but the effort of intelligence and of science is rather to find the basis of the personal experiences themselves; and this non-psychic basis of experience is what common sense calls the facts, and what practice is concerned with. Yet these are not the *pragmata* of the pragmatist, for it is only the despicable intellectualist that can arrive at them; and the bed-rock of facts that the pragmatist builds upon is avowedly drifting sand. Hence the odd expressions, new to literature and even to grammar, which bubble up continually in pragmatist writings. "For illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat," says one, quite innocently; and another observes that "two centuries later, nominalism was evidently true, because it alone would legitimise the local independence of cities." Lest we should suppose that the historical sequence of these "truths" or illusions is, at least, fixed and irreversible, we are soon informed that the past is always changing, too; that is (if I may rationalise this mystical dictum), that history is always being rewritten, and that the growing present adds new relations to the past, which lead us to conceive or to describe it in some new fashion. Even if the ultimate inference is not drawn, and we are not told that this changing idea of the past is the only past that exists—the real past being unattainable and therefore, for personal idealism, non-existent—it is abundantly clear that the effort to distinguish fact from theory cannot be successful, so long as the psychological way of thinking prevails; for a theory, psychologically considered, is a bare fact in the experience of the theorist, and the other facts of his experience are so many other momentary views, so many scant theories, to be immediately superseded by other "truths in the plural." Sensations and ideas are really distinguishable only by reference to what is assumed to lie without; of which external reality experience is always an effect (and in that capacity is called sensation) and often at the same time an apprehension (and in that capacity is called idea).

It is a crucial question, then, in the interpretation of pragmatism, whether the psychological point of view, undoubtedly prevalent in that school, is the only or the ultimate point of view which it admits. The habit of studying ideas rather than their objects might be simply a matter of emphasis or predilection. It might merely indicate a special interest in the life of reason, and be an effort, legitimate under any system of philosophy, to recount the stages by which human thought, developing in the bosom of nature, may have reached its present degree of articulation. I myself, for instance, like to look at things from this angle: not that I have ever doubted the reality of the natural world, or been able to take very seriously any philosophy that denied it, but precisely because, when we take the natural world for granted, it becomes a possible and enlightening inquiry to ask how the human animal has come to discover his real environment, in so far as he has done so, and what dreams have intervened or supervened in the course of his rational awakening. On the other hand, a psychological point of view might be equivalent to the idealistic doctrine that the articulation of human thought constitutes the only structure of the universe, and its whole history. According to this view, pragmatism would seem to be a revised version of the transcendental logic, leaving logic still transcendental, that is, still concerned with the evolution of the categories. The revision would consist chiefly in this, that empirical verification, utility, and survival would take the place of dialectical irony as the force governing the evolution. It would still remain possible for other methods of approach than this transcendental pragmatism, for instinct, perhaps, or for revelation, to bring us into contact with things-in-themselves. A junction might thus be effected with the system of M. Bergson, which would lead to this curious result: that pragmatic logic would be the method of intelligence, because intelligence is merely a method, useful in practice, for the symbolic and improper representation of reality; while another non-pragmatic method – sympathy and dream – would alone be able to put us in possession of direct knowledge and genuine truth. So that, after all, the pragmatic "truth" of working ideas would turn out to be what it has seemed hitherto to mankind, namely, no real truth, but rather a convenient sort of fiction, which ceases to deceive when once its merely pragmatic value is discounted by criticism.

I remember once putting a question on this subject to Professor James; and his answer was one which I am glad to be able to record. In relation to his having said that "as far as the past facts go, there is no difference . . . be the atoms or be the God their cause,"[1] I asked whether, if God had been the cause, apart from the value of the idea of him in our calculations, his existence would not have made a difference to *him,* as he would be presumably self-conscious. "Of course," said Professor James, "but I wasn't considering that side of the matter; I was thinking of our idea." The choice of the subjective point of view, then, was deliberate here, and frankly arbitrary; it was not intended to exclude the possibility or legitimacy of the objective attitude. And the original reason for deliberately ignoring, in this way, the realistic way of thinking, even while admitting that it represents the real state of affairs, would have been, I suppose, that what could be verified was always some further effect of the real objects, and never those real objects themselves; so that for interpreting and predicting our personal experience only the hypothesis of objects was pertinent, while the objects themselves, except as so represented, were useless and unattainable. The case, if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell's, was as if we possessed a catalogue of the library at Alexandria, all the books being lost for ever; it would be only in the catalogue that we could practically verify their existence or character, though doubtless, by some idle flight of imagination, we might continue to think of the books, as well as of those titles in the catalogue which alone could appear to us in experience. Pragmatism, approached from this side, would then seem to express an acute critical conscience, a sort of will not to believe; not to believe, I mean, more than is absolutely necessary for solipsistic practice.

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[1] *Pragmatism,* p. 101.

Such economical faith, enabling one to dissolve the hard materialistic world into a work of mind, which mind might outflank, was traditional in the radical Emersonian circles in which pragmatism sprang up. It is one of the approaches to the movement; yet we may safely regard the ancestral transcendentalism of the pragmatists as something which they have turned their back upon, and mean to disown. It is destined to play no part in the ultimate result of pragmatism. This ultimate result promises to be, on the contrary, a direct materialistic sort of realism. This alone is congruous with the scientific affinities of the school and its young-American temper. Nor is the transformation very hard to effect. The world of solipsistic practice, if you remove the romantic self that was supposed to evoke it, becomes at once the sensible world; and the problem is only to find a place in the mosaic of objects of sensation for those cognitive and moral functions which the soul was once supposed to exercise in the presence of an independent reality. But this problem is precisely the one that pragmatists boast they have already solved; for they have declared that consciousness does not exist, and that objects of sensation (which at first were called feelings, experiences, or “truths”) know or mean one another when they lead to one another, when they are poles, so to speak, in the same vital circuit. The spiritual act which was supposed to take things for its object is to be turned into “objective spirit,” that is, into dynamic relations between things. The philosopher will deny that he has any other sort of mind himself, lest he should be shut up in it again, like a sceptical and disconsolate child; while if there threatens to be any covert or superfluous reality in the self-consciousness of God, nothing will be easier than to deny that God is self-conscious; for indeed, if there is no consciousness on earth, why should we imagine that there is any in heaven? The psychologism with which the pragmatists started seems to be passing in this way, in the very effort to formulate it pragmatically, into something which, whatever it may be, is certainly not psychologism. But the bewildered public may well ask whether it is pragmatism either.

There is another crucial point in pragmatism which the defenders of the system are apt to pass over lightly, but which Mr. Russell regards (justly, I think) as of decisive importance. Is, namely, the pragmatic account of truth intended to cover all knowledge, or one kind of knowledge only? Apparently the most authoritative pragmatists admit that it covers one kind only; for there are two sorts of self-evidence in which, they say, it is not concerned: first, the dialectical relation between essences; and second, the known occurrence or experience of facts. There are obvious reasons why these two kinds of cognitions, so interesting to Mr. Russell, are not felt by pragmatists to constitute exceptions worth considering. Dialectical relations, they will say, are verbal only; that is, they define ideal objects, and certainty in these cases does not coerce existence, or touch contingent fact at all. On the other hand, such apprehension as seizes on some matter of fact, as, for instance, "I feel pain," or "I expected to feel this pain, and it is now verifying my expectation," though often true propositions, are not *theoretical* truths; they are not, it is supposed, questionable beliefs but rather immediate observations. Yet many of these apprehensions of fact (or all, perhaps, if we examine them scrupulously) involve the veracity of memory, surely a highly questionable sort of truth; and, moreover, verification, the pragmatic test of truth, would be obviously impossible to apply, if the prophecy supposed to be verified were not assumed to be truly remembered. How shall we know that our expectation is fulfilled, if we do not know directly that we had such an expectation? But if we know our past experience directly—not merely knew it when present, but know now what it was, and how it has led down to the present—this amounts to enough knowledge to make up a tolerable system of the universe, without invoking pragmatic verification or "truth" at all. I have never been able to discover whether, by that perception of fact which is not "truth" but fact itself, pragmatists meant each human apprehension taken singly, or the whole series of these apprehensions. In the latter case, as in the philosophy of M. Bergson, all past reality might constantly lie open to retentive intuition, a form of knowledge soaring quite over the head of any pragmatic method or pragmatic "truth." It looks, indeed, as if the history of at least personal experience were commonly taken for granted by pragmatists, as a basis on which to rear their method. Their readiness to make so capital an assumption is a part of their heritage from romantic idealism. To the romantic idealist science and theology are tales which ought to be reduced to an empirical equivalent in his personal experience; but the tale of his personal experience itself is a sacred figment, the one precious conviction of the romantic heart, which it would be heartless to question. Yet here is a kind of assumed truth which cannot be reduced to its pragmatic meaning, because it must be true literally in order that the pragmatic meaning of other beliefs may be conceived or tested at all.

Now, if it be admitted that the pragmatic theory of truth does not touch our knowledge either of matters of fact or of the necessary implications of ideas, the question arises: What sort of knowledge remains for pragmatic theory to apply to? Simply, Mr. Russell answers, those "working hypotheses" to which "prudent people give only a low degree of belief." For "we hold different beliefs with very different degrees of conviction. Some – such as the belief that I am sitting in a chair, or that 2 + 2 = 4 – can be doubted by few except those who have had a long training in philosophy. Such beliefs are held so firmly that non-philosophers who deny them are put into lunatic asylums. Other beliefs, such as the facts of history, are held rather less firmly. . . . Beliefs about the future, as that the sun will rise to-morrow and that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw, may be held with almost as great conviction as beliefs about the past. Scientific laws are generally believed less firmly. . . . Philosophical beliefs, finally, will, with most people, take a still lower place, since the opposite beliefs of others can hardly fail to induce doubt. Belief, therefore, is a matter of degree. To speak of belief, disbelief, doubt, and suspense of judgment as the only possibilities is as if, from the writing on the thermometer, we were to suppose that blood heat, summer heat, temperate, and freezing were the only temperatures." Beliefs which require to be confirmed by future experience, or which actually refer to it, are evidently only presumptions; it is merely the truth of presumptions that empirical logic applies to, and only so long as they remain presumptions. Presumptions may be held with very different degrees of assurance, and yet be acted upon, in the absence of any strong counter-suggestion; as the confidence of lovers or of religious enthusiasts may be at blood heat at one moment and freezing at the next, without a change in anything save in the will to believe. The truth of such presumptions, whatever may be the ground of them, depends in fact on whether they are to lead (or, rather, whether the general course of events is to lead) to the further things presumed; for these things are what presumptions refer to explicitly.

It sometimes happens, however, that presumptions (being based on voluminous blind instinct rather than on distinct repeated observations) are expressed in consciousness by some symbol or myth, as when a man says he believes in his luck; the presumption really regards particular future chances and throws of the dice, but the emotional and verbal mist in which the presumption is wrapped, veils the pragmatic burden of it; and a metaphysical entity arises, called luck, in which a man may think he believes rather than in a particular career that may be awaiting him. Now since this entity, luck, is a mere word, confidence in it, to be justified at all, must be transferred to the concrete facts it stands for. Faith in one's luck must be pragmatic, but simply because faith in such an entity is not needful nor philosophical at all. The case is the same with working hypotheses, when that is all they are; for on this point there is some confusion. Whether an idea is a working hypothesis merely or an anticipation of matters open to eventual inspection may not always be clear. Thus the atomic theory, in the sense in which most philosophers entertain it to-day, seems to be a working hypothesis only; for they do not seriously believe that there are atoms, but in their ignorance of the precise composition of matter, they find it convenient to speak of it as if it were composed of indestructible particles. But for Democritus and for many modern men of science the atomic theory is not a working hypothesis merely; they do not regard it as a provisional makeshift; they regard it as a probable, if not a certain, anticipation of what inspection would discover to be the fact, could inspection be carried so far; in other words, they believe the atomic theory is true. If they are right, the validity of this theory would not be that of pragmatic "truth" but of pragmatic "fact"; for it would be a view, such as memory or intuition or sensation might give us, of experienced objects in their experienced relations; it would be the communication to us, in a momentary dream, of what would be the experience of a universal observer. It would be knowledge of reality in M. Bergson's sense. Pragmatic "truth," on the contrary, is the relative and provisional justification of fiction; and pragmatism is not a theory of truth at all, but a theory of theory, when theory is instrumental.

For theory too has more than one signification. It may mean such a symbolic or foreshortened view, such a working hypothesis, as true and full knowledge might supersede; or it may mean this true and full knowledge itself, a synthetic survey of objects of experience in their experimental character. Algebra and language are theoretical in the first sense, as when a man believes in his luck; historical and scientific imagination are theoretical in the second sense, when they gather objects of experience together without distorting them. But it is only to the first sort of theory that pragmatism can be reasonably applied; to apply it also to the second would be to retire into that extreme subjectivism which the leading pragmatists have so hotly disclaimed. We find, accordingly, that it is only when a theory is avowedly unreal, and does not ask to be believed, that the value of it is pragmatic; since in that case belief passes consciously from the symbols used to the eventual facts in which the symbolism terminates, and for which it stands.

It may seem strange that a definition of truth should have been based on the consideration of those ideas exclusively for which truth is not claimed by any critical person, such ideas, namely, as religious myths or the graphic and verbal machinery of science. Yet the fact is patent, and if we considered the matter historically it might not prove inexplicable. Theology has long applied the name truth pre-eminently to fiction. When the conviction first dawned upon pragmatists that there was no absolute or eternal truth, what they evidently were thinking of was that it is folly, in this changing world, to pledge oneself to any final and inflexible creed. The pursuit of truth, since nothing better was possible, was to be accepted instead of the possession of it. But it is characteristic of Protestantism that, when it gives up anything, it transfers to what remains the unction, and often the name, proper to what it has abandoned. So, if truth was no longer to be claimed or even hoped for, the value and the name of truth could be instinctively transferred to what was to take its place—spontaneous, honest, variable conviction. And the sanctions of this conviction were to be looked for, not in the objective reality, since it was an idle illusion to fancy we could get at that, but in the growth of this conviction itself, and in the prosperous adventure of the whole soul, so courageous in its self-trust, and so modest in its dogmas.

Science, too, has often been identified, not with the knowledge men of science possess, but with the language they use. If science meant knowledge, the science of Darwin, for instance, would lie in his observations of plants and animals, and in his thoughts about the probable ancestors of the human race – all knowledge of actual or possible facts. It would not be knowledge of selection or of spontaneous variation, terms which are mere verbal bridges over the gaps in that knowledge, and mark the *lacunæ* and unsolved problems of the science. Yet it is just such terms that seem to clothe "Science" in its pontifical garb; the cowl is taken for the monk; and when a penetrating critic, like M. Henri Poincaré, turned his subtle irony upon them, the public cried that he had announced the "bankruptcy of science," whereas it is merely the language of science that he had reduced to its pragmatic value – to convenience and economy in the registering of facts – and had by no means questioned that positive and cumulative knowledge of facts which science is attaining. It is an incident in the same general confusion that a critical epistemology, like pragmatism, analysing these figments of scientific or theological theory, should innocently suppose that it was analysing truth; while the only view to which it really attributes truth is its view of the system of facts open to possible experience, a system which those figments presuppose and which they may help us in part to divine, where it is accidentally hidden from human inspection.

IV. HYPOSTATIC ETHICS

If Mr. Russell, in his essay on "The Elements of Ethics," had wished to propitiate the unregenerate naturalist, before trying to convert him, he could not have chosen a more skilful procedure; for he begins by telling us that "what is called good conduct is conduct which is a means to other things which are good on their own account; and hence . . . the study of what is good or bad on its own account must be included in ethics." Two consequences are involved in this: first, that ethics is concerned with the economy of all values, and not with "moral" goods only, or with duty; and second, that values may and do inhere in a great variety of things and relations, all of which it is the part of wisdom to respect, and if possible to establish. In this matter, according to our author, the general philosopher is prone to one error and the professed moralist to another. "The philosopher, bent on the construction of a system, is inclined to simplify the facts unduly . . . and to twist them into a form in which they can all be deduced from one or two general principles. The moralist, on the other hand, being primarily concerned with conduct, tends to become absorbed in means, to value the actions men ought to perform more than the ends which such actions serve. . . . Hence most of what they value in this world would have to be omitted by many moralists from any imagined heaven, because there such things as self-denial and effort and courage and pity could find no place. . . . Kant has the bad eminence of combining both errors in the highest possible degree, since he holds that there is nothing good except the virtuous will—a view which simplifies the good as much as any philosopher could wish, and mistakes means for ends as completely as any moralist could enjoin."

Those of us who are what Mr. Russell would call ethical sceptics will be delighted at this way of clearing the ground; it opens before us the prospect of a moral philosophy that should estimate the various values of things known and of things imaginable, showing what combinations of goods are possible in any one rational system, and (if fancy could stretch so far) what different rational systems would be possible in places and times remote enough from one another not to come into physical conflict. Such ethics, since it would express in reflection the dumb but actual interests of men, might have both influence and authority over them; two things which an alien and dogmatic ethics necessarily lacks. The joy of the ethical sceptic in Mr. Russell is destined, however, to be short-lived. Before proceeding to the expression of concrete ideals, he thinks it necessary to ask a preliminary and quite abstract question, to which his essay is chiefly devoted; namely, what is the right definition of the predicate "good," which we hope to apply in the sequel to such a variety of things? And he answers at once: The predicate "good" is indefinable. This answer he shows to be unavoidable, and so evidently unavoidable that we might perhaps have been absolved from asking the question; for, as he says, the so-called definitions of "good"—that it is pleasure, the desired, and so forth—are not definitions of the predicate "good," but designations of the things to which this predicate is applied by different persons. Pleasure, and its rivals, are not synonyms for the abstract quality "good," but names for classes of concrete facts that are supposed to possess that quality. From this correct, if somewhat trifling, observation, however, Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore before him, evokes a portentous dogma. Not being able to define good, he hypostasises it. "Good and bad," he says, "are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right." "We cannot maintain that for me a thing ought to exist on its own account, while for you it ought not; that would merely mean that one of us is mistaken, since in fact everything either ought to exist, or ought not." Thus we are asked to believe that good attaches to things for no reason or cause, and according to no principles of distribution; that it must be found there by a sort of receptive exploration in each separate case; in other words, that it is an absolute, not a relative thing, a primary and not a secondary quality.

That the quality "good" is indefinable is one assertion, and obvious; but that the presence of this quality is unconditioned is another, and astonishing. My logic, I am well aware, is not very accurate or subtle; and I wish Mr. Russell had not left it to me to discover the connection between these two propositions. Green is an indefinable predicate, and the specific quality of it can be given only in intuition; but it is a quality that things acquire under certain conditions, so much so that the same bit of grass, at the same moment, may have it from one point of view and not from another. Right and left are indefinable; the difference could not be explained without being invoked in the explanation; yet everything that is to the right is not to the right on no condition, but obviously on the condition that some one is looking in a certain direction; and if some one else at the same time is looking in the opposite direction, what is truly to the right will be truly to the left also. If Mr. Russell thinks this is a contradiction, I understand why the universe does not please him. The contradiction would be real, undoubtedly, if we suggested that the *idea* of good was at any time or in any relation the *idea* of evil, or the *intuition* of right that of left, or the *quality* of green that of yellow; these disembodied essences are fixed by the intent that selects them, and in that ideal realm they can never have any relations except the dialectical ones implied in their nature, and these relations they must always retain. But the contradiction disappears when, instead of considering the qualities in themselves, we consider the things of which those qualities are aspects; for the qualities of things are not compacted by implication, but are conjoined irrationally by nature, as she will; and the same thing may be, and is, at once yellow and green, to the left and to the right, good and evil, many and one, large and small; and whatever verbal paradox there may be in this way of speaking (for from the point of view of nature it is natural enough) had been thoroughly explained and talked out by the time of Plato, who complained that people should still raise a difficulty so trite and exploded.[2] Indeed, while square is always square, and round round, a thing that is round may actually be square also, if we allow it to have a little body, and to be a cylinder.

But perhaps what suggests this hypostasis of good is rather the fact that what others find good, or what we ourselves have found good in moods with which we retain no sympathy, is sometimes pronounced by us to be bad; and far from inferring from this diversity of experience that the present good, like the others, corresponds to a particular attitude or interest of ours, and is dependent upon it, Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore infer instead that the presence of the good must be independent of all interests, attitudes, and opinions. They imagine that the truth of a proposition attributing a certain relative quality to an object contradicts the truth of another proposition, attributing to the same object an opposite relative quality. Thus if a man here and another man at the antipodes call opposite directions up, "only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right."

To protect the belated innocence of this state of mind, Mr. Russell, so far as I can see, has only one argument, and one analogy. The argument is that "if this were not the case, we could not reason with a man as to what is right." "We do in fact hold that when one man approves of a certain act, while another disapproves, one of them is mistaken, which would not be the case with a mere emotion. If one man likes oysters and another dislikes them, we do not say that either of them is mistaken." In other words, we are to maintain our prejudices, however absurd, lest it should become unnecessary to quarrel about them! Truly the debating society has its idols, no less than the cave and the theatre. The analogy that comes to buttress somewhat this singular argument is the analogy between ethical propriety and physical or logical truth. An ethical proposition may be correct or incorrect, in a sense justifying argument, when it touches what is good as a means, that is, when it is not intrinsically ethical, but deals with causes and effects, or with matters of fact or necessity. But to speak of the truth of an ultimate good would be a false collocation of terms; an ultimate good is chosen, found, or aimed at; it is not opined. The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel; and it can be neither correct nor incorrect to feel them. We may assert these preferences fiercely or with sweet reasonableness, and we may be more or less incapable of sympathising with the different preferences of others; about oysters we may be tolerant, like Mr. Russell, and about character intolerant; but that is already a great advance in enlightenment, since the majority of mankind have regarded as hateful in the highest degree any one who indulged in pork, or beans, or frogs' legs, or who had a weakness for anything called "unnatural"; for it is the things that offend their animal instincts that intense natures have always found to be, intrinsically and *par excellence,* abominations.

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[2] Plato, *Philebus,* 14, D. The dialectical element in this dialogue is evidently the basis of Mr. Russell's, as of Mr. Moore's, ethics; but they have not adopted the other elements in it, I mean the political and the theological. As to the political element, Plato everywhere conceives the good as the eligible in life, and refers it to human nature and to the pursuit of happiness—that happiness which Mr. Russell, in a rash moment, says is but a name which some people prefer to give to pleasure. Thus in the *Philebus* (11, D) the good looked for is declared to be "some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy"; and later (66, D) the conclusion is that insight is better than pleasure "as an element in human life." As to the theological element, Plato, in hypostasising the good, does not hypostasise it as good, but as cause or power, which is, it seems to me, the sole category that justifies hypostasis, and logically involves it; for if things have a ground at all, that ground must exist before them and beyond them. Hence the whole Platonic and Christian scheme, in making the good independent of private will and opinion, by no means makes it independent of the direction of nature in general and of human nature in particular; for all things have been created with an innate predisposition towards the creative good, and are capable of finding happiness in nothing else. Obligation, in this system, remains internal and vital. Plato attributes a single vital direction and a single moral source to the cosmos. This is what determines and narrows the scope of the true good; for the true good is that relevant to nature. Plato would not have been a dogmatic moralist, had he not been a theist.

I am not sure whether Mr. Russell thinks he has disposed of this view where he discusses the proposition that the good is the desired and refutes it on the ground that "it is commonly admitted that there are bad desires; and when people speak of bad desires, they seem to mean desires for what is bad." Most people undoubtedly call desires bad when they are generically contrary to their own desires, and call objects that disgust them bad, even when other people covet them. This human weakness is not, however, a very high authority for a logician to appeal to, being too like the attitude of the German lady who said that Englishmen called a certain object *bread,* and Frenchmen called it *pain,* but that it really was *Brod.* Scholastic philosophy is inclined to this way of asserting itself; and Mr. Russell, though he candidly admits that there are ultimate differences of opinion about good and evil, would gladly minimise these differences, and thinks he triumphs when he feels that the prejudices of his readers will agree with his own; as if the constitutional unanimity of all human animals, supposing it existed, could tend to show that the good they agreed to recognise was independent of their constitution.

In a somewhat worthier sense, however, we may admit that there are desires for what is bad, since desire and will, in the proper psychological sense of these words, are incidental phases of consciousness, expressing but not constituting those natural relations that make one thing good for another. At the same time the words desire and will are often used, in a mythical or transcendental sense, for those material dispositions and instincts by which vital and moral units are constituted. It is in reference to such constitutional interests that things are "really" good or bad; interests which may not be fairly represented by any incidental conscious desire. No doubt any desire, however capricious, represents some momentary and partial interest, which lends to its objects a certain real and inalienable value; yet when we consider, as we do in human society, the interests of men, whom reflection and settled purposes have raised more or less to the ideal dignity of individuals, then passing fancies and passions may indeed have bad objects, and be bad themselves, in that they thwart the more comprehensive interests of the soul that entertains them. Food and poison are such only relatively, and in view of particular bodies, and the same material thing may be food and poison at once; the child, and even the doctor, may easily mistake one for the other. For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though relative, distinction, to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle! Yet just in this way Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore conceive things to be dead good and dead bad. It is such a view, rather than the naturalistic one, that renders reasoning and self-criticism impossible in morals; for wrong desires, and false opinions as to value, are conceivable only because a point of reference or criterion is available to prove them such. If no point of reference and no criterion were admitted to be relevant, nothing but physical stress could give to one assertion of value greater force than to another. The shouting moralist no doubt has his place, but not in philosophy.

That good is not an intrinsic or primary quality, but relative and adventitious, is clearly betrayed by Mr. Russell's own way of arguing, whenever he approaches some concrete ethical question. For instance, to show that the good is not pleasure, he can avowedly do nothing but appeal "to ethical judgments with which almost every one would agree." He repeats, in effect, Plato's argument about the life of the oyster, having pleasure with no knowledge. Imagine such mindless pleasure, as intense and prolonged as you please, and would you choose it? Is it your good? Here the British reader, like the blushing Greek youth, is expected to answer instinctively, No! It is an *argumentum ad hominem* (and there can be no other kind of argument in ethics); but the man who gives the required answer does so not because the answer is self-evident, which it is not, but because he is the required sort of man. He is shocked at the idea of resembling an oyster. Yet changeless pleasure, without memory or reflection, without the wearisome intermixture of arbitrary images, is just what the mystic, the voluptuary, and perhaps the oyster find to be good. Ideas, in their origin, are probably signals of alarm; and the distress which they marked in the beginning always clings to them in some measure, and causes many a soul, far more profound than that of the young Protarchus or of the British reader, to long for them to cease altogether. Such a radical hedonism is indeed inhuman; it undermines all conventional ambitions, and is not a possible foundation for political or artistic life. But that is all we can say against it. Our humanity cannot annul the incommensurable sorts of good that may be pursued in the world, though it cannot itself pursue them. The impossibility which people labour under of being satisfied with pure pleasure as a goal is due to their want of imagination, or rather to their being dominated by an imagination which is exclusively human.

The author's estrangement from reality reappears in his treatment of egoism, and most of all in his "Free Man's Religion." Egoism, he thinks, is untenable because "if I am right in thinking that my good is the only good, then every one else is mistaken unless he admits that my good, not his, is the only good." "Most people . . . would admit that it is better two people's desires should be satisfied than only one person's. . . . Then what is good is not good *for me* or *for you,* but is simply good." "It is, indeed, so evident that it is better to secure a greater good for *A* than a lesser good for *B,* that it is hard to find any still more evident principle by which to prove this. And if *A* happens to be some one else, and *B* to be myself, that cannot affect the question, since it is irrelevant to the general question who *A* and *B* may be." To the question, as the logician states it after transforming men into letters, it is certainly irrelevant; but it is not irrelevant to the case as it arises in nature. If two goods are somehow rightly pronounced to be equally good, no circumstance can render one better than the other. And if the locus in which the good is to arise is somehow pronounced to be indifferent, it will certainly be indifferent whether that good arises in me or in you. But how shall these two pronouncements be made? In practice, values cannot be compared save as represented or enacted in the private imagination of somebody: for we could not conceive that an alien good *was* a good (as Mr. Russell cannot conceive that the life of an ecstatic oyster is a good) unless we could sympathise with it in some way in our own persons; and on the warmth which we felt in so representing the alien good would hang our conviction that it was truly valuable, and had worth in comparison with our own good. The voice of reason, bidding us prefer the greater good, no matter who is to enjoy it, is also nothing but the force of sympathy, bringing a remote existence before us vividly *sub specie boni*. Capacity for such sympathy measures the capacity to recognise duty and therefore, in a moral sense, to have it. Doubtless it is conceivable that all wills should become co-operative, and that nature should be ruled magically by an exact and universal sympathy; but this situation must be actually attained in part, before it can be conceived or judged to be an authoritative ideal. The tigers cannot regard it as such, for it would suppress the tragic good called ferocity, which makes, in their eyes, the chief glory of the universe. Therefore the inertia of nature, the ferocity of beasts, the optimism of mystics, and the selfishness of men and nations must all be accepted as conditions for the peculiar goods, essentially incommensurable, which they can generate severally. It is misplaced vehemence to call them intrinsically detestable, because they do not (as they cannot) generate or recognise the goods we prize.

In the real world, persons are not abstract egos, like *A* and *B,* so that to benefit one is clearly as good as to benefit another. Indeed, abstract egos could not be benefited, for they could not be modified at all, even if somehow they could be distinguished. It would be the qualities or objects distributed among them that would carry, wherever they went, each its inalienable cargo of value, like ships sailing from sea to sea. But it is quite vain and artificial to imagine different goods charged with such absolute and comparable weights; and actual egoism is not the thin and refutable thing that Mr. Russell makes of it. What it really holds is that a given man, oneself, and those akin to him, are qualitatively better than other beings; that the things they prize are intrinsically better than the things prized by others; and that therefore there is no injustice in treating these chosen interests as supreme. The injustice, it is felt, would lie rather in not treating things so unequal unequally. This feeling may, in many cases, amuse the impartial observer, or make him indignant; yet it may, in every case, according to Mr. Russell, be absolutely just. The refutation he gives of egoism would not dissuade any fanatic from exterminating all his enemies with a good conscience; it would merely encourage him to assert that what he was ruthlessly establishing was the absolute good. Doubtless such conscientious tyrants would be wretched themselves, and compelled to make sacrifices which would cost them dear; but that would only extend, as it were, the pernicious egoism of that part of their being which they had allowed to usurp a universal empire. The twang of intolerance and of self-mutilation is not absent from the ethics of Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore, even as it stands; and one trembles to think what it may become in the mouths of their disciples. Intolerance itself is a form of egoism, and to condemn egoism intolerantly is to share it.

I cannot help thinking that a consciousness of the relativity of values, if it became prevalent, would tend to render people more truly social than would a belief that things have intrinsic and unchangeable values, no matter what the attitude of any one to them may be. If we said that goods, including the right distribution of goods, are relative to specific natures, moral warfare would continue, but not with poisoned arrows. Our private sense of justice itself would be acknowledged to have but a relative authority, and while we could not have a higher duty than to follow it, we should seek to meet those whose aims were incompatible with it as we meet things physically inconvenient, without insulting them as if they were morally vile or logically contemptible. Real unselfishness consists in sharing the interests of others. Beyond the pale of actual unanimity the only possible unselfishness is chivalry—a recognition of the inward right and justification of our enemies fighting against us. This chivalry has long been practised in the battle-field without abolishing the causes of war; and it might conceivably be extended to all the conflicts of men with one another, and of the warring elements within each breast. Policy, hypnotisation, and even surgery may be practised without exorcisms or anathemas.

When a man has decided on a course of action, it is a vain indulgence in expletives to declare that he is sure that course is absolutely right. His moral dogma expresses its natural origin all the more clearly the more hotly it is proclaimed; and ethical absolutism, being a mental grimace of passion, refutes what it says by what it is. Sweeter and more profound, to my sense, is the philosophy of Homer, whose every line seems to breathe the conviction that what is beautiful or precious has not thereby any right to existence; nothing has such a right; nor is it given us to condemn absolutely any force—god or man—that destroys what is beautiful or precious, for it has doubtless something beautiful or precious of its own to achieve.

The consequences of a hypostasis of the good are no less interesting than its causes. If the good were independent of nature, it might still be conceived as relevant to nature, by being its creator or mover; but Mr. Russell is not a theist after the manner of Socrates; his good is not a power. Nor would representing it to be such long help his case; for an ideal hypostasised into a cause achieves only a mythical independence. The least criticism discloses that it is natural laws, zoological species, and human ideals, that have been projected into the empyrean; and it is no marvel that the good should attract the world where the good, by definition, is whatever the world is aiming at. The hypostasis accomplished by Mr. Russell is more serious, and therefore more paradoxical. If I understand it, it may be expressed as follows: In the realm of eternal essences, before anything exists, there are certain essences that have this remarkable property, that they ought to exist, or at least that, if anything exists, it ought to conform to them. What exists, however, is deaf to this moral emphasis in the eternal; nature exists for no reason; and, indeed, why should she have subordinated her own arbitrariness to a good that is no less arbitrary? This good, however, is somehow good notwithstanding; so that there is an abysmal wrong in its not being obeyed. The world is, in principle, totally depraved; but as the good is not a power, there is no one to redeem the world. The saints are those who, imitating the impotent dogmatism on high, and despising their sinful natural propensities, keep asserting that certain things are in themselves good and others bad, and declaring to be detestable any other saint who dogmatises differently. In this system the Calvinistic God has lost his creative and punitive functions, but continues to decree groundlessly what is good and what evil, and to love the one and hate the other with an infinite love or hatred. Meanwhile the reprobate need not fear hell in the next world, but the elect are sure to find it here.

What shall we say of this strangely unreal and strangely personal religion? Is it a ghost of Calvinism, returned with none of its old force but with its old aspect of rigidity? Perhaps: but then, in losing its force, in abandoning its myths, and threats, and rhetoric, this religion has lost its deceptive sanctimony and hypocrisy; and in retaining its rigidity it has kept what made it noble and pathetic; for it is a clear dramatic expression of that human spirit—in this case a most pure and heroic spirit—which it strives so hard to dethrone. After all, the hypostasis of the good is only an unfortunate incident in a great accomplishment, which is the discernment of the good. I have dwelt chiefly on this incident, because in academic circles it is the abuses incidental to true philosophy that create controversy and form schools. Artificial systems, even when they prevail, after a while fatigue their adherents, without ever having convinced or refuted their opponents, and they fade out of existence not by being refuted in their turn, but simply by a tacit agreement to ignore their claims: so that the true insight they were based on is too often buried under them. The hypostasis of philosophical terms is an abuse incidental to the forthright, unchecked use of the intellect; it substitutes for things the limits and distinctions that divide them. So physics is corrupted by logic; but the logic that corrupts physics is perhaps correct, and when it is moral dialectic, it is more important than physics itself. Mr. Russell's ethics *is* ethics. When we mortals have once assumed the moral attitude, it is certain that an indefinable value accrues to some things as opposed to others, that these things are many, that combinations of them have values not belonging to their parts, and that these valuable things are far more specific than abstract pleasure, and far more diffused than one's personal life. What a pity if this pure morality, in detaching itself impetuously from the earth, whose bright satellite it might be, should fly into the abyss at a tangent, and leave us as much in the dark as before!

V

SHELLEY: OR THE POETIC VALUE OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

It is possible to advocate anarchy in criticism as in politics, and there is perhaps nothing coercive to urge against a man who maintains that any work of art is good enough, intrinsically and incommensurably, if it pleased anybody at any time for any reason. In practice, however, the ideal of anarchy is unstable. Irrefutable by argument, it is readily overcome by nature. It melts away before the dogmatic operation of the anarchist's own will, as soon as he allows himself the least creative endeavour. In spite of the infinite variety of what is merely possible, human nature and will have a somewhat definite constitution, and only what is harmonious with their actual constitution can long maintain itself in the moral world. Hence it is a safe principle in the criticism of art that technical proficiency, and brilliancy of fancy or execution, cannot avail to establish a great reputation. They may dazzle for a moment, but they cannot absolve an artist from the need of having an important subject-matter and a sane humanity.

If this principle is accepted, however, it might seem that certain artists, and perhaps the greatest, might not fare well at our hands. How would Shelley, for instance, stand such a test? Every one knows the judgment passed on Shelley by Matthew Arnold, a critic who evidently relied on this principle, even if he preferred to speak only in the name of his personal tact and literary experience. Shelley, Matthew Arnold said, was "a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating his wings in a luminous void in vain." In consequence he declared that Shelley was not a classic, especially as his private circle had had an unsavoury morality, to be expressed only by the French word *sale,* and as moreover Shelley himself occasionally showed a distressing want of the sense of humour, which could only be called *bête*. These strictures, if a bit incoherent, are separately remarkably just. They unmask essential weaknesses not only in Shelley, but in all revolutionary people. The life of reason is a heritage and exists only through tradition. Half of it is an art, an adjustment to an alien reality, which only a long experience can teach: and even the other half, the inward inspiration and ideal of reason, must be also a common inheritance in the race, if people are to work together or so much as to understand one another. Now the misfortune of revolutionists is that they are disinherited, and their folly is that they wish to be disinherited even more than they are. Hence, in the midst of their passionate and even heroic idealisms, there is commonly a strange poverty in their minds, many an ugly turn in their lives, and an ostentatious vileness in their manners. They wish to be the leaders of mankind, but they are wretched representatives of humanity. In the concert of nature it is hard to keep in tune with oneself if one is out of tune with everything.

We should not then be yielding to any private bias, but simply noting the conditions under which art may exist and may be appreciated, if we accepted the classical principle of criticism and asserted that substance, sanity, and even a sort of pervasive wisdom are requisite for supreme works of art. On the other hand—who can honestly doubt it?—the rebels and individualists are the men of direct insight and vital hope. The poetry of Shelley in particular is typically poetical. It is poetry divinely inspired; and Shelley himself is perhaps no more ineffectual or more lacking in humour than an angel properly should be. Nor is his greatness all a matter of æsthetic abstraction and wild music. It is a fact of capital importance in the development of human genius that the great revolution in Christendom against Christianity, a revolution that began with the Renaissance and is not yet completed, should have found angels to herald it, no less than that other revolution did which began at Bethlehem; and that among these new angels there should have been one so winsome, pure, and rapturous as Shelley. How shall we reconcile these conflicting impressions? Shall we force ourselves to call the genius of Shelley second rate because it was revolutionary, and shall we attribute all enthusiasm for him to literary affectation or political prejudice? Or shall we rather abandon the orthodox principle that an important subject-matter and a sane spirit are essential to great works? Or shall we look for a different issue out of our perplexity, by asking if the analysis and comprehension are not perhaps at fault which declare that these things are not present in Shelley's poetry? This last is the direction in which I conceive the truth to lie. A little consideration will show us that Shelley really has a great subject-matter—what ought to be; and that he has a real humanity—though it is humanity in the seed, humanity in its internal principle, rather than in those deformed expressions of it which can flourish in the world.

Shelley seems hardly to have been brought up; he grew up in the nursery among his young sisters, at school among the rude boys, without any affectionate guidance, without imbibing any religious or social tradition. If he received any formal training or correction, he instantly rejected it inwardly, set it down as unjust and absurd, and turned instead to sailing paper boats, to reading romances or to writing them, or to watching with delight the magic of chemical experiments. Thus the mind of Shelley was thoroughly disinherited; but not, like the minds of most revolutionists, by accident and through the niggardliness of fortune, for few revolutionists would be such if they were heirs to a baronetcy. Shelley's mind disinherited itself out of allegiance to itself, because it was too sensitive and too highly endowed for the world into which it had descended. It rejected ordinary education, because it was incapable of assimilating it. Education is suitable to those few animals whose faculties are not completely innate, animals that, like most men, may be perfected by experience because they are born with various imperfect alternative instincts rooted equally in their system. But most animals, and a few men, are not of this sort. They cannot be educated, because they are born complete. Full of predeterminate intuitions, they are without intelligence, which is the power of seeing things as they are. Endowed with a specific, unshakable faith, they are impervious to experience: and as they burst the womb they bring ready-made with them their final and only possible system of philosophy.

Shelley was one of these spokesmen of the *a priori,* one of these nurslings of the womb, like a bee or a butterfly; a dogmatic, inspired, perfect, and incorrigible creature. He was innocent and cruel, swift and wayward, illuminated and blind. Being a finished child of nature, not a joint product, like most of us, of nature, history, and society, he abounded miraculously in his own clear sense, but was obtuse to the droll, miscellaneous lessons of fortune. The cannonade of hard, inexplicable facts that knocks into most of us what little wisdom we have left Shelley dazed and sore, perhaps, but uninstructed. When the storm was over, he began chirping again his own natural note. If the world continued to confine and obsess him, he hated the world, and gasped for freedom. Being incapable of understanding reality, he revelled in creating world after world in idea. For his nature was not merely pre-determined and obdurate, it was also sensitive, vehement, and fertile. With the soul of a bird, he had the senses of a man-child; the instinct of the butterfly was united in him with the instinct of the brooding fowl and of the pelican. This winged spirit had a heart. It darted swiftly on its appointed course, neither expecting nor understanding opposition; but when it met opposition it did not merely flutter and collapse; it was inwardly outraged, it protested proudly against fate, it cried aloud for liberty and justice.

The consequence was that Shelley, having a nature preformed but at the same time tender, passionate, and moral, was exposed to early and continual suffering. When the world violated the ideal which lay so clear before his eyes, that violation filled him with horror. If to the irrepressible gushing of life from within we add the suffering and horror that continually checked it, we shall have in hand, I think, the chief elements of his genius.

Love of the ideal, passionate apprehension of what ought to be, has for its necessary counterpart condemnation of the actual, wherever the actual does not conform to that ideal. The spontaneous soul, the soul of the child, is naturally revolutionary; and when the revolution fails, the soul of the youth becomes naturally pessimistic. All moral life and moral judgment have this deeply romantic character; they venture to assert a private ideal in the face of an intractable and omnipotent world. Some moralists begin by feeling the attraction of untasted and ideal perfection. These, like Plato, excel in elevation, and they are apt to despise rather than to reform the world. Other moralists begin by a revolt against the actual, at some point where they find the actual particularly galling. These excel in sincerity; their purblind conscience is urgent, and they are reformers in intent and sometimes even in action. But the ideals they frame are fragmentary and shallow, often mere provisional vague watchwords, like liberty, equality, and fraternity; they possess no positive visions or plans for moral life as a whole, like Plato's *Republic*. The utopian or visionary moralists are often rather dazed by this wicked world; being well-intentioned but impotent, they often take comfort in fancying that the ideal they pine for is already actually embodied on earth, or is about to be embodied on earth in a decade or two, or at least is embodied eternally in a sphere immediately above the earth, to which we shall presently climb, and be happy for ever.

Lovers of the ideal who thus hastily believe in its reality are called idealists, and Shelley was an idealist in almost every sense of that hard-used word. He early became an idealist after Berkeley's fashion, in that he discredited the existence of matter and embraced a psychological or (as it was called) intellectual system of the universe. In his drama *Hellas* he puts this view with evident approval into the mouth of Ahasuerus:

> "This whole
> Of suns and worlds and men and beasts and flowers,
> With all the silent or tempestuous workings
> By which they have been, are, or cease to be,
> Is but a vision;—all that it inherits
> Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams.
> Thought is its cradle and its grave; nor less
> The future and the past are idle shadows
> Of thought's eternal flight—they have no being:
> Nought is but that which feels itself to be."

But Shelley was even more deeply and constantly an idealist after the manner of Plato; for he regarded the good as a magnet (inexplicably not working for the moment) that draws all life and motion after it; and he looked on the types and ideals of things as on eternal realities that subsist, beautiful and untarnished, when the glimmerings that reveal them to our senses have died away. From the infinite potentialities of beauty in the abstract, articulate mind draws certain bright forms—the Platonic ideas—"the gathered rays which are reality," as Shelley called them: and it is the light of these ideals cast on objects of sense that lends to these objects some degree of reality and value, making out of them "lovely apparitions, dim at first, then radiant . . . the progeny immortal of painting, sculpture, and rapt poesy."

The only kind of idealism that Shelley had nothing to do with is the kind that prevails in some universities, that Hegelian idealism which teaches that perfect good is a vicious abstraction, and maintains that all the evil that has been, is, and ever shall be is indispensable to make the universe as good as it possibly could be. In this form, idealism is simply contempt for all ideals, and a hearty adoration of things as they are; and as such it appeals mightily to the powers that be, in church and in state; but in that capacity it would have been as hateful to Shelley as the powers that be always were, and as the philosophy was that flattered them. For his moral feeling was based on suffering and horror at what is actual, no less than on love of a visioned good. His conscience was, to a most unusual degree, at once elevated and sincere. It was inspired in equal measure by prophecy and by indignation. He was carried away in turn by enthusiasm for what his ethereal and fertile fancy pictured as possible, and by detestation of the reality forced upon him instead. Hence that extraordinary moral fervour which is the soul of his poetry. His imagination is no playful undirected kaleidoscope; the images, often so tenuous and metaphysical, that crowd upon him, are all sparks thrown off at white heat, embodiments of a fervent, definite, unswerving inspiration. If we think that the *Cloud* or the *West Wind* or the *Witch of the Atlas* are mere fireworks, poetic dust, a sort of *bataille des fleurs* in which we are pelted by a shower of images – we have not understood the passion that overflows in them, as any long-nursed passion may, in any of us, suddenly overflow in an unwonted profusion of words. This is a point at which Francis Thompson's understanding of Shelley, generally so perfect, seems to me to go astray. The universe, Thompson tells us, was Shelley's box of toys. "He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song." This last is not, I think, Shelley's motive; it is not the truth about the spring of his genius. He undoubtedly shatters the world to bits, but only to build it nearer to the heart's desire, only to make out of its coloured fragments some more Elysian home for love, or some more dazzling symbol for that infinite beauty which is the need – the profound, aching, imperative need – of the human soul. This recreative impulse of the poet's is not wilful, as Thompson calls it: it is moral. Like the *Sensitive Plant*

> "It loves even like Love, – its deep heart is full;
> It desires what it has not, the beautiful."

The question for Shelley is not at all what will look nicest in his song; that is the preoccupation of mincing rhymesters, whose well is soon dry. Shelley's abundance has a more generous source; it springs from his passion for picturing what would be best, not in the picture, but in the world. Hence, when he feels he has pictured or divined it, he can exclaim:

> "The joy, the triumph, the delight, the madness,
> The boundless, overflowing, bursting gladness,
> The vaporous exultation, not to be confined!
> Ha! Ha! the animation of delight,
> Which wraps me like an atmosphere of light,
> And bears me as a cloud is borne by its own wind!"

To match this gift of bodying forth the ideal Shelley had his vehement sense of wrong; and as he seized upon and recast all images of beauty, to make them more perfectly beautiful, so, to vent his infinite horror of evil, he seized on all the worst images of crime or torture that he could find, and recast them so as to reach the quintessence of distilled badness. His pictures of war, famine, lust, and cruelty are, or seem, forced, although perhaps, as in the *Cenci,* he might urge that he had historical warrant for his descriptions, far better historical warrant, no doubt, than the beauty and happiness actually to be found in the world could give him for his *Skylark,* his *Epipsychidion,* or his *Prometheus*. But to exaggerate good is to vivify, to enhance our sense of moral coherence and beautiful naturalness; it is to render things more graceful, intelligible, and congenial to the spirit which they ought to serve. To aggravate evil, on the contrary, is to darken counsel—already dark enough—and the want of truth to nature in this pessimistic sort of exaggeration is not compensated for by any advantage. The violence and, to my feeling, the wantonness of these invectives—for they are invectives in intention and in effect—may have seemed justified to Shelley by his political purpose. He was thirsting to destroy kings, priests, soldiers, parents, and heads of colleges—to destroy them, I mean, in their official capacity; and the exhibition of their vileness in all its diabolical purity might serve to remove scruples in the half-hearted. We, whom the nineteenth century has left so tender to historical rights and historical beauties, may wonder that a poet, an impassioned lover of the beautiful, could have been such a leveller, and such a vandal in his theoretical destructiveness. But here the legacy of the eighteenth century was speaking in Shelley, as that of the nineteenth is speaking in us: and moreover, in his own person, the very fertility of imagination could be a cause of blindness to the past and its contingent sanctities. Shelley was not left standing aghast, like a Philistine, before the threatened destruction of all traditional order. He had, and knew he had, the seeds of a far lovelier order in his own soul; there he found the plan or memory of a perfect commonwealth of nature ready to rise at once on the ruins of this sad world, and to make regret for it impossible.

So much for what I take to be the double foundation of Shelley's genius, a vivid love of ideal good on the one hand, and on the other, what is complementary to that vivid love, much suffering and horror at the touch of actual evils. On this double foundation he based an opinion which had the greatest influence on his poetry, not merely on the subject-matter of it, but also on the exuberance and urgency of emotion which suffuses it. This opinion was that all that caused suffering and horror in the world could be readily destroyed: it was the belief in perfectibility.

An animal that has rigid instincts and an *a priori* mind is probably very imperfectly adapted to the world he comes into: his organs cannot be moulded by experience and use; unless they are fitted by some miraculous pre-established harmony, or by natural selection, to things as they are, they will never be reconciled with them, and an eternal war will ensue between what the animal needs, loves, and can understand and what the outer reality offers. So long as such a creature lives—and his life will be difficult and short—events will continually disconcert and puzzle him; everything will seem to him unaccountable, inexplicable, unnatural. He will not be able to conceive the real order and connection of things sympathetically, by assimilating his habits of thought to their habits of evolution. His faculties being innate and unadaptable will not allow him to correct his presumptions and axioms; he will never be able to make nature the standard of naturalness. What contradicts his private impulses will seem to him to contradict reason, beauty, and necessity. In this paradoxical situation he will probably take refuge in the conviction that what he finds to exist is an illusion, or at least not a fair sample of reality. Being so perverse, absurd, and repugnant, the given state of things must be, he will say, only accidental and temporary. He will be sure that his own *a priori* imagination is the mirror of all the eternal proprieties, and that as his mind can move only in one predetermined way, things cannot be prevented from moving in that same way save by some strange violence done to their nature. It would be easy, therefore, to set everything right again: nay, everything must be on the point of righting itself spontaneously. Wrong, of its very essence, must be in unstable equilibrium. The conflict between what such a man feels ought to exist and what he finds actually existing must, he will feel sure, end by a speedy revolution in things, and by the removal of all scandals; that it should end by the speedy removal of his own person, or by such a revolution in his demands as might reconcile him to existence, will never occur to him; or, if the thought occurs to him, it will seem too horrible to be true.

Such a creature cannot adapt himself to things by education, and consequently he cannot adapt things to himself by industry. His choice lies absolutely between victory and martyrdom. But at the very moment of martyrdom, martyrs, as is well known, usually feel assured of victory. The *a priori* spirit will therefore be always a prophet of victory, so long as it subsists at all. The vision of a better world at hand absorbed the Israelites in exile, St. John the Baptist in the desert, and Christ on the cross. The martyred spirit always says to the world it leaves, "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise."

In just this way, Shelley believed in perfectibility. In his latest poems—in *Hellas,* in *Adonais*—he was perhaps a little inclined to remove the scene of perfectibility to a metaphysical region, as the Christian church soon removed it to the other world. Indeed, an earth really made perfect is hardly distinguishable from a posthumous heaven: so profoundly must everything in it be changed, and so angel-like must every one in it become. Shelley's earthly paradise, as described in *Prometheus* and in *Epipsychidion,* is too festival-like, too much of a mere culmination, not to be fugitive: it cries aloud to be translated into a changeless and metaphysical heaven, which to Shelley's mind could be nothing but the realm of Platonic ideas, where "life, like a dome of many-coloured glass," no longer "stains the white radiance of eternity." But the age had been an age of revolution and, in spite of disappointments, retained its faith in revolution; and the young Shelley was not satisfied with a paradise removed to the intangible realms of poetry or of religion; he hoped, like the old Hebrews, for a paradise on earth. His notion was that eloquence could change the heart of man, and that love, kindled there by the force of reason and of example, would transform society. He believed, Mrs. Shelley tells us, “that mankind had only to will that there should be no evil, and there would be none.” And she adds: “That man could be so perfectionised as to be able to expel evil from his own nature, and from the greater part of creation, was the cardinal point of his system.” This cosmic extension of the conversion of men reminds one of the cosmic extension of the Fall conceived by St. Augustine; and in the *Prometheus* Shelley has allowed his fancy, half in symbol, half in glorious physical hyperbole, to carry the warm contagion of love into the very bowels of the earth, and even the moon, by reflection, to catch the light of love, and be alive again.

Shelley, we may safely say, did not understand the real constitution of nature. It was hidden from him by a cloud, all woven of shifting rainbows and bright tears. Only his emotional haste made it possible for him to entertain such opinions as he did entertain; or rather, it was inevitable that the mechanism of nature, as it is in its depths, should remain in his pictures only the shadowiest of backgrounds. His poetry is accordingly a part of the poetry of illusion; the poetry of truth, if we have the courage to hope for such a thing, is reserved for far different and yet unborn poets. But it is only fair to Shelley to remember that the moral being of mankind is as yet in its childhood; all poets play with images not understood; they touch on emotions sharply, at random, as in a dream; they suffer each successive vision, each poignant sentiment, to evaporate into nothing, or to leave behind only a heart vaguely softened and fatigued, a gentle languor, or a tearful hope. Every modern school of poets, once out of fashion, proves itself to have been sadly romantic and sentimental. None has done better than to spangle a confused sensuous pageant with some sparks of truth, or to give it some symbolic relation to moral experience. And this Shelley has done as well as anybody: all other poets also have been poets of illusion. The distinction of Shelley is that his illusions are so wonderfully fine, subtle, and palpitating; that they betray passions and mental habits so singularly generous and pure. And why? Because he did not believe in the necessity of what is vulgar, and did not pay that demoralising respect to it, under the title of fact or of custom, which it exacts from most of us. The past seemed to him no valid precedent, the present no final instance. As he believed in the imminence of an over-turn that should make all things new, he was not checked by any divided allegiance, by any sense that he was straying into the vapid or fanciful, when he created what he justly calls “Beautiful idealisms of moral excellence.”

That is what his poems are fundamentally—the *Skylark,* and the *Witch of the Atlas,* and the *Sensitive Plant* no less than the grander pieces. He infused into his gossamer world the strength of his heroic conscience. He felt that what his imagination pictured was a true symbol of what human experience should and might pass into. Otherwise he would have been aware of playing with idle images; his poetry would have been mere millinery and his politics mere business; he would have been a worldling in art and in morals. The clear fire, the sustained breath, the fervent accent of his poetry are due to his faith in his philosophy. As Mrs. Shelley expressed it, he "had no care for any of his poems that did not emanate from the depths of his mind, and develop some high and abstruse truth." Had his poetry not dealt with what was supreme in his own eyes, and dearest to his heart, it could never have been the exquisite and entrancing poetry that it is. It would not have had an adequate subject-matter, as, in spite of Matthew Arnold, I think it had; for nothing can be empty that contains such a soul. An angel cannot be ineffectual if the standard of efficiency is moral; he is what all other things bring about, when they are effectual. And a void that is alive with the beating of luminous wings, and of a luminous heart, is quite sufficiently peopled. Shelley's mind was angelic not merely in its purity and fervour, but also in its moral authority, in its prophetic strain. What was conscience in his generation was life in him.

The mind of man is not merely a sensorium. His intelligence is not merely an instrument for adaptation. There is a germ within, a nucleus of force and organisation, which can be unfolded, under favourable circumstances, into a perfection inwardly determined. Man's constitution is a fountain from which to draw an infinity of gushing music, not representing anything external, yet not unmeaning on that account, since it represents the capacities and passions latent in him from the beginning. These potentialities, however, are no oracles of truth. Being innate they are arbitrary; being *a priori* they are subjective; but they are good principles for fiction, for poetry, for morals, for religion. They are principles for the true expression of man, but not for the true description of the universe. When they are taken for the latter, fiction becomes deception, poetry illusion, morals fanaticism, and religion bad science. The orgy of delusion into which we are then plunged comes from supposing the *a priori* to be capable of controlling the actual, and the innate to be a standard for the true. That rich and definite endowment which might have made the distinction of the poet, then makes the narrowness of the philosopher. So Shelley, with a sort of tyranny of which he does not suspect the possible cruelty, would impose his ideal of love and equality upon all creatures; he would make enthusiasts of clowns and doves of vultures. In him, as in many people, too intense a need of loving excludes the capacity for intelligent sympathy. His feeling cannot accommodate itself to the inequalities of human nature: his good will is a geyser, and will not consent to grow cool, and to water the flat and vulgar reaches of life. Shelley is blind to the excellences of what he despises, as he is blind to the impossibility of realising what he wants. His sympathies are narrow as his politics are visionary, so that there is a certain moral incompetence in his moral intensity. Yet his abstraction from half of life, or from nine-tenths of it, was perhaps necessary if silence and space were to be won in his mind for its own upwelling, ecstatic harmonies. The world we have always with us, but such spirits we have not always. And the spirit has fire enough within to make a second stellar universe.

An instance of Shelley's moral incompetence in moral intensity is to be found in his view of selfishness and evil. From the point of view of pure spirit, selfishness is quite absurd. As a contemporary of ours has put it: "It is so evident that it is better to secure a greater good for A than a lesser good for B that it is hard to find any still more evident principle by which to prove this. And if A happens to be some one else, and B to be myself, that cannot affect the question." It is very foolish not to love your neighbour as yourself, since his good is no less good than yours. Convince people of this—and who can resist such perfect logic?—and *presto* all property in things has disappeared, all jealousy in love, and all rivalry in honour. How happy and secure every one will suddenly be, and how much richer than in our mean, blind, competitive society! The single word love—and we have just seen that love is a logical necessity—offers an easy and final solution to all moral and political problems. Shelley cannot imagine why this solution is not accepted, and why logic does not produce love. He can only wonder and grieve that it does not; and since selfishness and ill-will seem to him quite gratuitous, his ire is aroused; he thinks them unnatural and monstrous. He could not in the least understand evil, even when he did it himself; all villainy seemed to him wanton, all lust frigid, all hatred insane. All was an abomination alike that was not the lovely spirit of love.

Now this is a very unintelligent view of evil; and if Shelley had had time to read Spinoza—an author with whom he would have found himself largely in sympathy—he might have learned that nothing is evil in itself, and that what is evil in things is not due to any accident in creation, nor to groundless malice in man. Evil is an inevitable aspect which things put on when they are struggling to preserve themselves in the same habitat, in which there is not room or matter enough for them to prosper equally side by side. Under these circumstances the partial success of any creature—say, the cancer-microbe—is an evil from the point of view of those other creatures—say, men—to whom that success is a defeat. Shelley sometimes half perceived this inevitable tragedy. So he says of the fair lady in the *Sensitive Plant:*

> "All killing insects and gnawing worms,
> And things of obscene and unlovely forms,
> She bore in a basket of Indian woof,
> Into the rough woods far aloof—
> In a basket of grasses and wild flowers full,
> The freshest her gentle hands could pull
> For the poor banished insects, whose intent,
> Although they did ill, was innocent."

Now it is all very well to ask cancer-microbes to be reasonable, and go feed on oak-leaves, if the oak-leaves do not object; oak-leaves might be poison for them, and in any case cancer-microbes cannot listen to reason; they must go on propagating where they are, unless they are quickly and utterly exterminated. And fundamentally men are subject to the same fatality exactly; they cannot listen to reason unless they are reasonable; and it is unreasonable to expect that, being animals, they should be reasonable exclusively. Imagination is indeed at work in them, and makes them capable of sacrificing themselves for any idea that appeals to them, for their children, perhaps, or for their religion. But they are not more capable of sacrificing themselves to what does not interest them than the cancer-microbes are of sacrificing themselves to men.

When Shelley marvels at the perversity of the world, he shows his ignorance of the world. The illusion he suffers from is constitutional, and such as larks and sensitive plants are possibly subject to in their way: what he is marvelling at is really that anything should exist at all not a creature of his own moral disposition. Consequently the more he misunderstands the world and bids it change its nature, the more he expresses his own nature: so that all is not vanity in his illusion, nor night in his blindness. The poet sees most clearly what his ideal is; he suffers no illusion in the expression of his own soul. His political utopias, his belief in the power of love, and his cryingly subjective and inconstant way of judging people are one side of the picture; the other is his lyrical power, wealth, and ecstasy. If he had understood universal nature, he would not have so glorified in his own. And his own nature was worth glorifying; it was, I think, the purest, tenderest, richest, most rational nature ever poured forth in verse. I have not read in any language such a full expression of the unadulterated instincts of the mind. The world of Shelley is that which the vital monad within many of us—I will not say within all, for who shall set bounds to the variations of human nature?—the world which the vital monad within many of us, I say, would gladly live in if it could have its way.

Matthew Arnold said that Shelley was not quite sane; and certainly he was not quite sane, if we place sanity in justness of external perception, adaptation to matter, and docility to the facts; but his lack of sanity was not due to any internal corruption; it was not even an internal eccentricity. He was like a child, like a Platonic soul just fallen from the Empyrean; and the child may be dazed, credulous, and fanciful; but he is not mad. On the contrary, his earnest playfulness, the constant distraction of his attention from observation to day-dreams, is the sign of an inward order and fecundity appropriate to his age. If children did not see visions, good men would have nothing to work for. It is the soul of observant persons, like Matthew Arnold, that is apt not to be quite sane and whole inwardly, but somewhat warped by familiarity with the perversities of real things, and forced to misrepresent its true ideal, like a tree bent by too prevalent a wind. Half the fertility of such a soul is lost, and the other half is denaturalised. No doubt, in its sturdy deformity, the practical mind is an instructive and not unpleasing object, an excellent, if somewhat pathetic, expression of the climate in which it is condemned to grow, and of its dogged clinging to an ingrate soil; but it is a wretched expression of its innate possibilities. Shelley, on the contrary, is like a palm-tree in the desert or a star in the sky; he is perfect in the midst of the void. His obtuseness to things dynamic—to the material order—leaves his whole mind free to develop things æsthetic after their own kind; his abstraction permits purity, his playfulness makes room for creative freedom, his ethereal quality is only humanity having its way.

We perhaps do ourselves an injustice when we think that the heart of us is sordid; what is sordid is rather the situation that cramps or stifles the heart. In itself our generative principle is surely no less fertile and generous than the generative principle of crystals or flowers. As it can produce a more complex body, it is capable of producing a more complex mind; and the beauty and life of this mind, like that of the body, is all predetermined in the seed. Circumstances may suffer the organism to develop, or prevent it from doing so; they cannot change its plan without making it ugly and deformed. What Shelley's mind draws from the outside, its fund of images, is like what the germ of the body draws from the outside, its food – a mass of mere materials to transform and reorganise. With these images Shelley constructs a world determined by his native genius, as the seed organises out of its food a predetermined system of nerves and muscles. Shelley's poetry shows us the perfect but naked body of human happiness. What clothes circumstances may compel most of us to add may be a necessary concession to climate, to custom, or to shame; they can hardly add a new vitality or any beauty comparable to that which they hide.

When the soul, as in Shelley's case, is all goodness, and when the world seems all illegitimacy and obstruction, we need not wonder that *freedom* should be regarded as a panacea. Even if freedom had not been the idol of Shelley's times, he would have made an idol of it for himself. "I never could discern in him," says his friend Hogg, "any more than two principles. The first was a strong, irrepressible love of liberty. . . . The second was an equally ardent love of toleration . . . and . . . an intense abhorrence of persecution." We all fancy nowadays that we believe in liberty and abhor persecution; but the liberty we approve of is usually only a variation in social compulsions, to make them less galling to our latest sentiments than the old compulsions would be if we retained them. Liberty of the press and liberty to vote do not greatly help us in living after our own mind, which is, I suppose, the only positive sort of liberty. From the point of view of a poet, there can be little essential freedom so long as he is forbidden to live with the people he likes, and compelled to live with the people he does not like. This, to Shelley, seemed the most galling of tyrannies; and free love was, to his feeling, the essence and test of freedom. Love must be spontaneous to be a spiritual bond in the beginning and it must remain spontaneous if it is to remain spiritual. To be bound by one's past is as great a tyranny to pure spirit as to be bound by the sin of Adam, or by the laws of Artaxerxes; and those of us who do not believe in the possibility of free love ought to declare frankly that we do not, at bottom, believe in the possibility of freedom.

> "I never was attached to that great sect
> Whose doctrine is that each one should select,
> Out of the crowd, a mistress or a friend
> And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend
> To cold oblivion; though it is the code
> Of modern morals, and the beaten road
> Which those poor slaves with weary footsteps tread
> Who travel to their home among the dead
> By the broad highway of the world, and so
> With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe,
> The dreariest and the longest journey go.
> True love in this differs from gold and clay,
> That to divide is not to take away.
> Love is like understanding that grows bright
> Gazing on many truths. . . . Narrow
> The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates,
> The life that wears, the spirit that creates
> One object and one form, and builds thereby
> A sepulchre for its eternity!"

The difficulties in reducing this charming theory of love to practice are well exemplified in Shelley's own life. He ran away with his first wife not because she inspired any uncontrollable passion, but because she declared she was a victim of domestic oppression and threw herself upon him for protection. Nevertheless, when he discovered that his best friend was making love to her, in spite of his free-love principles, he was very seriously annoyed. When he presently abandoned her, feeling a spiritual affinity in another direction, she drowned herself in the Serpentine: and his second wife needed all her natural sweetness and all her inherited philosophy to reconcile her to the waves of Platonic enthusiasm for other ladies which periodically swept the too sensitive heart of her husband. Free love would not, then, secure freedom from complications; it would not remove the present occasion for jealousy, reproaches, tragedies, and the dragging of a lengthening chain. Freedom of spirit cannot be translated into freedom of action; you may amend laws, and customs, and social entanglements, but you will still have them; for this world is a lumbering mechanism and not, like love, a plastic dream. Wisdom is very old and therefore often ironical, and it has long taught that it is well for those who would live in the spirit to keep as clear as possible of the world: and that marriage, especially a free-love marriage, is a snare for poets. Let them endure to love freely, hopelessly, and infinitely, after the manner of Plato and Dante, and even of Goethe, when Goethe really loved: that exquisite sacrifice will improve their verse, and it will not kill them. Let them follow in the traces of Shelley when he wrote in his youth: "I have been most of the night pacing a church-yard. I must now engage in scenes of strong interest. . . . I expect to gratify some of this insatiable feeling in poetry. . . . I slept with a loaded pistol and some poison last night, but did not die." Happy man if he had been able to add, "And did not marry!"

Last among the elements of Shelley's thought I may perhaps mention his atheism. Shelley called himself an atheist in his youth; his biographers and critics usually say that he was, or that he became, a pantheist. He was an atheist in the sense that he denied the orthodox conception of a deity who is a voluntary creator, a legislator, and a judge; but his aversion to Christianity was not founded on any sympathetic or imaginative knowledge of it; and a man who preferred the *Paradiso* of Dante to almost any other poem, and preferred it to the popular *Inferno* itself, could evidently be attracted by Christian ideas and sentiment the moment they were presented to him as expressions of moral truth rather than as gratuitous dogmas. A pantheist he was in the sense that he felt how fluid and vital this whole world is; but he seems to have had no tendency to conceive any conscious plan or logical necessity connecting the different parts of the whole; so that rather than a pantheist he might be called a panpsychist; especially as he did not subordinate morally the individual to the cosmos. He did not surrender the authority of moral ideals in the face of physical necessity, which is properly the essence of pantheism. He did the exact opposite; so much so that the chief characteristic of his philosophy is its Promethean spirit. He maintained that the basis of moral authority was internal, diffused among all individuals; that it was the natural love of the beautiful and the good wherever it might spring, and however fate might oppose it.

> “To suffer . . .
> To forgive . . .
> To defy Power . . .
> To love and bear; to hope, till hope creates
> From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
> Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
> This . . . is to be
> Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free.”

Shelley was also removed from any ordinary atheism by his truly speculative sense for eternity. He was a thorough Platonist. All metaphysics perhaps is poetry, but Platonic metaphysics is good poetry, and to this class Shelley’s belongs. For instance:

> “The pure spirit shall flow
> Back to the burning fountain whence it came,
> A portion of the eternal, which must glow
> Through time and change, unquenchably the same.
> Peace, peace! he is not dead, he doth not sleep!
> He hath awakened from the dream of life.
> ’Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
> With phantoms an unprofitable strife.
>
> “He is made one with Nature. There is heard
> His voice in all her music, from the moan
> Of thunder, to the song of night’s sweet bird.
>
> “He is a portion of the loveliness
> Which once he made more lovely.
>
> “The splendours of the firmament of time
> May be eclipsed, but are extinguished not:
> Like stars to their appointed height they climb,
> And death is a low mist which cannot blot
> The brightness it may veil. When lofty thought
> Lifts a young heart above its mortal lair,
> . . . the dead live there.”

Atheism or pantheism of this stamp cannot be taxed with being gross or materialistic; the trouble is rather that it is too hazy in its sublimity. The poet has not perceived the natural relation between facts and ideals so clearly or correctly as he has felt the moral relation between them. But his allegiance to the intuition which defies, for the sake of felt excellence, every form of idolatry or cowardice wearing the mask of religion – this allegiance is itself the purest religion; and it is capable of inspiring the sweetest and most absolute poetry. In daring to lay bare the truths of fate, the poet creates for himself the subtlest and most heroic harmonies; and he is comforted for the illusions he has lost by being made incapable of desiring them.

We have seen that Shelley, being unteachable, could never put together any just idea of the world: he merely collected images and emotions, and out of them made worlds of his own. His poetry accordingly does not well express history, nor human character, nor the constitution of nature. What he unrolls before us instead is, in a sense, fantastic; it is a series of landscapes, passions, and cataclysms such as never were on earth, and never will be. If you are seriously interested only in what belongs to earth you will not be seriously interested in Shelley. Literature, according to Matthew Arnold, should be criticism of life, and Shelley did not criticise life; so that his poetry had no solidity. But is life, we may ask, the same thing as the circumstances of life on earth? Is the spirit of life, that marks and judges those circumstances, itself nothing? Music is surely no description of the circumstances of life; yet it is relevant to life unmistakably, for it stimulates by means of a torrent of abstract movements and images the formal and emotional possibilities of living which lie in the spirit. By so doing music becomes a part of life, a congruous addition, a parallel life, as it were, to the vulgar one. I see no reason, in the analogies of the natural world, for supposing that the circumstances of human life are the only circumstances in which the spirit of life can disport itself. Even on this planet, there are sea-animals and air-animals, ephemeral beings and self-centred beings, as well as persons who can grow as old as Matthew Arnold, and be as fond as he was of classifying other people. And beyond this planet, and in the interstices of what our limited senses can perceive, there are probably many forms of life not criticised in any of the books which Matthew Arnold said we should read in order to know the best that has been thought and said in the world. The future, too, even among men, may contain, as Shelley puts it, many "arts, though unimagined, yet to be." The divination of poets cannot, of course, be expected to reveal any of these hidden regions as they actually exist or will exist; but what would be the advantage of revealing them? It could only be what the advantage of criticising human life would be also, to improve subsequent life indirectly by turning it towards attainable goods, and is it not as important a thing to improve life directly and in the present, if one has the gift, by enriching rather than criticising it? Besides, there is need of fixing the ideal by which criticism is to be guided. If you have no image of happiness or beauty or perfect goodness before you, how are you to judge what portions of life are important, and what rendering of them is appropriate?

Being a singer inwardly inspired, Shelley could picture the ideal goals of life, the ultimate joys of experience, better than a discursive critic or observer could have done. The circumstances of life are only the bases or instruments of life: the fruition of life is not in retrospect, not in description of the instruments, but in expression of the spirit itself, to which those instruments may prove useful; as music is not a criticism of violins, but a playing upon them. This expression need not resemble its ground. Experience is diversified by colours that are not produced by colours, sounds that are not conditioned by sounds, names that are not symbols for other names, fixed ideal objects that stand for ever-changing material processes. The mind is fundamentally lyrical, inventive, redundant. Its visions are its own offspring, hatched in the warmth of some favourable cosmic gale. The ambient weather may vary, and these visions be scattered; but the ideal world they pictured may some day be revealed again to some other poet similarly inspired; the possibility of restoring it, or something like it, is perpetual. It is precisely because Shelley's sense for things is so fluid, so illusive, that it opens to us emotionally what is a serious scientific probability; namely, that human life is not all life, nor the landscape of earth the only admired landscape in the universe; that the ancients who believed in gods and spirits were nearer the virtual truth (however anthropomorphically they may have expressed themselves) than any philosophy or religion that makes human affairs the centre and aim of the world. Such moral imagination is to be gained by sinking into oneself, rather than by observing remote happenings, because it is at its heart, not at its finger-tips, that the human soul touches matter, and is akin to whatever other centres of life may people the infinite.

For this reason the masters of spontaneity, the prophets, the inspired poets, the saints, the mystics, the musicians are welcome and most appealing companions. In their simplicity and abstraction from the world they come very near the heart. They say little and help much. They do not picture life, but have life, and give it. So we may say, I think, of Shelley's magic universe what he said of Greece; if it

"Must be
A wreck, yet shall its fragments re-assemble,
And build themselves again impregnably

In a diviner clime,
To Amphionic music, on some cape sublime
Which frowns above the idle foam of time."

"Frowns," says Shelley rhetorically, as if he thought that something timeless, something merely ideal, could be formidable, or could threaten existing things with any but an ideal defeat. Tremendous error! Eternal possibilities may indeed beckon; they may attract those who instinctively pursue them as a star may guide those who wish to reach the place over which it happens to shine. But an eternal possibility has no material power. It is only one of an infinity of other things equally possible intrinsically, yet most of them quite unrealisable in this world of blood and mire. The realm of eternal essences rains down no Jovian thunderbolts, but only a ghostly Uranian calm. There is no frown there; rather, a passive and universal welcome to any who may have in them the will and the power to climb. Whether any one has the will depends on his material constitution, and whether he has the power depends on the firm texture of that constitution and on circumstances happening to be favourable to its operation. Otherwise what the rebel or the visionary hails as his ideal will be no picture of his destiny or of that of the world. It will be, and will always remain, merely a picture of his heart. This picture, indestructible in its ideal essence, will mirror also the hearts of those who may share, or may have shared, the nature of the poet who drew it. So purely ideal and so deeply human are the visions of Shelley. So truly does he deserve the epitaph which a clear-sighted friend wrote upon his tomb: *cor cordium,* the heart of hearts.

VI

THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

Address delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, August 25, 1911.

Ladies and gentlemen,—The privilege of addressing you to-day is very welcome to me, not merely for the honour of it, which is great, nor for the pleasures of travel, which are many, when it is California that one is visiting for the first time, but also because there is something I have long wanted to say which this occasion seems particularly favourable for saying. America is still a young country, and this part of it is especially so; and it would have been nothing extraordinary if, in this young country, material preoccupations had altogether absorbed people's minds, and they had been too much engrossed in living to reflect upon life, or to have any philosophy. The opposite, however, is the case. Not only have you already found time to philosophise in California, as your society proves, but the eastern colonists from the very beginning were a sophisticated race. As much as in clearing the land and fighting the Indians they were occupied, as they expressed it, in wrestling with the Lord. The country was new, but the race was tried, chastened, and full of solemn memories. It was an old wine in new bottles; and America did not have to wait for its present universities, with their departments of academic philosophy, in order to possess a living philosophy—to have a distinct vision of the universe and definite convictions about human destiny.

Now this situation is a singular and remarkable one, and has many consequences, not all of which are equally fortunate. America is a young country with an old mentality: it has enjoyed the advantages of a child carefully brought up and thoroughly indoctrinated; it has been a wise child. But a wise child, an old head on young shoulders, always has a comic and an unpromising side. The wisdom is a little thin and verbal, not aware of its full meaning and grounds; and physical and emotional growth may be stunted by it, or even deranged. Or when the child is too vigorous for that, he will develop a fresh mentality of his own, out of his observations and actual instincts; and this fresh mentality will interfere with the traditional mentality, and tend to reduce it to something perfunctory, conventional, and perhaps secretly despised. A philosophy is not genuine unless it inspires and expresses the life of those who cherish it. I do not think the hereditary philosophy of America has done much to atrophy the natural activities of the inhabitants; the wise child has not missed the joys of youth or of manhood; but what has happened is that the hereditary philosophy has grown stale, and that the academic philosophy afterwards developed has caught the stale odour from it. America is not simply, as I said a moment ago, a young country with an old mentality: it is a country with two mentalities, one a survival of the beliefs and standards of the fathers, the other an expression of the instincts, practice, and discoveries of the younger generations. In all the higher things of the mind – in religion, in literature, in the moral emotions – it is the hereditary spirit that still prevails, so much so that Mr. Bernard Shaw finds that America is a hundred years behind the times. The truth is that one-half of the American mind, that not occupied intensely in practical affairs, has remained, I will not say high-and-dry, but slightly becalmed; it has floated gently in the back-water, while, alongside, in invention and industry and social organisation, the other half of the mind was leaping down a sort of Niagara Rapids. This division may be found symbolised in American architecture: a neat reproduction of the colonial mansion – with some modern comforts introduced surreptitiously – stands beside the sky-scraper. The American Will inhabits the sky-scraper; the American Intellect inhabits the colonial mansion. The one is the sphere of the American man; the other, at least predominantly, of the American woman. The one is all aggressive enterprise; the other is all genteel tradition.

Now, with your permission, I should like to analyse more fully how this interesting situation has arisen, how it is qualified, and whither it tends. And in the first place we should remember what, precisely, that philosophy was which the first settlers brought with them into the country. In strictness there was more than one; but we may confine our attention to what I will call Calvinism, since it is on this that the current academic philosophy has been grafted. I do not mean exactly the Calvinism of Calvin, or even of Jonathan Edwards; for in their systems there was much that was not pure philosophy, but rather faith in the externals and history of revelation. Jewish and Christian revelation was interpreted by these men, however, in the spirit of a particular philosophy, which might have arisen under any sky, and been associated with any other religion as well as with Protestant Christianity. In fact, the philosophical principle of Calvinism appears also in the Koran, in Spinoza, and in Cardinal Newman; and persons with no very distinctive Christian belief, like Carlyle or like Professor Royce, may be nevertheless, philosophically, perfect Calvinists. Calvinism, taken in this sense, is an expression of the agonised conscience. It is a view of the world which an agonised conscience readily embraces, if it takes itself seriously, as, being agonised, of course it must. Calvinism, essentially, asserts three things: that sin exists, that sin is punished, and that it is beautiful that sin should exist to be punished. The heart of the Calvinist is therefore divided between tragic concern at his own miserable condition, and tragic exultation about the universe at large. He oscillates between a profound abasement and a paradoxical elation of the spirit. To be a Calvinist philosophically is to feel a fierce pleasure in the existence of misery, especially of one's own, in that this misery seems to manifest the fact that the Absolute is irresponsible or infinite or holy. Human nature, it feels, is totally depraved: to have the instincts and motives that we necessarily have is a great scandal, and we must suffer for it; but that scandal is requisite, since otherwise the serious importance of being as we ought to be would not have been vindicated.

To those of us who have not an agonised conscience this system may seem fantastic and even unintelligible; yet it is logically and intently thought out from its emotional premises. It can take permanent possession of a deep mind here and there, and under certain conditions it can become epidemic. Imagine, for instance, a small nation with an intense vitality, but on the verge of ruin, ecstatic and distressful, having a strict and minute code of laws, that paints life in sharp and violent chiaroscuro, all pure righteousness and black abominations, and exaggerating the consequences of both perhaps to infinity. Such a people were the Jews after the exile, and again the early Protestants. If such a people is philosophical at all, it will not improbably be Calvinistic. Even in the early American communities many of these conditions were fulfilled. The nation was small and isolated; it lived under pressure and constant trial; it was acquainted with but a small range of goods and evils. Vigilance over conduct and an absolute demand for personal integrity were not merely traditional things, but things that practical sages, like Franklin and Washington, recommended to their countrymen, because they were virtues that justified themselves visibly by their fruits. But soon these happy results themselves helped to relax the pressure of external circumstances, and indirectly the pressure of the agonised conscience within. The nation became numerous; it ceased to be either ecstatic or distressful; the high social morality which on the whole it preserved took another colour; people remained honest and helpful out of good sense and good will rather than out of scrupulous adherence to any fixed principles. They retained their instinct for order, and often created order with surprising quickness; but the sanctity of law, to be obeyed for its own sake, began to escape them; it seemed too unpractical a notion, and not quite serious. In fact, the second and native-born American mentality began to take shape. The sense of sin totally evaporated. Nature, in the words of Emerson, was all beauty and commodity; and while operating on it laboriously, and drawing quick returns, the American began to drink in inspiration from it æsthetically. At the same time, in so broad a continent, he had elbow-room. His neighbours helped more than they hindered him; he wished their number to increase. Good will became the great American virtue; and a passion arose for counting heads, and square miles, and cubic feet, and minutes saved—as if there had been anything to save them for. How strange to the American now that saying of Jonathan Edwards, that men are naturally God's enemies! Yet that is an axiom to any intelligent Calvinist, though the words he uses may be different. If you told the modern American that he is totally depraved, he would think you were joking, as he himself usually is. He is convinced that he always has been, and always will be, victorious and blameless.

Calvinism thus lost its basis in American life. Some emotional natures, indeed, reverted in their religious revivals or private searchings of heart to the sources of the tradition; for any of the radical points of view in philosophy may cease to be prevalent, but none can cease to be possible. Other natures, more sensitive to the moral and literary influences of the world, preferred to abandon parts of their philosophy, hoping thus to reduce the distance which should separate the remainder from real life.

Meantime, if anybody arose with a special sensibility or a technical genius, he was in great straits; not being fed sufficiently by the world, he was driven in upon his own resources. The three American writers whose personal endowment was perhaps the finest—Poe, Hawthorne, and Emerson—had all a certain starved and abstract quality. They could not retail the genteel tradition; they were too keen, too perceptive, and too independent for that. But life offered them little digestible material, nor were they naturally voracious. They were fastidious, and under the circumstances they were starved. Emerson, to be sure, fed on books. There was a great catholicity in his reading; and he showed a fine tact in his comments, and in his way of appropriating what he read. But he read transcendentally, not historically, to learn what he himself felt, not what others might have felt before him. And to feed on books, for a philosopher or a poet, is still to starve. Books can help him to acquire form, or to avoid pitfalls; they cannot supply him with substance, if he is to have any. Therefore the genius of Poe and Hawthorne, and even of Emerson, was employed on a sort of inner play, or digestion of vacancy. It was a refined labour, but it was in danger of being morbid, or tinkling, or self-indulgent. It was a play of intra-mental rhymes. Their mind was like an old music-box, full of tender echoes and quaint fancies. These fancies expressed their personal genius sincerely, as dreams may; but they were arbitrary fancies in comparison with what a real observer would have said in the premises. Their manner, in a word, was subjective. In their own persons they escaped the mediocrity of the genteel tradition, but they supplied nothing to supplant it in other minds.

The churches, likewise, although they modified their spirit, had no philosophy to offer save a new emphasis on parts of what Calvinism contained. The theology of Calvin, we must remember, had much in it besides philosophical Calvinism. A Christian tenderness, and a hope of grace for the individual, came to mitigate its sardonic optimism; and it was these evangelical elements that the Calvinistic churches now emphasised, seldom and with blushes referring to hell-fire or infant damnation. Yet philosophic Calvinism, with a theory of life that would perfectly justify hell-fire and infant damnation if they happened to exist, still dominates the traditional metaphysics. It is an ingredient, and the decisive ingredient, in what calls itself idealism. But in order to see just what part Calvinism plays in current idealism, it will be necessary to distinguish the other chief element in that complex system, namely, transcendentalism.

Transcendentalism is the philosophy which the romantic era produced in Germany, and independently, I believe, in America also. Transcendentalism proper, like romanticism, is not any particular set of dogmas about what things exist; it is not a system of the universe regarded as a fact, or as a collection of facts. It is a method, a point of view, from which any world, no matter what it might contain, could be approached by a self-conscious observer. Transcendentalism is systematic subjectivism. It studies the perspectives of knowledge as they radiate from the self; it is a plan of those avenues of inference by which our ideas of things must be reached, if they are to afford any systematic or distant vistas. In other words, transcendentalism is the critical logic of science. Knowledge, it says, has a station, as in a watch-tower; it is always seated here and now, in the self of the moment. The past and the future, things inferred and things conceived, lie around it, painted as upon a panorama. They cannot be lighted up save by some centrifugal ray of attention and present interest, by some active operation of the mind.

This is hardly the occasion for developing or explaining this delicate insight; suffice it to say, lest you should think later that I disparage transcendentalism, that as a method I regard it as correct and, when once suggested, unforgettable. I regard it as the chief contribution made in modern times to speculation. But it is a method only, an attitude we may always assume if we like and that will always be legitimate. It is no answer, and involves no particular answer, to the question: What exists; in what order is what exists produced; what is to exist in the future? This question must be answered by observing the object, and tracing humbly the movement of the object. It cannot be answered at all by harping on the fact that this object, if discovered, must be discovered by somebody, and by somebody who has an interest in discovering it. Yet the Germans who first gained the full transcendental insight were romantic people; they were more or less frankly poets; they were colossal egotists, and wished to make not only their own knowledge but the whole universe centre about themselves. And full as they were of their romantic isolation and romantic liberty, it occurred to them to imagine that all reality might be a transcendental self and a romantic dreamer like themselves; nay, that it might be just their own transcendental self and their own romantic dreams extended indefinitely. Transcendental logic, the method of discovery for the mind, was to become also the method of evolution in nature and history. Transcendental method, so abused, produced transcendental myth. A conscientious critique of knowledge was turned into a sham system of nature. We must therefore distinguish sharply the transcendental grammar of the intellect, which is significant and potentially correct, from the various transcendental systems of the universe, which are chimeras.

In both its parts, however, transcendentalism had much to recommend it to American philosophers, for the transcendental method appealed to the individualistic and revolutionary temper of their youth, while transcendental myths enabled them to find a new status for their inherited theology, and to give what parts of it they cared to preserve some semblance of philosophical backing. This last was the use to which the transcendental method was put by Kant himself, who first brought it into vogue, before the terrible weapon had got out of hand, and become the instrument of pure romanticism. Kant came, he himself said, to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith, which in his case meant faith in Calvinism. In other words, he applied the transcendental method to matters of fact, reducing them thereby to human ideas, in order to give to the Calvinistic postulates of conscience a metaphysical validity. For Kant had a genteel tradition of his own, which he wished to remove to a place of safety, feeling that the empirical world had become too hot for it; and this place of safety was the region of transcendental myth. I need hardly say how perfectly this expedient suited the needs of philosophers in America, and it is no accident if the influence of Kant soon became dominant here. To embrace this philosophy was regarded as a sign of profound metaphysical insight, although the most mediocre minds found no difficulty in embracing it. In truth it was a sign of having been brought up in the genteel tradition, of feeling it weak, and of wishing to save it.

But the transcendental method, in its way, was also sympathetic to the American mind. It embodied, in a radical form, the spirit of Protestantism as distinguished from its inherited doctrines; it was autonomous, undismayed, calmly revolutionary; it felt that Will was deeper than Intellect; it focussed everything here and now, and asked all things to show their credentials at the bar of the young self, and to prove their value for this latest born moment. These things are truly

American; they would be characteristic of any young society with a keen and discursive intelligence, and they are strikingly exemplified in the thought and in the person of Emerson. They constitute what he called self-trust. Self-trust, like other transcendental attitudes, may be expressed in metaphysical fables. The romantic spirit may imagine itself to be an absolute force, evoking and moulding the plastic world to express its varying moods. But for a pioneer who is actually a world-builder this metaphysical illusion has a partial warrant in historical fact; far more warrant than it could boast of in the fixed and articulated society of Europe, among the moonstruck rebels and sulking poets of the romantic era. Emerson was a shrewd Yankee, by instinct on the winning side; he was a cheery, child-like soul, impervious to the evidence of evil, as of everything that it did not suit his transcendental individuality to appreciate or to notice. More, perhaps, than anybody that has ever lived, he practised the transcendental method in all its purity. He had no system. He opened his eyes on the world every morning with a fresh sincerity, marking how things seemed to him then, or what they suggested to his spontaneous fancy. This fancy, for being spontaneous, was not always novel; it was guided by the habits and training of his mind, which were those of a preacher. Yet he never insisted on his notions so as to turn them into settled dogmas; he felt in his bones that they were myths. Sometimes, indeed, the bad example of other transcendentalists, less true than he to their method, or the pressing questions of unintelligent people, or the instinct we all have to think our ideas final, led him to the very verge of system-making; but he stopped short. Had he made a system out of his notion of compensation, or the over-soul, or spiritual laws, the result would have been as thin and forced as it is in other transcendental systems. But he coveted truth; and he returned to experience, to history, to poetry, to the natural science of his day, for new starting-points and hints toward fresh transcendental musings.

To covet truth is a very distinguished passion. Every philosopher says he is pursuing the truth, but this is seldom the case. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has observed, one reason why philosophers often fail to reach the truth is that often they do not desire to reach it. Those who are genuinely concerned in discovering what happens to be true are rather the men of science, the naturalists, the historians; and ordinarily they discover it, according to their lights. The truths they find are never complete, and are not always important; but they are integral parts of the truth, facts and circumstances that help to fill in the picture, and that no later interpretation can invalidate or afford to contradict. But professional philosophers are usually only apologists: that is, they are absorbed in defending some vested illusion or some eloquent idea. Like lawyers or detectives, they study the case for which they are retained, to see how much evidence or semblance of evidence they can gather for the defence, and how much prejudice they can raise against the witnesses for the prosecution; for they know they are defending prisoners suspected by the world, and perhaps by their own good sense, of falsification. They do not covet truth, but victory and the dispelling of their own doubts. What they defend is some system, that is, some view about the totality of things, of which men are actually ignorant. No system would have ever been framed if people had been simply interested in knowing what is true, whatever it may be. What produces systems is the interest in maintaining against all comers that some favourite or inherited idea of ours is sufficient and right. A system may contain an account of many things which, in detail, are true enough; but as a system, covering infinite possibilities that neither our experience nor our logic can prejudge, it must be a work of imagination and a piece of human soliloquy. It may be expressive of human experience, it may be poetical; but how should any one who really coveted truth suppose that it was true?

Emerson had no system; and his coveting truth had another exceptional consequence: he was detached, unworldly, contemplative. When he came out of the conventicle or the reform meeting, or out of the rapturous close atmosphere of the lecture-room, he heard Nature whispering to him: “Why so hot, little sir?” No doubt the spirit or energy of the world is what is acting in us, as the sea is what rises in every little wave; but it passes through us, and cry out as we may, it will move on. Our privilege is to have perceived it as it moves. Our dignity is not in what we do, but in what we understand. The whole world is doing things. We are turning in that vortex; yet within us is silent observation, the speculative eye before which all passes, which bridges the distances and compares the combatants. On this side of his genius Emerson broke away from all conditions of age or country and represented nothing except intelligence itself.

There was another element in Emerson, curiously combined with transcendentalism, namely, his love and respect for Nature. Nature, for the transcendentalist, is precious because it is his own work, a mirror in which he looks at himself and says (like a poet relishing his own verses), “What a genius I am! Who would have thought there was such stuff in me?” And the philosophical egotist finds in his doctrine a ready explanation of whatever beauty and commodity nature actually has. No wonder, he says to himself, that nature is sympathetic, since I made it. And such a view, one-sided and even fatuous as it may be, undoubtedly sharpens the vision of a poet and a moralist to all that is inspiriting and symbolic in the natural world. Emerson was particularly ingenious and clear-sighted in feeling the spiritual uses of fellowship with the elements. This is something in which all Teutonic poetry is rich and which forms, I think, the most genuine and spontaneous part of modern taste, and especially of American taste. Just as some people are naturally enthralled and refreshed by music, so others are by landscape. Music and landscape make up the spiritual resources of those who cannot or dare not express their unfulfilled ideals in words. Serious poetry, profound religion (Calvinism, for instance), are the joys of an unhappiness that confesses itself; but when a genteel tradition forbids people to confess that they are unhappy, serious poetry and profound religion are closed to them by that; and since human life, in its depths, cannot then express itself openly, imagination is driven for comfort into abstract arts, where human circumstances are lost sight of, and human problems dissolve in a purer medium. The pressure of care is thus relieved, without its quietus being found in intelligence. To understand oneself is the classic form of consolation; to elude oneself is the romantic. In the presence of music or landscape human experience eludes itself; and thus romanticism is the bond between transcendental and naturalistic sentiment. The winds and clouds come to minister to the solitary ego.

Have there been, we may ask, any successful efforts to escape from the genteel tradition, and to express something worth expressing behind its back? This might well not have occurred as yet; but America is so precocious, it has been trained by the genteel tradition to be so wise for its years, that some indications of a truly native philosophy and poetry are already to be found. I might mention the humorists, of whom you here in California have had your share. The humorists, however, only half escape the genteel tradition; their humour would lose its savour if they had wholly escaped it. They point to what contradicts it in the facts; but not in order to abandon the genteel tradition, for they have nothing solid to put in its place.

When they point out how ill many facts fit into it, they do not clearly conceive that this militates against the standard, but think it a funny perversity in the facts. Of course, did they earnestly respect the genteel tradition, such an incongruity would seem to them sad, rather than ludicrous. Perhaps the prevalence of humour in America, in and out of season, may be taken as one more evidence that the genteel tradition is present pervasively, but everywhere weak. Similarly in Italy, during the Renaissance, the Catholic tradition could not be banished from the intellect, since there was nothing articulate to take its place; yet its hold on the heart was singularly relaxed. The consequence was that humorists could regale themselves with the foibles of monks and of cardinals, with the credulity of fools, and the bogus miracles of the saints; not intending to deny the theory of the church, but caring for it so little at heart that they could find it infinitely amusing that it should be contradicted in men's lives and that no harm should come of it. So when Mark Twain says, "I was born of poor but dishonest parents," the humour depends on the parody of the genteel Anglo-Saxon convention that it is disreputable to be poor; but to hint at the hollowness of it would not be amusing if it did not remain at bottom one's habitual conviction.

The one American writer who has left the genteel tradition entirely behind is perhaps Walt Whitman. For this reason educated Americans find him rather an unpalatable person, who they sincerely protest ought not to be taken for a representative of their culture; and he certainly should not, because their culture is so genteel and traditional. But the foreigner may sometimes think otherwise, since he is looking for what may have arisen in America to express, not the polite and conventional American mind, but the spirit and the inarticulate principles that animate the community, on which its own genteel mentality seems to sit rather lightly. When the foreigner opens the pages of Walt Whitman, he thinks that he has come at last upon something representative and original. In Walt Whitman democracy is carried into psychology and morals. The various sights, moods, and emotions are given each one vote; they are declared to be all free and equal, and the innumerable common-place moments of life are suffered to speak like the others. Those moments formerly reputed great are not excluded, but they are made to march in the ranks with their companions—plain foot-soldiers and servants of the hour. Nor does the refusal to discriminate stop there; we must carry our principle further down, to the animals, to inanimate nature, to the cosmos as a whole. Whitman became a pantheist; but his pantheism, unlike that of the Stoics and of Spinoza, was unintellectual, lazy, and self-indulgent; for he simply felt jovially that everything real was good enough, and that he was good enough himself. In him Bohemia rebelled against the genteel tradition; but the reconstruction that alone can justify revolution did not ensue. His attitude, in principle, was utterly disintegrating; his poetic genius fell back to the lowest level, perhaps, to which it is possible for poetic genius to fall. He reduced his imagination to a passive sensorium for the registering of impressions. No element of construction remained in it, and therefore no element of penetration. But his scope was wide; and his lazy, desultory apprehension was poetical. His work, for the very reason that it is so rudimentary, contains a beginning, or rather many beginnings, that might possibly grow into a noble moral imagination, a worthy filling for the human mind. An American in the nineteenth century who completely disregarded the genteel tradition could hardly have done more.

But there is another distinguished man, lately lost to this country, who has given some rude shocks to this tradition and who, as much as Whitman, may be regarded as representing the genuine, the long silent American mind—I mean William James. He and his brother Henry were as tightly swaddled in the genteel tradition as any infant geniuses could be, for they were born before 1850, and in a Swedenborgian household. Yet they burst those bands almost entirely. The ways in which the two brothers freed themselves, however, are interestingly different. Mr. Henry James has done it by adopting the point of view of the outer world, and by turning the genteel American tradition, as he turns everything else, into a subject-matter for analysis. For him it is a curious habit of mind, intimately comprehended, to be compared with other habits of mind, also well known to him. Thus he has overcome the genteel tradition in the classic way, by understanding it. With William James too this infusion of worldly insight and European sympathies was a potent influence, especially in his earlier days; but the chief source of his liberty was another. It was his personal spontaneity, similar to that of Emerson, and his personal vitality, similar to that of nobody else. Convictions and ideas came to him, so to speak, from the subsoil. He had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age, with the moods of the dumb majority. His scattered words caught fire in many parts of the world. His way of thinking and feeling represented the true America, and represented in a measure the whole ultra-modern, radical world. Thus he eluded the genteel tradition in the romantic way, by continuing it into its opposite. The romantic mind, glorified in Hegel's dialectic (which is not dialectic at all, but a sort of tragi-comic history of experience), is always rendering its thoughts unrecognisable through the infusion of new insights, and through the insensible transformation of the moral feeling that accompanies them, till at last it has completely reversed its old judgments under cover of expanding them. Thus the genteel tradition was led a merry dance when it fell again into the hands of a genuine and vigorous romanticist like William James. He restored their revolutionary force to its neutralised elements, by picking them out afresh, and emphasising them separately, according to his personal predilections.

For one thing, William James kept his mind and heart wide open to all that might seem, to polite minds, odd, personal, or visionary in religion and philosophy. He gave a sincerely respectful hearing to sentimentalists, mystics, spiritualists, wizards, cranks, quacks, and impostors—for it is hard to draw the line, and James was not willing to draw it prematurely. He thought, with his usual modesty, that any of these might have something to teach him. The lame, the halt, the blind, and those speaking with tongues could come to him with the certainty of finding sympathy; and if they were not healed, at least they were comforted, that a famous professor should take them so seriously; and they began to feel that after all to have only one leg, or one hand, or one eye, or to have three, might be in itself no less beauteous than to have just two, like the stolid majority. Thus William James became the friend and helper of those groping, nervous, half-educated, spiritually disinherited, passionately hungry individuals of which America is full. He became, at the same time, their spokesman and representative before the learned world; and he made it a chief part of his vocation to recast what the learned world has to offer, so that as far as possible it might serve the needs and interest of these people.

Yet the normal practical masculine American, too, had a friend in William James. There is a feeling abroad now, to which biology and Darwinism lend some colour, that theory is simply an instrument for practice, and intelligence merely a help toward material survival. Bears, it is said, have fur and claws, but poor naked man is condemned to be intelligent, or he will perish. This feeling William James embodied in that theory of thought and of truth which he called pragmatism. Intelligence, he thought, is no miraculous, idle faculty, by which we mirror passively any or everything that happens to be true, reduplicating the real world to no purpose. Intelligence has its roots and its issue in the context of events; it is one kind of practical adjustment, an experimental act, a form of vital tension. It does not essentially serve to picture other parts of reality, but to connect them. This view was not worked out by William James in its psychological and historical details; unfortunately he developed it chiefly in controversy against its opposite, which he called intellectualism, and which he hated with all the hatred of which his kind heart was capable. Intellectualism, as he conceived it, was pure pedantry; it impoverished and verbalised everything, and tied up nature in red tape. Ideas and rules that may have been occasionally useful it put in the place of the full-blooded irrational movement of life which had called them into being; and these abstractions, so soon obsolete, it strove to fix and to worship for ever. Thus all creeds and theories and all formal precepts sink in the estimation of the pragmatist to a local and temporary grammar of action; a grammar that must be changed slowly by time, and may be changed quickly by genius. To know things as a whole, or as they are eternally, if there is anything eternal in them, is not only beyond our powers, but would prove worthless, and perhaps even fatal to our lives. Ideas are not mirrors, they are weapons; their function is to prepare us to meet events, as future experience may unroll them. Those ideas that disappoint us are false ideas; those to which events are true are true themselves.

This may seem a very utilitarian view of the mind; and I confess I think it a partial one, since the logical force of beliefs and ideas, their truth or falsehood as assertions, has been overlooked altogether, or confused with the vital force of the material processes which these ideas express. It is an external view only, which marks the place and conditions of the mind in nature, but neglects its specific essence; as if a jewel were defined as a round hole in a ring. Nevertheless, the more materialistic the pragmatist's theory of the mind is, the more vitalistic his theory of nature will have to become. If the intellect is a device produced in organic bodies to expedite their processes, these organic bodies must have interests and a chosen direction in their life; otherwise their life could not be expedited, nor could anything be useful to it. In other words—and this is a third point at which the philosophy of

William James has played havoc with the genteel tradition, while ostensibly defending it—nature must be conceived anthropomorphically and in psychological terms. Its purposes are not to be static harmonies, self-unfolding destinies, the logic of spirit, the spirit of logic, or any other formal method and abstract law; its purposes are to be concrete endeavours, finite efforts of souls living in an environment which they transform and by which they, too, are affected. A spirit, the divine spirit as much as the human, as this new animism conceives it, is a romantic adventurer. Its future is undetermined. Its scope, its duration, and the quality of its life are all contingent. This spirit grows; it buds and sends forth feelers, sounding the depths around for such other centres of force or life as may exist there. It has a vital momentum, but no predetermined goal. It uses its past as a stepping-stone, or rather as a diving-board, but has an absolutely fresh will at each moment to plunge this way or that into the unknown. The universe is an experiment; it is unfinished. It has no ultimate or total nature, because it has no end. It embodies no formula or statable law; any formula is at best a poor abstraction, describing what, in some region and for some time, may be the most striking characteristic of existence; the law is a description *a posteriori* of the habit things have chosen to acquire, and which they may possibly throw off altogether. What a day may bring forth is uncertain; uncertain even to God. Omniscience is impossible; time is real; what had been omniscience hitherto might discover something more to-day. “There shall be news,” William James was fond of saying with rapture, quoting from the unpublished poem of an obscure friend, “there shall be news in heaven!” There is almost certainly, he thought, a God now; there may be several gods, who might exist together, or one after the other. We might, by our conspiring sympathies, help to make a new one. Much in us is doubtless immortal; we survive death for some time in a recognisable form; but what our career and transformations may be in the sequel we cannot tell, although we may help to determine them by our daily choices. Observation must be continual if our ideas are to remain true. Eternal vigilance is the price of knowledge; perpetual hazard, perpetual experiment keep quick the edge of life.

This is, so far as I know, a new philosophical vista; it is a conception never before presented, although implied, perhaps, in various quarters, as in Norse and even Greek mythology. It is a vision radically empirical and radically romantic; and as William James himself used to say, the visions and not the arguments of a philosopher are the interesting and influential things about him. William James, rather too generously, attributed this vision to M. Bergson, and regarded him in consequence as a philosopher of the first rank, whose thought was to be one of the turning-points in history. M. Bergson had killed intellectualism. It was his book on creative evolution, said James with humorous emphasis, that had come at last to *"écraser l'infâme."* We may suspect, notwithstanding, that intellectualism, infamous and crushed, will survive the blow; and if the author of the Book of Ecclesiastes were now alive, and heard that there shall be news in heaven, he would doubtless say that there may possibly be news there, but that under the sun there is nothing new—not even radical empiricism or radical romanticism, which from the beginning of the world has been the philosophy of those who as yet had had little experience; for to the blinking little child it is not merely something in the world that is new daily, but everything is new all day.

I am not concerned with the rights and wrongs of that controversy; my point is only that William James, in this genial evolutionary view of the world, has given a rude shock to the genteel tradition. What! The world a gradual improvisation? Creation unpremeditated? God a sort of young poet or struggling artist? William James is an advocate of theism; pragmatism adds one to the evidences of religion; that is excellent. But is not the cool abstract piety of the genteel getting more than it asks for? This empirical naturalistic God is too crude and positive a force; he will work miracles, he will answer prayers, he may inhabit distinct places, and have distinct conditions under which alone he can operate; he is a neighbouring being, whom we can act upon, and rely upon for specific aids, as upon a personal friend, or a physician, or an insurance company. How disconcerting! Is not this new theology a little like superstition? And yet how interesting, how exciting, if it should happen to be true! I am far from wishing to suggest that such a view seems to me more probable than conventional idealism or than Christian orthodoxy. All three are in the region of dramatic system-making and myth to which probabilities are irrelevant. If one man says the moon is sister to the sun, and another that she is his daughter, the question is not which notion is more probable, but whether either of them is at all expressive. The so-called evidences are devised afterwards, when faith and imagination have prejudged the issue. The force of William James's new theology, or romantic cosmology, lies only in this: that it has broken the spell of the genteel tradition, and enticed faith in a new direction, which on second thoughts may prove no less alluring than the old. The important fact is not that the new fancy might possibly be true – who shall know that? – but that it has entered the heart of a leading American to conceive and to cherish it. The genteel tradition cannot be dislodged by these insurrections; there are circles to which it is still congenial, and where it will be preserved. But it has been challenged and (what is perhaps more insidious) it has been discovered. No one need be browbeaten any longer into accepting it. No one need be afraid, for instance, that his fate is sealed because some young prig may call him a dualist; the pint would call the quart a dualist, if you tried to pour the quart into him. We need not be afraid of being less profound, for being direct and sincere. The intellectual world may be traversed in many directions; the whole has not been surveyed; there is a great career in it open to talent. That is a sort of knell, that tolls the passing of the genteel tradition. Something else is now in the field; something else can appeal to the imagination, and be a thousand times more idealistic than academic idealism, which is often simply a way of white-washing and adoring things as they are. The illegitimate monopoly which the genteel tradition had established over what ought to be assumed and what ought to be hoped for has been broken down by the first-born of the family, by the genius of the race. Henceforth there can hardly be the same peace and the same pleasure in hugging the old proprieties. Hegel will be to the next generation what Sir William Hamilton was to the last. Nothing will have been disproved, but everything will have been abandoned. An honest man has spoken, and the cant of the genteel tradition has become harder for young lips to repeat.

With this I have finished such a sketch as I am here able to offer you of the genteel tradition in American philosophy. The subject is complex, and calls for many an excursus and qualifying footnote; yet I think the main outlines are clear enough. The chief fountains of this tradition were Calvinism and transcendentalism. Both were living fountains; but to keep them alive they required, one an agonised conscience, and the other a radical subjective criticism of knowledge. When these rare metaphysical preoccupations disappeared – and the American atmosphere is not favourable to either of them – the two systems ceased to be inwardly understood; they subsisted as sacred mysteries only; and the combination of the two in some transcendental system of the universe (a contradiction in principle) was doubly artificial. Besides, it could hardly be held with a single mind. Natural science, history, the beliefs implied in labour and invention, could not be disregarded altogether; so that the transcendental philosopher was condemned to a double allegiance, and to not letting his left hand know the bluff that his right hand was making. Nevertheless, the difficulty in bringing practical inarticulate convictions to expression is very great, and the genteel tradition has subsisted in the academic mind for want of anything equally academic to take its place.

The academic mind, however, has had its flanks turned. On the one side came the revolt of the Bohemian temperament, with its poetry of crude naturalism; on the other side came an impassioned empiricism, welcoming popular religious witnesses to the unseen, reducing science to an instrument of success in action, and declaring the universe to be wild and young, and not to be harnessed by the logic of any school.

This revolution, I should think, might well find an echo among you, who live in a thriving society, and in the presence of a virgin and prodigious world. When you transform nature to your uses, when you experiment with her forces, and reduce them to industrial agents, you cannot feel that nature was made by you or for you, for then these adjustments would have been pre-established. Much less can you feel it when she destroys your labour of years in a momentary spasm. You must feel, rather, that you are an offshoot of her life; one brave little force among her immense forces. When you escape, as you love to do, to your forests and your sierras, I am sure again that you do not feel you made them, or that they were made for you. They have grown, as you have grown, only more massively and more slowly. In their nonhuman beauty and peace they stir the sub-human depths and the superhuman possibilities of your own spirit. It is no transcendental logic that they teach; and they give no sign of any deliberate morality seated in the world. It is rather the vanity and superficiality of all logic, the needlessness of argument, the relativity of morals, the strength of time, the fertility of matter, the variety, the unspeakable variety, of possible life. Everything is measurable and conditioned, indefinitely repeated, yet, in repetition, twisted somewhat from its old form. Everywhere is beauty and nowhere permanence, everywhere an incipient harmony, nowhere an intention, nor a responsibility, nor a plan. It is the irresistible suasion of this daily spectacle, it is the daily discipline of contact with things, so different from the verbal discipline of the schools, that will, I trust, inspire the philosophy of your children. A Californian whom I had recently the pleasure of meeting observed that, if the philosophers had lived among your mountains their systems would have been different from what they are. Certainly, I should say, very different from what those systems are which the European genteel tradition has handed down since Socrates; for these systems are egotistical; directly or indirectly they are anthropocentric, and inspired by the conceited notion that man, or human reason, or the human distinction between good and evil, is the centre and pivot of the universe. That is what the mountains and the woods should make you at last ashamed to assert. From what, indeed, does the society of nature liberate you, that you find it so sweet? It is hardly (is it?) that you wish to forget your past, or your friends, or that you have any secret contempt for your present ambitions. You respect these, you respect them perhaps too much; you are not suffered by the genteel tradition to criticise or to reform them at all radically. No; it is the yoke of this genteel tradition itself that these primeval solitudes lift from your shoulders. They suspend your forced sense of your own importance not merely as individuals, but even as men. They allow you, in one happy moment, at once to play and to worship, to take yourselves simply, humbly, for what you are, and to salute the wild, indifferent, non-censorious infinity of nature. You are admonished that what you can do avails little materially, and in the end nothing. At the same time, through wonder and pleasure, you are taught speculation. You learn what you are really fitted to do, and where lie your natural dignity and joy, namely, in representing many things, without being them, and in letting your imagination, through sympathy, celebrate and echo their life. Because the peculiarity of man is that his machinery for reaction on external things has involved an imaginative transcript of these things, which is preserved and suspended in his fancy; and the interest and beauty of this inward landscape, rather than any fortunes that may await his body in the outer world, constitute his proper happiness. By their mind, its scope, quality, and temper, we estimate men, for by the mind only do we exist as men, and are more than so many storage-batteries for material energy. Let us therefore be frankly human. Let us be content to live in the mind.

Editorial Appendix

Explanation of the Editorial Appendix

Editorial Sigla and Symbols: a listing of the abbreviations used to represent the various editions or printings of source texts and an explanation of symbols employed in the Editorial Appendix. The material cited is keyed to the page and line numbers of the critical edition text for ready reference.

Standard Reference Bibliography: a bibliography of works by George Santayana and secondary source material which may be pertinent to this text. An abbreviation for each title is listed, based on those established by Angus Kerr-Lawson for *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*. These abbreviations are used mainly in the "Introduction" and "Notes to the Text."

Notes to the Text: identifications of persons, places, books, and quotations referred to in the text; translations of foreign terms and quotations; and general information useful to a fuller understanding of the work. Organization is by order of appearance of the item in the text.

Textual Commentary: a thorough description of the editorial methods and textual principles and procedures used for the critical edition, a description of the history and development of the text of each particular book, and a discussion of the steps in establishing the critical text. The textual commentary and introduction of each book provide information important to scholars for the source and reference study of Santayana's writings and thought.

Discussions of Adopted Readings: comments on editorial decisions to emend or not to emend, requiring, in the opinion of the editors of the critical edition, more information than that reported in the "List of Emendations." The reading of the critical edition is given first, to the left of the lemma bracket.

List of Emendations: all emendations, both in substantives and in accidentals, made in the copy-text for the present critical edition. The critical edition reading is given to the left of the lemma bracket, the rejected copy-text reading to the right. The symbols following the emended readings indicate the source of the emendations. Readings followed by the siglum *CE* have been supplied by the present editors.

Report of Line-End Hyphenation: a list of the editorially established forms of possible compounds which were hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text, followed by a list of the copy-text forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the critical edition text.

Since some possible compound words (not customarily hyphenated) are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text, the intended forms of these words (i.e., with or without hyphen) must be determined by editorial decision. When a word hyphenated at line-end appears elsewhere in the copy-text in only one form, that form is followed; however, when the spelling of the word is not consistent (and the inconsistency is acceptable as a form of the word), the form appearing more frequently in the copy-text is adopted for the critical edition text. If the word does not occur elsewhere in the copy-text, the form of the word is then determined by comparing it to Santayana's preferred form for similar words in the copy-text or, if necessary, in other Santayana manuscripts and printed texts.

The first list in the "Report of Line-End Hyphenation," called the "Copy-Text List," records editorial decisions by noting the critical edition forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text. This list shows the editorially established form of each of these words, with or without hyphens, when appearing within the line. The "Copy-Text List" records information necessary to the reader in evaluating editorial decisions or in reconstructing the copy-text. The second list, called the "Critical Edition List," records the copy-text forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the critical edition text. The second list is for the purpose of recording only those line-end hyphens that are to be retained in resetting, quoting from, or otherwise transcribing the critical edition text. The critical edition list does not, of course, involve editorial decisions.

List of Variants: variant readings in all versions of the text published during Santayana's lifetime, constituting a historical record. (These variant readings are discovered in the process of collation, that is, comparing the various texts. Therefore, this section is often referred to in scholarly editing as a historical collation.) Readings to the left of the lemma bracket are those of the copy-text. Listed to the right of the bracket are those readings that are at variance with the readings of the copy-text. Sigla for publications reported in the "List of Variants" are the same as those used in the "List of Emendations."

Editorial Sigla and Symbols

The following abbreviations or sigla are used to designate the sources of readings in the various lists of the Editorial Appendix.

The original published state of the text:

A	First edition, first issue of *Winds of Doctrine* (January 1913).
$A^{1913–1914}$	The second through fourth printings of the first edition.
A^{1926}	Reprinting of first edition text with Preface.
A^{1940}	Second reprinting of first edition text with Preface.

The second published state of the text:

B^{1936}	Second edition of Chapter V, in volume II of the Triton Edition of The Works of George Santayana (1936), 217–52.
B^{1937}	Second edition of Chapters I–IV, VI, and 1926 Preface, in volume VII of the Triton Edition of The Works of George Santayana (1937), 3–150.

Subsequent authorial intentions:

GSC_{LE}	Marked-up, cut-up copy of the January 1913 printing used by Santayana in compiling *Little Essays* (1920).
LE	*Little Essays: Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana by Logan Pearsall Smith, With the Collaboration of the Author* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable, 1920), containing excerpts from *Winds of Doctrine.*
CE	The present critical edition.

For a complete listing of all editions and printings refer to the "Textual Commentary" (page 307). The sigla for this volume do not differentiate between the successive editions and impressions labeled Dent, Scribner's, Dent/Scribner's, and Scribner's/Dent.

Pre-copy-text:

RPE	"Russell's Philosophical Essays." *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, I. "The Study of Essence," 8 (1911): 57–63; II. "The Critique of Pragmatism," 8 (1911): 113–24; III. "Hypostatic Ethics," 8 (1911): 421–32. Review of Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays.*
GT	"The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy." *University of California Chronicle* 13 (1911): 357–80.

The following editorial symbols are used in the Editorial Appendix:

Asterisk *

The asterisk precedes emendations which are discussed in the "Discussions of Adopted Readings."

Caret ^

The caret indicates the absence of a punctuation mark.

Ellipsis …

The ellipsis indicates the omission of part of the text of a citation (to economize on space) in the "Notes to the Text," the "Textual Commentary," the "Discussions of Adopted Readings," the "List of Emendations," and the "List of Variants."

Lemma Bracket]

Critical edition readings and their sources are listed to the left of the lemma bracket in the "List of Emendations"; rejected copy-text readings are listed to the right of the bracket. Copy-text readings are listed to the left of the bracket in the "List of Variants"; the variant readings are listed to the right. In "Notes to the Text" and the "Discussions of Adopted Readings" the critical edition reading is to the left of the bracket and editorial notes and discussions are to the right.

Marginal Notes MN

The marginal notes are the paragraph summaries in bold print which appear on the left or right side of the page in the critical edition text.

Paragraph Symbol ¶

The paragraph symbol indicates the beginning of a new paragraph.

Similar

Similar begins a parenthetical listing of additional lines where the forms of a variant or emendation are identical.

Slash or Virgule /

The slash or virgule is used to indicate separate lines of verse or lines of a title.

Table of Contents TOC

Indicates material from the "Contents" pages in the "List of Variants."

Wavy Dash or Tilde ~

In the "List of Emendations" the wavy dash or tilde stands for the word or words cited to the left of the lemma bracket and signals that only punctuation is emended. In the "List of Variants" the wavy dash or tilde stands for the word or words cited to the left of the bracket and signals that only punctuation constitutes the variant.

Standard Reference Bibliography

The following is a list of abbreviations and bibliographical references to Santayana's works and secondary source materials. The abbreviations are used for books cited in the "Introduction" and "Notes to the Text." Citations of the current work are referenced by the abbreviation followed by page numbers.

Primary Sources

BR *The Birth of Reason & Other Essays*. Edited by Daniel Cory. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968.

COUS *Character and Opinion in the United States: With Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd.; Toronto: McLeod, 1920. Volume XI of the critical edition of *The Works of George Santayana* (*WGS*).

CP *The Complete Poems of George Santayana: A Critical Edition.* Edited by William G. Holzberger. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1979.

DL *Dialogues in Limbo.* London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1925; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Volume XIV of the critical edition (*WGS*).

DP *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1951. Volume XIX of the critical edition (*WGS*).

EGP *Egotism in German Philosophy.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1916. Volume X of the critical edition (*WGS*).

GTB *The Genteel Tradition at Bay.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: "The Adelphi," 1931. Volume XVII of the critical edition (*WGS*).

HC *A Hermit of Carmel and Other Poems.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901; London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1902.

ICG *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels; or, God in Man: A Critical Essay.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Toronto: Saunders, 1946. Volume XVIII of the critical edition (*WGS*).

IPR *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Black, 1900. Volume III of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited

	by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989.
LP	*The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel.* London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1935; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Volume IV of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994.
LGS	*The Letters of George Santayana.* Volume V (in eight books) of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by William G. Holzberger, Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., and Marianne S. Wokeck. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000–2008. (Citations in the notes refer to book and page number; i.e., *LGS,* 8:150 is page 150 of Book Eight.)
LR	*The Life of Reason: or, the Phases of Human Progress.* Five volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1905–6. Volume VII of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by Martin Coleman and Marianne Wokeck. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
LR1	*Introduction and Reason in Common Sense.* Book 1, 1905 (2011).
LR2	*Reason in Society.* Book 2, 1905 (2013).
LR3	*Reason in Religion.* Book 3, 1905 (2014).
LR4	*Reason in Art.* Book 4, 1905 (2015).
LR5	*Reason in Science.* Book 5, 1906 (2016).
LE	*Little Essays: Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana by Logan Pearsall Smith, With the Collaboration of the Author.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1920.
LUC	*Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy.* Chicago and New York: Herbert S. Stone, 1899.
LHT	Revised second edition published as *Lucifer, or the Heavenly Truce: A Theological Tragedy.* Cambridge, MA: Dunster House, 1924.
MARG	*George Santayana's Marginalia: A Critical Selection.* Volume VI (in two books) of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by John McCormick. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011.
OB	*Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews.* Edited by Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1936.
PP	*Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography.* Volume I of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986.

- ***PP1*** *Persons and Places: The Background of My Life.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1944.
- ***PP2*** *The Middle Span.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1947.
- ***PP3*** *My Host the World.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Cresset Press, 1953.

POML *Physical Order and Moral Liberty.* Edited by John Lachs. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969.

PSL *Platonism and the Spiritual Life.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1927. Volume XV of the critical edition (*WGS*).

PSA *Poems: Selected by the Author and Revised.* London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1922; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

PT *The Poet's Testament: Poems and Two Plays.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.

RB *Realms of Being.* Four volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1927–40. Volume XVI of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- ***RE*** *The Realm of Essence: Book First of Realms of Being,* 1927.
- ***RM*** *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being,* 1930.
- ***RT*** *The Realm of Truth: Book Third of Realms of Being,* 1938.
- ***RS*** *The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being,* 1940.

RB1 *Realms of Being.* One-volume edition, with a new introduction by the author. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942.

SAF *Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1923. Volume XIII of the critical edition (*WGS*).

SB *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: A. and C. Black, 1896. Volume II of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988.

SE *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1922. Volume XII of the critical edition (*WGS*).

SOV *Sonnets and Other Verses.* Cambridge and Chicago: Stone and Kimball, 1894.

STTMP	*Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. Volume XVII of the critical edition (*WGS*).
TPP	*Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1910. Volume VIII of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by Kellie Dawson and David E. Spiech. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2019.
WD	*Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1913. Volume IX of the critical edition (*WGS*), edited by David E. Spiech, Martin A. Coleman, and Faedra Lazar Weiss. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2023.

Secondary Sources

WAGS	Arnett, Willard. *George Santayana.* New York: Washington Square Press, 1968.
LY	Cory, Daniel. *Santayana: The Later Years: A Portrait with Letters.* New York: George Braziller, 1963.
UAS	Flamm, Matthew Caleb, and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, eds. *Under Any Sky: Contemporary Readings of George Santayana.* Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007.
AFSL	Lachs, John, ed. *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967.
JLGS	Lachs, John. *George Santayana.* Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988.
OnS	Lachs, John. *On Santayana*. Belmont, CA; London: Wadsworth, 2001.
SPSL	Levinson, Henry S. *Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
GSB	McCormick, John. *George Santayana: A Biography.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
BSS	*Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society.* Edited by The George Santayana Society. https://www.ulib.iupui.edu/digitalcollections/Santayana.
PGS	Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. *The Philosophy of George Santayana.* Volume II of *The Library of Living Philosophers.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1940; second edition, New York: Tudor, 1951.

TRS Singer, Beth. *The Rational Society: A Critical Study of Santayana's Thought.* Cleveland, OH: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970.

SAEP Sprigge, Timothy L. S. *Santayana.* London and Boston: Routledge, 1995.

LITE Woodward, Anthony. *Living in the Eternal: A Study of George Santayana.* Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1988.

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Sources and Citations for "Notes to the Text"

The "Notes to the Text" are based on a collection of standard sources in addition to primary texts and scholarly studies. The standard sources are listed in the "Sources and Citations for 'Notes to the Text'" section of the "Standard Reference Bibliography" and are not cited in the notes; some translations of words or phrases may be taken from these sources. Citations of texts from the works of Plato and of biblical texts follow the conventions explained below. Sources other than standard ones that occur in a note are cited in the particular note.

Specific texts in the works of Plato are cited using the conventional form of reference known as Stephanus numbers. They standardize references to Plato's works regardless of translation or edition and often appear in the margins of both Greek and English editions of Plato. Stephanus is the Latinized name of Henri Estienne (1528–1598), the editor of a three-volume 1578 edition of the complete works of Plato. Each page of this edition is split into two columns, with the Greek text on the right and a Latin translation (by Jean de Serres) on the left. Between the two columns are the letters "a" to "e" dividing each column into five sections. A Stephanus number consists of the title of a work, a number corresponding to a page in the Stephanus edition, and a letter indicating a section of a column; for example, *Sophist* 247d. Unless otherwise indicated, translations of Plato's texts in these notes come from *The Collected Dialogues,* edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

References to the Bible are to the King James Version unless otherwise noted. Biblical texts are identified according to the name of the book, the chapter, and the verse; for example, Matthew 18:20.

Standard Sources for "Notes to the Text"

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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Notes to the Text

1926 Preface

lxxix.25 *Crise de l'Esprit*] "La crise de l'esprit" is the French title of "The Crisis of the Mind," a two-part essay by French writer Paul Valéry (1871–1945), which consists of two open letters articulating an intellectual crisis in Europe after World War I (published in *The Collected Works of Paul Valéry*, Vol. 10, *History and Politics,* trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews [New York: Pantheon Books, 1962], 23–36). Valéry diagnosed disorder in the European mind due to the variety of opinions that marks modernism. He considered whether Europe could maintain its predominance in the world as technology spread, and he suggested that freedom might be more effectively sought by studying "the thinking individual in his struggle for a personal life against his life in society" rather than looking at social groups. The work was commissioned by John Middleton Murry for the English-language publication *The Athenaeum* and appeared in the 11 April 1919 and 2 May 1919 issues, with a French version appearing in August in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* 13 (1919): 321–37. For more information on the publication history see Valéry, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, 575–76. Santayana was in Paris when Valéry's French version appeared (*LGS,* 2:529). Santayana also published articles in 1919 in *The Athenaeum*, which he later included in his *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922); and in a 1920 letter to John Middleton Murry he acknowledged seeing *The Athenaeum* regularly (*LGS,* 2:403). Santayana mentioned Paul Valéry as a significant and characteristic figure "among the moderns" (*The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931, 16), and he wrote of Valéry in a 1931 letter, "How he understands our times!" (*LGS,* 4:275). Santayana's personal library included seven books by Valéry published between 1926 and 1952, most including marginalia in Santayana's hand. For a study of the relation of the thought of Santayana and Valéry, see Daniel Pinkas, "Santayana and Valéry," *BSS* 17 (1999): 26–34.

lxxix.25–26 *Untergang des Abendlandes;*] *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck) is the most influential of more than a dozen books by German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler (1880–1936). The two volumes of this work appeared in 1918 and 1922, with the English version *The Decline of the West* (New York: A. A. Knopf) published in 1926 and 1928. Spengler believed that human civilizations are born, mature, and die according to a repeating natural pattern such as is observed in biological phenomena and he thought that European civilization was at the end of its natural lifecycle. Spengler's notion of historical development stands in contrast to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) understanding of history as a rational process of absolute spirit actualizing itself. Santayana's personal library included *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, both volumes of which contain extensive and often critical marginalia in Santayana's hand. Santayana remarked on reading Spengler in a letter dated 23 February 1923 (*LGS,* 3:128), and in a 1 February 1929 letter he mentions finishing an article on Spengler (*LGS,* 4:105). The next month his article "Spengler" appeared in *The New Adelphi,* March 1929: 210–14 (reprinted in George Santayana, *The Idler and His Works*, ed. Daniel Cory [New York: George Braziller, 1957], 87–96). See Note 11.15 Hegel.

lxxix.32 *morituri te salutamus;*] A variant of "Ave imperator, morituri te salutant!" [Latin for "Hail, emperor; they who are about to die salute thee!"] Santayana's rendering uses the first-person plural conjugation: "we salute thee." It is attributed to the prisoners of war and condemned criminals compelled by Claudius to fight in a mock sea battle on the Fucine Lake in 52 AD (Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars,* Vol. 2, trans. J. C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library 38 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914], 42–43).

The Intellectual Temper of the Age

1.30 Goethe] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), German poet, dramatist, novelist, critic, statesman, and scientist, became famous with the success of his novel *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (1774) (*The Sorrows of Werter*, 1779). He and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) transformed German literature as leaders of the *Sturm und Drang* movement. As a scientist, Goethe published works in comparative anatomy and optics. He disputed Isaac Newton's (1643–1727) theory of color, improved on Carolus Linnaeus's (1707–1778) taxonomy, and aligned himself with pre-Darwinians in finding continuity in the development of humans and other animals. His best-known work is his *Faust*, a two-part dramatic poem in the *Sturm und Drang* style, begun in 1773 and completed in 1831. Santayana regarded Goethe as philosophically significant in his expression of an influential worldview, namely a romantic one that "presents experience in its immediacy, variety, and apparent groundlessness," but there is, claimed Santayana, no totality in this presentation because there is no ground (*TPP*, 121). In his *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910), Santayana characterizes Goethe as "the poet of romantic experience, [who] will tell us that we must renounce, renounce perpetually" (*TPP*, 41). In his later *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana described Goethe as "many-sided, not encyclopædic; he went out to greet the variety of things, he did not pack it together. . . . Nevertheless the sympathies of Goethe were only romantic or æsthetic; they were based on finding in others an interesting variation from himself, an exotic possibility, rather than an identity with himself in thought or in fate" (*EGP*, 45–46). In a letter Santayana reflected on his different treatments of Goethe in his earlier and later books regarding Goethe's "sworn allegiance to Life [and] romantic philosophy" (*LGS,* 8:399). Anthony Woodward, in his article "Santayana and Goethe," examined Santayana's ambivalence toward Goethe and suggested that Santayana was "a kind of spiritual cousin of Goethe" (*BSS* 9 [1991]: 7). See also David Dilworth, "Santayana's Repression of Goethe," *BSS* 38 (2020): 55–67. Santayana's personal library included *Goethes Gedichte* (*Goethe's Poetry*) (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1905).

2.1–2 it is sweet to see the moon . . . mildly shining.] Paraphrase of text in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749–1832) autobiography. Goethe wrote of meeting, after a recently failed love affair, a friend's daughters, "von denen die älteste mich gar bald besonders anzog. Es ist eine sehr angenehme Empfindung, wenn sich eine neue Leidenschaft in uns zu regen anfängt, ehe die alte noch ganz verklungen ist. So sieht man bei untergehender Sonne gern auf der entgegengesetzten Seite den Mond aufgehn und erfreut sich an dem Doppelglanze der beiden Himmelslichter" ["of whom the eldest soon particularly attracted me. It is a very pleasant sensation when a new passion begins to stir in us, before the old one is quite extinct. Thus, when the sun is setting, one often likes to see the moon rise on the opposite side, and takes delight in the double lustre of the two heavenly luminaries"] (*Goethes Sämtliche Werke, Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Vol. 3, ed. Eduard von der Hellen [Stuttgart: Cotta, 1902], 138; the English version is from *The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe*, Vol. 2, trans. John Oxenford [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], 188). See Note 1.30 Goethe.

2.12 Babel] Genesis 11:1–9 relates that Noah's descendants attempted to construct a tower in the city of Babel that would reach to heaven. God observed this and said, "The people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do" (Genesis 11:6). So God confused the language of the workers, disrupting construction of the tower and introducing the variety of human languages. The term "babel" has come to refer to confusion.

3.2 Reformation,] Also known as the Protestant Reformation, it began during the sixteenth century in Western Europe as an effort to reform the Roman Catholic Church. It was the catalyst for massive political upheaval and resulted in the establishment of Protestant churches that rejected the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. The term "Protestant" was first applied to a group of German political leaders who protested the decision of Charles V (1500–1558), Holy Roman Emperor, to revoke each leader's right to decide independently whether to observe the Roman Catholic condemnation of German theologian Martin Luther (1483–1546). For Santayana, the Reformation was the second of the three Rs of modernity, the first and third being the Renaissance and the (French) Revolution; of these three Rs, he wrote that they "have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline" (*GTB*, 8). Of the Reformation in particular, Santayana wrote,

> [It] had a mental façade which completely hid the forces that really moved it, and the direction in which its permanent achievements would lie. It gave out that it was a religious reform and revival, and it easily enlisted in its cause all the shocked consciences, restless intellects, and fanatical hearts of the day; but in its very sincerity it substituted religious experience for religious tradition, and that, if the goal had been really religious, would have been suicide: for in religious experience, taken as its own criterion, there is nothing to distinguish religion from moral sentiment or from sheer madness. . . . The fact is, I think, that the Reformation from the beginning lived on impatience of religion and appealed to lay interests: to the love of independence, national and personal; to free thought; to local pride; to the lure of plunder and enterprise; to the sanctity of thrift. . . . [After the Reformation] religion is to be regarded as an instrument for producing a liberal well-being. But when this is secured, and we have creature comforts, a respectable exterior, and complete intellectual liberty, what in turn are the spiritual fruits? None: for the spirit, in this system, is only an instrument, and its function is fulfilled if those earthly advantages are realised. (*GTB*, 8–9)

See also Note 25.37 Luther.

3.7 Voltaire] Pseudonym of François Marie Arouet (1694–1778), French playwright, poet, and philosopher. He was born in Paris to a wealthy family and educated at Louis-Le-Grand, a Jesuit school. Voltaire lived in exile in London from 1726 to 1728 and returned a great admirer of the empiricism of Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and John Locke (1632–1704). He criticized Christianity, especially as represented in the philosophy of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662, French mathematician and philosopher), and he opposed the institutions of the Catholic Church, which he believed promoted superstition and fanaticism. He also attacked atheism, being a Deist who believed in God and personal immortality as sources of meaning in human life. His skeptical humanism acknowledged the fallible character of human knowledge, and he believed no one was knowledgeable enough to have just cause to persecute those with opposing philosophical or theological beliefs. Voltaire's own theological preoccupations included the problem of evil, which he initially thought resolved in the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). However, he later rejected Leibniz's philosophy in his satire *Candide, ou l'optimisme* (1759) (*Candide, or All for the Best* [1759]). Other works by Voltaire include *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) (*Philosophical Letters on the English Nation* [1788]), *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756) (*Essays on the Manners and Spirit of Nations* [1758]), and *Dictionnaire philosophique* (1764) (*Philosophical Dictionary* [1764]). In a 1922 letter, Santayana reported owning Voltaire's "complete works in 69 volumes . . . , having got them second hand in a very nice edition (1793, I think) for 400 francs" (*LGS*, 3:113). See Note 41.27 Locke; Note 42.6 Pascal; and Note 59.14 Leibnitz.

3.8 Rousseau] Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Swiss-born French philosopher, author, political theorist, and composer. Rousseau went to France as a teenager and read extensively in Savoy as he educated himself with the guidance of Françoise-Louise de Warens, who convinced him to convert from Calvinism to Catholicism. Her religious influence on Rousseau included Deistic beliefs and a rejection of original sin and hell. He went to Paris in 1742 to pursue a musical career and met Denis Diderot (1713–1784), who invited him to write for the *Encyclopédie* (1751–72), the 28-volume Enlightenment project. In 1754 Rousseau returned to Geneva and became a Calvinist again. Of his many works, his best known and most influential are *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754) (*A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind* [1762]), *Émile, ou de l'Éducation* (1762) (*Emile, or On Education* [1764]), *Du contrat social* (1762) (*The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right* [1764]), and *Les Confessions* (1782, 1789) (*Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* [1783–90]). In *Émile*, Rousseau laid out an educational program that rejected corrupting social influences with the aim of preserving the natural goodness of all humans. The religious views expressed in this work were Deistic, affirming the existence of God, the soul, and the afterlife on the basis of individual conscience and a personal relationship with God. In *The Social Contract* he argued that the body of citizens should rule itself through the general will, which arises from each citizen and so each is justly subject to it. In this work Rousseau distinguished civil religion from natural religion, with the former being determined by the state and prohibiting dogmatic intolerance. Rousseau's philosophy and works, and in particular *Émile*, offended both Catholic and Protestant authorities, spurring him to go into exile, although he returned to France in 1768. Leaders of the French Revolution took up Rousseau's ideas and regarded him as an intellectual inspiration. Santayana's library included a single-volume edition of *Du contrat social; Les Rêveries d'un promeneur solitaire* (*The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912).

3.8 Bossuet] Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704), French writer, orator, theologian, educator, political thinker, Catholic priest, and Bishop of Meaux. His sermons, and especially his funeral orations for figures at the court of Louis XIV, earned him the reputation of France's greatest orator. From 1670 to 1681 Bossuet was a tutor to the king's son, after which he became Bishop of Meaux. He corresponded with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) in pursuit of a peaceful reunification of the Christian church. He worked diligently to protect the Catholic Church from Protestants, freethinkers, and heretics (a heretic, according to Bossuet, is "he who has an opinion"), as well as fellow Catholics who advocated new doctrines. He opposed the philosophies of René Descartes (1596–1650, French philosopher, scientist, and mathematician; often cited as the originator of modern philosophy) and Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715, French Cartesian philosopher) which he studied closely, and stood in opposition to the cultural and intellectual currents that would become known as the Enlightenment. Unsurprisingly, he was a main target of Voltaire's (1694–1778) criticism. Bossuet's significant works include *Exposition de la doctrine catholique* (1671) (*An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church*), which sought to purge Catholicism of falsehoods, legends, and superfluous doctrines; *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) (*Discourse on Universal History*), which demonstrates the Christian view of the authority of the divine in history; and *Histoire des variations des églises protestantes* (2 vols., 1688) (*History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*), which was one of many publications attacking Protestantism that he authored. Santayana's personal library included a copy of Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, 19th ed. (London: 1897) in which Santayana wrote a list of social and political philosophy titles on the endpaper, including "Bossuet *Discours de l'histoire universelle.*" In *Reason in Religion* Santayana quotes *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* on the flood narrative in Genesis 6–9 (*LR3,* 57), and in a 1932 letter, Santayana characterizes Bossuet along with playwright and poet Jean Racine (1639–1699) as "austere Catholics of the seventeenth century" (*LGS*, 4:310). See also Note 3.7 Voltaire; for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, see Note 59.14 Leibnitz.

3.8 Fénelon.] François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715), French writer, theologian, educator, political thinker, Catholic priest, and Bishop of Cambrai. Born into a noble family in the southwest of France, he studied at the Collège du Plessis in Paris in 1674, took a doctorate in theology at Cahors, and was ordained in 1677. He concentrated on preaching and writing and had special interest in the conversion of Protestants. In 1689, he began an eight-year engagement as tutor to the grandsons of Louis XIV (1638–1715), King of France. From this came his best-known work, *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699) (*The Adventures of Telemachus*), a novel that uses the voyage of Telemachus in the *Odyssey* to exemplify virtues and skills appropriate to a young monarch; it is regarded as the first novel written for children. He came into conflict with his friend and patron Bossuet over the controversy regarding the teachings of Madame Guyon. Bossuet attacked Guyon's teachings as a Quietist heresy, which held that perfection entails abandoning oneself to God such that one becomes completely passive and eliminates all willing. Fénelon defended Madame Guyon against the accusation of heresy. Although Fénelon made a convincing defense and had many friends in Rome and France, his adversaries were stronger; Fénelon had angered Louis XIV with his defense of Madame Guyon and with the publication of *The Adventures of Telemachus*, which the king took as personal criticism. In March 1699, after a request by Louis XIV, Pope Innocent XII condemned Fénelon, who dutifully submitted to the Pope's authority. Fénelon, in spite of his loyalty to the Catholic Church, has come to be seen as a forerunner of the Enlightenment. One reason was his interest in the individual soul and its motivations, which would now be understood as psychology. His attention to the self and subjective experience served as a model to later writers such as Rousseau.

3.11 modernist,] An advocate of Modernism, which was, in the context of Catholicism, a twentieth-century movement that attempted to reconceive doctrine in light of recent scientific and philosophical developments. Modernism included diverse views but tended to take a critical rather than literal view of the Bible, emphasize practice over doctrine in understanding the Christian life, and find meaning in history by looking to the results of processes rather than their origins. Leading Catholic Modernist theologians included Alfred Firmin Loisy (1857–1940), Lucien Laberthonnière (1860–1932), George Tyrrell (1861–1909), Maurice Blondel (1861–1949), Romolo Murri (1870–1944), and Édouard Le Roy (1870–1954). Modernists often regarded favorably the philosophies of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and William James (1842–1910), the latter being Santayana's teacher and, later, colleague at Harvard. Pope Leo XIII (reigned 1878–1903) was tolerant of Modernist theology, though he grew more critical of it over time. Pope Pius X (reigned 1903–1914) regarded the movement as heretical and condemned it in 1907; the following year, Loisy was excommunicated from the Catholic Church. In a 18 March 1909 letter, Santayana writes of reading "Loisy, Tyrrell, and Paul Sabatier (who is a Protestant, but a great friend of the 'Modernists') as well as the Pope's Encyclical 'Pascendi' and other documents" (*LGS*, 1:402). Santayana's personal library included works by Le Roy and Loisy and by Bergson and James. Santayana considers Modernism in Chapter 2 of *Winds of Doctrine* and the philosophy of Henri Bergson in Chapter 3. See Note 8.18 William James; for Henri Bergson, see Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson; for Pius X and his condemnation of Modernism and his encyclical letter *Pascendi*, see Note 28.19–20 Pius X . . . modernism; and for Édouard Le Roy, see Note 30n.1–2 M. Le Roy.

3.25 Liberalism] An ideology or set of political doctrines that traditionally opposes absolute rule, whether feudal, monarchical, military, clerical, or communitarian, and typically supports individual rights, democratic institutions, and capitalist economies. Liberalism emerged in response to seventeenth-century European religious wars and promoted religious tolerance rather than government-enforced uniform belief as the basis for peace. In practice it has protected private property and promoted freedom of religion, expression, and association. Liberalism has drawn intellectual support from the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679, English philosopher), John Locke (1632–1704), David Hume (1711–1776), Adam Smith (1723–1790, English philosopher and political economist), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). There are diverging interpretations of liberalism, with some emphasizing economic freedom while supporting state intervention in moral life and others emphasizing minimal state intervention in all areas. Santayana was often critical of liberalism and wrote about it in "Liberalism and Culture" and "The Irony of Liberalism" in *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), "Alternatives to Liberalism" in the journal *Saturday Review of Literature* (1934), and "Liberalism in a Thankless World" in *Dominations and Powers* (1951). See also Note 5.16 Kant; for Hume, see Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.27 Locke; and Note 46.20 Mill.

3.39 "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"] An expression of the fundamental principle of the ethical doctrine that came to be known as Utilitarianism, as articulated by English philosophers and social reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Bentham wrote, "*It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong*" (*A Fragment on Government* [London: 1776], ii; italics in the original) and later referred to this as "the greatest happiness principle." This expression has long been associated with Bentham, though he is not the original author. Bentham claimed to have read it in the work of English polymath Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), and Bentham's friend and editor John Bowring (1792–1872) cited Priestley's *Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768) as the source; but in fact the phrase does not appear there. Elsewhere, Bentham raised the possibility that he took the expression from Italian criminologist and economist Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794). According to English philologist and librarian Robert Shackleton (1919–1986), "There can be no reasonable doubt that it was the English version of [Beccaria's] *Dei delitti e delle pene* [*On Crimes and Punishments*] which put the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' before the eyes of Bentham" (Robert Shackleton, "The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham's Phrase," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 90 [1972]: 1474). For John Stuart Mill, see Note 46.20 Mill.

5.16 Kant,] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher, born in Königsberg, East Prussia (today Kaliningrad, Russia), established the philosophical position known as critical idealism. His teachers were Pietists influenced by the German philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Kant himself found inspiration in Rousseau and Newton. Except for a time when he worked as a tutor in the countryside, Kant spent his life as a student and a teacher in Königsberg. Kant maintained that all knowledge is conditioned by the structure of the mind, though he did not deny that there is a reality independent of this structure. Knowledge of experienced objects or "phenomena" is contrasted with the independent reality of things-in-themselves or "noumena." Our ability to *perceive* phenomena includes the necessary "pure forms of intuition," space and time, which structure the representations delivered by the senses. Our ability to *understand* phenomena includes the necessary "pure concepts of the understanding" or "categories," such as causality and substance. In Kant's moral philosophy, the categorical imperative is the fundamental rule of behavior governing rational agents; it declares what ought to be done from the perspective of pure reason, independent of individual motives or desires. The general formulation commands one to act only on a maxim that can at the same time be consistently willed to be a universal law (a maxim being a particular determination of the will). For example, if acting on the maxim "I will lie by promising to repay money that I desperately need but can never repay," it cannot be willed to be a universal law without contradiction. The attempt would yield the universal law "Whenever one is in need, one may obtain what is needed by making a false promise," but if this were a universal law every promise would become suspect and the practice of making promises would become meaningless. Hence as a universal law it is contradictory and in violation of the categorical imperative. Of greater significance is that in choosing the categorical imperative as an essential law of reason, rational agents achieve moral freedom. The rational agent, in choosing the rational categorical imperative, gives the law to him or herself and thus achieves autonomy. To choose an irrational course is to destroy the capacity to choose and to surrender one's freedom (the moral agent then falls into heteronomy). Santayana read Kant as a sower of the seeds of egotism that grew into Romanticism. According to Santayana, egotism is "subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals—which is the soul of German philosophy" (*EGP,* 6). He wrote that Kant did not embrace that "principle of dogmatic egotism that nothing is able to exist unless I am able to know it" (*EGP,* 55), but he claimed that Kant was "misled by the psychological fallacy that nothing can be an object of knowledge except some idea in the mind, [which] led him in the end to subjectivism" (*EGP*, 55–56). This "void outside" and the internal absoluteness of the categorical imperative "are germs of egotism" (*EGP*, 56). Santayana saw Kant's philosophy developed in the direction of egotism and Romanticism in Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), ultimately leading to Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) (*EGP*, 65). Kant's major works include *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781, 1787) (*Critique of Pure Reason*), *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783) (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science*) and in moral philosophy *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*) and *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788) (*Critique of Practical Reason*). Santayana's personal library included *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* in German and two English translations; and *Critique of Practical Reason*, each with extensive annotations in Santayana's hand. See Note 3.8 Rousseau; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 59.14 Leibnitz; and for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean.

5.17 Darwin,] Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882), English naturalist, born in Shrewsbury to a family of physicians. He studied medicine at Edinburgh, but grew to dislike it. Darwin took up theology at Cambridge, but natural history remained his passion. After graduating from Cambridge he participated in a five-year voyage exploring southern South America. He is known for his theory of evolution of species, explained in his work *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859). Darwin argued that species evolve through natural selection of random variations. His theory did not assume progress through evolution or that one biological type is absolutely better than another. Other important works by Darwin include *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871) and *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872). Santayana praised Darwin's naturalism and regarded his contribution to philosophical cosmology as comparable to those of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza (*LGS*, 7:221; *PGS*, 12–13). In particular, Darwin "did more than any one since Newton to prove that mechanism is universal" (*LR1*, 58). Santayana wrote that "as earlier naturalists had shown us how mechanical causes might produce the miracle of the sunrise and the poetry of the seasons, so Darwin showed us how similar causes might secure the adaptation of animals to their habitat. Evolution, so conceived, is nothing but a detailed account of mechanical origins" (*LR5*, 62). Santayana explained that "a naturalism like that of Darwin . . . . is a denial of Aristotelianism" because new species may arise; generations differ not by degree of perfection but in the very perfection at which they aim: "the very ground plan of organisation may gradually change and a new form and a new ideal may appear" (*LR5*, 63). He continued, "All that is scientific or Darwinian in the theory of evolution is accordingly an application of mechanism, a proof that mechanism lies at the basis of life and morals" (*LR5*, 64). Darwin's work greatly influenced Santayana's account of human reason in *The Life of Reason.* Santayana wrote that "a better example of [reason's] essential working could hardly be found than one which Darwin gives to illustrate the natural origin of moral sense" (*LR1*, 159). (Santayana's reference is to "Comparison of the Mental Power of Man and the Lower Animals," Chapter 3 of *The Descent of Man* [New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1871], 1:87.)

5.17 Bismarck,] Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), German political leader, born in Pomerania into a family of the Protestant, land-owning Prussian aristocracy. After serving as a member of the Prussian parliament and an ambassador to St. Petersburg and Paris, he became Chief Minister of Prussia in 1862 under Wilhelm I. Bismarck was known as a reactionary with an imposing personal presence and remembered as a skilled practitioner of *realpolitik* (political realism, which values national interest over ideals). He unified Germany through wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–71), which resulted in the establishment of the Second German Empire and his appointment as Chancellor of Germany. Known as the "Iron Chancellor," Bismarck worked to maintain peace through a strong military; alliances with Austria, Britain, and eventually Russia; and a diplomatic strategy of isolating France. Domestically, his political realism rather than principle led him between 1883 and 1887 to institute liberal reforms such as welfare programs and labor protections, as a way to weaken increasingly popular socialist leaders. He served as Chancellor from 1871 until 1890, when, two years after assuming the throne, young Kaiser Wilhelm II forced Bismarck to resign.

5.17 Nietzsche:] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), German philosopher and critic, born in Röcken, Saxony, the son of a Lutheran pastor. Educated in classical philology at Bonn and Leipzig, he became a professor at the University of Basel when he was 24 years old and before receiving his doctorate. Nietzsche came to philosophy through Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788–1860) *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818) (*The World as Will and Representation*), which influenced him greatly. Nietzsche was concerned primarily with finding an alternative to the nihilistic cultural reaction he foresaw as a result of the declining influence of traditional religious and philosophical beliefs. He was openly hostile to traditional religion and morality, and he sought an affirmative philosophy that could replace the absolutist and rationalistic metaphysics and Judeo-Christian traditions that could no longer provide meaning and value. His philosophical approach was naturalistic and perspectival, acknowledging that different individuals, institutions, and cultures flourished under different moral conceptions. Moralities have a history rooted in cultural circumstances that can be understood genealogically. Nietzsche thought a new morality could be conceived suitable to a higher humanity that recognized and affirmed what he called the "will to power," which led him to take creativity as a guiding idea in formulating naturalistic human values. His philosophical writings most often are aphoristic, which suits his perspectival philosophical method. In *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana wrote three chapters criticizing Nietzsche as an "imperturbable egotist" whom he thought "hardly fair . . . to judge . . . as a philosopher" (*EGP*, 114). Santayana acknowledged the temptation to dismiss Nietzsche's work as "the swagger of an immature, half-playful mind," but he took Nietzsche's "explosions [to be] symptomatic; there stirs behind them unmistakably an elemental force. . . . Nietzsche, in his general imbecility, betrays the shifting of great subterranean forces. What he said may be nothing, but the fact that he said it is all-important" (*EGP*, 135). In a marginal note to *De Nietzsche à Hitler* (1936) (*From Nietzsche down to Hitler)* by Marius Paul Nicolas, Santayana wrote that Nietzsche "was a genius: but in politics he was an æsthete" (*MARG,* 2:90). Important works by Nietzsche include *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (1872) (*The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*); *Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen* (1883–85) (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*); *Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft* (1886) (*Beyond Good and Evil: Overture to a Philosophy of the Future*), and *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift* (1887) (*Toward the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*). See also Note 46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer.

5.20–21 cry with Faust: "Two souls, alas, dwell in my bosom!"] The quotation is from Part I (1808) of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749–1832) epic drama *Faust: Eine Tragödie*, in which the title character wearies of academic pursuits with their abstractions and limitations and longs for vivid experience and unlimited knowledge. Mephistopheles wagers that he can gratify Faust's longing, and so he and Faust agree that if ever Faust be satisfied and cease striving, then Mephistopheles may claim his soul. The text that Santayana quoted may be found in *Faustus, A Tragedy: Translated from the German of Goethe* (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1834), 39. "Two souls" refers to Faust's competing impulses: a "stubborn fondness for the world" and a life in material nature versus aspiration "to regions where our great forefathers dwell" and intellectual pursuits (*Faustus*, 40). See Santayana's discussion in *Three Philosophical Poets,* 91–92, and see Note 1.30 Goethe.

5.38 Ruskin,] John Ruskin (1819–1900), English writer, artist, critic, and social reformer, born in London and educated at Oxford University. He was the most influential art critic of his day and was the first Slade Professor of Fine Art (1870–78; 1883–85) at Oxford, where he gave lectures and lessons, designed curricula, and established a drawing program. Much of his art criticism dates from his early career, with his attention turning to social issues in the late 1850s; yet he always exhibited concern with the relation of art, morality, and social justice. His most influential art criticism extolled sincerity and truth to nature, and he held good art to be moral and bad art to be insincere and immoral. He was regarded by a broad public as a source of moral wisdom and commentary on contemporary issues. Ruskin was a prolific writer (the standard edition of his complete works comprises 39 volumes). His most well-known works include *Modern Painters: Their Superiority in the Art of Landscape Painting to the Ancient Masters*, 5 vols. (1843–60), which begins with a defense of his artistic hero, the painter J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851) and concludes with attention to art's social context; *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849), which takes up architecture as a political and moral art expressive of social values; *The Stones of Venice*, 3 vols. (1851–53), an extensively researched and deeply personal work about Venice, which judges the Renaissance as the ruin of the city; and *Unto This Last* (1860), which Ruskin regarded as "the one that will stand . . . surest and longest of all work of mine." *Unto This Last* argues that the truest principles of social organization are found in the Christian Gospels, in opposition to the so-called science of political economy. Ruskin was for wage equality and for labor that serves life, arguing that to be "valuable" is to "avail towards life." Other reforms he supported, such as old age pensions, later became common policy. His own inheritance, exhausted by the end of his life, he used for philanthropic work. Ruskin founded the Guild of St. George as a utopian venture to promote medieval values and social improvement; the organization still exists today as an educational charity. Santayana wrote in *Persons and Places* that he "profited by, and built [his] love of architecture upon," Ruskin's *The Stones of Venice* (*PP*, 86). However, Santayana thought the Italian Gothic style popularized by Ruskin "absurdly out of place, bastard, and theatrical" (*PP*, 138), and it left Santayana "quite cold, in spite of *The Stones of Venice*" (*PP*, 138). Santayana found an excellent corrective to Ruskin in the article on architecture in his family's *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: "The illustrations were all plans, elevations, and sections; and the only styles treated were the classic and the 'Italian'. There were no perspective views. I was thus introduced to the art professionally; and the structural interest became as great for me as the picturesque" (*PP*, 143).

5.39 Pater] Walter Horatio Pater (1839–1894), English essayist and critic, born in London and educated at Queen's College, Oxford. He spent his life at Oxford as a tutor and fellow at Brasenose College. His writings ranged widely over literature, aesthetics, art and art history, ancient Greece, and medieval and

Renaissance culture; they include essay collections: *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1873, later reissued as *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry*) and *Appreciations, with an Essay on Style* (1889); collections of lectures: *Plato and Platonism* (1893) and *Greek Studies* (1895, published posthumously); and fiction: *Imaginary Portraits* (1887) and *Marius the Epicurean* (1885), which Santayana, in a 1928 letter, indicated having read (*LGS*, 4:42). Pater practiced "aesthetic criticism," in which "the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is. . . . What effect does [the object] really produce on me?" (*The Renaissance* [London: Macmillan, 1877], viii). Pater emphasized moments of intense experience that fell outside conventional expectations, and his conclusion to *The Renaissance* was controversial for arguing that to live fully required dedication to experiences of intense beauty. He held that experience and not what it might produce was the aim of life. This approach stood in contrast to John Ruskin's emphasis on moral value in judging art, and Pater's critics interpreted his position as advocating hedonism. Pater further disturbed Oxford authorities with his religious skepticism and his relating of spirituality and bodily pleasure. Homoerotic suggestion in much of his work did not help his case with university leaders. Pater's aestheticism was influenced by the French writer and critic Théophile Gautier (1811–1872) who espoused the doctrine of "art for art's sake." Richard Lyon writes that Santayana "sometimes thought of himself as the last of the Victorians, speaking as had Arnold and Ruskin and Pater for the recovery of the past not for its own sake but as it may serve present sensibility and the full range of the spirit's needs—as also it may serve to remind us of better times when religions and philosophies and works of art were the vital expressions of an ongoing general life" (*PP,* xvii). Indeed, in a 1928 letter Santayana wrote of his generation: "You must remember that we were not very much later than Ruskin, Pater, Swinburne, and Matthew Arnold: our atmosphere was that of poets and persons touched with religious enthusiasm or religious sadness. Beauty (which mustn't be mentioned now) was then a living presence, or an aching absence, day and night: history was always singing in our ears: and not even psychology or the analysis of works of art could take away from art its human implications. It was the great memorial to us, the great revelation, of what the soul had lived on, and had lived with, in her better days. But now analysis and psychology seem to stand alone: there is no spiritual interest, no spiritual need. The mind, in this direction, has been desiccated: art has become an abstract object in itself, to be studied scientifically as a caput mortuum [empty husk, lifeless specimen; literally, "dead head"]: and the living side of the subject—the tabulation of people's feelings and comments—is no less dead" (*LGS*, 4:85). See Note 5.38 Ruskin; Note 15.1 Renaissance; Note 40.1 Plato; and Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.

5.39 Oscar Wilde.] Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills Wilde (1854–1900), Irish writer, poet, critic, lecturer, and playwright; born to an aristocratic family in Dublin, Ireland; and educated at Trinity College and Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was a student of Walter Pater and John Ruskin. Wilde is well known as a wit, international celebrity, and writer, especially of the novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891) and the plays *Lady Windermere's Fan* (1892), *A Woman of No Importance* (1893), *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895), and *An Ideal Husband* (1895). He often is remembered as a victim of Victorian sexual conventions, which led to his criminal conviction and imprisonment. Wilde also was a serious and significant critic and theorist whose important works of criticism included "The Portrait of Mr. W. H." (1889), "The Soul of Man under Socialism" (1891), and the four essays published as *Intentions* (1891): "The Decay of Lying," "Pen, Pencil and Poison," "The Critic as Artist," and "The Truth of Masks." Influenced by French writers Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867), Théophile Gautier (1811–1872), and Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–1898), and his teachers Ruskin and Pater, Wilde rejected realism in favor of technique and atmosphere. As a member of this aesthetic movement Wilde's commitment to beauty led him to deeply value individualism, and he conceived of personal autonomy as the freedom to, like the artist, enrich sensation and experiment with new forms of expression. Such artistic experiment should not, thought Wilde, be constrained by morality; rather aesthetic experience should be the standard of success or failure. This was not a rejection of morals, but rather recognition that genuine community and growth cannot come from moral principles alone, and to limit artistic expression to representation of morals and social conventions greatly reduced art's capacity for cultivating and expressing individual experience. In this Wilde departed from his teachers: Ruskin's criticism relied on social rationales, and Pater ignored social context altogether. See Note 5.38 Ruskin and Note 5.39 Pater.

6.21 Gilbert Murray,] George Gilbert Aimé Murray (1866–1957), British classical scholar, public intellectual, and humanist; born in Sydney, Australia; educated at St. John's College, Oxford. At 24, he became professor of Greek at University of Glasgow (1889–99) but later resigned due to illness. After recovering, he became Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford (1908–36). Murray produced popular translations of many Greek plays, including works of Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Menander. Productions of his translations won popular acclaim in London theaters in the first decade of the twentieth century. Of his many publications, his best known books are his interpretations of Hellenic culture such as *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907) and *Four* (later *Five*) *Stages of Greek Religion* (1912; 1925). Murray, along with classical scholars Jane Harrison (1850–1928) and Francis Cornford (1874–1943), was a member of the “Cambridge Ritualists,” who used findings of anthropological inquiry in a collaborative search for the origins of religion in primitive ritual. After World War I, Murray moved away from the Cambridge Ritualists and scholarly work when he took a leadership role in the League of Nations. This reflected his strong commitment to political liberalism, which was consistent with his understanding of Hellenism as a process of continual striving toward ideals. His social activism included involvement with the founding in 1942 of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, a nongovernmental organization that continues today as Oxfam. Santayana wrote his impressions of the man in a 1907 letter: “We had a truly ‘liberal’ mind with us in Cambridge for a while this winter. Gilbert Murray of Oxford—who lectured with great éclat about early Greek poetry and culture—Homer and what preceded. It was both in substance and in manner very much to my mind, although he takes, on the technical Homeric question, a radical view which I had not before been inclined to, and on which I am yet much in doubt. But the feeling for moral progress, for the cleansing and rationalizing of human society, was very fine and clear in him, so much clearer than in our canting professional moralists. But being English, or rather Scotch, he has to have some private isms, and is a Vegetarian, a Tee-totaller, a Pro-Boer, a Woman Suffragist, etc, etc.” (*LGS*, 1:368).

6.38 French Revolution] A period of political upheaval in France beginning in 1789 and lasting until 1799. During this time the monarchy was deposed and France was reestablished as a republic. The Revolution tore down the ancient structure of Europe, opened the path for nineteenth-century liberalism, and hastened the advent of nationalism and the era of modern total warfare. For Santayana, the Revolution was the third of the three Rs of modernity, the first and second being the Renaissance and the Reformation; of these three Rs, he wrote that they “have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline” (*GTB*, 8). He thought “that in each of the three R’s we may distinguish an efficacious hidden current of change in the unconscious world from the veneer of words and sentiments that may have served to justify that change, or to mask it in the popular mind, and often in the mind of the leaders” (*GTB*, 8); but he thought the distinction less obvious in the Revolution because “liberty, fraternity, and equality have been actually achieved in some measure, even if they lack that Arcadian purity and nobleness which the revolutionary prophets expected. Their cry had been for limpid virtue, antique heroism, and the radical destruction of unreason: the event has brought industrialism, populousness, comfort, and the dominance of the average man, if not of the average woman” (*GTB,* 10–11).

7.3 socialism] A theory of social organization that emerged in the early nineteenth century, emphasizing community, cooperation, and harmony over the individualism, competition, and instability of capitalism; hence, socialism promotes rational ordering of society and economy in contrast to what it regards as the chaotic free market of capitalism. Socialism typically supports some form of collective control of the means of production, exchange of goods, and distribution of wealth, but, like capitalism, it can take diverse and conflicting forms. Early advocates of socialism such as Welsh textile manufacturer Robert Owen (1771–1858), French philosopher Charles Fourier (1772–1837), French philosopher and politician Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), and French philosopher Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) inspired small, experimental, collectivist communities that differed in regard to centralized control, private property, and family life. In the mid-nineteenth century, the German philosophers, political theorists, and economists Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) presented a more systematic political and economic theory of international scope that they characterized as "scientific" compared to their more "utopian" forerunners. Marxism criticized capitalism for its class divisions and exploitation, advocating worker control of the means of production with the aim of eventually realizing a classless society. Socialists have long disagreed on strategies for abolishing exploitation and achieving equality, with some pursuing change from within liberal democratic systems and others pursuing violent revolution and overthrow of existing non-socialist institutions, whether aristocratic or liberal.

7.9 germ of rational order] The possibility of rational order—a harmony of natural impulses—penetrating philosophy, society, religion, science, and art was the subject of Santayana's five-book *The Life of Reason* (1905–6). To realize the ideal of reason in art, Santayana wrote, "we should have to knit it more closely with other rational functions, so that to beautify things might render them more useful and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them in their truth. . . . What might help to bring about this consummation would be, on the one side, more knowledge; on the other, better taste. When a mind is filled with important and true ideas and sees the actual relationship of things, it cannot relish pictures of the world which wantonly misrepresent it" (*LR4*, 129–30). Art remains irrational so long as we demand it to be a dream or escape from reality. Increasing rational order in art would mean that "the poet himself will soon prefer to describe nature in natural terms and to represent human emotions in their pathetic humility, not extended beyond their actual sphere nor fantastically uprooted from their necessary soil and occasions" (*LR1*, 91). In *Three Philosophical Poets*, Santayana remarked that "to think straight, to see things as they are, or as they might naturally be, [rather] than to fancy things impossible. . . . shows, not want of imagination, but true imaginative power and imaginative maturity. It is those of us who are too feeble to conceive and master the real world, or too cowardly to face it, that run away from it to those cheap fictions that alone seem to us fine enough for poetry or for religion" (*TPP*, 113).

7.15 Romanticism,] Early nineteenth-century painters related to the Romantic tradition include three students of the French painter Jacques-Louis David (1748–1825): François Pascal Simon, Baron Gérard (1770–1837), French, born in Rome; prolific portraitist Antoine-Jean Gros (1771–1825), French, child prodigy, known for his large-scale works marked by drama, color, and vigor; and Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy (or de Roucy), also known as Anne-Louis Girodet-Trioson (1767–1824), French, orphaned at an early age, some of whose paintings had a dreamlike, eerie, or hallucinatory quality; and also Jean-Louis André Théodore Géricault (1791–1824), French, student of French painters Carle Vernet (1758–1836) and Pierre-Narcisse Guérin (1774–1833), regarded as a founder of the French Romantic School. Géricault was known for his sympathetic portraits of mentally ill patients and still lifes of severed heads and limbs of criminals.

7.17 This realism] Examples of nineteenth-century Realist painters include Gustave Courbet (1819–1877), French, regarded as a founder of the Realist movement. Claiming (falsely) to be self-taught, he was self-assured and hostile to authority, academic practice, and conventional standards. He rejected idealization and said he painted what he saw, a practice reflected in his scenes from everyday rural life and erotic paintings without classical allusions; Honoré Daumier (1808–1879), French lithographer and painter. He contributed satirical cartoons on political and social subjects to popular publications and later produced often-satirical paintings of subdued color. His work portrayed city life, often revealing its bleaker aspects; and Jules Bastien-Lepage (1848–1884), French, known for large *en plein air* (French for "outdoors") works. He enjoyed acclaim throughout Europe and especially in Great Britain. His work, marked by muted colors, often portrayed peasant subjects including children, workers, and beggars.

7.19–20 a display of archæological lore or for exotic *motifs;*] Ferdinand-Victor-Eugène Delacroix (1798–1863), French, born in Paris, student of Pierre-Narcisse Guérin (1774–1833) and admirer of André Théodore Géricault (1791–1824). Often associated with the Romantic tradition, he rejected the label in spite of temperamental sympathies and personal friendships. He painted subjects from myth, history, and contemporary European literature, and an 1832 trip to Morocco made a lifelong impression on him: his sketchbooks from his travels gave him material for a lifetime. He enjoyed great artistic and social success;

Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824–1904), French, student of Paul Delaroche (1797–1856) and Charles Gleyre (1806–1874). He was known for his archaeologically precise scenes of ancient Greece and Rome, including sensationalistic details of carnage and sex. Beginning in 1855 he was a regular traveler to Egypt and Asia Minor. He was committed to tradition and opposed progressive artistic trends such as Impressionism; Théodore Chassériau (1819–1856), French, student of Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780–1867). He visited North Africa in 1840 and 1846 and was inspired by Delacroix, especially the latter's use of color. He painted subjects from North Africa, the Bible, and the works of William Shakespeare (1564–1616); Alexandre-Gabriel Decamps (1803–1860), French, born in Paris. His travels in 1828–29 through Greece, Asia Minor, and North Africa provided material for his work. He often painted colorful, small-scale works with thickly applied paints. See Note 7.15 Romanticism and Note 15.2 Shakespeare.

7.20–21 others . . . abstract problems of execution,] In the second half of the nineteenth century several French painters, who came to be known as Impressionists, rejected the highly refined and formal techniques of the academy and conventional subject matter (history, myth, the Bible) in favor of spontaneity in capturing the visual impression of a moment in city settings or rural landscapes. The label "Impressionist"—though often understood to indicate paintings done *en plein air* (French for "outdoors") and characterized by informal brushwork and bright color—suggests greater unity of principle than existed among these artists. Their only actual common aim was mounting public exhibitions independent of the conservative, state-sponsored salon system. Artists associated with Impressionism and, later, Post-Impressionism or Neo-Impressionism include Paul Cézanne (1839–1906), Edgar Degas (1834–1917), Édouard Manet (1832–1883) (who never exhibited at the group shows), Claude Monet (1840–1926), Camille Pissarro (1830–1903), Pierre-Auguste Renoir (1841–1919), Alfred Sisley (1839–1899), Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), Vincent van Gogh (1853–1890), and Georges Seurat (1859–1891). Problems of execution that interested particular artists included pictorial structure (Cézanne), the symbolic values of color and line when freed from representational functions (Gauguin and, later, Cézanne), and scientific analysis of color (Seurat).

7.26 One gave himself to religious archaism,] In the late nineteenth century several French painters known as Symbolists, reacting to the naturalism of Impressionism, took up religious, mythological, or mystical subject matter in attempts to express intense emotions visually. Often motivated by antimaterialist and antirational sentiments, they rejected literal representations and instead aimed to evoke or suggest sensuous feeling through color and line. They believed in a correspondence between external forms and subjective states, and that their work could transmit and perpetuate emotions. Some sought to express a mystical unity of spirit and matter in signs and hidden meanings, comprehensible only to initiates. Significant Symbolists included Gustave Moreau (1826–1898), Pierre Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898), and Eugène Carrière (1849–1906). Stylistically similar to Symbolists were the Nabis, who were heavily influenced by Paul Gauguin's (1848–1903) use of color and rhythmic pattern for expressive purposes and whose work often was esoteric and bound up with religious symbolism. The name "Nabis" comes from "nabi," the Hebrew and Arabic word for "prophet," and indicated their missionary zeal for Gauguin's style, which they regarded as a sort of religious illumination, and their interest in mystical and occult subject matter. Significant members of the group included Paul Sérusier (1864–1927), Maurice Denis (1870–1943), and Émile Bernard (1868–1941).

7.26–27 Japanese composition,] Japanese ukiyo-e prints began to arrive in European ports in the 1850s, influencing French artists in their use of color and pattern. "Ukiyo-e" or "pictures of the floating world" refers to the principal art movement in Japan of the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, in which subject matter reflected the trends and fashions of everyday life. Popular subjects included actors performing well-known roles, prostitutes, and bathhouse scenes. The French Impressionist painter Claude Monet bought an ukiyo-e print in 1856 at Le Havre, and Edgar Degas, also a French Impressionist, imitated the use of unfamiliar perspectives he found in Japanese color prints. The Dutch painter Vincent van Gogh moved to Paris in 1886, where his style was influenced by Impressionism and Japanese woodcuts. The Nabis, a group formed in 1892 by French painters who rejected Impressionism and academic training, looked to Japanese prints (among other sources) for new inspiration. For the Nabis, see Note 7.26 One gave himself to religious archaism.

7.27 barbaric symphonies of colour;] The French painter Henri Matisse (1869–1954) was a central figure in the movement of French artists known as Fauvism, which was characterized by the nonnaturalistic use of intense color, sometimes applied directly from the tube without mixing. The group came to be known as the Fauves ("les fauves" in French, meaning "wild beasts") after a critic's hostile characterization upon viewing a 1905 Salon d'Automne exhibition of work by several artists including Matisse, Georges Rouault (1871–1958), André Derain (1880–1954), Maurice Vlaminck (1876–1958), Kees van Dongen (1877–1968), Raoul Dufy (1877–1953), and Georges Braque (1882–1963). The Fauves, reacting to Impressionism and academic conventions and influenced by Gauguin's symbolic use of color and van Gogh's forceful expression, were active as a group from 1905 to 1907. Fauvism strongly influenced Abstract Expressionism.

7.27–28 sculptors . . . dramatic climaxes, . . . lyrical passion,] Auguste Rodin (1840–1917), French sculptor and draftsman, one of the most well-known and influential artists of the nineteenth century. He failed three times to gain admittance to the École des Beaux-Arts, Paris, and began his career as an artisan working as an ornamental mason. By 1900 he was regarded as the greatest living sculptor. His sculptures often are of figures or groups with historical, literary, or symbolic import, including several commemorative sculptures of significant figures in the arts. Rodin exerted a lasting influence through his ability to convey a sense of movement and energy, use of partial figure, and demonstration that sculpture could be appreciated for its immediate characteristics as well as its representational qualities. He resisted narrative as found in classical sculpture and challenged expectations of visual coherence, juxtaposing images that did not readily seem to belong together.

7.29–32 latest whims . . . abandon painful observation . . . crudity of caricature.] When Santayana published this essay in 1913, the artistic movement known as Expressionism was dominant in Europe. Expressionism, as a rejection of naturalism and Impressionism, privileged an artist's inner feelings over the reproduction of an observed scene; antecedents can be found in Gauguin's and van Gogh's use of color and line to convey intensity of feeling. The term was used broadly enough to refer also to the Fauves and the Cubists. Cubism was a style that flourished from 1907 to 1914. It originated in the work of Spanish painter Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) and of Georges Braque (1882–1963), who were followed in the style by Spanish painter Juan Gris (1887–1927). Cubism is characterized by its rejection of a naturalistic three-dimensional perspective and an emphasis on the material quality of the medium. Spatial dimensions were depicted by the use of multiple perspectives, and painted spatial forms were broken up into patterns of flat planes. Artists who employed Cubist methods include French painters Robert Delaunay (1885–1941), Albert Gleizes (1881–1953), Roger de La Fresnaye (1885–1925), Jean Metzinger (1883–1956), and Francis Picabia (1879–1953). In Santayana's 1922 essay "Penitent Art" (in *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews*, ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936], 149–61), he characterized contemporary art: "Little children is what artists and poets are now striving hard to be; little children who instead of blowing a tin trumpet blow by chance through a whole orchestra, but with the same emotion as the child; or who, instead of daubing a geometrical skeleton with a piece of chalk, can daub a cross-eyed cross-section of the entire spectrum or a compound fracture of a nightmare. Such is Cubism: by no means an inexpert or meaningless thing. Before you can compose a chaos or paint the unnameable, you must train yourself to a severe abstention from all practical habits of perception; you must heroically suppress the understanding" (*OS*, 155). For the Fauves, see Note 7.27 barbaric symphonies of colour.

8.8–9 modern philosophy] Modern European philosophy is typically regarded as beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing through the twentieth century. In the most general terms, modern philosophy is marked by concern with problems of knowledge (the nature, possibility, and limits of knowledge), often in connection with scientific methods of knowing. Significant figures in modern philosophy, whose interests actually were broader than the characterization just given, include Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), John Locke (1632–1704), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), George Berkeley (1685–1753), David Hume (1711–1776), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (German mathematician and philosopher, 1848–1925), and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Santayana regularly taught courses at Harvard on Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but he wrote in a 1949 letter that "modern philosophy was always alien to me" (*LGS*, 8:154). In a 1933 letter he wrote, "I disagree utterly with that modern philosophy which regards experience as fundamental" (*LGS*, 5:25). Santayana published criticism of several modern philosophers and modern philosophy. See, for example, *Reason in Common Sense, Egotism in German Philosophy,* and *Scepticism and Animal Faith.* In *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, Santayana wrote that modern philosophy's "advances in analysis and self-knowledge . . . have been neutralized . . . by a total intellectual cramp or by a colossal folly" (*SELS,* 216). In Santayana's view, this cramp or folly is detrimental to a vital philosophical life. He explained that

> to survey the world of existences in its truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives, or with practical urgency. . . . is the path trodden by ancient philosophers and modern saints or poets; not, of course, by modern writers on philosophy (except Spinoza), because these have not been philosophers in the vital sense; they have practised no spiritual discipline, suffered no change of heart, but lived on exactly like other professors, and exerted themselves to prove the existence of a God favourable to their own desires, instead of searching for the God that happens to exist. (*SELS,* 120–21)

See also Note 3.8 Bossuet; Note 3.25 Liberalism; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 7.3 socialism; Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 11.15 Hegel; Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell; Note 40.22 Spinoza; Note 41.26 English malicious psychology; Note 41.27 Locke; Note 46.20 Mill; Note 53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates; Note 59.14 Leibnitz; and Note 74.11 *The Problems of Philosophy.*

8.10 Berkeley and Hume,] George Berkeley (1685–1753), Anglo-Irish philosopher, graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, lived in Rhode Island from 1728 to 1732, and became Anglican bishop of Cloyne, Ireland in 1734. He wrote on the psychology of vision, mathematics, and medicine, as well as philosophy and theology. His important works include *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). His subjective idealism denied the existence of matter and maintained that all existing entities are either perceiving spirits or perceptions, which entails that perception by a mind is the being of unthinking things: “Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them” (*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, in *Philosophical Works, 1705–21*, Vol. 1 of *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. C. Fraser [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901], 259). Santayana’s personal library included *Selections from Berkeley* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884). David Hume (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher and historian, born and educated in Edinburgh. Hume, an empiricist, claimed that philosophy could not go beyond experience to any ultimate origins. His important philosophical works include *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751). Hume is known for his claim that, despite the persistent human belief in necessary causal connections, neither sense nor reason can discover such a connection. Sense experience reveals only temporal or spatial contiguity. Reason offers no direct access to the truth of causal connection because there is no contradiction in imagining an observed correlation happening otherwise than it has so far been observed. Although he explains this belief as a habit conditioned by the experience of constant conjunction of things said to be causally related, Hume did not reject inductive reasoning based on causal relations; rather, he offered a new description of reason as a habit of mind. Between 1889 and 1898, Santayana taught six courses at Harvard on English philosophy including works by Berkeley and Hume (these included Philosophy 5 [1889–90], Philosophy 11 [1890–91, 1891–92, 1892–93, 1894–95], and Philosophy 11^2 [1897–98]). In a 1952 letter Santayana wrote of Berkeley and Hume that

> they never seemed to me to belong, as the English think, to the main line of philosophy, but to a loop-line called subjectivism, and limited, in appeal, to the Protestant and romantic movements. . . . I have a great esteem for both Berkeley and Hume in their personal dispositions and temper, each in a different way. I think you have read my paper on Berkeley: but in regard to Hume I think I have written nothing. But as a man of the world and a historian he felt as I do, and was not subjective or negative at all. I say "negative" rather than "sceptical" because he was a sceptic in official philosophy but a naturalist in his real convictions. (*LGS*, 8:426)

Santayana wrote an essay called "Bishop Berkeley" that appeared in *From Anne to Victoria: Essays by Various Hands,* ed. Bonamy Dobrée (London: Cassell, 1937), 75–88; reprinted in John Lachs, ed., *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 102–14. Comments on Hume by Santayana can be found in *Reason in Common Sense*, *Reason in Science*, and *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. For a study of Santayana on Hume see Jessica Wahman, "Corpulent or a Train of Ideas? Santayana's Critique of Hume," *BSS* 25 (Fall 2007), 1–9.

8.18 Avenarius,] Richard Avenarius (1843–1896), German philosopher, born in Paris, educated at the University of Leipzig, professor at Leipzig and then at University of Zürich. His major work was *Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung* (1888–90) (*Critique of Pure Experience*). His "empirio-criticism" sought to eliminate metaphysical ideas in order to clarify the intuitions of pure experience, and he attempted to describe the character of pure experience in order to justify a scientific empiricism. Like David Hume (1711–1776), he held the ideas of substance and causality to be ontologically invalid. His ideas about pure experience influenced William James (1842–1910), and his epistemology influenced Ernst Mach (1838–1916). Santayana mentioned him in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920) as one whose ideas inclined him to deny the existence of consciousness (151).

8.18 William James,] William James (1842–1910), American philosopher and psychologist, born in New York City, educated as a physician at Harvard, brother of novelist Henry James, professor of philosophy at Harvard. James is well known for his version of pragmatism. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce's (1839–1914) idea that a concept's meaning lies in the practical relevance of the concept's effects, James held that the truth of an idea depended on its utility in predicting experience or in leading to beneficial behavior. James also advocated what he called radical empiricism, which regarded reality ultimately to be pure experience. The qualities of pure experience make up mind in one arrangement, and physical things in another arrangement. Knowledge is understood as the way in which mind, made up of one arrangement of experience, results in a beneficial coordination with experience in a different arrangement apart from mind. James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) is a classic in the field and was reviewed admiringly by Santayana ("James's Psychology," *The Atlantic Monthly* 67 [April 1891]: 552–56). James's other important works include *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (1897), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907), and *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912). James was a teacher and later a colleague of Santayana at Harvard. Santayana published criticism of James's philosophy and personal recollections of James in several places, including "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" (1912), *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920), and *Persons and Places* (1943, 1947, 1953); *The Letters of George Santayana* also includes letters to and about James. Of his published remarks on James, Santayana wrote:

> I have made sundry scattered observations for the public, without attempting a fair total portrayal of the man or of his philosophy: neither he nor his philosophy lent themselves to being summed up. But here, where I am portraying only my own impressions, I may add a word more about the feelings that he excited in me. I trusted his heart but I didn't respect his judgment. I admired his masculine directness, his impressionistic perceptions, and his picturesque words. I treasured his utterances on the medical side of things, such as that the best way to understanding the normal is to study the abnormal. All this belonged to his independent, radical, naturalistic temper, to his American sense of being just born into a world to be rediscovered. But he was really far from free, held back by old instincts, subject to old delusions, restless, spasmodic, self-interrupted: as if some impetuous bird kept flying aloft, but always stopped in mid-air, pulled back with a jerk by an invisible wire tethering him to a peg in the ground. The general agreement in America to praise him as a marvellous person, and to pass on, is justified by delight at the way he started, without caring where he went. In fact, he got nowhere; and for that reason his influence could be great and beneficent over those who knew him, but soon seemed to become untraceable in the confused currents of the world. I, for instance, was sure of his goodwill and kindness, of which I had many proofs; but I was also sure that he never understood me, and that when he talked to me, there was a mannikin in his head, called G. S. and entirely fantastic, which he was really addressing. No doubt I profited materially by this illusion, because he would have liked me less if he had understood me better; but the sense of that illusion made spontaneous friendship

> impossible. I was uncomfortable in his presence. He was so extremely natural that there was no knowing what his nature was, or what to expect next; so that one was driven to behave and talk conventionally, as in the most artificial society. I found no foothold, I was soon fatigued, and it was a relief to be out again in the open, and alone. (*PP*, 401–2)

8.18–19 M. Bergson] Henri-Louis Bergson (1859–1941), French philosopher, born in Paris, educated at the École Normale Supérieure, and taught at Clermont-Ferrand and later the Collège de France. Bergson is best known for his ideas of *la durée*, duration or time as experienced by consciousness, and of *élan vital*, a life force that counters the mechanistic movement of matter. According to Bergson, to understand time as analogous to space, as science does, is a mistake that misses the essence of time. Duration is not composed of discrete, homogeneous moments that can be quantified, but rather it is continuous, ever-changing, and qualitative. Duration, being qualitative and spontaneous, is unpredictable and gives rise to free acts. His notion of *élan vital* appears in his best-known work *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907) (in English translation, *Creative Evolution* [New York: Henry Holt, 1911]). Evolution, thought Bergson, is driven by *élan vital*, a creative force that overcomes the entropic tendency of matter without aiming at some predestined end. Bergson's work influenced Catholic modernists, and he and William James mutually influenced each other, as indicated in their published work and their correspondence. Bergson and James met three times: 1905 in Paris, 1908 in London, and 1910 at Bergson's home in Auteuil, Paris (Larry McGrath, "Bergson Comes to America," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 74, no. 4 [2013]: 599–620). Santayana wrote of Bergson that "his own mind is fanatically closed to almost all ideas. His smooth language and wide information (not always correct or impartial) are gathered as protective colouring for his bitter hatred of the intellect" (*MARG,* 1:64). In a 1947 letter Santayana wrote, "The intolerable thing about Bergson is his blindness to definite concepts, to the *tout fait* [ready-made] and the 'static'. There is flux enough in the world; but the mind arrests essences (which can have all degrees of articulation) and in those terms is able to distinguish events and objects. Just to flow is never to be anywhere or to be anything. Toynbee has the same superstition as Bergson, and it would spoil his work if he were a mere historian; but the interest for him is to see the hang of certain political movements, and that is to find 'static' forms or types of motion in the flux" (*LGS,* 7:370). An extensive critical review of Bergson by Santayana appears in this volume as "The Philosophy of M. Henri Bergson" (39–71). Santayana wrote after its publication that he "feared it might seem too severe" (*LGS*, 2:128). However, after reading Julian Benda's critical attack in *Le Bergsonisme, ou, Une philosophie de la mobilité* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1912), Santayana wrote that “Benda’s capital book on Bergson . . . relieved me of all qualms about my essay. . . . When I read now some newspaper accounts of [Bergson’s] visit to America (I have heard nothing of the substance of his lectures there) I begin to fear on the contrary that I have taken him too seriously. But the best way of discrediting a charlatan is perhaps not to call him one” (*LGS*, 2:128). Santayana’s personal library included *L’intuition philosophique* (1927); *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (1932) (*Two Sources of Morality and Religion*), with extensive marginal notes; and *La pensée et le mouvant* (1934) (*The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*), with marginal notes. For Catholic Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist; see also Note 8.18 William James; Note 44.36 M. Bergson’s *Evolution Créatrice*; and Note 45.18 *élan vital*.

9.6 Babylon] Capital of Babylonia, a region in the south of modern Iraq that was the site of several ancient civilizations, including those of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Persians. In 586 BC, the Chaldean Empire conquered Egypt and removed prominent and capable Jews to Babylon to serve the empire. The captives tended to view this city as a place of decadence and immorality, and Babylon became a symbol for exile and corruption. For biblical reference to Babylon, see Note 22.3–4 Israel was led . . . restored the Temple.

9.7–8 the porcupine. . . its fretful quills] Santayana borrowed phraseology from *Hamlet*, Act 1, Scene 5: “Like quills upon the fretful porpentine.”

9.20 Solipsism] The doctrine that one can know only the contents of one’s own mind, thereby isolating one from other persons or anything else that may exist outside of one’s mind. One form of solipsism would be the idea that a sentient being is isolated from any other by a mutual inability to access the experience of another. Another form of solipsism would be the idea that the only thing that can be said to exist is oneself and one’s experience.

9.21 idealism;] Idealism holds that human self-consciousness is the main philosophical datum; that the world is thoroughly spiritual, having something akin to a cosmic self; and that for both the individual and the cosmic self the will is more significant than the intellect. Santayana was critical of idealism because he saw it as a sort of romantic egotism which grew out of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) “radical subjectification of knowledge” (*EGP*, 34). According to Henry Samuel Levinson, Santayana thought the idealists “tried to revive the corpse of supernaturalism” (*Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life* [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992], 125). See Santayana’s *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915) for his sustained critique of the tradition, and see Note 32.27 German idealism.

11.15 Hegel,] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), German philosopher, born in Stuttgart. He was educated at the University at Tübingen, where he met as students the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). Hegel worked as a private tutor, a newspaper editor, and a high school headmaster, and in 1801 he gained a university appointment. In 1818 he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, which was the center of German intellectual culture under the Prussian monarchy. Hegel's philosophy maintains the priority of a collective spirit over the individual, and human history is understood as the coming to consciousness of this collective or Absolute Spirit, which becomes actual or self-conscious through the development of human consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved through the dialectical interaction of spirit and matter in history and results in the realization of universal rational order. Hegel regarded Prussia as the fulfillment of the dialectical ideal, and he wrote that Prussia's Frederick the Great (Friedrich II, 1713–1786) "hatte das Bewußtsein von der Allgemeinheit, die die letzte Tiefe des Geistes und die ihrer selbstbewußte Kraft des Denkens ist" (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* [Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1837], 435) (in English translation: "had the consciousness of Universality, which is the profoundest depth to which Spirit can attain, and is Thought conscious of its own inherent power" (*Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree [London: The Colonial Press, 1900], 438). Commentators have read Hegel's work as endorsing the Prussian state, and philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) accused Hegel of selling himself to the Prussian ruling power that employed him. Santayana commented on Hegel's philosophy throughout his career, acknowledging it as an inspiration for *Life of Reason* ("Preface to Second Edition," *LR1*, 185), while also regularly criticizing it, especially in *Egotism and German Philosophy.* In this work, Santayana wrote that Hegel regarded the state as "morally absolute" and recognized "no moral authority or tribunal higher than the state" (*EGP*, 96). He explained that "for Hegel . . . the life of the state was the moral substance, and the souls of men but the accidents; and as to the judgment of God he asserted that it was none other than the course of history. This is a characteristic saying, in which he seems to proclaim the moral government of the world, when in truth he is sanctifying a brutal law of success and succession. . . . He despised every ideal not destined to be realised on earth, he respected legality more than justice, and extant institutions more than moral ideals; and he wished to flatter a government in whose policy war and even crime were recognised weapons" (97). In his marginalia to Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History,* Vol. 5: *The Disintegrations of Civilizations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), Santayana characterized Hegel as a fascist: "Liberalism = Protestantism = a bastard X'ity; so that to be a Fascist is to desert the Church. Yes, Hegel was a 'Fascist'. He liquidated X'ity into Pantheism" (*MARG*, 2:348). Santayana's personal library included three of Hegel's most important works: *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1914[?]) (*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*), *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) (*Phenomenology of Spirit*), and *The Logic of Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874). See also Note 46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer.

12.4–6 if life is better . . . best form of life.] The text is similar to Santayana's observation in *Three Philosophical Poets* that "Philosophy is a more intense sort of experience than common life is, just as pure and subtle music, heard in retirement, is something keener and more intense than the howling of storms or the rumble of cities" (*TPP*, 73).

12.10 *la nostalgie de la boue.*] French for "nostalgia for mud" or "homesickness for mud." The phrase is used to indicate a wish to regress to a previous or more primitive condition; a desire for what is crude, base, or degrading. The first known appearances of the phrase are in Act 1, Scene 1 and Act 2, Scene 14 of French playwright Émile Augier's 1855 play *Le Mariage d'Olympe* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1881), 5, 68. In both contexts, the same character makes this remark referring to lower-class young women who married for title and wealth but persisted in their crude manners and promiscuous lifestyles; the first is in response to the comparison that a duck moved to a clear lake among swans will prefer, and eventually return to, its life in the swamps (5).

14.22 Shelley] Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), English romantic poet, essayist, playwright, and translator. Born to a wealthy family in Sussex, educated at Eton and University College, Oxford. Shelley was expelled from Oxford for coauthoring *The Necessity of Atheism* (1811). That same year, he further alienated his father and lost his financial support when he married 16-year-old Harriet Westbrook. In 1813 he published *Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem*, which advocated for republicanism, vegetarianism, atheism, and free love. His marriage ended in 1814, when Shelley left his pregnant wife and daughter to travel Europe with Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin and her stepsister Clara Mary Jane "Claire" Clairmont. Harriet Westbrook killed herself in 1816, and her family won a suit denying Shelley custody of his children. That summer was spent with Lord Byron (George Gordon Byron, 1788–1824) at Lake Geneva. In 1818, Shelley, Godwin, and Clairmont moved to Italy permanently to escape creditors and social disapproval. It was the beginning of a productive period in which Shelley translated Homer, Euripides (c. 480–c. 406 BC), Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681), Johann Wolfgang von

Goethe (1749–1832), and Plato (c. 427–347 BC); and wrote his poems *The Revolt of Islam* (1818), *The Cenci* (1819), *Prometheus Unbound* (1820), and *Epipsychidion* (1821); and the essay *A Defence of Poetry* (1821, published in 1840). He drowned in August 1822 after visiting Byron in Livorno when a sudden storm sunk his boat. Shelley was a hard-working and assiduous writer, and he was extremely well read in classics, philosophy, and science. He was a sophisticated political thinker, critical heir of Enlightenment ideals, and energetic advocate of revolutionary views. Santayana greatly admired Shelley's poetry, as he did that of Byron and Keats, and his own poetry was influenced by their work. In an 1887 letter, Santayana wrote,

> I had not read Shelley to any extent since my early days of poetic sentiment, when I saw nothing in him but music and nonsense. But I find that he is the prophet of the rising generation in England, and the only true substitute for Jesus Christ. Well, I have reread him, and find a great deal in him that I knew nothing of. He represents, in an exaggerated and therefore vulnerable form, the contradiction of my theory of natural authority. His theory is briefly this: Nature is ready and willing to maintain the human race, (multiplied by the full energies of free love) in happiness and luxury, but the Evil Power, embodied in kings, priests, judges, and capitalists, somehow wickedly prevents it. Let but a spring be touched, and the scene will transform itself. The hollow power of tyrants will disappear, and everything will be in a normal and satisfactory condition. That is, a wrong has somewhere been perpetrated, and authority and subordination are the result. Now I conceive on the contrary that authority is naturally and normally acquired, because the business of society can be better done by some people and in certain ways, than by other people in other ways. (Santayana to Charles A. Loeser, 4 June 1887; available at https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/loeser/index.html, 47–49).

In 1910–11, Santayana hosted weekly poetry readings modeled on the "poetry bees" he had hosted in his room as a young professor eighteen years earlier. This new incarnation was more like a seminar, he wrote, and was dedicated to reading "Shelley, from beginning to end, except *The Cenci*" (*PP*, 345). From these sessions came a paper Santayana read that spring at Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr College, and Williams College. It later became the essay "Shelley, or the Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles" (1913), which appears in this volume (103–123). See Note 1.30 Goethe and Note 40.1 Plato.

14.22 Leopardi.] Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837), Italian poet and scholar. Born in Recanati to an aristocratic family of reduced financial means. Taught by private tutors until he was 14 years old, he then directed his own education in the family's extensive private library. He studied classical languages and wrote poetry in Latin and Greek. His intense study took a toll on his eyesight and general health, and he was chronically ill during his short life. Leopardi felt oppressed and unhappy at home, where his talents were unappreciated, and after a series of departures and returns beginning with a trip to Rome in 1822, he finally moved out of the family home for good in 1830. In 1824 he turned to writing philosophical prose, though he continued to write poetry. His early poetry, inspired by his study of classics and of the poet and philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), sought a poetic language in nature. However, Leopardi later articulated a cosmic pessimism and regarded nature as lacking any purpose and indifferent to humanity. Important works include the lyric poems in *Canti* (1831, 1845), written between 1816 and 1837; and the philosophical essays, dialogues, and aphorisms in *Operette morali* (1827, 1845). Robert Lowell and Ezra Pound, both correspondents of Santayana's, published translations of Leopardi. Santayana wrote a foreword to Iris Origo's *Leopardi: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935; reissued as *Leopardi: A Study in Solitude* [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953]). Origo was the daughter of a Harvard friend of Santayana's, Bayard Cutting (*PP*, 397). In his foreword, Santayana praised the divine quality of Leopardi's poetry and wrote that reading it "we are transported out of ourselves ascetically, by the vision of truth" (*Leopardi: A Biography* [1935], vi). He acknowledged Leopardi's suffering but thought that "the white heat of his anguish burned all anguish away," and Leopardi's intuition of beauty in a world of change and loss "liberated him from the illusions of the past and those of the future" (*Leopardi* [1935], vi).

15.1 Renaissance] French for "rebirth," the term "Renaissance" was first used in the nineteenth century to refer to the intellectual movement that revived Classical Greek and Roman learning and emphasized a hopeful image of human life (known as "humanism") that embraced the possibilities in the development of human capacities. The movement began in Northern Italy in the thirteenth century and spread throughout Italy over the next two centuries. By the sixteenth century the movement culminated in what is often called the High Renaissance and spread throughout Europe. The humanism of the movement contrasted with medieval Christianity's emphasis on the inherent corruption and depravity of human nature. Humanism was marked by a turning away from Christian dogma in favor of experience and increasing adoption of vernacular in written works. Important early figures include Brunetto Latini, Dante, Boccaccio, Petrarch, Machiavelli, and Erasmus. High Renaissance figures include Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo. For Santayana, the Renaissance was the first of the three Rs of modernity, the second and third being the Reformation and the (French) Revolution; of these three Rs, he wrote that they “have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline” (*GTB*, 8). Of the Renaissance, Santayana wrote that it “really tended to emancipate the passions and to exploit nature for fanciful and for practical human uses: it simply continued all that was vivacious and ornate in the Middle Ages”; but “for all its poetry, scholarship, and splendour, [the Renaissance] was a great surrender of the spirit to the flesh, of the essence for the miscellany of human power” (*GTB*, 8–9). See Note 24.18 Dante.

15.2 Raphael] Raffaello Sanzio (1483–1520), Italian High Renaissance artist, born in Urbino. He was greatly influenced by his older contemporaries Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) and Michelangelo (1475–1564) but established an original style of extensive influence. Raphael spent most of his life in Rome and was chief architect of Saint Peter’s Basilica. The Sistine Madonna (c. 1512–14) is perhaps his best-known work.

15.2 Shakespeare;] William Shakespeare (1564–1616), English actor, poet, and dramatist, baptized in Stratford-on-Avon. He was a leading literary figure of the English Renaissance and now is regarded as the foremost writer in English literature and most influential dramatist in the world. His best-known works include the tragedies *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Othello*, and *Romeo and Juliet*. He also wrote over 150 sonnets. Santayana, in his 1896 essay “The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare,” observed in Shakespeare “no fixed conception of any forces, natural or moral, dominating and transcending our mortal energies” (*IPR*, 100); and he contrasted Shakespeare with Homer and Dante, whose “faith had enveloped the world of experience in a world of imagination, in which the ideals of the reason, of the fancy, and of the heart had a natural expression. They had caught in the reality the hint of a lovelier fable,—a fable in which that reality was completed and idealised. . . . They had, as it were, dramatised the universe, and endowed it with the tragic unities” (*IPR*, 96). Santayana also wrote “Hamlet’s Question” in 1919, which appeared later in *Soliloquies in England* (27–29); and an essay entitled “Introduction to Hamlet” (*Hamlet, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare,* Vol. 15*,* ed. Sidney Lee [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906], ix–xxxiii); reprinted as “Hamlet” in *Obiter Scripta,* 1936, 41–67), as well as citing or alluding to this play in almost all of his other published work as well as in many letters. In a notable 1933 letter, Santayana gave an extended summary of his view of the writer:

> Shakespeare happened to have a great fluid imagination and an enormous eloquence or gift of storing and mating and pouring out words. These natural powers—which many a man has here and there—happened in his case to be set free, fed, and loosened by the circumstances of the age and by his special craft as an actor and playwright. Most other poets have been

> held down by tradition or religion or lack of opportunity to a single mode of expression, to one literary key. They were not allowed to mix poetry with prose, tragedy with comedy, love-making with politics, or edification with atheism. The top wave of the renaissance allowed Shakespeare to combine all these elements: and the wealth of Christendom and of paganism were at his disposal, without the restraints or limitations of either. . . . Exuberance seems to me to cover everything, the wealth of genius as well as the contempt for art; and in particular it covers the irrelevant elaboration of language and of characters which, to us, is one of Shakespeare's chief charms: those glimpses that he stops to give us of the back-waters and eddies and weeds of the stream of passion. He challenged and perhaps annoyed his public by doing so; but he just could manage it without being dismissed as a closet-tragedian; and these escapades of his imagination into the by-conscious now seem to us a proof of miraculous depth in him. I don't think they are that: but they are proofs of his knowingness and quick intuition. And this brings me back to your conclusion about his philosophy—that life is a dream. Yes, that is his philosophy; and, when T. S. Eliot says that this philosophy (borrowed he thinks from Seneca) is an inferior one, compared with Dante's, I agree if you mean inferior morally and imaginatively: but it happens to be the true philosophy for the human passions, and for a man enduring, without supernaturally interpreting, the spectacle of the universe. It is a commonplace philosophy, the old old heathen philosophy of mankind. Shakespeare didn't create it. He felt it was true, and never thought of transcending it" (*LGS,* 5:19–20). See Note 24.18 Dante.

15.15 *Wanderjahre*] German for "years of traveling," which refer, in medieval tradition, to the time of working as a journeyman, that is, one who has completed an apprenticeship but not yet established himself as a master. Traditionally, a journeyman traveled for two or three years, working with different masters in different locations.

15.37 Bertrand Russell,] Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970), 3rd Earl Russell, English philosopher and social activist; grandson of Lord John Russell (1792–1878), a former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; secular godson of English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873); educated at Trinity College, Cambridge University. His early philosophical work was on logic, mathematics, and language. He investigated the logical foundations of mathematics, a project known as "logicism," and attempted to clarify the logical structure of language. He also wrote on epistemology and metaphysics, arguing that the world we know is made up of immediately perceived "sense-data" and the facts they comprise, a doctrine known as "logical atomism." His work influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889–1951, Austrian philosopher) *Tractatus*

Logico-Philosophicus (1922). He also wrote on morals, politics, and education. Russell founded an experimental school, Beacon Hill School, with his second wife, Dora Black, in 1927. He supported female suffrage, opposed World War I (for which he was imprisoned in 1918), and helped lead the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He was a prolific and clear writer and won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. His important works include *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903); *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13), written with A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947); *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940); *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945); *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (1948); and *Autobiography* (1967–69). In 1885, Santayana met Bertrand's brother, John Francis Stanley Russell, 2nd Earl Russell (1865–1931), known as Frank, when they were undergraduates at Harvard. In 1895, Frank introduced Santayana to Bertrand during a day trip to Cambridge, England. The next year, when Santayana was on sabbatical at Cambridge, he came to know Bertrand better. Santayana wrote of him in *Persons and Places*:

> Of all my friends, of all persons belonging at all to my world, Bertrand Russell was the most distinguished. He had birth, genius, learning, indefatigable zeal and energy, brilliant intelligence, and absolute honesty and courage. His love of justice was as keen as his sense of humour. He was at home in mathematics, in natural science, and in history. He knew well all the more important languages and was well informed about everything going on in the world of politics and literature. He ought to have been a leader, a man of universal reputation and influence. He was indeed recognised to be a distinguished man, having made his mark in mathematics and logic, and largely inspired the new philosophical sect of 'logical realists'. Yet on the whole, relatively to his capacities, he was a failure. He petered out. He squandered his time and energy, and even his money, on unworthy objects. He left no monument – unless it be the early *Principia Mathematica* written in collaboration with Whitehead – that does justice to his powers and gives him a place in history. (*PP*, 440)

Winds of Doctrine includes a review essay entitled "The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell" (73–101) which Santayana characterized in a 1911 letter to Russell as "an elaborate review – in three articles – for the . . . Columbia 'Journal of Philosophy, etc'. You will not expect me to agree with you in everything, but, whatever you may think of my ideas, I always feel that yours, and [G. E.] Moore's too, make for the sort of reconstruction in philosophy which I should welcome. It is a great bond to dislike the same things, and dislike is perhaps a deeper indication of our real nature than explicit affections, since the latter may be effects of circumstances, while dislike is a reaction against them" (*LGS,* 2:28). Santayana's personal library included several books by Russell, including copies presented by the author to Santayana. See also Note 73.6 Mr. G. E. Moore. For John Stuart Mill, see Note 46.20 Mill.

MODERNISM AND CHRISTIANITY

17.19 *Zeitgeist.*] German for "spirit of the age." It is used to refer to social or cultural trends and is sometimes taken to suggest a suprahuman influence on the actions and choices of masses of people.

17.22 Copernicus,] Nikolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), Polish mathematician and astronomer. He proposed the theory that the Earth and other planets revolve around the sun in individual orbits while spinning on their axes. His theory replaced Ptolemy's (second century AD) assertion that planets and stars revolve around the Earth.

17.27 liberal Catholicism,] See Note 3.11 modernist.

18.23 days of the Prophets] The period in which the prophetic books in the Hebrew scriptures are set ranges approximately from the ninth century BC to the sixth century BC. The major prophets, so called because of the length of their writings in the Old Testament of the Bible, are Isaiah (eighth century BC), Jeremiah (seventh and sixth centuries BC), and Ezekiel (seventh and sixth centuries BC). Sometimes Daniel (sixth century BC) is included among the major prophets. The twelve minor prophets, represented by shorter books, include Hosea (eighth century BC), Joel (eighth century BC), Amos (eighth century BC), Obadiah (sixth century BC?), Jonah (eighth century BC?), Micah (eighth century BC), Nahum (seventh century BC), Habakkuk (seventh or sixth century BC), Zephaniah (seventh century BC), Haggai (sixth century BC), Zechariah (sixth century BC), and Malachi (sixth century BC). Also recognized as prophets are Elijah and his successor Elisha (both ninth century BC), whose stories appear in the Old Testament books of 1 and 2 Kings. The prophets communicated the will of God to the people of Israel and often warned of God's wrath if the Israelites did not follow God's laws.

18.25–26 St. John the Baptist] A Jewish preacher, ascetic, and prophetic figure, mentioned in the New Testament and by the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus (AD 37–100). According to the Gospel of Matthew in the New Testament, John was born to Elisabeth, a cousin of Mary, mother of Jesus, and Zechariah, a Jewish priest (Luke 1:5). John lived alone in the desert, wearing camel's hair and a leather belt and eating locusts and honey (Matthew 3:4). He was a popular preacher in Judea, warning of God's wrath and the people's need to repent of their sins (Matthew 3:5–12; Luke 3:3–17). He introduced the rite of baptism: a one-time ritual cleansing that promised salvation (Matthew 3:11; Mark 1:4). His birth and ministry were believed to foretell the coming of Jesus (Matthew 3:3;

Mark 1:2–3; Luke 1:41–44, 1:76, 3:4), and he later baptized Jesus (Matthew 3:14; Mark 1:9; Luke 3:21). He was executed by King Herod after John denounced Herod's unlawful marriage to his brother's wife (Matthew 14:1–12).

18.30–37 Those who hoped . . . that very generation.] Allusion to several Bible verses. "The remnant" refers to the group of righteous and faithful believers who will be spared divine punishment. The Old Testament prophets Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah all told of a group of Jews who would survive because they repented and trusted in God. Isaiah was especially concerned with the idea of the remnant and the coming of the Messiah (Isaiah 11:1–26), and in the New Testament, Paul cited Isaiah and wrote of the remnant of Jews whom God's grace would preserve (Romans 9:27, 11:1–5). The idea of a "New Jerusalem" comes from Isaiah's prophecy of future glory for Jerusalem (Isaiah 52:1), and in the New Testament the name refers to the perfected Church after the Final Judgment and in the reign of Christ in the new heaven and new earth (Revelation 3:12, 21). Sackcloth is a coarse cloth made of black goathair (Revelation 6:12) traditionally worn by mourners or penitents, who might also sit in ashes or put ashes upon their heads (2 Samuel 13:19 and Jonah 3:5–6, for example). In the New Testament, sackcloth and ashes are mentioned as signs of repentance (Matthew 11:21; Luke 10:13). Jesus advised followers: "Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning" (Luke 12:35) in preparation for the coming of the kingdom of God; and he warned them that the exact time of the coming was unknown (Matthew 24:42; Mark 13:32–33; Luke 12:35–40). Since one's main concern should be the kingdom of God, Jesus said, "Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 6:33–34).

19.14–15 sifting of the wheat from the tares, or to any burning of whole bundles of nations,] In the Gospel of Matthew 13:24–30 and 36–43, Jesus compared the coming of the kingdom of heaven, when the wicked shall be cast "into a furnace of fire" (13:42) and then the righteous "will shine forth as the sun" (13:43), to the harvest of a field, when the wheat and tares (weeds resembling wheat, maliciously sown by an "enemy" [13:25]) must be similarly separated. Pulling the weeds too early risks uprooting the wheat as well, so the owner of the field charges his servants to wait until the wheat is ripe and then to begin by bundling and burning the tares before gathering and storing the wheat (13:29–30).

19.32 Professor Harnack,] Carl Gustav Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), German theologian and historian of Christianity, born in a Russian province (now Estonia), educated at University of Leipzig, professor at University of Berlin

(1888–1921). His three-volume *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (1886–89) (*History of Dogma*, 7 vols., 1894–99) examined Christian doctrine from its beginnings through the Reformation and questioned miracles, the Resurrection, baptism, and the authorship of several New Testament books. He regarded the adoption of Greek metaphysics by Christian theology as a distortion of Christian doctrine, a view which put him in opposition to conservatives who opposed his appointment to the University of Berlin. His *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900) (*What is Christianity?* [1901]) emphasized the moral message of Christianity to the exclusion of doctrine. The influential twentieth-century theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968) was a student of Harnack and later a strong critic of Harnack's work. In his copy of *Dogmengeschichte*, Santayana wrote, "Harnack's original Christianity is an idiocy pure and simple" (*MARG*, 1:319).

21.1 The prophecy about . . . world] According to the New Testament, Jesus told listeners that some of them would not die before seeing Jesus in his kingdom, suggesting that his return would occur within their lifetimes (Matthew 16:28; Mark 9:1; Luke 9:27). Christians believe that Jesus's return will initiate the Final Judgment and his eternal kingdom will replace the imperfect human world. In the New Testament, 2 Thessalonians 2:1–9 prophesies the coming of Jesus Christ and his destruction of lawlessness, which is the work of Satan. The Nicene Creed, a concise statement of Christian beliefs that originated at the First Ecumenical Council of the Catholic church at Nicaea in 325, states: "[Jesus Christ] will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and his kingdom will have no end" (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed., Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2019, 50).

21.7–8 It would profit . . . his own soul.] Allusion to parallel verses in the three synoptic Gospels:

> For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? (Matthew 16:26)
>
> For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? (Mark 8:36)
>
> For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, or be cast away? (Luke 9:25)

21.23 "this wicked world"] Santayana quoted a similar but longer text in *LR3* (122): "renounce the pomps and vanities of this wicked world," which is found in *The Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, with which is Incorporated a*

Scripture Catechism in the Method of the Assembly's (1703) by Matthew Henry (1662–1714), an English Presbyterian minister and biblical commentator. The text occurs in the context of the question "What is Baptism?" and more specifically the question of whether baptism binds one to renounce the devil (Henry, *A Scripture Catechism,* American edition [Princeton, NJ: Franklin Merrill, 1846], 193). The phrase "this wicked world" appears twice in Marcus Dods's English translation of Augustine's *City of God* ([Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871], 99, 281). Augustine of Hippo (354–430) was a Christian theologian, philosopher, bishop, and Catholic saint, whose writings have directly influenced orthodox doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. His influential work *City of God* (413–26), in twenty-two books, defends Christianity against the charge that its rejection of pagan gods made it responsible for the sack of Rome in 410. Augustine built his defense by describing human history as the interaction between two cities: a divine city of God, exemplified by the true Church, whose members – through grace – have renounced self in favor of God, and a corrupt city of Man (or of Satan), exemplified by Rome or Babylon and whose citizens have turned away from God in favor of self. The progress of history moves toward the separation of the two cities until ultimately all persons are united with their resurrected bodies and citizens of the city of God enjoy the vision of God and citizens of the city of Satan suffer eternal punishment. The second reference to "this wicked world" refers to the condition in which many nonbelievers are mingled with faithful believers in God, but in the future, wrote Augustine, "the wicked must be separated from the good, that in the good, as in his Temple, God may be all in all" (Augustine, *City of God*, 1871, 282). See Note 19.14–15 sifting of the wheat . . . bundles of nations.

21.23–24 "this transitory life"] The phrase occurs in the Church of England's *The Book of Common Prayer* in the section "The Order for the Administration of The Lord's Supper or Holy Communion": "And we most humbly beseech thee of thy goodness, O Lord, to comfort and succour all them, who in this transitory life are in trouble, sorrow, need, sickness, or any other adversity" (*The Book of Common Prayer*, [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892], 242). *The Book of Common Prayer* originated with King Edward VI and his First Prayer Book (1549) and Second Prayer Book (1552), which drew on liturgies from Latin, German, Spanish, and Orthodox traditions and was assembled largely by Thomas Cranmer. The book was altered or suppressed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as religious and political conditions in England changed. Though modernized versions appeared in the late twentieth century, the official version remains the 1662 edition. *The Book of Common Prayer* has greatly influenced the English language and is an early published source for many now common idioms and expressions.

21.24 "the coming of the Kingdom"] The phrase refers to the prophecy discussed in Note 31.3–4 the prophecy about . . . world. It also occurs in the New Testament in Luke 17:20–21:

> Once, on being asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God would come, Jesus replied, "The coming of the kingdom of God is not something that can be observed, nor will people say, 'Here it is,' or 'There it is,' because the kingdom of God is in your midst."

21.24–25 "life everlasting."] The phrase occurs at the end of the Apostles' Creed, a statement of belief used in western Christian churches. The title comes from a reference to the creed in a fourth-century letter from St. Ambrose. Contrary to legend, the creed was not composed by Jesus's twelve apostles. It is derived from a second-century Roman baptismal creed based on Jesus's instruction to spread salvation through baptism found in Matthew 28:19: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The enumeration in this New Testament text of the Trinity (the Christian doctrine of the one God being three persons) gives the creed its three-part structure. The English version current in the nineteenth century comes from the seventeenth-century *The Book of Common Prayer*: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth: And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the virgin Mary, Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead and buried. He descended into Hell, The third day he rose again from the dead. He ascended into Heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty. From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost, The holy Catholic Church, The Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins, The resurrection of the body, And the life everlasting. Amen" (*The Book of Common Prayer* [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892], 55).

22.1 Sodom and Gomorrah] According to the Old Testament, God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah because of the wickedness of the inhabitants: "Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven" (Genesis 19:24). Lot, the nephew of Abraham, was spared destruction because he showed kindness to two strangers and protected them from his neighbors who planned to assault them; the strangers actually were angels sent by God. The angels warned Lot to flee and told him, "We will destroy this place, because the cry of them is waxen great before the face of the LORD; and the LORD hath sent us to destroy it" (Genesis 19:13).

22.3–4 Israel was led . . . restored the Temple.] The Old Testament (2 Kings 24–25) recounts the conquest of Jerusalem by King Nebuchadnezzar of

Babylon in 586 BC. He destroyed the Temple (or Temple Mount) originally built by Solomon (1 Kings 6) and took the Jews captive: "And he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the princes, and all the mighty men of valour, even ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save the poorest sort of the people of the land. . . . And all the men of might, even seven thousand, and craftsmen and smiths a thousand, all that were strong and apt for war, even them the king of Babylon brought captive to Babylon" (2 Kings 24:14, 16). The destruction of the Temple and the Jewish exile in Babylon figure in much of the narrative and imagery of the Old and New Testaments. After this exile ended, reconstruction of the Temple began in 515 BC (Haggai 2). The second Temple was completed by Herod in 20 BC and again destroyed in AD 70 by the Romans.

22.19 St. Paul,] Paul, also known as Saul (died c. AD 67), Christian missionary, born in Tarsus to a Hellenistic Jewish family. He became a Pharisee, represented in the New Testament as demanding strict adherence to the group's interpretation of religious law, especially to laws concerned with ritual purity, and as shunning people regarded as sinners. Initially he opposed Christianity and actively persecuted Christians, but a conversion experience in which the Lord spoke to him convinced him that Jesus lived and was the Son of God (Acts 9:1–31). After his conversion, he became a dedicated preacher of the gospel. Paul's missionary work included extensive travels throughout Greece and Asia Minor, where he established and supported churches in major cities and encouraged church members to evangelize in surrounding towns. The New Testament book of Acts includes information about his mission work and the challenges he faced. The New Testament contains 14 books (Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon, Hebrews) traditionally attributed to Paul and known as the Pauline Epistles. These letters addressed to early church communities and individuals became foundational to Christian theology, influencing Augustine of Hippo (354–430), Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), Martin Luther (1483–1546), John Calvin (1509–1564), and other thinkers essential to the Christian tradition.

22.19 St. James,] James, son of Zebedee (d. AD 44), born in Galilee, worked as a fisherman, one of the Twelve Apostles chosen by Jesus, older brother of Saint John the Apostle. Along with John and Simon Peter, he was a member of Jesus's innermost circle and witnessed the Transfiguration of Christ (when Jesus appeared with Moses and Elijah [Matthew 17:1–13, Mark 9:2–13, Luke 9:28–36]) and Jesus's agony at Gethsemane (where he prayed prior to his arrest resulting from Judas's betrayal [Mark 14:32–42]). Jesus called James and John "Boanerges" or "Sons of Thunder" (Mark 3:17), presumably for their zeal in preaching the gospel. James became the first martyred apostle when he was beheaded by Herod Agrippa I; he is the only apostle whose martyrdom is recorded in the Bible (Acts 12:2). He is distinct from another of the twelve apostles, James, son of Alphaeus (Acts 1:13), and from James, brother of Jesus (Matthew 13:55, Mark 6:3) who became a follower of Jesus after the crucifixion and a leader of the early church (Acts 15:13).

22.20 St. John,] John, son of Zebedee, brother of James, also known as Saint John the Apostle and Saint John the Evangelist. He is traditionally regarded as the author of five books of the New Testament: the Gospel of John; three letters, 1 John, 2 John, and 3 John; and Revelation. The Gospel of John often is distinguished from the three synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) for its emphasis on theology and for providing a foundation for an understanding of what is distinctive about Jesus. Taken together, the stylistically varying letters of John give an account of Jesus's relation to God and humankind, present an idea of righteous conduct, and promote unity among the Christian churches. The book of Revelation is written as a letter to the seven churches of Roman Asia relating a vision John had of the events leading up to God's final judgment and the establishment of a new heaven and earth after the defeat of evil. John is mentioned in the New Testament book of Acts, including his imprisonment along with Peter (Acts 4:1–21) and his evangelizing with Peter in Samaria (Acts 8:14). For James, son of Zebedee, see Note 22.19 St. James.

24.4 whoever does the will . . . brother and sister and mother] Allusion to Matthew 12:50: "For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother."

24.6–7 pledged, at baptism, to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil;] The language is common in Christian tradition. It appears, for example, in the Litany, or general prayer of supplication, recited regularly in Anglican churches after morning prayer on Sundays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and at other ritual services: "*Good Lord deliver us*. . . . from the "the deceipts of the world, the Flesh, and the devill" (*The Book of Common Prayer,* London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892, 74). Santayana appropriated the triad to describe, "after the picturesque manner of Christian wisdom," what distracts spirit or consciousness from "the spontaneous exercise of its liberty and holds it down to the rack of care, doubt, pain, hatred, and vice" (*RB*, 673). In 1938, he described his later work as a "goodbye to the world, the flesh, and the devil, particularly the last, recognized by me under the disguise of modern philosophy" (*LGS,* 6:156).

24.18 Dante?] Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), Italian poet, born in Florence. He was the first poet to write a major work in Italian vernacular. His best-known work is *Divina Commedia* (1321) (*The Divine Comedy*), which describes a spiritual journey through hell, purgatory, and heaven in three *cantiche* (canticles): *Inferno, Purgatorio,* and *Paradiso.* Each of these parts is divided into 33 *canti* (songs) of 115 to 160 lines of verse. For this work, Dante invented the verse form known as *terza rima,* with a rhyme scheme of ABA BCB CDC. In addition to a vision of the afterlife, the poem presents social critique and moral education, drawing symbols and allusions from contemporary political and social events as well as from natural science, astronomy, history, and philosophy. Dante is one of the figures treated in Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910), in which Santayana wrote that Dante's idea of nature "is . . . intercepted by myths and worked out by dialectic." He continued, "Dante is always thinking of the divine order of history and of the spheres; . . . so that he seems to be a cosmic poet, and to have escaped the anthropocentric conceit of romanticism. But he has not escaped it." (*TPP*, 185). Santayana's personal library included four copies of *The Divine Comedy,* two in English and two in Italian. Other important works by Dante include two collections of poems in vernacular with the author's commentary: *Vita Nova* (1293/4) (*The New Life*) and *Convivio* (1304–7) (*The Banquet*); and a prose treatise in Latin on political philosophy: *De Monarchia* (c. 1318).

24.26 Philip II.] (1527–1598), King of Spain; born in Valladolid, son of Emperor Charles V and Isabella of Portugal. In 1556, Charles V abdicated, and Philip became king of Spain, Naples, Sicily, Milan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the Spanish empire in America. Philip aimed to limit French power, beat back the Turks, and defend Catholicism in the lands he ruled. His conflict with France ended in 1559, but he still worked to undermine French stability by supporting civil strife there. His navy defeated the Turks at Lepanto in 1571. Philip was less successful in establishing papal leadership that favored Spanish interests, and in 1588 his attempt to subdue England on behalf of Spanish trade and Catholic interests failed when the Spanish Armada was defeated. He secured his own lands, but the effort—including suppression of the 1567 Revolt of the Netherlands that continued 11 years after his death—strained the Spanish economy and cost much wealth imported from America. In Spain, Philip dealt with two regional rebellions, including one by Moriscos (Christianized Muslims, often suspected of secretly practicing Islam) in Granada (1568–70). In the sixteenth century, Moriscos had become a target of the Spanish Inquisition, an ecclesiastical tribunal that judged and punished heretics and enforced orthodox teaching and that Philip used to eliminate political enemies and extend his power. The Spanish Inquisition was modeled on but separate from the Roman Catholic Inquisition. Philip's cultural legacy includes the Escorial (1563–83), a monastery, palace, and mausoleum, where Philip lived his final years. See also Note 24.29 Inquisition.

24.28 Protestants.] See Note 3.2 Reformation and Note 25.37 Luther; see also Note 24.26 Philip II.

24.29 Inquisition,] A special tribunal of the Catholic Church concerned with the detection and prosecution of heresy. The early Christian Church typically punished heresy with excommunication. After the Roman Empire adopted Christianity, secular rulers came to regard heresy as an affront to their authority punishable by forfeiture of property or death, though the Church's policy on punishment remained largely unchanged. However, in 1184 Pope Lucius III commanded bishops to turn over unrepentant heretics in their dioceses to secular authorities. This was not effective, and in 1233 Pope Gregory IX established a permanent papal inquisition into heresy. Inquisitors, answering to the pope, were assigned to areas where heresy was thought to be a problem and where secular authorities were supportive. By the fifteenth century, the Inquisition was in steep decline. It was revived by Pope Paul III in 1542, though its power extended only to Papal States (most of peninsular Italy and Avignon in France).

The Spanish Inquisition was distinct from that in Rome. Established in 1478 by Ferdinand V (1452–1516) and Isabella I of Castile (1451–1504) and authorized by Pope Sixtus IV, it was a centralized organization led by an Inquisitor General named by the pope. In practice the Inquisitor General served the Spanish king, and Philip II (1527–1598) made use of the Spanish Inquisition to eliminate political enemies and extend his power. The Spanish Inquisition, which punished heretics by torture, seizure of property, and *autos de fé* (public ceremonial punishment, which could include execution by burning), targeted converted Jews and Muslims suspected of being Christians in name only. It also attacked Protestants and Alumbrados (contemplatives, some of whom claimed spiritual visions and original revelations).

In a 1951 letter, Santayana gave this account of the Inquisition:

> This was, and still is, a tribunal to judge any reported heresy or moral perversion arising within the Catholic fold; the accused being assumed to be pledged to support Christian faith and morals. The people are supposed to be unanimous, as in the present Communist countries; and torture was applied, as now in those countries, to extract confessions of guilt from the accused. Nobody was condemned who had not confessed sin, and fire, following on self-accusation, was calculated to burn the corruption away. I once read the verbatim reports of the trial of the Cenci family on the charge of having murdered their husband and father. The judge would say: the Court knows, and would retail [recount] the crime as discovered or imagined by the agents of the Holy Office:

> the prisoners all began by denying and all ended by confessing; and they were condemned to various punishments: the son to be branded with hot irons and then quartered; the wife and daughter to be beheaded, and the boy to be sent to the galleys for life. Horrible glimpses of hell, by which actual endless hell was avoided. There was a sort of rationality in this religious madness; and it is impossible not to be impressed by the overwhelming force of the moral tyranny asserted to rule the world (*LGS,* 8:364).

The Cenci family's torture and killing by the Church are the subject of Shelley's *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts* (1819), about which see Note 109.19 *Cenci.*

25.12 the Revolution] See Note 6.38 French Revolution.

25.33–36 "I see a vision . . . been done for."] The quotation is from section 61 of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's (1844–1900) *The Antichrist* (1895). The original text reads, "Ich sehe ein Schauspiel, so sinnreich, so wunderbar paradox zugleich, dass alle Gottheiten des Olymps einen Anlass zu einem unsterblichen Gelächter gehabt hätten – Cesare Borgia als Papst . . . Versteht man mich? . . . Wohlan, das wäre der Sieg gewesen, nach dem ich heute allein verlange –: damit war des Christenthum abgeschafft!" (*Nietzsches Werke*, Vol. 8 [Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1899], 311). The first English translation reads, "I see a spectacle so rich in meaning and so wonderfully paradoxical to boot, that it would be enough to make all the gods of Olympus rock with immortal laughter, – *Caesar Borgia as Pope*. . . . Do you understand me? . . . Very well then, this would have been the triumph which *I* alone am longing for to-day: – this would have *swept* Christianity *away!*" (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Vol. 16, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, *First Complete and Authorised English Translation in Eighteen Volumes*, ed. Oscar Levy, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici [Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911], 228–29). This contemporary authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 5.17 Nietzsche.

25.34 Cæsar Borgia] Cesare Borgia (1475–1507), Italian political and military leader, Duke of Valentinois, Duke of Romagna, born in Rome as the illegitimate son of the Aragon aristocrat Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia (later Pope Alexander VI). In 1492 Cesare's father was elected the second Borgia pope (after Callistus III [reigned 1455–58]), and Cesare was then made archbishop of Valencia and admitted to the College of Cardinals a year later. In 1497, Cesare's brother Giovanni (Juan), Duke of Gandía, was murdered by an unknown assailant. Cesare resigned his ecclesiastical offices and succeeded his brother as Captain-General of the Church in charge of the papal army. A successful military commander, Cesare conquered most of central Italy in two campaigns beginning in 1500. Cesare and his father became seriously ill in 1503 (possibly from poisoning); his father died and Cesare remained incapacitated and politically ineffective. Cesare had an ally in the newly elected Pope Pius III (reigned 1503), but Pius III died three weeks after assuming office. His successor, Julius II (reigned 1503–1513), was a longtime opponent of the Borgias, and Cesare lost his Italian conquests and fled to Naples. In 1504, Cesare was arrested and delivered to the Spanish King Ferdinand, who imprisoned him for two years before he escaped. Cesare then served in the military of his brother-in-law King John III of Navarre and died in 1507 while besieging a rebel castle. Cesare had a reputation for cruelty but also was known as a firm and fair ruler. Niccolò Machiavelli wrote approvingly of Cesare Borgia in his work *The Prince*: "There were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties" (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott [London: J. M. Dent, 1903], 61). In Machiavelli's judgment, the only political mistake Cesare ever made was not preventing the election of Julius II by supporting a rival candidate.

25.37 Luther] Martin Luther (1483–1546), German theologian and leader of the Protestant Reformation, born in Eisleben, Saxony, educated in Magdeburg and Erfurt. He entered the monastery of the Augustinian Friars in 1505 and two years later was ordained a priest. In 1508 he was named professor of moral philosophy at the University of Wittenberg, where in 1511 he became doctor of theology and professor of biblical exegesis, a position he held for the rest of his life. In 1517, Luther posted on the church door at Wittenberg ninety-five theses criticizing the use of indulgences by the Catholic Church. This academic dispute became a movement for church reform typically known as the Protestant Reformation or simply the Reformation. In 1520, Luther explicitly advocated reform in three treatises addressed to the German people and the following year was condemned as a heretic and excommunicated by the Catholic Church. Unlike earlier critics of the Roman Catholic Church, he attacked doctrine rather than simply the day to day activities of the church and its relationship with adherents. In particular, he rejected papal authority in favor of unmediated interpretation of the Bible; abandoned several Catholic sacraments, including confession; and believed that salvation is the gift of divine grace rather than the result of human effort, thereby denying the power of an institution to mediate one's relationship to God or determine one's spiritual state. See also Note 3.2 Reformation.

26.27 Empedocles] Empedocles of Acragas (492–432 BC), philosopher, poet, and physician. He was born in the Greek city of Acragas (present-day Agrigento in Sicily) to an aristocratic family, was active in political life, and participated in the Olympic Games. He was influenced by Parmenides, and his thought is preserved in two fragmentary poems, *On Nature* and *Purifications*, and in the work of Diogenes Laërtius (third century AD). He is known for his theory of matter (which remained influential until the advent of modern chemistry in the eighteenth century), which posits four "roots" or unchanging elements: earth, water, fire, and air. He also held that the cosmos results from the cyclical influence on the elements of Love and Strife. When Love dominates, the universe is a harmonious whole; when Strife dominates, all elements are completely separated.

27.27 Ritschl] Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), German Protestant theologian, born in Berlin, educated at Bonn, Halle, Heidelberg, and Tübingen. He was professor of theology at Bonn (1851–64) and Göttingen (1864–89). As a student of F. C. Baur, Ritschl initially followed the Tübingen School, which used Hegelian ideas to explain the development of early Christianity, but he broke with his early academic influences in the 1850s. He came to regard religion and faith as superior to philosophy and reason, and he believed that the exculpation of sins and reconciliation with God are possible only through the community. He rejected metaphysical inquiry, natural theology, mysticism, and individualism for this communal faith as a means to revelation and relation with God. His central ideas are expressed in the influential three-volume *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (1870–74) (*The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*). The Ritschlian School, emphasizing ethics and community, included theologians J. W. M. Kaftan (1848–1926), Wilhelm Hermann (1846–1922), Adolf Harnack (1851–1930), and Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923). By the 1920s Ritschl's influence had waned considerably. See Note 29.7 Professor Harnack and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

28.11 *a priori,*] Latin for "before," used in philosophy to denote knowledge that is prior to or independent of experience.

28.19–20 Pius X. . . . modernism,] Giuseppe Melchiorre Sarto (1835–1914), Roman Catholic priest and Pope (reigned 1903–1914), born to a poor family in Riese, Upper Venetia, Italy. Ordained in 1858, he became Pope Pius X in 1903 and took as his motto "Instaurare omnia in Christo" ("To restore all things in Christ") (Ephesians 1:10), consistent with his intention to be a religious rather than political leader. This meant not that he disregarded political matters but rather that he resolved not to compromise with secular authorities: he protested the separation of church and state legislated in France and Portugal; he supported Catholics in Poland and Ireland, to the vexation of Russian and British leaders; and he was an active opponent of socialism both before and during his time as pope. He also opposed the liberalizing movement in the Roman Catholic Church known as Modernism. In his decree *Lamentabili* (3 July 1907) Pius X rejected Modernist propositions that departed from orthodox views of the Church, revelation, Christ, and the sacraments, and in his encyclical (a letter addressed to all Roman Catholic parishes) *Pascendi* (8 September 1907) he condemned Modernism, calling it a "synthesis of all heresies." He also instituted an anti-Modernist oath for all clergy. Though he was religiously conservative, he reorganized church administration, education, and liturgy with the aims of securing the independence of the Church, increasing pastoral effectiveness, and improving the spiritual life of Catholics generally. While still living, he was regarded as a saint with a reputation for miracles, and he was canonized forty years after his death, in 1954. For Catholic Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist.

28.22 Prometheus,] In Greek mythology, Prometheus, son of the Titan Iapetus, seeks to alleviate human suffering by introducing fire in defiance of the gods, who have reserved fire for themselves. Zeus, king of the gods, punishes Prometheus by chaining him to the top of a mountain and dispatching an eagle to eat his liver. By night Prometheus's liver grows back and the eagle returns the next day to repeat the evisceration. Even after prolonged suffering, Prometheus refuses to submit to Zeus and eventually is rescued by Hercules. See also Note 109.22 *Prometheus* about Shelley's 1820 drama *Prometheus Unbound* based on the Greek myth.

28.31 Ovid] Publius Ovidius Naso (43 BC–AD 17), Roman poet, born to an aristocratic family at Sulmo in Abruzzi, educated in Rome. After a brief career in law, he dedicated himself, contrary to his father's wishes, to writing poetry. At the height of his fame, he was exiled in AD 8 by the Emperor Augustus to a remote town on the Black Sea, where he died. The cause of his exile is unclear but may have been due to knowledge of a scandal involving Augustus or his family. Ovid is perhaps best known for his unorthodox epic *Metamorphoses (Transformations).* Purporting to be a history of the world from creation to his own times in fifteen books, it compiles mythological tales of shape changing in the natural and divine worlds. Among his contemporaries, Ovid gained prominence as a writer of love elegies. *Amores (Loves)* is composed as an autobiographical account of a love affair. Unlike earlier love elegies, Ovid's work unites the perspective of the poet and the lover. *Heroides* (*Heroines*) is a collection of epistolary poems written from the perspective of mythological women to lovers or husbands. Ovid also composed a series of three didactic works on love, writing in the second person. The first, *Ars Amatoria* (*Art of Love*) gives relationship advice to both men and women. *Medicamina Faciei Femineae*

(Women's Facial Cosmetics) gives instruction about female makeup. *Remedia Amoris (Cures for Love)* provides an antidote to the results of the first book, explaining how to fall out of love. In a 1948 letter (some thirty-five years after the reference in the present work), Santayana wrote, "I have recently got . . . two lovely eighteenth century editions, one of Lucretius and the other of Ovid. In the latter I have discovered that the end of Romeo & Juliet comes from that of Pyramus and Thisbe!" (*LGS*, 8:114).

28.32 Mohammed,] also known as Mahomet or Muhammad (c. 570–632), prophet and founder of Islam, born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, orphaned and raised in the tribe of his uncle Abu Talib. According to his traditional biography, Mohammed was visited in 610 by the angel Gabriel, who delivered words from God about correct worship, his earlier prophets (including Adam, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, and Jesus), Judgment Day, and right conduct. These revelations would be compiled in a standardized written form in the 650s as the Quran. Initially, Mohammed repeated God's message privately to family, and then publicly in 613. Wealthy merchants opposed Mohammed's teachings that elevated the importance of piety over one's class, wealth, or race; and in 622, Mohammed and his followers were forced to flee to Yathrib, which then became known as Medina (from Madinat al-Nabi, "city of the Prophet"). This flight to Medina is known as the Hegira ("Emigration"). Mohammed established Islam in Medina and surrounding areas; and in 628, after years of conflict with Mecca, he negotiated a treaty to allow his followers to make a pilgrimage (or hajj) to Mecca. When the treaty was broken a year later, Mohammed peacefully took control of Mecca. Mohammed made the hajj in 631 and died the next year in Medina, where he was buried in the mosque.

30n.1–2 M. Le Roy's interesting theory of dogma] Édouard Le Roy (1870–1954). French philosopher, born in Paris, studied at the École Normale Supérieure, earning a doctorate in 1898. He was deeply influenced by Henri Bergson, whom he succeeded as professor of philosophy at the Collège de France in 1921. Le Roy claimed that scientific facts are constructed as means to action in meeting human needs. Science, in this way, modifies reality and enables discourse about what would otherwise be an inarticulate flux. Le Roy applied these pragmatic ideas to religious truth in *Dogme et critique* (1907) (translation published as *What is a Dogma?*), which influenced Modernist theologians who were condemned in Pope Pius X's 1907 encyclical *Pascendi.* (Le Roy's 1929 work *Le problème de Dieu [The Problem of God]* would be placed on the Catholic Church's "List of Prohibited Books.") Le Roy maintained that dogma was unprovable, imposed by authority, assumed a medieval worldview, and was incompatible with modern inquiry, and so could not be regarded as truth, but that dogma has a pragmatic moral value as a guide to action. Le Roy considered Christianity not as a collection of speculative truths but as a set of precepts indicating a way of life. Raised a Catholic and trained as a scientist, his philosophy reflected his commitment to both institutions. Santayana's personal library included Le Roy's *Dogme et critique* (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907), which includes the following comment among Santayana's marginal notes: "Le Roy is more interested in proving that Catholics must be pragmatists than that men should be Catholics" (*MARG*, 1:446). For Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist; for Pius X and his encyclical letter *Pascendi*, see Note 28.19–20 Pius X . . . modernism.

30.16–17 Because, as one of the most distinguished modernists has said, the age of partial heresy is past.] Édouard Le Roy wrote, "Nous ne sommes plus au temps des hérésies partielles" ("We no longer live in the day of partial heresies") in *Dogme et critique* (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907), 5. See Note 30n.1–2 M. Le Roy's . . . .

31.22 mysticism,] The religious attitude or opinion that knowledge of the real world cannot be obtained by means of the senses or by conceptual thought. Such knowledge is obtained instead through mystical experience, often connected with ascetic or meditative practice. Typically, mystical experience leads to the realization that distinctions between oneself and reality, or subject and object, are erroneous. Santayana wrote of mysticism that it is

> a certain genial loosening of convention, whether rational or mythical. . . . Mysticism can exist, in varied degrees, at any stage of rational development. Its presence is therefore no indication of the worth or worthlessness of its possessor. . . . Mysticism is the most primitive of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments of intellectual arrest and dissolution. It can exist in a child, very likely in an animal. . . . When articulation fails in the face of experience; when instinct guides without kindling any prophetic idea to which action may be inwardly referred; when life and hope and joy flow through the soul from an unknown region to an unknown end, then consciousness is mystical. . . . Every religion, all science, all art, is accordingly subject to incidental mysticism; but in no case can mysticism stand alone and be the body or basis of anything. (*LR5*, 164–65)

31.38 "Scholasticism"] The term typically refers to an academic European philosophy that flourished in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries. Scholasticism grew out of the traditions of Plato (c. 427–347 BC), Aristotle (384–322 BC), and Christian apologetics. Influential figures on the development of Scholasticism include Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and Anicius Manlius Severinus Boëthius of Rome (480–524). Consistent with Anselm of Canterbury's (1033–1109) phrase *fides quaerens intellectum* ("faith seeking understanding"), Scholastic philosophers often were concerned with making Christian theology a field of rational inquiry, resulting in contributions to logic and the nature of scientific inquiry. Scholasticism declined in the Renaissance as inductive methods of scientific inquiry and humanism challenged the theological agenda in philosophy. In addition to Anselm, important scholastic philosophers included Peter Abelard (1079–1142), Peter Lombard (1100–1160), Albertus Magnus (c. 1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), Bonaventure (1221–1274), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William of Ockham (1285–1349). Neo-scholastic revivals (often characterized as neo-Thomist for their emphasis on Aquinas's philosophy) have occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a marginal note to neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain's 1934 work *Sept leçons sur l'être et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative (A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being),* Santayana characterized Scholasticism as "myth denuded of poetry and reduced to grammar" (*MARG*, 2:23). For Augustine, see Note 21.23 "this wicked world." See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 45.12 Aristotle.

31.39 "Mediævalism"] The study or reconstruction of the arts and culture of the European Middle Ages (eighth century to fifteenth century). Medievalism includes the treatment in art of medieval themes such as chivalry, religious faith, and social hierarchy. It may be exemplified in literature in the use of medieval idioms, as in Edmund Spenser's (c. 1552–1599) use of expressions from Geoffrey Chaucer's (c. 1340–1400) poetry or in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's (1772–1834) imitation of medieval ballads. Social critics such as Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) and John Ruskin (1819–1900) drew on medieval values to present an alternative to modern industrial society. Also reacting to industrial society, Pre-Raphaelite artists such as Dante Gabriel Rossetti (1828–1882), John Millais (1829–1896), and William Holman Hunt (1827–1910) took up a medieval aesthetic, which they conceived as favoring clean lines, in an attempt to achieve a pictorial realism in service of social utility as well as beauty. The first use of the term "mediaevalism" is attributed to Ruskin in an 1853 lecture in which he distinguished architectural styles of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the postmedieval period. In the decades following Ruskin's use, the term often was used to distinguish popular interest in the Middle Ages from scholarly inquiries in medieval history and philology. See also Note 5.38 Ruskin and Note 127.10 Carlyle.

32.27 German idealism;] A nineteenth-century philosophical movement that reintroduced speculative metaphysics after its eclipse by science during the Enlightenment. Idealism holds that human self-consciousness is the main philosophical datum; that the world is thoroughly spiritual, having something akin to a cosmic self; and that for both the individual and the cosmic self the will is more significant than the intellect. Important figures in German idealism include Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854). Santayana was critical of German idealism because he saw it as a sort of romantic egotism which grew out of Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) "radical subjectification of knowledge" (*EGP*, 34). Santayana characterized German idealism as "a false physics adored" (*LR1*, 107) and "a translation of physical evolution into a mythical language, which now presents the facts in the guise of a dialectical progression, now in that of a romantic drama" (*LR5*, 5). Santayana's personal library included Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* (*Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794]), trans. A. E. Kroeger (Philadelphia,

J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868); Anna Boynton Thompson's *The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895); Benedetto Croce's (1866–1952) *Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel* (*What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel*), trans. Henri Buriot (Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1910); Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* ed. Johannes Schulze (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*); and *The Logic of Hegel,* translated from Hegel's *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817–1843) (*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*) by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 9.21 idealism; Note 11.15 Hegel; for Fichte, Note 66.10 Fichtean; Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

34.2 vanity and vexation of spirit,] Allusion to Ecclesiastes 1:14: "I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit."

34.10–11 waiting lamp in hand for the celestial bridegroom.] Allusion to the parable of the wise and foolish virgins in Matthew 25:1–12: "Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom" (25:1). The bridegroom arrived at midnight; the wise virgins, who had brought extra lamp oil with them, were ready to meet the bridegroom for their metaphorical marriage, while the foolish virgins, who had run out of oil and had to go out and buy more, were shut out of the kingdom of God: "Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us. But he answered and said: Verily I say unto you, I know you not" (25:11–12).

34.27 as a leaven] Appears in several parables in the New Testament, in the metaphorical sense of something initially almost imperceptible bringing about an overwhelming change in the whole of what it touches. The metaphor is used to refer to both negative and positive changes. Here is it used positively, as in Matthew 13:33: "Another parable spake he unto them; The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened" and its doublet Luke 13:20–21.

34.31 monachism,] Another term for monasticism, both coming from the ancient Greek μοναχός, meaning "single, solitary." Monachism or monasticism has come to refer to the practices of monks and nuns, who take religious vows renouncing or limiting conventional social institutions (such as family and private property) and physical pleasures (such as sex, food, or sleep) in order to better cultivate spiritual discipline through, for example, systematic meditation, prayer, study, or fasting. Monastic life may be solitary (hermitic) or communal (cenobitic). Both forms are found in the Christian tradition of monasticism, which originated in ascetic practices of the early Church that attempted to detach members from worldly concerns. Supporters of Christian monasticism find scriptural support in Jesus's call to leave behind family and follow him (Luke 14:26; Matthew 10:34–39) and in Paul's endorsement of celibacy (1 Corinthians 7:1, 7–8). In the sixth century, St. Benedict of Nursia (c. 480–c. 550) composed administrative and spiritual rules that influenced Christian monasticism in Europe for centuries. Christian monasteries supported local economies both as producers and consumers of goods and services, became centers of learning where manuscripts were kept and copied, and developed political significance as providers of priests and bishops who served in the hierarchy of an increasingly powerful Church. Sixteenth-century humanists attacked monasticism for deceiving lay people with the shallow trappings of holiness while indulging in corruption and material excess. Reformation theology, such as that of Martin Luther, maintained that salvation came through divine grace, not human effort (such as monastic practices), and so rejected the idea of monastics as spiritual elite, instead articulating a form of holiness outside of the monastery in work and marriage. See Note 3.2 Reformation; for sixteenth-century humanists, see Note 15.1 Renaissance; and for Martin Luther, see Note 25.37 Luther.

34.31 scholasticism,] See Note 31.38 Scholasticism.

34.31 Jesuitism,] Jesuits are members of the Society of Jesus, a Catholic religious order founded by Ignatius of Loyola in 1534 and approved by Pope Paul III in 1540. Loyola's book *Spiritual Exercises*, a thirty-day program of meditations required of every initiate and typically repeated annually by Jesuits, continues to guide Jesuit spirituality. The organization has been distinguished since its beginning by its commitment to ministry and mission work, and Jesuits vow to minister anywhere in the world at the direction of the Pope. The Jesuit commitment to ministry was extended in 1548 when they began large-scale efforts in education, which has earned them a reputation for learning and scholarship. While other religious orders included scholars, Jesuits' systematic approach to learning and education distinguished them. The Society of Jesus added "defense of the faith" to their stated aims in 1550, and they were active (especially in German-speaking countries) in opposing the Reformation, which included prosecuting heresy but also pastoral efforts to support and encourage Catholics experiencing doubt or facing criticism. The power of the Jesuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made them targets of both political and religious opponents, and eventually Pope Clement XIV, compelled by France, Spain, and Portugal, suppressed the Society of Jesus in 1773. However, with protection from Frederick the Great of Prussia (Friedrich II, 1713–1786) and Empress Catherine of Russia (Catherine II, 1729–1796), the Jesuits continued to teach in Austria and Germany and initiated new members in Russia.

Governmental indifference in England allowed them to retain property and establish a college at Stonyhurst in 1794. In 1814, Pope Pius VII restored the Jesuit order. In 2013, Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina became the first Jesuit pope, taking the papal name Francis. Santayana, in *Reason in Society* (1905), cited the Jesuits, along with Sparta, as societies in which “public spirit has held best [though] it has been paid for by a notable lack of spontaneity and wisdom; such inhuman devotion to an arbitrary end has made these societies odious. We may say, therefore, that a zeal sufficient to destroy selfishness is, as men are now constituted, worse than selfishness itself. In pursuing prizes for themselves people benefit their fellows more than in pursuing such narrow and irrational ideals as alone seem to be powerful in the world. . . . For an indoctrinated and collective virtue turns easily to fanaticism; it imposes irrational sacrifices prompted by some abstract principle or habit once, perhaps, useful; but that convention soon becomes superstitious and ceases to represent general human excellence” (*LR2,* 84–85). See also Note 3.2 Reformation.

34.31 ultramontanism,] From Latin, “ultra” meaning “beyond,” and “montes” meaning “mountains.” For most of Europe, an ultramontane was an Italian, who lived beyond the Alps. The term took on an ecclesiastical rather than geographical sense in the eighteenth century and referred to Catholics who supported papal over state authority in matters of doctrine and Church governance. Ultramontanism was opposed to movements such as Gallicanism in France and Josephinism in Austria that promoted Enlightenment principles and national authority over the Church. Ultramontanism appealed to those in the Church seeking to strengthen Catholic identity as state support for religion declined, and the Ultramontane party gained influence with the 1814 restoration by Pius VII of the Jesuit order, the 1864 issuing by Pius IX of the *Syllabus Errorum* declaring liberalism incompatible with Catholicism, and the 1870 declaration by the First Vatican Council of papal infallibility. See also Note 34.31 Jesuitism.

34.31 Vaticanism] The doctrine, sometimes equated with Ultramontanism, of papal supremacy and infallibility. These dogmas have deep historical roots, but were first formally defined in 1870, in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Pastor Aeternus*. This doctrine was reaffirmed in *Lumen Gentium*, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church promulgated by the Second Vatican Council in 1964: “The Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible principle and foundation of unity of both the bishops and of the faithful” (Vatican Council II, *Lumen Gentium*, “The Mystery of the Church,” §23, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html; accessed 28 February

2020). “The pope’s power of primacy over all, both pastors and faithful, remains whole and intact. In virtue of his office, that is as Vicar of Christ and pastor of the whole Church, the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme and universal power over the Church. And he is always free to exercise this power” (*Lumen Gentium*, §22).

35.8 *mise-en-scène*] From the French for “putting” or “placing on stage”; it is used in English to mean the stage setting; the arrangement of scenery, props, and actors; or the physical environment of a scene. It can be used apart from the context of theatre production or filmmaking to refer more generally to situation or surroundings.

35.26 Buddhists,] Students of the teachings of the Buddha, who was born Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–c. 480 BC) in present-day Nepal. The Buddha’s teachings emerged in a context of Vedic and Brahmanic religious traditions of northern India, but they differed from these traditions in rejecting the caste system and Brahmanic ritualism and in finding transience in all things, including self. Buddha taught that relief from suffering is the result of pursuing the Middle Way between austerity and sensual indulgence, and he expressed his insights in the form of The Four Noble Truths: suffering or dissatisfaction exists; its cause lies in desire or clinging to what is transient; it can be ended by eliminating desire or clinging; the way to end desire or clinging is the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path consists in perfected view, perfected resolution, perfected speech, perfected conduct, perfected livelihood, perfected effort, perfected mindfulness, and perfected concentration (in some translations “perfected” is replaced with “right” or “skillful”). Following the Eightfold Path results in escape from samsara, or the cycle of birth and death, and achievement of nirvana, or the extinction of desire. Though the number of followers of Buddha’s teachings had declined in India by the first century, these teachings had already spread throughout Asia and given rise to a new form known as Mahayana which emphasized the pursuit of enlightenment or nirvana for the well-being of all sentient creatures, in contrast to the older form of Theravada that emphasizes personal enlightenment. Further developments occurred in the seventh century with the arrival of the Buddha’s teachings in Tibet and the emergence, under the influence of Taoism, of Zen Buddhism in China, with this latter becoming established in Japan in the twelfth century. There are an estimated three million students of the Buddha’s teachings today. Santayana wrote in response to a query about his thoughts on Buddhism that he made “no distinction between [Buddhism] and Brahmanism, between Vendanta and Samkya philosophies. This is not wholly an effect of ignorance, but because the differences touch mythology or metaphysics only, and not the wisdom which is all I care for in these (or any other) philosophers" (*LGS,* 3:68).

35.26 Mohammedans] Followers of the teachings of Mohammed, also known as Muslims or adherents of Islam. See Note 28.32 Mohammed.

36.10 Noah] According to the Bible, Noah, a tenth-generation descendant of the first man Adam, and his family were spared when God caused a great flood to wipe out all other humans because of their corruption and immorality. God warned Noah of the impending deluge and instructed him to build an ark and take on board a breeding pair of each kind of animal. The inhabitants of the ark then repopulated the earth after the flood subsided. According to the account, all later peoples are descended from Noah's sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth (Genesis 5:28–10:1).

37.15 a voice crying in the wilderness,] Allusion to Mark 1:2–3: "As it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." This passage, which paraphrases Isaiah 40:3, in context announces the imminent metaphorical or literal presence of God. Often the phrase, "a voice crying in the wilderness," indicates a significant announcement not heeded, as early Christians perceived the announcement of the appearance of Christ and Christ's subsequent message not to have been heeded by their persecutors.

The Philosophy of M. Henri Bergson

40.1 Plato] Greek philosopher (c. 427–347 BC), born to a wealthy family in Athens. He was a follower of Socrates (469–399 BC), and in 387 BC he founded the Academy in Athens, where Aristotle (384–322 BC) was his student. Plato wrote approximately twenty–four dialogues, which typically feature an inquirer and a respondent exploring a topic. Plato maintained that the observable world is made up of imperfect copies of unchanging ideal "Forms" that constitute true reality. His ethical doctrine advocated a life dedicated to study and contemplation of these Forms. Because the truth of the Forms was difficult (or impossible) to communicate, some commentators have thought that Plato resorted to myths in his dialogues to convey a sense of the truth. Santayana wrote that in the 1890s "what then most enticed me in philosophy was Plato" (*PP,* 393). In 1896–97, he took a leave of absence from teaching at Harvard and enrolled as an advanced student at King's College, Cambridge University, where he studied Plato with English classics scholar Henry Jackson (1839–1921) (*PP*, 394, 439). After returning to Harvard, Santayana began teaching "a new course, Philosophy 12, on Plato and Aristotle in English, which remained my chief subject, until almost the end. I lectured on the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*" (*PP*, 394). In *Reason in Religion* (1905), Santayana wrote of the "disastrous consequences" of Plato's parables or mythmaking and described how Greek culture appropriated Hebrew metaphors and created "a chimerical metaphysics containing much which, in reference to existing facts, is absurd" (*LR3,* 54). Santayana further remarked that "to give moral importance to myths, as Plato tended to do, is to take them far too seriously and to belittle what they stand for" (*LR4,* 108). Santayana's personal library contained editions of Plato's dialogues in German, English, and ancient Greek. See also Note 45.12 Aristotle and Note 49.5 Socrates.

40.1 Kant] See Note 5.16 Kant.

40.21 Prussia,] The Kingdom of Prussia, established in 1701, occupied present-day northeast Germany and Poland with Berlin as its capital. In the eighteenth century under Friedrich II (Frederick the Great, 1713–1786), Prussia became a military and cultural leader. In the nineteenth century, after the Prussian victory over France in 1871, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) united twenty-five German states to create the German Second Empire, led by the Prussian king, who became Emperor Wilhelm I. The Prussian monarchy was dissolved after Germany's defeat in World War I, and Prussia as a political entity ceased to exist after Germany's defeat in World War II. Prussia's significance for the history of philosophy owes much to Frederick, who as a young man cultivated a deep interest in philosophy. He was an admirer of German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754), and shortly after becoming king Frederick recalled Wolff to Halle from Marburg, where he had been exiled for impiety. Frederick actively supported the French Enlightenment, welcoming Voltaire (1694–1778), Jean-Baptiste le Rond d'Alembert (1717–1783), Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Count of Mirabeau (1749–1791), and others to Berlin. Prussian-born philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) wrote that "this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick" ("An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. Ted Humphrey [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983], 45). In the Prussian capital city in 1809, philosophers Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), and Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768–1834) founded the University of Berlin, where Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) later became a professor. In his copy of British Idealist Thomas Hill Green's (1836–1882) *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Santayana notes in the margin by Green's characterization of ideal society:

"Here is base Hegelianism. Prussia the type of heaven" (*MARG,* 1:292). See also Note 3.7 Voltaire; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Bismarck; Note 11.15 Hegel; for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean; and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

40.22 Spinoza] Baruch (or Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677), Dutch philosopher, born and educated in the Spanish–Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam. He studied René Descartes's (1596–1650) philosophy with a German former Jesuit, Franciscus van den Enden, in 1652–56, and in 1656 the Jewish community excommunicated Spinoza for his unorthodox views. In 1673 he refused the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg because he was unwilling to give up his independence and tranquility. Spinoza's philosophy finds its fullest expression in his most famous work, *Ethics* (1677). Spinoza maintained that one cannot understand the world without understanding it as a whole, a single system that has two names, God and Nature. This pantheism constituted the heresy that led to his excommunication. Santayana published "The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza" in *The Harvard Monthly* (June 1886: 144–52) and wrote an introduction to Spinoza's *Ethics and De intellectus emendatione* (London: Dent, 1910, vii–xxii). In 1932 Santayana was invited to give a public lecture, published as "Ultimate Religion" in *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews* (ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936], 280–97), in honor of the tricentennial of Spinoza's birth. In his autobiography, Santayana characterized Spinoza as his "master and model" in understanding the naturalistic basis of morality. While Santayana regarded Spinoza as a complete naturalist, he believed "Spinoza was not a complete humanist. He had no idea of human greatness and no sympathy with human sorrow. His notion of the soul was too plebeian and too quietistic. . . . Now such limitations, deep as they run, do not at all annul the nobility of Spinoza's simple and brave life, devoted to sublime speculation; yet they destroy the authority of his judgment in moral matters" (*PP*, 235). Nevertheless, Santayana maintained Spinoza to "have been right on the chief issue, the relation of man and of his spirit to the universe" (*SAF*, viii). Santayana thought Spinoza distinct among "modern writers on philosophy" because he, like "ancient philosophers and modern saints or poets," surveyed "the world of existences in its truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives" (*SELS,* 120–21). Unlike modern philosophers, Spinoza along with Lucretius "were not especially epistemologists but had theories of the nature of things, putting human 'knowledge' in its place" (*LGS*, 8:233). In contrast to Bergson with his "blindness to definite concepts, to the *tout fait* [ready-made] and the 'static'"(*LGS,* 7:370), Spinoza was "the clearest philosopher on the 'eternal' . . . . Plato too often shows that his heart is in the right place but his political preoccupations make him lean more and more, as he grows old, to popularise his myths into dogmas" (*LGS*, 8:311). Santayana's personal library included a collection of Spinoza's works entitled *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1882–83) and several of Spinoza's works in German and Spanish. For Lucretius, see Note 67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing.

40.23 St. Francis] Saint Francis of Assisi, originally Giovanni Francesco di Pietro di Bernardone (c. 1181–1226), Italian monk, preacher, and founder of the Franciscan order. Born into a wealthy merchant family, he fought as a soldier and was held as a prisoner of war for a year. In 1204, he had a vision that led him to give up soldiering. Later, after a pilgrimage to Rome, he broke with his old life in Assisi and was disowned by his father. In 1208, while attending Mass, he heard the preaching of the gospel as a personal call and undertook a life of poverty and evangelism. Attracting similarly committed men, he composed a simple rule of life, and in 1209 Pope Innocent III approved the new religious order. In 1212, Saint Clare, originally Chiara Offreduchio (1194–1253), a noblewoman of Assisi, was inspired by Francis's ideals to establish a religious order for women. Francis's order continued to grow, and the simple rule he composed was revised and approved in 1223 by Pope Honorius III. In 1224, Francis displayed the stigmata wounds of the crucified Christ. In 1226, he died in Assisi, and in 1228, he was canonized. He is known for his humility, charity, love of nature, strong faith, and devotion to God. Twentieth-century interest in Francis revived with the scholarly work of Paul Sabatier, whom Santayana, in a 1909 letter, reported reading and described as "a Protestant, but a great friend of the 'Modernists'" (*LGS*, 1:406). Francis's writings include rules for his followers, liturgical works, and letters (*Francis and Clare: The Complete Works*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong and Ignatius C. Brady [New York: Paulist Press, 1982]). For Catholic Modernists, see Note 3.11 modernist.

41.15 *"retardent sur Kant"*;] In *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), Bergson wrote, "Ces doctrines se trouvent ainsi retarder sur la critique kantienne" (235), translated as "These doctrines are thus found to fall short of the Kantian criticism" (*Creative Evolution,* trans. Arthur Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911], 356). "Retarder sur" can also imply being behind the times, echoed in Santayana's comment in the same paragraph that "M. Bergson himself 'lags behind' Kant." The quotation refers to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). See also Note 5.16 Kant.

41.17 more sinned against than sinning,] In William Shakespeare's (1564–1616) tragedy *King Lear*, Act 3, Scene 2, Lear says, "I am a man more sinned against than sinning." See also Note 15.2 Shakespeare.

41.25 Scylla or Charybdis.] In Book 12 of Homer's *Odyssey*, Odysseus is warned by Circe of the threat posed by Scylla and Charybdis. Scylla is a six-headed monster living in a cave above the Straits of Messina whose heads, each with three rows of teeth, dart out to snatch fish or passing sailors from the water below. Across from Scylla, the monster Charybdis lies beneath the water and three times daily sucks in the sea and spews it out, resulting in the whirlpool that bears her name. When Odysseus comes to the Straits of Messina, he sees the water churned up by Charybdis and must drive the ship away from it to avoid going down, but Scylla then snatches up and devours six of his sailors. From this story comes the expression "to be caught between Scylla and Charybdis," which means to be faced with two equally unappealing or dangerous courses of action.

41.26 English malicious psychology] In "On Some Critics of this Discovery," Chapter 4 of *Reason in Common Sense*, Santayana wrote of the "malicious purpose" of "the English psychologists who first disintegrated the idea of substance" (*LR1*, 53). He was referring to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), and George Berkeley (1685–1753), and their heir Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who, according to Santayana, reasoned according to the principle "that ideas whose materials could all be accounted for in consciousness and referred to sense or to the operations of the mind were thereby exhausted and deprived of further validity" (*LR1*, 53). The malicious result was that "the advance of psychology meant, in this school, the retreat of reason" (*LR1*, 53). In "Hesitations in Method," Chapter 4 of *Reason in Science*, Santayana wrote of the psychologists treating "the whole mechanical world as a mere idea. In that case, it is true, the only existences that remained remained entirely without calculable connexions: every thing was a divine trance or a shower of ideas falling by chance through the void. But this result might not be unwelcome. It fell in well enough with that love of emotional issues, that want of soberness and want of cogency, which is so characteristic of modern philosophers" (*LR5*, 58). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 8.8–9 modern philosophy; for Berkeley, see Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.27 Locke; and Note 46.20 Mill.

41.27 Locke] John Locke (1632–1704), English philosopher and physician, born in Somerset to a middle-class Puritan family, studied at Oxford. His important works include *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1689) and the *Second Treatise of Government* (1689). Locke is regarded as one of the British Empiricists, since he rejected innate ideas as an explanation for knowledge. He instead regarded the mind as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) at birth that acquires ideas through experience, specifically through sensation and reflection. The mind then combines, divides, generalizes, and abstracts these ideas to create new ideas. Locke accounts for physical objects, about which one has ideas, in terms of matter in motion and impacts among material bodies. But Locke characterized the fundamental substance of things as that "I know not what," and he was unsure about what immaterial and material substances had in common that made both substances. Locke acknowledged a distinction between natural and revealed theology. He believed the existence of God could be demonstrated and that the existence of God was a condition for human existence. In 1923, Santayana wrote of Locke "that he was regarded as a great philosopher . . . due . . . not to any intrinsic greatness. He announced some revolutionary principles, which alarmed and excited the public, but he did not carry them out, so that the public was reassured" (*SAF*, 298–99). In 1932, Santayana accepted an invitation to lecture on Locke at the Royal Society of Literature in October, which, like the lecture Santayana gave on Spinoza at The Hague the month before, commemorated the 300th anniversary of the philosopher's birth (*PP*, 521–22). Of his topic, Santayana wrote in a letter that "Locke is a terrible come-down after Spinoza; but it is an easier and pleasanter theme. At the Royal Society of Literature (of which I have the honour to be a member, though I have never been at their place, 2 Bloomsbury Square, nor know even the name of any other member) the audience too will be easier and pleasanter to address. They will understand a little philosophic banter: because Locke . . . is intelligent and ridiculous. This will be the comedy after the high tragedy of Spinoza" (*LGS,* 4:335). Preparing for the lecture he found Locke "a bit prosy, and speculatively poor, but pungent and genuine in his common sense" (*LGS,* 4:344). Two months before the lecture, Santayana wrote in a letter, "My Locke paper is to have a sub-title, 'and the Frontiers (or Boundaries) of Common Sense.' I try to show where Locke went too far, for common sense, in the direction of psychologism" (*LGS,* 4:353). The lecture was published the following year as "Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense," Chapter 1 of *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (1–47). In it, consistent with his 1923 comment, Santayana asserted that "had Locke's mind been more profound, it might have been less influential. He was in sympathy with the coming age, and was able to guide it: an age that confided in easy, eloquent reasoning, and proposed to be saved, in this world and the next, with as little philosophy and as little religion as possible" (*STTMP*, 3). Santayana's personal library included a two-volume edition of Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Samuel Marks, 1825). See also Note 40.22 Spinoza; for more on Santayana's criticism of Locke, see Note 41.26 English malicious psychology.

41.29 Protestantism] See Note 3.2 Reformation and Note 25.37 Luther.

41.34 The tree of knowledge] See Note 118.3–4 sin of Adam.

42.6 Pascal.] Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), French mathematician and philosopher; born in Clermont-Ferrand and raised in Paris. An important figure in the scientific revolution in Europe, he made significant contributions to mathematics and physics. When Pascal was 16 years old he published a scholarly paper on solid geometry, and when he was 18 he invented the first functional mechanical calculator. With his father, also a mathematician, he demonstrated by experiment that a vacuum is possible, countering the ancient dictum that nature abhors a vacuum, and in 1647 he formulated a law regarding the transmission of force in a static fluid. This law bears his name, as do a theorem of projective geometry, a triangular array, the standard unit of pressure, and a modern computer programming language. In philosophy, Pascal is known for his religious writings, which appeared after a conversion experience on 23 November 1654. He denied that human reason could ever prove the existence of God, and he argued instead for the rationality of believing in God. His argument, which is known as Pascal's Wager, appeared in the posthumously published *Pensées* (1670). It contends that if God exists, a believer stands to gain the infinite reward of an eternal life of happiness; but if God does not exist, a believer loses nothing significant yet still gains the benefit of a virtuous life. Santayana, in a 1916 letter, noted that he was reading "Pascal's Pensées—they are very wrong-headed" (*LGS,* 2:248). In a 1949 letter, Santayana remarked that "although there are not many great French philosophers, they all write good French . . . . because they know how to see and to judge the world. They are not so good in the heights and the depths, because these can't be written about in good French, and they don't talk inflated nonsense about those super- or infra-human things, because the French language will not permit it. Yet they do manage to say quite clearly what is intelligible about the greatest subjects, for instance, . . . Pascal about 'existence' and its irrationality." In this same letter Santayana described Pascal as "too good a mathematician to be a man of the world" (*LGS,* 8:180).

42.14 *Auseinandersein.*] German for "being apart" or "being apart from another." Santayana used this term to characterize the perception of extension and to mean "mutual externality":

> The perception of extension is therefore a perception of form, although of the most rudimentary kind. It is merely *Auseinandersein*, and we might call it the *materia prima* of form, were it not capable of existing without further determination. (*SB*, 64)

> A mutual externality, or *Auseinandersein*—an alternation of centres such as moment and moment, thing and thing, place and place, person and person—is characteristic of existence. (*RB*, 203)

43.8 Jesuit] See Note 34.31 Jesuitism.

43.27–28 Goethe . . . *farbiger Abglanz,*] The German “farbiger Abglanz” can be translated as “colored reflection” or “colorful reflection.” The reference is to a text in Act 1 of Part II of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749–1832) *Faust*:

> Allein wie herrlich diesem Sturm entspriessend,
> Wölbt sich des bunten Bogen Wechseldauer,
> Bald rein gezeichnet, bald in Luft zerfliessend,
> Der spiegelt ab das menschliche Bestreben.
> Ihm sinne nach und du begreifst genauer:
> Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben.

(*Goethes Sämtliche Werke* [Goethe’s Complete Works], Vol. 10, intr. Karl Goedeke [Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1893], 198–99)

Nineteenth-century translations render Goethe’s text variously as follows:

> But how lovely budding from out the storm doth the changing continuity of the variegated bow vault itself, now clearly outlined, now flowing away into air, spreading cool showers around. This mirrors human striving. Look on *this*, and thou wilt comprehend the other better. In the coloured reflection we have life. (*Goethe’s Faust, Part II*, trans. Leopold J. Bernays [London: Sampson Low, 1839], 4)

> But see, in splendour bursting from the storm,
> Arches itself the many-coloured bow,
> An ever-changeful, yet continuous form,
> Now drawn distinctly, melting now away,
> Diffusing dewy coolness all around!
> Man’s efforts there are glassed, his toil and strife;
> Reflect, more true the emblem will be found:
> This bright reflected glory pictures life!

(*Goethe’s Faust, In Two Parts,* trans. Anna Swanwick [London: George Bell and Sons, 1881], 174.)

> But, see! where springs—glad bud of this wild storm—
> A tranquil presence thro’ the storm that gleams,
> The heaven-illumined Rainbow’s glorious form;
> Distinctly now limned out, and now it seems
> To flow away, in airy atoms lost,

Spreading around a cool and fragrant shower.
Man's strivings, are they not the torrent's strife?
Think, and yet more you feel the emblem's power:
The colour, the reflected light, is LIFE.

(*The Second Part of Goethe's Faust*, trans. John Anster [London: George Routledge and Sons, 1886], 13)

Santayana also refers to this text in *Three Philosophical Poets* (127). See Note 1.30 Goethe.

44.26 *ad libitum.*] Latin for "at pleasure;" in this context meaning "without constraint," "spontaneously."

44.31 *arrière pensée*] French for "ulterior motive," "secret intention" (literally, "back thought"). It may also refer to "mental reservation," the Roman Catholic theological idea of inwardly or mentally qualifying a statement such that what is spoken and understood by the hearer is not what actually is intended by the speaker.

44.36 M. Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice*] Refers to Henri Bergson's book *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), in which he proposed an *élan vital* ("vital impetus," "vital impulse," or "life-force") to account for the evolution of novel and complex forms of life that he thought could not be explained by materialist theories of evolution. He denied teleological characterization of *élan vital*; and he wrote, "It is abundantly evident that the rest of nature is not for the sake of man. . . . It would be wrong to regard humanity . . . as pre-figured in the evolutionary movement" (265–66), but critics still charged him with anthropocentrism. Bergson also introduced the notion of *durée* (duration) to counter intellectualist conceptions of time, such as the absolute time of physics, which he thought distorted a reality fully known only through intuition. A fundamental concern of Bergson's was creative freedom, which he thought was threatened by materialist philosophies, and which, in Bergson's view, allows humans to escape an automatism of routine habits characteristic of nonhuman animals. See also Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

45.12 Aristotle.] Greek philosopher (384–322 BC), born in the Ionian city of Stagira. He entered Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) Academy in Athens around 367 BC and remained until Plato's death. For three years Aristotle supervised the education of Alexander the Great (Alexander III of Macedon, 356–323 BC) and eventually founded the Lyceum about 335 BC near Athens. He was a prolific lecturer and writer on art, logic, metaphysics, natural sciences, psychology, politics, and ethics. Santayana had special regard for Aristotle's *Ethics* and

Politics, and he wrote that "in Aristotle the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural an ideal development. . . . The Life of Reason finds there its classic explication" (*LR1*, 12–13). Santayana read Aristotle as a philosophic naturalist who rejected Plato's Theory of Forms but who also maintained that forms (or essences or ideals) could influence matter and who saw no place for mechanism in scientific explanation (*LR1*, 15); this made Aristotle's physics dialectical or magical rather than scientific (*LR1*, 14; *TPP*, 60). According to Santayana, Aristotle understood motion as striving for fulfillment of an ideal; this compelling ideal or purpose, and not physical causes, was to explain things. The ultimate fulfillment is found in the mind of God, which is "eternally realizing what the world aspires to. . . . Its operation is admittedly not transitive or physical. It itself does not change in working. . . . The world accordingly is moved and vivified in every fibre by magic, by the magic of the goal to which it aspires" (*TPP*, 60). Around 1900, Santayana worked on a translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that was never completed (a transcription is available in the Santayana Edition's digital collections at https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/metaphysics/index.html). Santayana's personal library contained German, English, and French editions of Aristotle's works, as well as editions in the original Greek. See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 49.5 Socrates.

45.18 *élan vital,*] French for "vital impetus," "vital impulse." or "life-force." See also Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson and Note 44.36 *Evolution Créatrice* (M. Bergson).

46.14 seven-league boots] Invoked in many fairy tales, seven-league boots allow their possessor to travel rapidly, with strides of seven leagues (21 miles). As Santayana notes, a disadvantage of seven-league boots is that they allow only skimming of the surface of the ground passed over, with no opportunity to examine one's surroundings in depth.

46.20 Mill,] John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), English philosopher, civil servant, and social reformer. Beginning at age 3, Mill pursued an ambitious curriculum of classics, mathematics, logic, and political economy, designed and overseen by his father, the historian, political economist, and journalist James Mill (1773–1836). For 35 years, John Stuart Mill worked for the East India Company, and then served as a member of the British Parliament. He established himself in philosophy with the 1843 publication of *A System of Logic*, a study of inductive reasoning that greatly influenced understandings of scientific method. His best-known works are *On Liberty* (1859), in which he argued that society is justified in interfering with the actions of an individual only when the individual poses a threat to others, not merely to him or herself; and *Utilitarianism* (1861, 1863), in which he developed the moral philosophy of his father and his father's friend

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), stating that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure" (*Utilitarianism*, 2nd ed. [1864], ed. George Sher [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002], 7). In 1869 he published *The Subjection of Women*, advocating for the rights of women, including access to education, reform of marriage laws, and establishment of women's suffrage. Santayana was critical of Mill's philosophy and wrote that Mill was "a poor victim of the malicious psychology, and of the intuitive dogmatism behind it" (*MARG*, 2:44). In *Reason in Common Sense,* Santayana ascribed this malicious psychology to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and wrote that "they thought that if they could once show how metaphysical ideas are made they would discredit those ideas and banish them for ever from the world. . . . The principle of their reasoning, where they chose to apply it, was always this, that ideas whose materials could all be accounted for in consciousness and referred to sense or to the operations of mind were thereby exhausted and deprived of further validity. Only the unaccountable, or rather the uncriticised, could be true. Consequently, the advance of psychology meant, in this school, the retreat of reason; for as one notion after another was clarified and reduced to its elements it was *ipso facto* deprived of its function" (*LR1*, 53). Santayana, consistent with his criticism of modern philosophy as being subjective (*WD*, 8), wrote "that such worthies as Mill have little speculative capacity and missed their vocation in becoming philosophers. It is a mere scratching of the surface in a deep soil of prejudices and verbal conventions. There is not the least freedom or sweep of mind" (*MARG,* 2:46).

Santayana's personal library included four works by Mill, two with extensive marginalia in Santayana's hand: *Dissertations and Discussions* (New York: Holt, 1882); *Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism*, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1885); *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1889); and *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1904); as well as *Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill*, edited from Mill's manuscript by N. MacMinn, J. R. Hainds, and J. M. McCrimmon (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1945). See also Note 3.39 "the greatest happiness of the greatest number"; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 8.8–9 modern philosophy; for Berkeley, Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.26 English malicious psychology; and Note 41.27 Locke.

46.20 Huxley] Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), English biologist. He trained in medicine and was appointed to the Navy Medical Service in 1846. As assistant surgeon on the HMS *Rattlesnake* he traveled to Australia and New Guinea and carried out important research on coelenterates, for which he was awarded the Royal Medal of the Royal Society in 1852. He took up a teaching post in London at the School of Mines in 1854. He objected to evolutionary theories that relied on divine directives, but Charles Darwin, whom he first met in 1856, presented a theory of evolution in *Origin of Species* (1859) agreeable to Huxley's naturalism (though Huxley departed from Darwin's theory of natural selection). Huxley's defense of Darwin's theory earned him the epithet "Darwin's Bulldog." He, more readily than Darwin, argued for the evolutionary origins of human beings, and in 1863 he published *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, in which he argued for human descent from an ancestor common to apes and humans. He was a vigorous advocate for science education as a means to improve society both intellectually and morally, and this informed his work as a member of the London School Board from 1870 to 1872. He was not opposed to Bible reading in schools, but he was opposed to organized religion and its influence on education. He coined the term "agnosticism" for the idea that "it is wrong for a man to say he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty" (*Agnosticism and Christianity and other Essays* [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992], 193). In 1878, Huxley published *Hume,* a study of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776), and later expanded this work, reissued in 1894 as *Hume, with helps to the study of Berkeley* and including two additional essays on the Anglo-Irish philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753). Huxley was a member of the Metaphysical Society, which was founded by James Knowles and existed from 1869 to 1880, debating issues of science and religion. Huxley's descendants include grandsons evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley (1887–1975), novelist Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) (whom Santayana was acquainted with when Huxley was an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford [*PP*, 498]), and winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine Andrew Huxley (1917–2012). See also Note 5.17 Darwin and Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume.

46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), German philosopher, born in Danzig, studied medicine at the University of Göttingen and philosophy at the University of Berlin and the University of Jena, where he earned his doctorate in 1813. His main philosophical influence was German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). The systematic statement of his philosophy and his most well-known work is *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818) (*The World as Will and Representation*) in which he claims that the fundamental reality is Will, which he equates with Kant's thing-in-itself. Furthermore, he maintains that the thing-in-itself is knowable through experience of one's inner reality of willing. In Schopenhauer's view, Will extends beyond the individual to the inner nature of all things, and, in fact, all Will is one. The quieting of the Will is the human ideal and is achieved only rarely and by the saint, who recognizes the futility of struggle and rejects desire. This results in compassion for all beings and the insight that all things are one. Other important works include *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* (*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason)* (1813, rev. 1847) and *Parerga und Paralipomena* (1851). As a graduate student in 1888, Santayana told his advisor, Josiah Royce, that he wanted to write his doctoral dissertation on Schopenhauer. According to Santayana, "the wise Royce shook his head. That might do, he said, for a Master of Arts, not for a doctor of philosophy. Instead, he proposed [German philosopher and logician Hermann] Lotze [1817–1881]" (*PP*, 389). In a marginal note to the 1952 dissertation by Richard Butler entitled *The Notion of Essence in the Philosophy of George Santayana*, Santayana wrote that Schopenhauer "had a great influence over me" (*MARG*, 1:126), and the ways in which Schopenhauer entered into his thought can be seen in both early and late works. In his *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), Santayana wrote, "It was a capital error in Fichte and Schopenhauer to assign essential fertility to the will in the creation of ideas. They mistook, as human nature will do, even when at times it professes pessimism, an ideal for a reality: and because they saw how much the will clings to its objects, how it selects and magnifies them, they imagined that it could breed them out of itself. A man who thinks clearly will see that such self-determination of a will is inconceivable, since what has no external relation and no diversity of structure cannot of itself acquire diversity of functions" (*IPR*, 165). In *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana wrote that "the transcendentalism of Schopenhauer" had jettisoned the egotistical idea that the universe is but the image of reality created by the mind. In Schopenhauer's system "the so-called Will which he still placed behind everything was no longer his own will evolving experience out of nothing; it was a fanciful name for whatever force or substance might lie behind experience, animating all its objects, determining their inherent life, and constituting them facts collateral with himself. . . . Life was seen to radiate, as it really does, from an elementary form into all sorts of disparate and incomparable growths, capable of endless diversity. No limit, no forced co-operation, no stereotyped method was imputed to life. . . . Man lost his importance and at the same time the insufferable burden of his false pretensions. In Schopenhauer frankness returned, and with frankness clearness" (*EGP*, 108–9). In his autobiography, *Persons and Places* (1944–53), Santayana made a similar point in terms of his own system, writing that "the 'Will' in Schopenhauer was a transparent mythological symbol for the flux of matter. There was absolute equivalence between such a system, in its purport and sense for reality, and the systems of Spinoza and

Lucretius. This was the element of ancient sanity that kept me awake and conscious of the points of the compass in the subsequent wreck of psychologism" (*PP*, 239). Santayana's personal library included Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena,* 2 vols. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1891). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 40.22 Spinoza; and, for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean.

46.33–34 the "Unknowable Force" of Herbert Spencer.] (1820–1903), English philosopher and social and political theorist, born in Derby, son of a schoolmaster, self-educated. He applied the study of natural sciences and psychology to philosophy, making the theory of evolution a unifying principle of knowledge and applying it to all phenomena. The phrase "theory of evolution" appeared in an 1857 revision of his essay "The Developmental Hypothesis" (*The Leader*, 20 March 1852) to refer to an explanation of transmuting species, predating publications on the subject by Alfred Russell Wallace in 1858 and Charles Darwin in 1859. In the preface to a later reprint of this essay, Spencer wrote, "It struck the keynote of all that was to follow" (*Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, Vol. 1 [London: Williams and Norgate, 1891], 1). In his *Principles of Biology*, Spencer coined the phrase "survival of the fittest," which he characterized as synonymous with Charles Darwin's "natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life" (*Principles of Biology* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1864], 444–45). Spencer's first books appeared in the 1850s: *Social Statics* (1851) and *Principles of Psychology* (1855). His *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (1861) was an enduringly popular textbook for teachers. Inspired by evolutionary theory, utilitarianism, political liberalism, and individualism, he announced his intention in 1860 to articulate his "synthetic philosophy" in several books which appeared over the next thirty-six years: *First Principles* (1862), *The Principles of Biology* (1864–67), *The Principles of Sociology* (1876–96), and *The Principles of Ethics* (1879–93). Spencer was extremely influential in the fields he wrote about and in intellectual culture more broadly. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) provided financial support for Spencer's work; Thomas Henry Huxley respected his pre-Darwinian evolutionary theorizing; Wallace and Darwin were admirers of Spencer's work; William James and John Dewey addressed Spencer as a worthy target of criticism in their important contributions to psychology and educational theory; and George Eliot was a close friend. Nevertheless, Spencer's popular reputation began to wane by the 1880s. Spencer was a leading proponent of agnosticism and regarded the domain of religion as unknowable. While this unknowable was closed off to human consciousness, it was the foundation for knowledge of reality; and reality was dependent on the Absolute, which could never be known. Spencer treated the idea of the unknowable in Part I of his book *First Principles.* Santayana's essay "The Unknowable," presented at Oxford University as the

Herbert Spencer Lecture on 24 October 1923 and reprinted in *Obiter Scripta*, 162–88, criticized the idea of the unknowable for confusing knowledge with intuition, like an idealistic philosophy. Reality is unknowable in the way a drum is inaudible—you hear the sound, not the drum, and you know the intuition, not the reality; but this is an idealistic doctrine and little better, Santayana thought, than a pun. Santayana maintained that one hears the sound or perceives the reality by intuition and knows it by animal faith—a readiness to assume and act in ways required for actually living, and in this way reality is knowable (*OS*, 173). Santayana further criticized Spencer's use of the unknowable as a problematic attempt to reconcile science and religion—problematic because genuine religion, according to Santayana, claims actual knowledge of reality and would never be satisfied with the comparatively meager knowledge "that no knowledge can penetrate to the heart of things" (*OS,* 176). In his autobiography, Santayana wrote, "Herbert Spencer, I think, taught me nothing. I agreed with his naturalism or materialism, because that is what we all start with: the minimum presupposition of perception and action. But I agreed with James about Spencer's theory of evolution: It was a tangle of words, of loose generalities that some things might sometimes suggest to us, and that, said properly, it might have been *witty* to say, but that had absolutely no value as 'laws' or 'causes' of events. Spencer in his 'principles' was an 'objective idealist', not a naturalist or a scientific man. . . . Spencer, unlike Lucretius and Spinoza, had no speculative power. He meant to be a naturalist, but language and the hypostasised idea of progress turned him into an idealistic metaphysician" (*PP*, 232–33). Santayana's personal library included Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1897). See Note 5.17 Darwin; Note 8.18 William James; Note 46.20 Mill; and Note 46.20 Huxley.

46.36 vitalism] In the history of science, vitalism is contrasted with materialism. Materialism holds that biological phenomena can be explained in terms of matter moving in ways described by chemistry and physics. Vitalism holds that biological phenomena depend on a vital principle distinct from anything described by chemistry or physics. Materialism explains life as resulting from matter in motion; vitalism accounts for life as the result of a soul or special force. The term "vitalism" appeared for the first time in the seventeenth century, but Aristotle (384–322 BC) often is regarded as a vitalist in opposition to materialists such as the Greek philosophers Democritus (c. 460–c. 370 BC), and Epicurus (341–270 BC), who conceived the world as material atoms moving in space. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, vitalists and materialists working in the life sciences engaged in debates that gained attention with increasing religious concerns about the implications of materialism for moral and political order. Romanticism sometimes made common cause with vitalism against materialism. Like Romanticism, vitalism is notoriously difficult to define, with a range of sometimes incompatible positions classed together as "vitalist" (see, for example, Edward Benton, "Vitalism in Nineteenth-Century Scientific Thought: A Typology and Reassessment," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 5, no. 1 [May 1974]: 17-48). Philosophical vitalists included Bergson, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). In his copy of Henri Bergson's *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1932), Santayana wrote, "Vitalism a confession of ignorance" (*MARG*, 1:59)

48.36–39 mankind is what nature . . . her darling is all mankind and not merely Israel.] Santayana distinguished between the Judaic conception of Israel as God's chosen people (for example, Exodus 19:5, Deuteronomy 14:2) and Bergson (who was Jewish by ancestry) regarding all human beings as nature's chosen creation.

49.5 Socrates,] (469–399 BC) Greek philosopher, lived entire life in Athens, concerned primarily with moral questions and specifically the nature of the good. He famously maintained that the unexamined life is not worth living, and his dedication to the examined life led him to question famous and powerful Athenians about the virtues they lauded. His persistent questioning provoked the ire of fellow Athenians, who put him on trial and condemned him to death for impiety and for corrupting the youth of the city. Socrates left no written works, but Plato (c. 427–347 BC) wrote many dialogues portraying him in conversation with fellow Athenians and visitors to the city. Plato's accounts are the chief source of Socrates's reputation, though it is often difficult to distinguish Platonic and Socratic strains of thought. Xenophon (c. 430–350 BC), an Athenian soldier and writer, also left written accounts of Socrates. According to Santayana, Socrates "thought the moral interpretation of existence the whole of philosophy. . . . The virtues or moral uses of things, according to Socrates, were the reason why the things had been created and were what they were" (*STTMP*, 14). This inspired later Greek thinkers to establish what Santayana called "orthodoxy in morals," and he wrote in 1940 that he had "endeavoured to retrace this theme in *The Life of Reason* and in my entire criticism of literature and religion" (*PGS,* 12). In *Reason in Science*, Santayana wrote that Socrates's method "consists in accepting any estimation which any man may sincerely make, and in applying dialectic to it, so as to let the man see what he really esteems. What he really esteems is what ought to guide his conduct; for to suggest that a rational being ought to do what he feels to be wrong, or ought to pursue what he genuinely thinks is worthless, would be to impugn that man's rationality and to discredit one's own (*LR5*, 143). And in this way, Socrates "rescued logic and ethics for ever from authority. With his friends the Sophists, he made man the measure of all things, after bidding him measure himself, as they neglected to do, by his own ideal" (*LR1*, 11). But on Santayana's interpretation, a "plebeian strain in [Socrates's] humanity . . . hardly did justice to what gives utility to life" so that "what purposes a civilised soul might harbour, and in what highest shapes the good might appear, was a problem that seems not to have attracted his genius. . . It was reserved to Plato to bring the Socratic ethics to its sublimest expression and to elicit from the depths of the Greek conscience those ancestral ideals which had inspired its legislators and been embodied in its sacred civic traditions" (*LR1*, 11–12). However, Plato and Aristotle (384–322 BC) in following Socrates's example of moral interpretation of existence "could not bear to abstain from physics altogether; they therefore made a mock physics in moral terms, out of which theology was afterward developed. Plato, standing nearer to Socrates and being no naturalist by disposition, never carried the fatal experiment beyond the mythical stage. He accordingly remained the purer moralist, much as Aristotle's judgment may be preferred in many particulars. Their relative position may be roughly indicated by saying that Plato had no physics and that Aristotle's physics was false; so that ideal science in the one suffered from want of environment and control, while in the other it suffered from misuse in a sphere where it had no application" (*LR1*, 14). Santayana maintained the criticism throughout his career, writing fifteen years after *The Life of Reason* that "we must remember that ever since the days of Socrates, and especially after the establishment of Christianity, the dice of thought have been loaded. Certain pledges have preceded inquiry and divided the possible conclusions beforehand into the acceptable and the inacceptable, the edifying and the shocking, the noble and the base. Wonder has no longer been the root of philosophy, but sometimes impatience at having been cheated and sometimes fear of being undeceived. The marvel of existence, in which the luminous and the opaque are so romantically mingled, no longer lay like a sea open to intellectual adventure, tempting the mind to conceive some bold and curious system of the universe on the analogy of what had been so far discovered. Instead, people were confronted with an orthodoxy though not always the same orthodoxy whispering mysteries and brandishing anathemas. Their wits were absorbed in solving traditional problems, many of them artificial and such as the ruling orthodoxy had created by its gratuitous assumptions" (*COUS*, 10–11; see also *TPP*, 61, and *STTMP*, 114–15). In his autobiography Santayana wrote that "since the age of the Greek Sophists and of Socrates . . . . subjectivism, egotism, conceit of mind" have contributed to undermining "political sanity . . . by way of a moral fable, an anthropomorphic picture of the universe given out for scientific truth and imposed on mankind by propaganda, by threats, and by persecution" (*PP*, 546). See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 45.12 Aristotle.

49.8 literary psychology.] This is the first documented use by Santayana of a term that became much more frequent in his writing after 1920. In *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923), "Literary Psychology" is the title of Chapter 24 (*SAF,* 252–61), where it is defined as "the art of imagining how [animals] feel and think" (*SAF*, 252). The term figures significantly in *The Realm of Matter* (1930)*, The Realm of Truth* (1938)*,* and *The Realm of Spirit* (1940). Other appearances of the term are found in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920; 72–73), the 1922 Preface to *Reason in Common Sense*, the review article "Living without Thinking" (1922, reprinted in *AFSL*), and in letters written in 1922 (*LGS,* 3:101), 1931 (*LGS,* 4:257), 1932 (*LGS,* 4:340), and 1951 (*LGS,* 8:395). The term also appears in published and unpublished pieces collected in *Obiter Scripta* (1936)*, Physical Order and Moral Liberty* (1969), *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life* (1967)*,* and both books of *George Santayana's Marginalia.* Though some of the unpublished occurrences are undated, evidence suggests these were not written before the publication of *Winds of Doctrine.* For discussions of Santayana's notion, see Charles T. Harrison, "Santayana's 'Literary Psychology'," *The Sewanee Review* 61 (1953): 206–20; Jessica Wahman, "The Meaning of Self-Knowledge in Santayana's Philosophy," *BSS* 19 (2001): 1–7; Glenn Tiller, "Self-Knowledge and Psychology: Literary, Dialectical, and Scientific," *BSS* 19 (2001): 8–10; and Wahman, "Literary Psychology and Philosophical Method," *BSS* 31 (2013): 29–38.

49.23 Homer] Epic poet. According to Herodotus, Homer lived c. 850 BC; others date him as early as the twelfth or as late as the eighth century BC. Homer is credited with authorship of the *Iliad* (c. 750 BC), the *Odyssey* (c. 725 BC), and *The Homeric Hymns*. Santayana devotes the second essay in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* to *The Homeric Hymns*. According to Santayana, these narrative fragments "are not hymns and are not Homer's" (*IPR*, 21) but provide insight into Greek religious mythos and practice. Allusions to Homer and the works attributed to him are frequent in Santayana's letters and published works. Santayana's personal library included copies of *Aphrodite: The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and the Pervigilium Veneris* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948) and *The Original Iliad,* trans. Robinson Smith (London: Grafton & Co., 1937).

50.14 Æsop] Legendary Ancient Greek storyteller, known for satirical and moralistic animal stories, including "The Tortoise and the Hare," "The Fox and the Grapes," and "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." According to one tradition, Aesop was born in Thrace in the early sixth century BC and was enslaved on Samos.

He is mentioned in Herodotus's *Histories,* Aristophanes's *Wasps,* and Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) *Phaedo.* Drawing on these earlier accounts and popular legends about the storyteller, a Greek work titled *Life of Aesop* appeared in the second century AD. According to this work, Aesop was extremely ugly and regarded as foolish, but he outwitted his slave masters to gain his freedom. After winning a reputation for storytelling and wisdom, he later was accused of theft and executed after insulting the people of Delphi. The first known collection of his tales, since lost, was compiled by Demetrius of Phaleron (c. 350–c. 280 BC); a later collection is attributed to the Roman poet Gaius Julius Phaedrus in the first century AD. In addition to other ancient and medieval compilers, European editors produced influential collections of Aesop's fables in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries. Santayana occasionally referred to the fabulist in his work when indicating shortcomings of some example of speculation: In *Reason in Common Sense*, he wrote of the limits of insight into other minds and remarked that characterizations of animal minds "are a grotesque compound of Æsop and physiology" (*LR1*, 94). In *Reason in Religion*, he wrote of the tendencies of pantheism to mythologize without acknowledging the limitations of its poetic expression, producing idealizations of some aspects of nature in which "their total and real mechanism is no better represented than that of animals in Æsop's fables" (*LR3*, 105).

50.25–26 Paolo . . . Francesca] Paolo Malatesta (c. 1246–c. 1285) was one of four brothers in the ruling family of Rimini, a Northern Italian city on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. Francesca da Rimini or Francesca da Polenta (1255–c. 1285) was the wife of Paolo's brother Giovanni Sciancato, a soldier serving Francesca's father. The marriage was loveless, and Francesca fell in love with Paolo. Giovanni caught Paolo and Francesca together and murdered them. Their story appears in Dante's *Inferno* (Canto 5), and Santayana discusses Dante's account in some detail as an example of Dante's understanding of moral reward and punishment. According to Santayana, Dante at his best regarded a sinner's punishment as "nothing added; [the punishment] is what the passion itself pursues; it is a fulfilment, horrifying the soul that desired it. . . . [Rewards and punishments are] simply symbols for the intrinsic quality of good and evil ways" (*TPP*, 68). But in Dante's account Paolo and Francesca spend an eternity floating in each other's arms, which seems a complete satisfaction of their passion; how could it be a punishment for the lovers? Santayana explained that

> love itself dreams of more than mere possession; to conceive happiness, it must conceive a life to be shared in a varied world, full of events and activities, which shall be new and ideal bonds between the lovers. But unlawful love cannot pass out into this public fulfilment. It is condemned to be mere possession—possession in the dark, without an

> environment, without a future. It is love among the ruins. And it is precisely this that is the torment of Paolo and Francesca – love among the ruins of themselves and of all else they might have had to give to one another. Abandon yourself, Dante would say to us, – abandon yourself altogether to a love that is nothing but love, and you are in hell already. Only an inspired poet could be so subtle a moralist. Only a sound moralist could be so tragic a poet. (*TPP*, 70–71)

See Note 24.18 Dante.

51.19–21 The idea Paul . . . that of Paul;] Refers to Spinoza's *Ethics,* Part II, Prop. 17, Scolium: "Moreover . . . we clearly understand what is the difference between, e.g., the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists; but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul than the nature of Peter, and so as long as this disposition of Paul's lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he were nevertheless present to him" (Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. A. Boyle [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910], 54–55; the original is found in Benedicti de Spinoza, *Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt* I–II, eds. J. Van Vloten and J. P. N. Land [The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1913], 91–92). This text from Spinoza was a favorite of Santayana's for remarking on the variance between an observer's idea and the object of inspection, with allusions occurring throughout Santayana's writings (*LR5,* 76, 82; *SAF*, 247; *RE*, 141; *LGS*, 6:58, 6:187).

52.26 *mobile*] Latin for "thing capable of movement."

52.31 Achilles and the tortoise] One of four paradoxes of motion attributed to Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC), Greek philosopher, born in Italy and followed his teacher Parmenides (c. 515–after 450 BC) to Athens. Parmenides and Zeno are primary figures among thinkers known as the Eleatics, who argued that reality is changeless. Zeno's thought is known primarily through others' commentaries; for example, the paradoxes are discussed in Aristotle's (384–322 BC) Book VI, Chapter 9 of *Physics.* In the second paradox, that of Achilles and the tortoise, the slow-moving tortoise is given a head start in a race against the fleet-footed Achilles. When Achilles begins the race, the tortoise is some definite distance ahead. In the time it takes Achilles to cover that definite distance, the tortoise has moved ahead some further definite distance. In the time it takes Achilles to cover that second definite distance, the tortoise has again moved ahead some further definite distance. This is repeated, with the result that Achilles never can overtake the tortoise because no matter how quickly Achilles covers the distance between himself and the tortoise, in that same amount of time the tortoise has covered some further definite distance. Zeno's own interpretation of the paradox is not documented, but he may have taken the paradox to demonstrate the impossibility of making sense of motion and so supporting skepticism about it. In other words, the paradox uses the assumption that motion is real to arrive at an absurd conclusion (an argument strategy traditionally known as *reductio ad absurdum*) thereby refuting the assumption. Santayana, in *Reason in Common Sense*, wrote that "when the Eleatics proved the impossibility—i.e., the inexpressibility—of motion, . . . their task was made easy by the native diversity between the concretions in existence which were the object of their thought and the concretions in discourse which were its measure. The two do not fit; and intrenched as these philosophers were in the forms of logic they compelled themselves to reject as unthinkable everything not fully expressible in those particular forms" (*LR1*, 110).

Apart from the paradox, Achilles is the central figure and greatest of Greek heroes in Homer's eighth-century BC epic poem the *Iliad*, which tells of the Trojan War. The war is believed to have historical roots in a thirteenth-century BC conflict between Greece and Troas, but evidence of a historical Achilles yields little reliable information. For discussion of Achilles see Santayana's *The Sense of Beauty*, 113–20.

53.11–12 "blooming buzzing confusion"] Quotation from William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1890), 488. It appears in Chapter 13, "Discrimination and Comparison," in a section in which James claimed "that *any number of impressions, from any number of sensory sources, falling simultaneously on a mind* WHICH HAS NOT YET EXPERIENCED THEM SEPARATELY, *will fuse into a single undivided object for that mind.* The law is that all things fuse that can fuse, and nothing separates except what must" (emphasis in original). As an example he gives the following: "The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things in one space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations which came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space" (James, *Principles,* 488). See Note 8.18 William James.

53.37–38 the wise men . . . language of birds;] Facility with the language of birds, symbolizing wisdom or community with a higher state of being, is a trope found in many religious traditions and mythologies, including the Quran, the legend of Siegfried, and Greek literature. For the Greeks, the ability to decipher the noises made by birds was bestowed by the god Apollo and was a form of prophecy practiced by oracles and recorded in myth. Ancient Greeks reputed to understand the language of birds include the Neo-Pythagorean holy man and teacher Apollonius of Tyana (first century AD) and the mythical seer Melampus. Santayana refers to understanding the language of birds in *LR4,* 52 and in *SELS,* 263. In the latter work, the ability was attributed to "the healing wand of [the Greek god] Hermes the Interpreter." See René Guénon, "The Language of Birds," *Studies in Comparative Religion* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 80–82; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica,* The Loeb Classical Library, trans. R. C. Seaton (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1912), 22; Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana,* Books I–IV, The Loeb Classical Library, trans. Christopher P. Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 81.

53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates,] The idea that the properties of light can be explained if light acts like waves was proposed by René Descartes (1596–1650) and further developed by English polymath Robert Hooke (1635–1703), who compared light waves to waves washing against a shore. Dutch mathematician and physicist Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) devised the mathematical theory describing this phenomenon. Isaac Newton (1643–1727) was the most prominent proponent of the alternative theory that light behaves as if composed of particles. At the turn of the twentieth century, the work of physicists Max Planck (1858–1947) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955) reconciled the two views with the development of quantum theory. In *Realms of Being,* Santayana expands on the concept of light: "Light, which should be the source of clearness, is itself the most obscure of things, and its name the most ambiguous of names. For in physics light is understood to be a mysterious agency coursing through space, . . . and is a form of vibration or radiation emitted by bodies when ignited, and intercepted and reflected upon them even when opaque" (*RB*, 237).

54.1 each throb forgotten as the next follows upon it;] Refers to the phenomenon called "persistence of vision." The eye or brain can interpret only about 10–12 images per second. As a result, images viewed at a faster rate appear continuous. This phenomenon is used in animation, movies, and television to create the illusion of movement. On a more basic level, it explains why light is experienced as continuous despite acting on a microscopic level as waves or particles.

54.3–4 "Like as the waves . . . to their end."] The original text is from the opening lines of William Shakespeare's (1564–1616) Sonnet 60:

> Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
> So do our minutes hasten to their end;
> Each changing place with that which goes before,
> In sequent toil all forwards do contend.
> Nativity, once in the main of light,
> Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crown'd,
> Crooked eclipses 'gainst his glory fight,
> And Time that gave doth now his gift confound.
>
> Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth
> And delves the parallels in beauty's brow,
> Feeds on the rarities of nature's truth,
> And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow:
> And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,
> Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand.
> (William Shakespeare, *The Sonnets of William Shakespeare,*
> London: John Lane, 1902, 93–94)

Shakespeare's poem continues to invoke the comparison of waves of light and waves approaching shore, as well as connecting light to birth and noting the conflict between light and eclipse. See Note 15.2 Shakespeare and Note 53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates.

55.22–56.2 "Any one, . . . is simplicity itself."] The original text by Bergson reads as follows:

> Quiconque s'est essayé à la composition littéraire, par exemple, sait bien que lorsque le sujet a été longuement étudié, tous les documents recueillis, toutes les notes prises, il faut, pour aborder le travail de composition lui-même, quelque chose de plus, un effort, souvent très pénible, pour se placer tout d'un coup au cœur même du sujet et pour aller chercher aussi profondément que possible une impulsion à laquelle il n'y aura plus ensuite qu'à se laisser aller. Cette impulsion, une fois reçue, lance l'esprit sur un chemin où il retrouve et les renseignements qu'il avait recueillis et mille autres détails encore; elle se développe, elle s'analyse elle-même en termes dont l'énumération se poursuivrait sans fin; plus on va, plus on en découvre; jamais on n'arrivera à tout dire : et pourtant, si l'on se retourne brusquement vers l'impulsion qu'on sent derrière soi pour la saisir, elle se dérobe ; car ce n'était pas une chose, mais une direction de mouvement, et, bien qu'indéfiniment extensible, elle est la simplicité même. ("Introduction à la métaphysique," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 11, no. 1 [January 1903]: 35)

The English text quoted by Santayana, which he presumably translated himself, differs from the first published English translations of the essay, which appeared in 1912:

> For example, whoever has attempted literary production knows indeed that, if the object has been studied for a long time, if all the documents have been collected, and if all the notes have been taken, one must exert an effort, often quite difficult, in order to project oneself into the heart of the object, and in order to seek a stimulus as deeply as possible; on the other hand, all one has to do is to let oneself go. This impulse, once received, guides the mind into a road where it rediscovered the information, which it has collected, and a thousand other details; it develops itself, and it analyses itself in terms, the enumeration of which goes on infinitely; the further one goes, the more one discovers; one never reaches the point where one can say everything: and yet, if one suddenly returns toward the impulse, which one feels behind him, in order to seize it, it conceals itself; for it was not a thing but a direction of movement, and though infinitely extensible, it is simplicity itself. (Henri Bergson, *The Introduction to a New Philosophy: Introduction à la métaphysique,* trans. Sidney Littman [Boston: J. W. Luce, 1912], 104–6)

> Any one of us, for instance, who has attempted literary composition, knows that when the subject has been studied at length, the materials all collected, and the notes all made, something more is needed in order to set about the work of composition itself, and that is an often very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only let ourselves go. This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers all the information it had collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyzes itself into terms which could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover; we shall never say all that could be said, and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we feel behind us, and try to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely simple. (Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. T. E. Hulme [New York: Putnam's, 1912], 89–90).

See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

55.33 *ad infinitum.*] Latin for "to infinity"; in other words, endlessly.

57.18 *Antony and Cleopatra,*] A tragedy written by William Shakespeare (1564–1616), probably in 1606 (it first appeared in print in 1623). Shakespeare followed closely the account of his subject as presented in Sir Thomas North's

(1535–1603) translation of Plutarch's (AD c. 46–120) *Life of Antony.* John Dryden (1631–1700) acknowledged his debt to Shakespeare's work for inspiring his play on the same subject, *All for Love; or, The World Well Lost* (1676). Marc Antony (c. 82–30 BC), Roman general and statesman who backed Julius Caesar against the Roman Senate and the republicans. After Caesar's assassination, civil war broke out between Caesarists and republicans. Antony eventually prevailed against Julius Caesar's assassin, the republican Brutus, and went on to form the Second Triumvirate with his rival Octavian and Lepidus, dividing rule of the Roman Empire. Cleopatra (69–30 BC), Egyptian queen and last of the Ptolemies, the Greek-speaking Macedonian ruling family who came to Egypt with Alexander the Great. Shakespeare's play treated Antony and Cleopatra's love affair, Antony's defeat by Octavian, and the resultant suicide of Antony and Cleopatra. The play is among Shakespeare's longest dramatic works and includes a large number of scenes set all around the Mediterranean. Santayana occasionally alluded to Antony or Cleopatra in his writing, sometimes citing Shakespeare's work (*LGS,* 6:85; *LGS,* 8:446; *SELS* 70), sometimes Dryden's (*LGS,* 3:65), and sometimes to a conventional depiction of the historical figures (*LGS,* 3:17; *PP,* 207, 319). See Note 15.2 Shakespeare and Note 57.21 Plutarch.

57.21 Plutarch] Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (AD c. 46–120), Greek writer and philosopher, born in Chaeronea in Boeotia. He studied in Athens, visited Egypt and Italy, and lectured in Rome. The last thirty years of his life he served as a priest at Delphi. He was a prolific writer, producing rhetorical performances earlier in his career, treatises on moral philosophy, dialogues (on love and prophecy, for example), and other works on religious and literary themes. Plutarch is best known for his biographies, which include individual biographies and two series: *Lives of the Caesars* and *The Parallel Lives.* Unlike most of his writings, the majority of *The Parallel Lives*, forty-six biographies, has survived to the present. The work includes chronologically ordered biographies arranged in pairs, each pair comparing the lives of historically significant Greek and Roman figures, for example, Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Alexander and Caesar, and Demosthenes and Cicero. In addition to being a history, the work examines the sources and effects of virtues and vices in the lives of extraordinary individuals. Plutarch's *Lives* has influenced readers' understanding of Greek and Roman culture for over a millennium. It was translated into French by Jacques Amyot (1572), whose version was translated into English by Sir Thomas North (1579). Plutarch's work inspired notable writers Michel Montaigne (1533–1592), William Shakespeare (1564–1616), John Dryden (1631–1700), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882). Philosophically, he was a Middle Platonist, believing in an immaterial god and a transcendental hierarchy of reality. However, unlike other Platonists, he regarded evil as a positive force in the universe. Santayana, in his autobiography, wrote that "the sectarian politics and moralising of most historians made history an impossible study for me for many years: not ancient history, of course, nor Plutarch's *Lives*, which we had at school to read out of at sight" (*PP*, 142). Santayana praised "the excellent Plutarch" for refuting sophistical arguments that since there can be no good without evil, to diminish one is to undermine the other (*EGP*, 132–33); but he also wrote that "in reading Plutarch . . . I am put out by his doctrinaire morality, as if all men and ages ought to follow the same model" (*PP*, 464). See Note 3.8 Rousseau, Note 15.2 Shakespeare, and Note 129.7 Emerson.

59.10–12 Herbert Spencer says . . . law of evolution.] Allusions to Herbert Spencer's (1820–1903) parody of English mathematician and critic of evolutionary theory Thomas Penyngton Kirkman (1806–1895), which Spencer presented as an "imaginary addition to that address before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, in which [Kirkman] first set forth the leading ideas of his volume":

> "Observe, gentlemen," we may suppose him saying, "I have here the yolk of an egg. The evolutionists, using their jargon, say that one of its characters is 'homogeneity'; and if you do not examine your thoughts, perhaps you may think that the word conveys some idea. But now if I translate it into plain English, and say that one of the characters of this yolk is 'all-alikeness,' you at once perceive how nonsensical is their statement. You see that the substance of the yolk is not all-alike, and that therefore all-alikeness cannot be one of its attributes. Similarly with the other pretentious term 'heterogeneity,' which, according to them, describes the state things are brought to by what they call evolution. It is mere empty sound, as is manifest if I do but transform it, as I did the other, and say instead 'not-all-alikeness.' For on showing you this chick into which the yolk of the egg turns, you will see that 'not-all-alikeness' is a character which cannot be claimed for it. How can any one say that the parts of the chick are not-all-alike?" (Herbert Spencer, "Prof. Tait on the Formula of Evolution," *Various Fragments* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1897], 83.)

See Note 70.6–7 the "Unknowable Force" of Herbert Spencer.

59.14 Leibnitz] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), German philosopher, mathematician, scientist, historian, and diplomat, born in Leipzig, educated in law, died in Hanover. He developed the basic theory of calculus independently of Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and was first to publish his results. Leibniz maintained that the fundamental entities of the universe are monads, which are simple, immaterial, perceiving, and desiring discrete elements. Each monad perceives every other with varying clarity, except for God who perceives all monads with complete clarity. Contrary to appearance, monads do not interact causally with one another; rather, any given state of a monad is causally linked only to its own prior or subsequent states. To explain the appearance of interaction among discrete elements Leibniz posited a "pre-established harmony." On this view each monad is similar to a clock in that it behaves independently of others of its kind; yet all are synchronized or harmonious in their individual activity; God establishes this harmony among monads. Leibniz further considered the nature and role of God when he considered the question of freedom and how some states of affairs are true when they could have been false. The reason for any state of affairs that actually obtains is God, and God's choice is due to God's power and moral character. Hence, it is necessary that God choose to create the best of all possible worlds, so what is actual is necessary.

Leibniz published only one philosophical work during his lifetime, *Théodicée* (1710) (*Theodicy*), which Santayana characterized as "an intelligent abstract of Christian doctrine, exhibiting what it would be if it were essentially scientific, whereas it is essentially moralistic, so that its inspiration is missed, while its dogmas are harmonized as much as possible" (*LGS*, 8:395). Other important works by Leibniz include *Discours de métaphysique* (1686; not published until 1846) (*The Discourse on Metaphysics*) and the work now known as *Monadology* (1714; published 1720 in German translation as *Lehrsätze über die Monadologie*).

As a first-year teacher at Harvard in 1889–90, Santayana was unexpectedly asked to teach a course on René Descartes (1596–1650), Spinoza (1632–1677), and Leibniz (*PP*, 390). Later in his career Santayana acknowledged several times in published and unpublished writings the influence of Leibniz on his mature philosophy. In 1922, he wrote that the realm of essence was not his own discovery, having been described "by Leibniz in two different ways; once as the collection of all possible worlds, and again as the abyss of non-existence, *le néant*" (*SELS*, 256). He again acknowledged the equivalence of the realm of essence and Leibniz's possible worlds in 1927 (*RB*, 162) and in a letter of 1948 (*LGS*, 8:36). In 1940, he wrote of the "respects in which the monadology [of Leibniz] does justice to spirit" (*RB*, 581–85). The similarity was not lost on at least one critic: Santayana reported in his autobiography that "a faithful diehard of British psychologism, asked why I was overlooked among contemporary philosophers, replied: 'Because he has no originality. Everything in him is drawn from Plato and Leibniz'" (*PP*, 541). In a 1947 letter, he revealed this British critic to be Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), who had excluded Santayana from his *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). In response to

Russell's charge of unoriginality Santayana wrote, "This is a very interesting assertion; it shows that R. was considering me as a logician only, which of course I am not, and disregarding the real influences that have affected me. Besides, I never wished to be original, so as to contribute to the growth of science. All I care for is to sift the truth from traditional imagination, without empoverishing the latter" (*LGS,* 7:328–29). Unsurprisingly, Santayana had a high regard for Leibniz, who, he wrote, "had a wonderfully clear head" (*RB*, 162), but he was not without criticism; he thought Leibniz's "philosophy is technically first rate, but absurd, because . . . he was too good a mathematician to be a man of the world" (*LGS,* 8:180). And though worldly concerns seemed sometimes to hinder Leibniz, Santayana's ultimate criticism targeted what he thought to be Leibniz's artificiality: "Leibniz could be a very great philosopher when he chose, when the press of business allowed, or when some Serene Highness commanded it; but he was a diplomatist even in philosophy, and his chief preoccupation was to reconcile powerful opinions and to recommend himself to the orthodox as well as to the competent. He could play as readily with the notion of essence as with any other notion, but his sincerity was not of that profound sort which gives to human conceptions their radical values, and his system was a masterpiece of artificiality in which nobody—not even himself—could very heartily believe" (*RB*, 164). Santayana's personal library included a copy of *The Philosophical Works of Leibniz* (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1890). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

61.18 Neptune] Ancient Italian god of water and protector of waterways. The origin of his name and early form is unknown. Greek cultural influences led to Neptune's identification with Poseidon, god of the sea and natural forces such as weather and earthquakes and who is often portrayed with a trident with which he brings storms or pacifies the sea. He was the patron of sailors and fishermen, who prayed to him for calm waters and bountiful catches.

61.18 Æolus] In Book 10 of Homer's *Odyssey,* Aeolus is king of the floating island of Aeolia and, though a mortal, is entrusted by Zeus to be keeper of the winds. When Odysseus's ship lands on Aeolia, the hospitable Aeolus gives Odysseus a bag containing the winds to aid his journey home. After departing Aeolia, Odysseus falls asleep, and his sailors open the bag thinking it contains treasure. The winds escape and blow the ship back to Aeolia, and an angry Aeolus offers no further help to Odysseus. In Virgil's *Aeneid*, Aeolus is said to control the winds by keeping them in a large cave.

62.8–10 Bradley murmuring . . . unmeaning to him;] Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924), British philosopher, educated at Oxford University, where he became a fellow of Merton College. Noted Santayana scholar T. L. S. Sprigge wrote that "Bradley is indisputably the greatest British philosopher between J. S. Mill and Bertrand Russell" (Sprigge, "Bradley, Francis Herbert" in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], 100). Bradley's work, influenced by Hegel, responded critically to the utilitarian ethics and empirical logic and metaphysics dominant in British universities, substantially aiding the rise of British Idealism in academic philosophy. In response to hedonistic and Kantian ethics (after Immanuel Kant [1724–1804]), Bradley argued that ideal morality regards the individual as a concrete, unified person rather than a series of experiences (hedonism) or an abstract ego (Kantianism); and this individual has a capacity to develop beyond what social conditions might dictate. Bradley's metaphysics considered unity and wholeness as characteristic of reality, while division and distinction were the marks of illusion. Concepts and language are always partial and cannot capture reality, but even as they give rise to contradictions they are part of the harmony of the Absolute, or the reality that exceeds all concepts. In *Appearance and Reality,* Bradley wrote:

> Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realizing either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* [London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893], 145)

Other important works by Bradley include *Ethical Studies* (1876), *The Principles of Logic* (1883), and *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914). Santayana reported in a 1928 letter that he was reading Bradley's *Ethical Studies* for the first time in preparation for reviewing the second edition (*LGS,* 4:7). Santayana's review, "Fifty Years of British Idealism," appeared in *The New Adelphi 2* (1928): 112–20, and was reprinted as the second chapter of *STTMP* (48–70). Reflecting on the fifty years since the first edition of *Ethical Studies,* Santayana wrote that Bradley, "with his scornful and delicate intellect, his wit, his candour, his persistence, and the baffling futility of his conclusions" has been "a chief agent in the change" of English opinion "from insular dogmatism to universal bewilderment" (*STTMP,* 48). He noted that Bradley held "that the only possible reality was consciousness" (*STTMP,* 52) but he did not think such idealism ultimately required any refutation. Idealism "is an honest examination of conscience in a reflective mind. Refutations and proofs depend on pregnant meanings assigned to terms, meanings first rendered explicit and unambiguous by those very proofs or refutations. On any different acceptation of those terms, these proofs and refutations fall to the ground; and it remains a question for good sense, not for logic at all, how far the terms in either case describe anything existent" (*STTMP*, 65–66). The significance of the distinction between logical refutation and good sense is echoed in Santayana's observation that Bradley's part in dislodging utilitarianism and empiricism from academic philosophy did little to influence "certain political and intellectual circles outside" universities, which still "need[ed] chastening at least as much as those of fifty years ago" (*STTMP*, 49). Santayana's personal library included *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* and *Ethical Studies*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927). For J. S. Mill see Note 46.20 Mill; see also Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

63.6–7 "To perceive all . . . a material object."] The original text reads, "Percevoir toutes les influences de tous les points de tous les corps serait descendre à l'état d'objet matériel" (Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire: essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* [Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896], 38). The authorized English translation reads, "To perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object" (Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1911], 46). The authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

64.35 Plotinus] Plotinus (c. AD 205–270), philosopher, birthplace unknown (ancient sources suggest Egypt). At the age of 28, Plotinus began studying philosophy at Alexandria. After ten years, interest in Persian and Indian philosophy led him to join a military expedition to Persia. After the expedition foundered, Plotinus, now 40 years old, moved to Rome to teach philosophy and established a school there. At the age of 50 he produced his first writings: short pieces in Greek intended for his pupils. His student Porphyry (AD 234–c. 305) later arranged Plotinus's writings into six groups of nine articles and published them about AD 300 as the *Enneads.* They covered ethics, aesthetics, physics, psychology, metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Plotinus is known as the leading figure in Neoplatonism, a revival of Platonic philosophy that flourished through the sixth century. Plotinus thought the unity of all being is the Absolute One, a transcendental and unknowable principle or cause of all existence. Most removed from the unified Absolute One is Matter, which has the least value and reality. Three grades of reality, each exhibiting increasingly diminished unity, lie between the One and Matter: first, *Nous* or World–Mind or Intelligence consists of an eternal apprehension of the Platonic ideas as interrelated forces; second, *Psyche* or World–Soul, with its diminished unity, must apprehend objects successively and severally, thereby creating time and space; third, *Phusis* or Nature has a dreamlike consciousness that projects the physical world.

Santayana described the universe of Plotinus in this way: "a process of emanation from the One through the Ideas to the Soul of the World, whence, like rays from different stars, human and animal souls descend on occasion to animate material bodies. This system was designed to encourage the spirit to rise from its animal prison—prison was the word—reversing that emanation until it recovered the primal bliss of contemplative union with pure Being" (*PSL,* 70). The Absolute One of Plotinus typically has been identified with the Good, but Santayana wrote, "It is the good of religion, because religion is a conversion from one object of pursuit to another, under the form of the good: but in the One itself, or in attainment, the pursuit is absent, and the category of the good no longer has any application" (*PSL*, 46). In *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), Santayana claimed that the failure of Neoplatonism as a religion was due to its foundation in dialectic and in the hypostasis of abstractions, such as taking Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) allegories as metaphysical discoveries and revelations (*IPR*, 52). According to Santayana, a successful religion takes its form from tradition and its substance from national imagination and conscience. Neoplatonism, however, took its form and substance from abstract thought (*IPR*, 53). This left Plotinus's philosophy at an explanatory disadvantage. Santayana followed up this criticism thirteen years later, the same year *Winds of Doctrine* appeared, with a review of B. A. G. Fuller's *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* ("Dr. Fuller, Plotinus, and the Nature of Evil," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 10, no. 23 [23 October 1913]: 589–99; reprinted as "Plotinus and the Nature of Evil," *Obiter Scripta*, 68–87). In the review, Santayana wrote that Plotinus "could not explain the origin of evil; in fact he could not explain the origin of anything, his whole natural philosophy being unnatural, and merely a moral allegory" (*OS,* 83). Further, the disconnection with nature caused serious moral problems because "Plotinus, in supposing that the good was single and *a priori*, in fancying it to be the creative power, encouraged himself to ignore the greater part of its possible forms. He shut himself up, with his sect, in imaginative intolerance" (*OS*, 75).

None of this was reason for Santayana to dismiss Plotinus, in whom Santayana found a "dominant sense . . . of the spiritual life" absent in Socrates (469–399

BC) and Plato; and this aspect of Plotinus was a significant inspiration for Santayana in thinking about Platonic philosophy. In several letters from 1926, Santayana wrote of working on an essay about Platonism and "Spiritual religion," which originally was to be a review of *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (1926) by William Ralph Inge, who also wrote *The Religious Philosophy of Plotinus and Some Modern Philosophies of Religion* (1914) and *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (1918) (*LGS*, 3:284, 287, 289, 299). After the review became an independent essay, it soon outgrew "the limits of an article, for which it was first intended, and [became] a little book" (*LGS,* 3:287, 289, 291), namely, Santayana's *Platonism and the Spiritual Life* (1927) (*LGS*, 3:289, 291, 299). In Santayana's *Realms of Being,* the second book, *The Realm of Matter,* carries an epigraph—which observes the effects of matter on the heavenly soul—from Plotinus (Plotinus, Vol. 1: *Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead* 1 [Loeb Classical Library 440], trans. A. H. Armstrong [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 314–15). For studies of Plotinus and Santayana see Jay Bregman, "Santayana and Neoplatonism," *BSS* 34 (2016): 4–15; Paul G. Kuntz, "Santayana's Christian Neoplatonism," *Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought,* Part 1, ed. R. Baine Harris (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 271–302; and John Lachs, "Neoplatonic Elements in the Spiritual Life," *Neoplatonism and Western Aesthetics,* ed. A. Alexandrakis and N. J. Moutafakis (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 143–52. See also Note 40.1 Plato.

65.37 Hebraic morality.] According to Santayana, the Jewish moral tradition includes a prophetic legacy that identified virtue and happiness and understood social well-being as dependent on character and conduct rather than omens and sacrifices (*LR3*, 46). But these insights were not interpreted naturalistically: Virtue was not understood as natural human excellence but rather regarded as a supernatural means for securing Jehovah's favor (*LR3*, 45). To this moral understanding was added the institution of a formal law taken as revealed by Jehovah and recorded by Moses (*LR3*, 46). While these innovations led to an articulation of "the moral government of the world," it was not accompanied by the notion "that nature shows a generic benevolence toward life and reason wherever they arise" (*LR3*, 47). In Santayana's words, "What this moral government of things meant when it was first asserted was that Jehovah expressly directed the destinies of heathen nations and the course of nature itself for the final glorification of the Jews" (*LR3*, 47–48). And this "fanaticism," wrote Santayana, was then bequeathed to the Christian and Muslim traditions (*LR3*, 48). The broader contribution to human moral development has been an instrumentality for adhering to ideals: "Hebraism has put earnestness and urgency into morality, making it a matter of duty, at once private and universal, rather than what paganism had left it, a mass of local allegiances and legal practices" (*LR5,* 135–36). Santayana regarded this a potentially powerful factor in a rational ethics: "Could this abstract moral habit, this transferable earnestness, be enlisted in rational causes, the Life of Reason would have gained a valuable instrument. . . . The abstract power of self-direction . . . might give the Life of Reason a public embodiment such as it has not had since the best days of classic antiquity" (*LR5*, 136).

65.39–66.3 Philosophy, said Plato, is a meditation on death . . . ; and Schopenhauer said that the spectacle of death was the first provocation to philosophy.] In Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) *Phaedo*, Socrates remarks that "those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death" (*Phaedo*, 63e–64a). Socrates's observation is based on the possibility that "death is nothing more or less than . . . the separate condition of the body by itself when it is released from the soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when released from the body" (*Phaedo*, 64c) and that "the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body, so far as is possible" (*Phaedo*, 65a). He goes on to state, "If at its release the soul is pure and carries with it no contamination of the body, because it has never willingly associated with it in life, but has shunned it and kept itself separate as its regular practice—in other words, if it has pursued philosophy in the right way and really practiced how to face death easily—this is what 'practicing death' [μελέτη θανάτου] means" (*Phaedo* 80e–81a). Schopenhauer wrote, "Death is the true inspiring genius, or the muse of philosophy, wherefore Socrates has defined the latter as θανάτου μελέτη. Indeed without death men would scarcely philosophise" (*The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 3, trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp [London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1909], 249). See Note 40.1 Plato, Note 46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer, and Note 49.5 Socrates.

66.10 Fichtean)] Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), German philosopher and political thinker, born in Saxony and educated at Jena and Leipzig. His chief philosophical influence was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Fichte called his account of transcendental idealism *Wissenschaftslehre*, the first systematic account of which he gave in his seminal work *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* (*Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy*) [Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794]). His main philosophical concern was reconciling human freedom with natural necessity. Fichte took the free human will to be primary and then sought to understand how human beings with free will could be part of the natural world of causally determined material objects. He was an influential figure for German idealism and romanticism. The three basic principles of Fichte's philosophical system are: first, the basic existent is the self-affirming

Ego, which is absolute and whose infinite activity makes possible any ideal act of Ego. Second, the Ego posits a nonego, thereby differentiating absolute ideal activity and its field of activity. Third, the absolute Ego posits a limited ego in contrast to a limited nonego. These provide the subject matter for empirical knowledge (as opposed to the ideal activity of Ego). Santayana wrote in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900) that

> It was a capital error in Fichte and Schopenhauer to assign essential fertility to the will in the creation of ideas. They mistook, as human nature will do, even when at times it professes pessimism, an ideal for a reality: and because they saw how much the will clings to its objects, how it selects and magnifies them, they imagined that it could breed them out of itself. A man who thinks clearly will see that such self-determination of a will is inconceivable, since what has no external relation and no diversity of structure cannot of itself acquire diversity of functions. (*IPR*, 165)

In 1901, Santayana wrote that reading Fichte felt "as if I were listening to the confessions of a refracted sun-beam rather than of a two-legged man" (*LGS*, 1:247). In a 1914 letter, Santayana wrote "I am rereading Fichte: it is very fine and grand, and at the same time curiously childish. It seems as if Life, to him, meant Inexperience" (*LGS*, 2:201). In Santayana's *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1916), a sustained criticism of German idealism and transcendental philosophy, he wrote that "Fichte purified the system of Kant of all its inconsistent and humane elements; he set forth the subjective system of knowledge and action in its frankest and most radical form" (*EGP,* 65). Santayana explained, in a chapter entitled "Fichte on the Mission of Germany," that the mission of German idealism "to consecrate the world and show that every part of it is an organ of the spirit" gave rise to Fichte's "prophetic glimpses of an idealistic Germany conquering the world" (*EGP,* 78). In 1933, Santayana maintained his earlier views when he wrote that with Fichte "transcendental method showed its true colours" (*STTMP,* 30). Santayana's personal library included Fichte's *Science of Knowledge,* trans. A. E. Kroeger (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1868), which contains marginalia in Santayana's hand. See Note 5.16 Kant and Note 32.27 German idealism.

67.14–18 the lower organisms store energy. . .perished. Their *élan vital* . . . to live is to kill.] The description of *élan vital* parallels Einstein's formulation of $e = mc^2$, as the energy and mass in the grass and mutton are transmuted into energy and mass in the sheep who eats the grass and the human who eats the sheep.

67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing.] Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–c. 55 BC), Roman poet and follower of Epicurean philosophy. Little is known with confidence of Lucretius' life apart from the fact that he is the author of the epic poem *De Rerum Natura* (*On the Nature of Things* or *On the Nature of the Universe*), which presents Epicurean philosophy in hexameter verse. It presents even the most abstruse points of physics and philosophy as contributing to tranquility and freedom from the fears of popular religion, especially the fear of death. The work has survived mostly intact, though it is not known whether Lucretius completed it to his satisfaction. Santayana's allusion is to Book I of *De Rerum Natura*: "None of the things therefore which seem to be lost is utterly lost, since nature replenishes one thing out of another and does not suffer any thing to be begotten, before she has been recruited by the death of some other" (T. Lucreti Cari, *De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex, with Notes and a Translation,* 4th ed., trans. H. A. J. Munro [London: George Bell and Sons, 1886], 7). Santayana greatly admired and referred throughout his writings to Lucretius' philosophy. In his autobiography, Santayana wrote of his initial acquaintance with Lucretius's work and its influence on his thought:

> I read Lucretius, in a pocket edition without notes given me by a friend, somewhat pathetically, because he was leaving college. I couldn't properly understand the text, many a word was new to me, and I had to pass on, reading as I did at odd moments, or in the horse-car. But the general drift was obvious, and I learned the great passages by heart. Even the physical and biological theories seemed instructive, not as scientific finalities, as if science could be final, but as serving to dispel the notion that anything could be non-natural or miraculous. If the theory suggested were false, another no less naturalistic would be true; and this presumption recommended itself to me and has become one of my first principles: not that a particular philosophy called naturalism must be true *a priori*, but that nature is the standard of naturalness. (*PP*, 230)

In letters spanning decades, Santayana often wrote of his appreciation and admiration for Lucretius. In 1887, he wrote to a friend, "By the way, do you ever read Lucretius? If you don't, I should advise you to try him. He fills me with the greatest enthusiasm and delight. The arguments are often childish, but the energy, the flow, the magnificence and solidity are above everything." (*LGS,* 1:46). And in 1951, he wrote, "Naturalism . . . is something to which I am so thoroughly wedded that I like to call it materialism, so as to prevent all confusion with romantic naturalism like Goethe's, for instance, or that of Bergson. Mine is the hard, non-humanistic naturalism of the Ionian philosophers, of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza" (*LGS*, 8:328). Lucretius is one of the poets treated in Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (1922), in which Santayana described him as "the poet of substance" (*TPP*, 121) and "of nature" (*TPP*, 122). Santayana thought that "Lucretius' notion . . . of what is positively worth while or attainable is very meagre: freedom from superstition, with so much natural science as may secure that freedom, friendship, and a few cheap and healthful animal pleasures" (*TPP*, 122). But Santayana also believed that, "If any poet ever felt the life of nature in its truth, irrepressible, many-sided, here flaming up savagely, there helplessly dying down, that poet was Lucretius, whose materialism was unqualified" (*RB*, 188). Santayana's personal library included a copy of *De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex.*

67.39 the angel the pool of Bethesda.] Refers to a scene in Chapter 5 of the book of John in the New Testament. Sick and disabled people would gather at the pool of Bethesda, where an angel would periodically visit and stir the waters, and the first person to step into the water thereafter was cured of whatever ailment was present. The text reads: "Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep market a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water: whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had" (John 5:2–4). In John's account, Jesus visits the pool and performs a miracle, curing a man who never could manage to be first into the water after the angel's appearance.

Santayana used the image of the angel and the pool of Bethesda to different purposes in different works. It appears in Santayana's *The Sense of Beauty* in a section about the importance of form for beauty:

> A formless object cannot *inform* the mind, cannot mould it to a new habit. That happens only when the data, by their clear determination, compel the eye and imagination to follow new paths and see new relations. Then we are introduced to a new beauty, and enriched to that extent. But the indeterminate, like music to the sentimental, is a vague stimulus. It calls forth at random such ideas and memories as may lie to hand, stirring the mind, but leaving it undisciplined and unacquainted with any new object. This stirring, like that of the pool of Bethesda, may indeed have its virtue. A creative mind, already rich in experience and observation, may, under the influence of such a stimulus, dart into a new thought, and give birth to that with which it is already pregnant; but the fertilising seed came from elsewhere, from study and admiration of those definite forms which nature contains, or which art, in imitation of nature, has conceived and brought to perfection. (*SB,* 92)

More similar to Santayana's usage in *Winds of Doctrine* is the appearance of this image in *The Realm of Matter.* Santayana wrote that one tempted to dualism when contemplating life may suppose "two opposite agents: one an inert matter only capable of sinking into a dead sea of indistinction: the other a supernatural spirit, intrinsically disembodied, but swooping down occasionally upon that torpid matter, like the angel into the pool of Bethesda, and stirring it for a while into life and shape" (*RB,* 328).

68.6–9 The original tendency of life . . . like a wireless message sent at the creation . . . by the humanity of to-day.] The phrase "we are told. . ." suggests that Santayana is referring to something specific and well known to him and presumably to the reader. The idea of one "message" producing diverse individuals goes back at least as far as the Mishnah (redacted early third century), which uses the metaphor that coins stamped by a die are all alike but that humans, all of whom God creates in the image of Adam/the original human, are all different (Sanhedrin 4:5). A more contemporary parallel, referring to a semaphore telegraph, comes from the German writer Heinrich Heine (1797–1856): "Siehst du ihn schon, den Willen Gottes? Er zieht durch die Luft, wie das stumme Geheimniß eines Telegraphen" (Heine, "Französische Zustände" ["Conditions in France"] [1831/1832]; repr. in *So weit das Auge reicht: Die Geschichte der optischen Telegraphie,* ed. Klaus Beyrer [Karlsruhe: Braun, 1995], 157; cited and translated in Erik Christopher Born, "Sparks to Signals: Literature, Science, and Wireless Technology, 1800–1930" [doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2016], 76): "Do you see it already, the will of God? It moves through the air like a telegrapher's silent secret." A closer parallel appears in the newsletter of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church of Zion, a Biblical literalist and utopian community based in Zion, Illinois: "I wish to say to the Glory of God, that WIRELESS TELEPHONY IS NO NEW THING IN THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN among the children of God. It has been practiced from the beginning of creation," followed with numerous examples of "WIRELESS TELEPHONY IN OPERATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF CREATION" (O. L. Tindall, "Wireless Telephony," *Leaves of Healing 37* [January 15, 1916]: 375; all emphasis in original).

Santayana is much more likely to have been familiar with Henri Bergson's somewhat similar assertion that "le cerveau ne doit donc pas être autre chose, à notre avis, qu'une espèce de bureau téléphonique central" ("in our opinion, then, the brain is no more than a kind of central telephonic exchange") (Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* [Paris: Alcan, 1896], 16; authorized trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer as *Matter and Memory* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1911], 19).

68.39–69.1 Translate me into a thousand tongues!] A well-known Hebrew parable states that when God gave the Torah on Mount Sinai, it was given in seventy languages, comprising the languages of all peoples and nations, so that everyone would understand (Shabbat 88a; Exodus Rabbah 5). In the New Testament, Acts 2:1–18 recounts that at Pentecost, the apostles "were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak in tongues" (2:4). The multitude who came to listen, representing "every nation under heaven" (2:5), were astonished "because that every man heard them speak in his own language" (2:6).

69.37–70.5 "led to suppose" . . . "capable of . . . their future," . . . "we shall . . . earthly life."] The quotations are from Henri Bergson, "Life and Consciousness," *The Hibbert Journal* 10, no. 1 (October 1911): 24–44 (reprinted as "Life and Consciousness," *Huxley Memorial Lectures to the University of Birmingham* [Birmingham, UK: Cornish Brothers, 1914], 99–128):

> when we see that consciousness, whilst being at once creation and choice, is also memory, that one of its essential functions is to accumulate and preserve the past, that very probably (I lack time to attempt the demonstration of this point) the brain is an instrument of forgetfulness as much as one of remembrance, and that in pure consciousness nothing of the past is lost, the whole life of a conscious personality being an indivisible continuity, are we not led to suppose that the effort continues beyond, and that in this passage of consciousness through matter (the passage which at the tunnel's exit gives distinct personalities) consciousness is tempered like steel, and tests itself by clearly constituting personalities and preparing them, by the very effort which each of them is called upon to make, for a higher form of existence? If we admit that with man consciousness has finally left the tunnel, that everywhere else consciousness has remained imprisoned, that every other species corresponds to the arrest of something which in man succeeded in overcoming resistance and in expanding almost freely, thus displaying itself in true personalities capable of remembering all and willing all and controlling their past and their future, we shall have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life. (*Hibbert Journal* 10, no. 1 [October 1911]: 43)

The published essay is a modified version of Bergson's Huxley lecture presented on 29 May 1911 at the University of Birmingham, the seventh in the lecture series established in honor of T. H. Huxley (see Note 46.20 Huxley). In 1919 another modified version of the Huxley lecture appeared in French as "La conscience et la vie" in Henri Bergson, *L'énergie spirituelle. Essais et conferences* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1919), 1–14. When the English translation of this book appeared the next year, it included a translation of "La conscience et la vie":

"Life and Consciousness," in *Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays*, trans. H. Wilden Carr (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 3–36. This English translation of the French-language essay is distinct from the identically titled 1911 publication, the latter being the source of the quotations Santayana used. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

70.6–8 "spurn every kind of resistance and break through many an obstacle, perhaps even death."] The quotation is from Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), 294: "L'animal prend son point d'appui sur la plante, l'homme chevauche sur l'animalité, et l'humanité entière, dans l'espace et dans le temps, est une immense armée qui galope à côté de chacun de nous, en avant et en arrière de nous, dans une charge entraînante capable de culbuter toutes les résistances et de franchir bien des obstacles, même peut-être la mort." The authorized English translation renders the text in this way: "The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death" (Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt, 1911], 271, 285–86). The authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

71.17 *non peccavi,*] Latin for "I have not sinned." "Peccavi" is the first person singular perfect indicative active for "to miss, to mistake, to offend, to sin." The text of "Confiteor" ("I confess"), recited by the celebrant in the Tridentine Roman Catholic Mass that was used during Santayana's lifetime, includes the confession "peccavi"–"I have sinned" (*Missale Romanum ex Decreto Sacro Sancti Concilii Tridentini restitutum: Pii V Pont. Max. iussu Editum* [Roman Missal as established by the Council of Trent: ed. Pope Pius V] [Paris: Societatem Typographicam Librorum Officii Ecclesiastici, 1603], 136; retrieved December 22, 2021 from https://archive.org/details/MissaleRomanum1603/).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

73.6 Mr. G. E. Moore] George Edward Moore (1873–1958), British philosopher, born in London and educated at Cambridge University, where he was a lecturer (1911–25) and professor (1925–39) of philosophy. Moore, with Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), responded to the Hegelian idealism prevalent in British universities with demands for clarity and criteria of meaning faithful to common sense, and contributed to what came to be known as analytic philosophy. In ethics, Moore's legacy includes his articulation of the naturalistic fallacy, which consists in giving an account of the good that denies its goodness as something distinct from whatever natural concepts or elements it is reduced to. In other words, the fallacy consists in reducing the good to something else such as pleasure or power or honor and neglecting whatever makes any one of those good. This fallacy is treated in Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), a work which, along with Moore himself, influenced the Bloomsbury Group and, in particular, its members Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), Leonard Woolf (1880–1969), Clive Bell (1881–1964), and Lytton Strachey (1880–1932). Moore's other works include *Ethics* (1912), *Philosophical Studies* (1922), and the posthumous collection *Philosophical Papers* (1959). As an advanced student at King's College, Cambridge University, Santayana first met Moore in 1896–97: "Although I was a member of King's, all my work was at Trinity, under Henry Jackson as Tutor, and with Bertie Russell, G. E. Moore and MacTaggart as philosophical friends" (*PP*, 439). Santayana wrote that Russell and "Moore . . . helped me, in 1897, to grind fine and filter Platonic Ideas into my realm of essence" (*PGS*, 587). In 1904, Santayana wrote to a friend about Moore's *Principia Ethica*: "I should more heartily agree with his logic if it were backed by some sense of the conditions in which it operates, some knowledge of human nature. His points become cogent only when the speaker forgets himself and makes his assertions irresponsibly forthright and categorical. So taken—as ready-made accidental judgments—they may well be what Moore says they are in respect to their form. Their substance, however, needs to be transformed by experience and culture. How little wisdom these metaphysicians have, and how punctiform and scholastic their vision of things is apt to become when they live in colleges or dwell in an atmosphere of technical controversy. In its rather insignificant sphere, however, I agree with Moore's doctrine. Good is a unique predicate, quite distinct in meaning from pleasant, etc; but its application is intelligible, and what things are good can be decided only by asking what things make a difference to somebody. The inanimate 'beautiful' universe Moore speaks of can be good only because it meets a given sense for harmony" (*LGS*, 1:275). In another letter Santayana wrote that Moore's "book seems to contain a grain of accuracy in a bushel of inexperience" (*LGS,* 1:282). More than ten years after their initial meeting Santayana characterized Moore as "arrogant and brutal" and "disagreeable and unfair" but also liked "the clearness with which [Moore] holds to the intent of thought and avoids those psychological sophisms to which we all, brought up under the blight of idealism, remain so prone. For that lesson I am willing to forgive him all his narrowness and general incapacity" (*LGS*, 1:378–9). Santayana's personal assessment of Moore changed after meeting him in person in the summer of 1908, and he wrote to Bertrand Russell, "It was a real pleasure to see Moore who is so different from what I expected, so young, shy, and nice-looking, instead of ugly, old, and aggressive, as for some reason I had imagined him" (*LGS,* 1:386). Santayana consistently attributed the development of his ideas to, among other sources, his early interactions with Russell and Moore

(*LGS,* 6:81, 8:36), but he remarked in his autobiography that Moore did not maintain a friendly attitude toward him in later years (*PP*, 444). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell, Note 40.1 Plato, and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

73.20–21 *ex cathedra,*] Latin for "from the chair" or "from the seat." It is used to mean "authoritative," "authoritatively," often with the implication of a view held dogmatically. It sometimes suggests the authority of the professor's chair, and sometimes the authority of the Pope, who according to Roman Catholic doctrine is infallible when speaking *ex cathedra* on matters of faith or morals.

74.10 *Philosophical Essays*] Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910). The book collects seven essays, all previously published except the final one. Three are concerned with ethics ("The Elements of Ethics," "The Free Man's Worship," and "The Study of Mathematics") and four with the nature of truth ("Pragmatism," "William James's Conception of Truth," "The Monistic Theory of Truth," and "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood"). The first essay makes plain the influence of G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903) on Russell's thinking. The second and third essays present ideals that Russell himself finds good, ideals that broaden one's perspective beyond the individual and human and that realize freedom in renunciation of willful resistance to Fate. The essays concerning truth include Russell's critique of pragmatism and James's pragmatic notion of truth. Reviewers praised the book for its style and accessibility, comparing it favorably on those points to the works of James that Russell criticized. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

74.11 *The Problems of Philosophy*] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912). The book is the fortieth in the "Home University Library of Modern Knowledge: A Comprehensive Series of New and Specially Written Books" and was intended as an introduction to philosophy for students and the general public. The book states (and Santayana notes) that its fifteen chapters deal mainly with the theory of knowledge. The final chapter presents philosophy as valuable:

> not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, . . . but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. (Russell, *Problems*, 249–50)

The historical and intellectual context of the book is reflected in the recommended reading list: Plato (c. 427–347 BC), René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), George Berkeley (1685–1753), David Hume (1711–1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

76.20–21 This backward look, when the hand is on the plough,] Allusions to Luke 9:57–62. In this passage, one man pledges to follow Jesus wherever he may go, but two others, whom Jesus asks to follow him, say that they need to attend to family issues first. "And Jesus said unto him, No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God" (Luke 9:62). This verse contrasts with 1 Kings 19:15–21, in which God commands Elijah to anoint Elisha as his successor in his prophetic mission. Elijah permits Elisha to say goodbye to his family and to share with them a feast, roasting the oxen he had been plowing with over a fire made of wood from the broken plow, before leaving to follow Elijah (1 Kings 19:20–21).

76.39–77.1 The quality of wisdom, like that of mercy, is not strained.] Based on the opening line of Portia's speech in Act IV, Scene 1 of *The Merchant of Venice*: "The quality of mercy is not strained."

77.19–77.28 "The solution of . . . in this matter."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," *Philosophical Essays,* 77–78. Including the elided text, the paragraph begins: "The solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably the greatest achievement of which our own age has to boast. Since the beginnings of Greek thought these difficulties have been known; in every age the finest intellects have vainly endeavoured to answer the apparently unanswerable questions that had been asked by Zeno the Eleatic. At last Georg Cantor has found the answer, and has conquered for the intellect a new and vast province which had been given over to Chaos and old Night." See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 52.31 Achilles and the tortoise.

77.22 Cantor] Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp Cantor (1845–1918), German mathematician, born in St. Petersburg, Russia, earned his doctorate from the University of Berlin in 1868, and joined the faculty at the University of Halle in 1870. He became a professor of mathematics at Halle in 1879 and remained there for his entire career. He is known for his work on infinite sets and as the originator of modern set theory. In 1874, Cantor, building on Richard Dedekind's (1831–1916) work on infinite sets, demonstrated that infinite sets may have differing numbers of elements and established the theory of transfinite numbers, which include transfinite cardinals, numbers used to quantify elements of infinite sets; and transfinite ordinals, numbers ordering the infinite sets. See Note 77.26 Dedekind.

77.22 Dedekind] Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind (1831–1916), German mathematician, born in Braunschweig, earned his doctorate at Göttingen in 1852. After teaching in Göttingen and Zürich, he returned to Braunschweig in 1862, teaching at the Technical High School until his retirement in 1912. Dedekind is known for his work demonstrating how the real numbers can be formally constructed from the rational numbers, which contributed to the formalizing of the foundations of mathematics. His definition of infinite sets (a set is infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself), published in 1872, was used by Georg Cantor (1845–1918), with whom Dedekind was friends, in his groundbreaking work on infinite sets. See Note 77.26 Cantor.

77.28–78.2 "To reconcile us . . . of its beauty."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," *Philosophical Essays*, 82. The elided text reads: "—which is merely the literary personification of these forces—". See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

78.6–15 "Real life is . . . the actual world."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," *Philosophical Essays*, 82. Santayana's quotation departs slightly from Russell's 1910 text, with two changes in punctuation and one in wording. The original reads: "Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise. . ." and "the pitiful facts [Santayana substituted "laws"] of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell. . . ." See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

78.15–16 "those elements in . . . place in heaven."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," *Philosophical Essays*, 73. Santayana's quotation departs slightly from Russell's 1910 text. The original reads "and Plato realised, more perhaps than any other single man, what those elements are in human life which merit a place in heaven," with Santayana omitting "are". See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 40.1 Plato.

78.16–19 "The true spirit . . . as in poetry."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," *Philosophical Essays*, 73. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

81.29–30 laying up his treasures in the mathematical heaven.] Allusion to Matthew 6:19–21: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

82.11 “Thirteen Pragmatisms”;] Arthur Oncken Lovejoy (1873–1962), philosopher and historian of ideas, in his two-part article “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1908): 5–12; “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 5, no. 2 (16 January 1908): 29–39, distinguished thirteen logically independent meanings of the term “pragmatism.” He ordered them “according to the leading of those associations of ideas through which the ambiguities of the several doctrines, and the transitions from one to another, become relatively intelligible” (Lovejoy, “Thirteen Pragmatisms. II”: 37):

1. The meaning of a judgment consists in future experienced consequences regardless of belief in the proposition.
2. The meaning of a judgment consists in the future consequences of believing it.
3. The truth of a judgment is identical with the occurrence of the series of experiences which it predicts.
4. A judgment is true insofar as its predictions have been realized in past experience.
5. General propositions are true which have in past experience been biologically serviceable to those living by them.
6. Temporal becoming is fundamental to reality, and processes of consciousness contribute an essential and creative part to this becoming. The future is nonreal, partly indeterminate, and dependent on movement of consciousness.
7. Apprehension of truth is a kind of satisfaction, and the true judgment fulfills some need. Moving from doubt to belief is moving from dissatisfaction to satisfaction.
8. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is satisfactoriness, and all the dimensions of satisfaction have commensurable epistemological values.
9. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is the degree in which it satisfies the distinctive theoretic demands of human nature.
10. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is its practical usefulness as a postulate; general truths are postulated truths, and there are no necessary truths.
11. There are some necessary truths, but they are few and not practically suitable to our needs; beyond these truths it is legitimate and needed to use postulates.
12. Of postulates regarded as truths, those that enrich moral, esthetic, and religious life have a coordinate place with those commended by common sense and physical science as the basis of active physical life.
13. The meaning of a judgment consists in part in the apprehension of the relation of an object to a conscious purpose.

After enumerating the different pragmatisms, Lovejoy grouped them "in a more logical manner" according to the forms of theory they took:

Pragmatist Theories of Meaning: 1, 2, 13

Pragmatism as an Epistemologically Functionless Theory concerning the "Nature" of Truth: 3

Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i.e., of the Criterion of the Validity of Judgment: 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Pragmatism as an Ontological Theory: 6

82.18–83.3 "The influence of democracy. . . . rather than a George III."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism," in *Philosophical Essays*, 121–22. Santayana's quotation departs slightly from Russell's 1910 original in text: "to decide philosophical questions by putting them to the [Santayana substituted "a"] vote," and punctuation: "the religion of the pragmatists: they have the religion they have chosen." The elided text reads: "Dr. [Ferdinand Canning Scott] Schiller at one time set to work to elucidate the question of a future life by taking a poll. William James claims for the pragmatist temper 'the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth'" (Russell, "Pragmatism," 121). F(erdinand) C(anning) S(cott) Schiller (1864–1937) was an English philosopher educated at Oxford University, where he became a fellow of Corpus Christi College; he also taught at Cornell University and the University of Southern California. Russell's citations of William James are drawn from James, "What Pragmatism Means," Lecture 2 in *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 20, 28–29. In turn, James took the phrase "The prince of darkness is a gentleman" from *King Lear,* Act 3, Scene 4. See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.2 George Washington] (1732–1799), American military and political leader, tobacco farmer, first president of the United States of America, born into a slave-owning and landowning family in the British colony of Virginia. At the age of 15, he became a land surveyor and plantation supervisor. At 20, he inherited his older half-brother's estate and eighteen slaves. From 1752 to 1758 Washington served as an officer in the Virginia militia and had success in the French and Indian War. In 1759, he resigned his commission, having achieved the rank of brigadier general, and retired to his estate to farm tobacco, later converting his crops to wheat. That same year he became a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses (the lower house of the colonial Virginia legislature). After 1763, he opposed British colonial policies discouraging western settlement and taxing imported goods. Washington was a delegate to the First Continental Congress in 1774, and he was named commander in chief of the

Continental Army at the Second Continental Congress in 1775. Washington retained the post, in spite of setbacks and conspiracies to remove him, until the conflict ended, retiring in 1783. Washington attended the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 and was chosen presiding officer. Though he had quelled a 1783 mutiny that sought to make him an American king, he reluctantly ran for president and won the election. He served two terms as president and chose not to run for a third, though he likely would have won. He sought to ensure the financial soundness of the new nation and maintain international neutrality, and upon leaving office he warned of the risks to the nation posed by party politics. Washington retired to his estate, Mount Vernon, and died in 1799.

83.3 George III."] (1738–1820), King of Great Britain, first monarch of the ethnic German House of Hanover born in England. He succeeded to the throne when his grandfather George II died in 1760. George III respected the constitution and did not interfere with ministers' responsibility for colonial policy. However, the king became for American colonists the symbol of British oppression, and his supposed tyranny was taken as justification for revolution. George III had supported repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, but after the Boston Tea Party in 1774 he no longer sought any compromise with colonists. He supported prime minister Lord North's prosecution of the war and was reluctant to end that support when Parliament refused to continue the war. George III became ill in 1788 and was thought to be insane, but he recovered. However, in 1810 he became ill again. Already losing his sight and hearing, George III also suffered increasing mental deficits and was again declared insane. His son George IV then became regent, succeeding to the throne after his father's death.

83.6–14 "The facts that . . . are both psychological."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism," *Philosophical Essays*, 104. Santayana's quotation departs slightly from Russell's 1910 text. The original has "The facts which fill" instead of the "The facts that fill" and colons rather than semicolons after "psychical facts" and "theories are based." See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.18–19 "they never think . . . theories are based,"] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism," 104. This repetition of text previously quoted by Santayana (see Note 83.6-14) omits the phrase ", like scientific specialists,". See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.19–20 Facts are the cash which the credit of theories hangs upon.] This metaphor is drawn from the thought of William James and of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), American polymath and a founder of pragmatism. The idea of the cash value of truth runs throughout James's 1906–7 lecture series published as *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907). In Lecture 6, "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," James asserts, "Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But all this points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other's truth" (80). Peirce was a founder of economic theory. According to Peirce, "The doctrine of economy, in general, treats of the relations between utility and cost. That branch of it which relates to research considers the relations between the utility and the cost of diminishing the probable error of our knowledge. Its main problem is, how, with a given expenditure of money, time, and energy, to obtain the most valuable addition to our knowledge" ("Note on the Economy of Research," *Coast Survey Report* [1879], 197–201, reprinted as "Economy of Research" in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 7, ed. Arthur W. Burks [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958], 140). Peirce continues with a series of equations for maximizing utility while minimizing cost, concluding by cautioning, "It is to be remarked that the theory here given rests on the supposition that the object of the investigation is the ascertainment of truth. When an investigation is made for the purpose of attaining personal distinction, the economics of the problem are entirely different" (157). This pioneering article deals with actual costs and benefits related to Peirce's work as a surveyor, but he also saw that these concepts could be used figuratively: "Let us now come to the question of the maxim of Pragmatism. This maxim runs as follows: 'Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object' " (Charles Sanders Peirce, *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard* Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997], 231). In his commentary on the Turrisi edition of Peirce's lectures, Philip L. Campbell summarizes: "That is, the cash value of a concept is its possible effects" (Campbell, *Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking* [SAND2011-5583] [Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2011], 51).

83.33 *pragmata*] Greek; singular *pragma,* literally "things", "actions", "facts"; the basis of the term "pragmatism."

83.38 "For illustration . . . earth is flat,"] The quotation is from Helen Bradford Thompson, "Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment," in John Dewey, *Studies in*

Logical Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903), 86–127. The original text occurs in this context:

> The contrast between the naïve view of the criterion of reality and the one we have just been discussing may be brought out by considering how we should have to interpret from each standpoint the constant succession of facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts. For illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat. It ceased to be a fact, says the theory we have been reviewing, because further thought-constructions of the real world convinced us that there is no reality which the idea "flat-world" represents. The idea "round-world" alone reproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the naïve view, because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men found they could sail around the world. Correspondence in one case is pictorial, and its existence or non-existence can, as we have seen, never be ascertained. In the other, correspondence is response, adjustment, the co-meeting of specific conditions in further constituting of experience.
>
> In actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we use is a practical one. The test of reality does not consist in ascertaining the relationship between an idea and an *x* which is not an idea, but in ascertaining what experience can be taken for granted as a safe basis for securing other experiences. (Thompson, 106–7)

83.39–84.2 "two centuries . . . independence of cities."] The quotation is from Wendell T. Bush, "Sub Specie Æternitatis," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 4, no. 24 (November 21, 1907): 659–63. The original text occurs in this context:

> The dispute over universals in the twelfth century, and again in the fourteenth century, shows us a doctrine first suppressed because it was hostile to the dominant conception of society and its needs, and then victorious because the political and social situation characterized by the breaking up of the medieval world could use such a point of view as nominalism. If nominalism were true, then it would follow that the church was but the aggregate of its members, a conception intolerable to a period in which social and metaphysical thinking started with the idea of "the whole," and with very little application to a world where nationality had hardly begun to emerge. Again, two centuries later, nominalism was evidently true because it alone could legitimatize the local independence of cities, and the rights of individual citizens, and recognize the working of the principle of nationality. (Bush, "Sub Specie Æternitatis": 660–61)

Santayana substituted "would legitimise" for "could legitimatize" in the sentence quoted.

84.16 “truths in the plural.”] The quotation is from William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 218; quoted in Bertrand Russell, “Pragmatism,” 102. The quotation of James in Russell reads, “Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised *in rebus* [in fact], and having only this quality in common, that they *pay*.” In James’s original text “realized” appears instead of “realised.” See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

85.21–22 “as far as . . . God their cause.”] The quotation is from William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 101. The original text, including the text elided in Santayana’s quotation, reads: “As far as the past facts go, indeed, there is no difference. Those facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that’s in them is gained, be the atoms or be the God their cause” (James, *Pragmatism*, 101). See Note 8.18 William James.

85.25–27 “Of course, . . . of our idea.”] This exchange also is reported in Santayana’s 1922 *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, in the essay “On My Friendly Critics,” in which he wrote:

> The whole contention of my book [*Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*] was that the glow of human emotion lent a value to good poetry which it denied to bad, and to one idea of God which it denied to another. My position in this matter was that of empirical philosophy, and of William James himself. In his book on Pragmatism he says that the being of atoms is just as good as the being of God, if both produce the same effects in human experience; and I remember once mildly protesting to him on that point, and asking him if, apart from these effects on us, the existence of God, assuming God to be conscious, would not have a considerable value in itself; and he replied, “Of course; but I was thinking of our idea.” This was exactly the attitude of my book; I was thinking of our religious and poetic ideas, and reducing their value to what they stood for in the elements of our experience, or in our destiny. (*SELS*, 247–48)

The James text referred to is found in *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 101. See Note 8.18 William James and Note 85.21–22 “as far as . . . God their cause.”

85.37 if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell’s,] The allusion is to Russell’s “William James’s Conception of Truth,” in which he wrote:

> This brings me to the difference between *criterion* and *meaning*—a point on which neither James nor Dr. Schiller is very clear. I may best explain the difference, to begin with, by an instance. If you wish to know whether a certain book is in a library, you consult the catalogue: books

> mentioned in the catalogue are presumably in the library, books not mentioned in it are presumably not in the library. Thus the catalogue affords a *criterion* of whether a book is in the library or not. But even supposing the catalogue perfect, it is obvious that when you say the book is in the library you do not mean that it is mentioned in the catalogue. You mean that the actual book is to be found somewhere in the shelves. It therefore remains an intelligible hypothesis that there are books in the library which are not yet catalogued, or that there are books catalogued which have been lost and are no longer in the library. And it remains an inference from the discovery that a book is mentioned in the catalogue to the conclusion that the book is in the library. Speaking abstractly, we may say that a property A is a criterion of a property B when the same objects possess both; and A is a useful criterion of B if it is easier to discover whether an object possesses the property A than whether it possesses the property B. Thus being mentioned in the catalogue is a useful criterion of being in the library, because it is easier to consult the catalogue than to hunt through the shelves. (*Philosophical Essays*, 137).

See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

86.1–2 a catalogue of the library at Alexandria, all the books being lost for ever;] The Library of Alexandria was established, likely in the third century BC, as part of the Mouseion, a campus dedicated to scholarship and knowledge and the source of the word "museum." According to tradition, the goal of the Library was to acquire or copy as many texts as possible; estimates of the numbers of scrolls it contained range from forty thousand to four hundred thousand. Popular culture represents the Library as having been entirely destroyed by fire during Julius Caesar's occupation of Alexandria in 48 BC. Although this story is legendary in part or in whole, the destruction of the Library of Alexandria has become the paradigm of lost knowledge. Thus, a catalogue of the texts held by the Library of Alexandria, if such a document were extant, would be an excellent example of representations of objects—the lost scrolls listed in the catalogue—which are "useless and unattainable" (*WD,* 85). See Note 85.37 if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell's.

86.12–13 Emersonian circles in which pragmatism sprang up.] For Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), see Note 129.7 Emerson.

86.14 transcendentalism] See Note 130.4 Transcendentalism.

88.15–16 "working hypotheses" . . . "prudent people . . . degree of belief."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth," *Philosophical Essays*, 147. According to Russell, working hypotheses are assumed propositions from which data are deduced, and they include

> all the general laws of science and all the metaphysics both of common sense and of professed philosophy. It is, apparently, by generalising the conception of "working hypothesis" that pragmatism has arisen. But three points seem to me to have been overlooked in this generalisation. First, working hypotheses are only a small part of our beliefs, not the whole, as pragmatism seems to think. Secondly, prudent people give only a low degree of belief to working hypotheses; it is therefore a curious procedure to select them as the very types of beliefs in general. Thirdly, pragmatism seems to confound two very different conceptions of "working." When science says that a hypothesis works, it means that from this hypothesis we can deduce a number of propositions which are verifiable, i.e. obvious under suitable circumstances, and that we cannot deduce any propositions of which the contradictories are verifiable. But when pragmatism says that a hypothesis works, it means that the effects of believing it are good, including among the effects not only the beliefs which we deduce from it, but also the emotions entailed by it or its perceived consequences, and the actions to which we are prompted by it or its perceived consequences. (Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, 147–48)

See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

88.16–31 "we hold different . . . only temperatures."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth," *Philosophical Essays*, 133–34. The original text reads:

> When we survey our beliefs, we find that we hold different beliefs with very different degrees of conviction. Some – such as the belief that I am sitting in a chair, or that 2 + 2 = 4 – can be doubted by few except those who have had a long training in philosophy. Such beliefs are held so firmly that non-philosophers who deny them are put into lunatic asylums. Other beliefs, such as the facts of history, are held rather less firmly, but still in the main without much doubt where they are well authenticated. Beliefs about the future, as that the sun will rise to-morrow and that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw, may be held with almost as great conviction as beliefs about the past. Scientific laws are generally believed less firmly, and there is a gradation among them from such as seem nearly certain to such as have only a slight probability in their favour. Philosophical beliefs, finally, will, with most people, take a still lower place, since the opposite beliefs of others can hardly fail to induce doubt. Belief, therefore, is a matter of degree. To speak of belief, disbelief, doubt, and suspense of judgment as the only possibilities is as if, from the writing on the thermometer, we were to suppose that blood heat, summer heat, temperate, and freezing were the only temperatures.

See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

88.22–23 that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw,] George Bradshaw (1800–1853), English cartographer, printer, and publisher, originated a series of travel guides to Europe, the Middle East, and India, notably including railroad timetables for the British Isles and Ireland. These were published from 1839 until 1961, and became so well known that the term "Bradshaw" was understood to refer to any railroad timetable.

88.29–31 from the writing on the thermometer. . . were the only temperatures."] These markings, sometimes together with additional empirical markings such as boiling point and "cold of snow and salt," were used in the past as either the only markings or alongside degree markings on thermometers. The article "United States Thermometer" (S. B. D., *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* 49, no. 16 [November 16, 1853]: 318–21) describes the development of a thermometer including these reference points to be specifically calibrated for a minimum of four major cities, the primary one being Boston.

89.25 Democritus] Greek philosopher (c. 460–c. 370 BC), born at Abdera in Thrace. Following fellow Greek philosopher Leucippus (fifth century BC), Democritus was a materialist who held that all existence could be explained in terms of collisions and conglomerations of atoms (from the Greek ἄτομος, meaning "uncut" or "unmown," "indivisible") moving in a void. Atoms are, according to Democritus, tiny indivisible and indestructible particles, imperceptible to the senses. The mechanical motion of atoms, and not human perception, is true reality; human knowledge results from contact with atoms; and mind operates according to the same principles as other material existence. Democritus's works, which included writings on physics, astronomy, mathematics, literature, and ethics, are known only through quotations by other authors and through Aristotle's (384–322 BC) discussion of atomism. Democritus was a significant influence on Santayana's thought, and Santayana wrote that his own naturalism, which he preferred to call materialism to distinguish it from Romantic naturalism, was "the hard, non-humanistic naturalism of the Ionian philosophers, of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza" (*LGS,* 8:328). He regarded Democritus as the culmination in Greek philosophy of "orthodox physics" (*PP*, 234), by which he meant an understanding of physics consistent with "a certain shrewd orthodoxy which the sentiment and practice of laymen maintain everywhere" (*SAF*, v). According to Santayana, Democritus held as an ideal the intelligibility of natural phenomena: "To reduce phenomena to constant elements, as similar and simple as possible, and to conceive their union and separation to obey constant laws, is what a natural philosopher will inevitably do so soon as his interest is not merely to utter experience but to understand it. Democritus brought this scientific ideal to its ultimate expression" (*LR1*, 10). Santayana acknowledged the "grossness and false simplicity" of Democritus's atomic theory and wrote "that while atomism at a given level may not be a final or metaphysical truth, it will describe, on every level, the practical and efficacious structure of the world. We owe to Democritus this ideal of practical intelligibility; and he is accordingly an eternal spokesman of reason" (*LR1*, 10). Democritus also figured as a character in Santayana's *Dialogues in Limbo* (1925/1948). See Note 40.22 Spinoza; for Lucretius, see Note 67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing.

91.7–8 M. Henri Poincaré,] (1854–1912) French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher, born at Nancy, studied mathematics and engineering before attending the University of Paris, where he earned a doctorate in mathematics in 1879. He is reputed to have been the last mathematician with expertise in all fields of the subject. According to Bertrand Russell, "Henri Poincaré was, by general agreement, the most eminent scientific man of his generation—more eminent, one is tempted to think, than any man of science now living. From the mere variety of the subjects which he illuminated, there is certainly no one who can appreciate critically the whole of his work" (Bertrand Russell, "Preface," Henri Poincaré, *Science and Method*, trans. Francis Maitland [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1914], 5). Poincaré created the field of algebraic topology; he also contributed to cosmology and, independently of Albert Einstein (1879–1955), to the special theory of relativity. In philosophy of science, Poincaré is remembered as a conventionalist because he held that the truth of the laws of geometry and Newton's laws of motion could be established neither prior to experience nor empirically; in other words, their truth depends on prior theories or definitions. However, he did not regard all of science to be conventional, since he held the truth of scientific theories to be subject to empirical results. Poincaré wrote about science and mathematics for a general audience in works such as *La valeur de la science* (Paris: Flammarion, 1905), translated as *The Value of Science,* trans. George Bruce Halsted (New York: The Science Press, 1907); and *Science et méthode* (Paris: Flammarion, 1908) (*Science and Method*). Other important works include *La science et l'hypothèse* (Paris: Flammarion, 1902), translated as *Science and Hypothesis*, trans. George Bruce Halsted (New York: Science Press, 1905); and *Dernières pensées* (Paris: Flammarion, 1913), translated as *Mathematics and Science: Last Essays*, trans. John W. Bolduc (New York: Dover, 1963).

91.9 "bankruptcy of science,"] The original text, of which the quotation is a translation, is found in Chapter 10, "Les théories de la physique moderne" ("The

Theories of Modern Physics"), in Henri Poincaré, *La science et l'hypothèse* (*Science and Hypothesis* [Paris: Flammarion, 1902]):

> Les gens du monde sont frappés de voir combien les théories scientifiques sont éphémères. Après quelques années de prospérité, ils les voient successivement abandonnées; ils voient les ruines s'accumuler sur les ruines; ils prévoient que les théories aujourd'hui à la mode devront succomber à leur tour à bref délai et ils en concluent qu'elles sont absolument vaines. C'est ce qu'ils appellent la *faillite de la science.* (Poincaré, *La science et l'hypothèse*, 189; emphasis in original)

The chapter is derived from a public presentation Poincaré gave in 1900 at the International Congress of Physics in Paris. The authorized English translation (with an introduction written by Santayana's teacher and colleague Josiah Royce), beginning with the paragraph quoted above and continuing, reads:

> The laity are struck to see how ephemeral scientific theories are. After some years of prosperity, they see them successively abandoned; they see ruins accumulate upon ruins; they foresee that the theories fashionable to-day will shortly succumb in their turn and hence they conclude that these are absolutely idle. This is what they call the *bankruptcy of science.*
>
> Their scepticism is superficial; they give no account to themselves of the aim and the role of scientific theories; otherwise they would comprehend that the ruins may still be good for something.
>
> No theory seemed more solid than that of Fresnel which attributed light to motions of the ether. Yet now Maxwell's is preferred. Does this mean the work of Fresnel was in vain? No, because the aim of Fresnel was not to find out whether there is really an ether, whether it is or is not formed of atoms, whether these atoms really move in this or that sense; his object was to foresee optical phenomena.
>
> Now, Fresnel's theory always permits of this, to-day as well as before Maxwell. The differential equations are always true; they can always be integrated by the same procedures and the results of this integration always retain their value.
>
> And let no one say that thus we reduce physical theories to the role of mere practical recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain true it is because these relations preserve their reality. They teach us, now as then, that there is such and such a relation between some thing and some other thing; only this something formerly we called motion; we now call it electric current. But these appellations were only images substituted for the real objects which nature will

> eternally hide from us. The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain to, and the only condition is that the same relations exist between these objects as between the images by which we are forced to replace them. If these relations are known to us, what matter if we deem it convenient to replace one image by another. (*Science and Hypothesis*, trans. George Bruce Halsted [New York: Science Press, 1905], 114–15; emphasis in original)

An alternative translation renders the relevant paragraph in this way:

> The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the *bankruptcy of science.* (Henri Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis,* trans. W. J. G. [London: Walter Scott, 1905], 160; emphasis in original)

See Note 91.7–8 M. Henri Poincaré.

91.22 “The Elements of Ethics,”] The first essay in Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, 1–58. Regarding the ethical doctrine expressed in his essay, Russell acknowledged the influence of Santayana’s criticism more than once. In 1929, Russell wrote:

> I no longer regard good and evil as objective entities wholly independent of human desires, nor can I find an emotional refuge in the realm of essence with the same intellectual confidence which I once felt. It was Santayana who first led me to disbelieve in the objectivity of good and evil by his criticism of my then views in his “Winds of Doctrine”, but I have been gradually driven to a position beyond that which he holds, since for him but not for me, the realm of essence is eternal and independent of existence. (“Preface,” *Mysticism and Logic* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1929], v)

Twenty-seven years later, Russell wrote:

> I owe [Santayana] certain philosophical debts. When I was young, I agreed with G. E. Moore in believing the objectivity of good and evil. Santayana’s criticism, in a book called *Winds of Doctrine*, caused me to abandon this view, though I have never been able to be as bland and comfortable without it as he was. (*Portraits from Memory and Other Essays* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956], 96)

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

91.25–28 “what is called . . . included in ethics.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 3–4. The original, including the elided text, reads:

> What is called good conduct is conduct which is a means to other things which are good on their own account; and hence the study of what is good on its own account is necessary before we can decide upon rules of conduct. And the study of what is good or bad on its own account must be included in ethics, which thus ceases to be concerned only with human conduct.

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

91.34–92.10 “The philosopher, bent . . . moralist could enjoin.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 50–51. The original, including elided text, reads:

> The philosopher, bent on the construction of a system, is inclined to simplify the facts unduly, to give them a symmetry which is fictitious, and to twist them into a form in which they can all be deduced from one or two general principles. The moralist, on the other hand, being primarily concerned with conduct, tends to become absorbed in means, to value the actions men ought to perform more than the ends which such actions serve. This latter error – for in theorising it is an error – is so forced upon us by the exigencies of practice that we may easily come to feel the ultimate ends of life far less important than the proximate and intermediate purposes which we consciously endeavour to realise. And hence most of what they value in this world would have to be omitted by many moralists from any imagined heaven, because there such things as self-denial and effort and courage and pity could find no place. The philosopher’s error is less common than the moralist’s, because the love of system and of the intellectual satisfaction of a deductive edifice is rarer than the love of virtue. But among writers on ethics the philosopher’s error occurs oftener than the other, because such writers are almost always among the few men who have the love of system. Kant has the bad eminence of combining both errors in the highest possible degree, since he holds that there is nothing good except the virtuous will – a view which simplifies the good as much as any philosopher could wish, and mistakes means for ends as completely as any moralist could enjoin.

See also Note 5.16 Kant and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

92.37–93.2 “Good and bad . . . which is right.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 11. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 text by omitting italics for the words “good,” “bad,” “round,” and “square.” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

93.2–5 “We cannot maintain . . . or ought not.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 7. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

94.2–3 Plato, who complained . . . trite and exploded.] In Plato’s *Philebus* 14c–d, Socrates objects to those paradoxes such as his interlocutor raises “that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single ‘me’ into many ‘me’s,’ and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways” (*The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], 579). Socrates characterizes them as “common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought” (*Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 579). Santayana’s personal library included this book. See Note 40.1 Plato.

94.17–18 “only one of . . . which is right.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 11. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 92.37–93.2 “Good and bad . . . which is right.”.

94.21–22 “if this were . . . what is right.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 18. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

94.22–95.1 “We do in . . . them is mistaken.”] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 18. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

94n.1 *Philebus,*] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 11a–67b (575–645). A dialogue, typically counted among Plato’s later writings, in which Socrates engages with two young men, Protarchus and Philebus, about whether pleasure or knowledge constitutes the good for all beings capable of both. The dialogue proceeds by considering a method of inquiry, the nature of pleasure, and the constitution of happiness. The dialogue declares neither pleasure nor knowledge the winner of the contest: the good, Socrates states, is found in a life with pleasure and knowledge mixed (61b). A happy mixture requires beauty, proportion, and truth, which together constitute the good. By considering whether pleasure or knowledge is more akin to each of these ingredients, knowledge comes to be regarded as closer to the good than does pleasure. Santayana recounted in his autobiography his study of *Philebus* with Henry Jackson (1839–1921), a classics tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge University, when Santayana spent a year (1896–97) as an advanced student at Cambridge:

> [Jackson] was tolerant and considerate about my bad Greek, which I had confessed at the beginning; and he recommended, as I needed a translation to help me in my reading, to get the dialogues we were to read – the Parmenides, Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus – in a cheap edition in separate little volumes with the text and a German translation on opposite pages. These little books proved invaluable. They went easily into the pocket, and I could read them anywhere during my walks, or look up again at any time a passage that had arrested my attention. (*PP*, 439)

Santayana's personal library contained several works by and about Plato, including Plato, *Platons Philebos: Griechisch und Deutsch* (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1857); Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vols. 1–5, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett; and several articles by Henry Jackson about Plato's later theory of ideas from late nineteenth-century issues of *The Journal of Philology*. See Note 40.1 Plato.

94n.6–7 "some state and . . . all men happy."] The text is from Plato, *Philebus* 11d. The quotation is found in Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett, 576. See Note 40.1 Plato.

94n.8 "as an element in human life."] The text is from Plato, *Philebus* 66e (Santayana cited the text as *Philebus* 66d). The quotation is found in Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 644. Santayana's personal library included this book. See Note 40.1 Plato.

95.3–4 Truly the debating . . . and the theatre.] The idols of the cave and of the theatre are two of the four types of idols that Francis Bacon (English philosopher, 1561–1626) describes in his *Novum Organum* (London, 1620), Book 1, Axioms 39–45. As rendered in a modern translation:

> XXXIX.
> There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names,–calling the first class *Idols of the Tribe;* the second, *Idols of the Cave;* the third, *Idols of the Market-place;* the fourth, *Idols of the Theatre.*
>
> . . .
>
> XLII.
> The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or

> den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.
>
> . . .
>
> XLIV.
> Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed and in like artificial manner set forth; seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part alike.
>
> ("Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man: Book I," in *The Works of Francis Bacon,* ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. 8: *Translation of the Philosophical Works,* Vol. 1 [Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900], 76–78; retrieved December 22, 2021 from https://archive.org/details/worksfrancisbaco08bacoiala/)

95.18–20 since the majority . . . or frogs' legs,] Pork is taboo for observant Jews and Muslims, and might also be found hateful by people who do not eat meat at all for religious or ethical reasons; Pythagoras (c. 570–495) insisted that his disciples follow a vegetarian diet but specifically forbade them to eat the local staple fava beans, legendarily for a perceived resemblance to human fetuses or flesh and perhaps more practically because G6PD deficiency, a genetic disorder prevalent in the Mediterranean area and far more common among men than among women, can cause severe and sometimes fatal anemia in persons with the disorder who eat fava beans; and over and above anyone whose religion or ethics prohibits eating frogs, the English elite in Santayana's time patriotically hated frogs' legs because their peers in their traditional enemy France considered these a delicacy, going so far as to refer to the French themselves as "frogs."

95.34 *Brod.*] This is an older spelling for the German word "Brot."

97.3–7 Plato's argument . . . the oyster. . . answer instinctively, No!] The reference is to *Philebus* 21a–d:

> *Soc.* Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
>
> *Pro.* Certainly I should.
>
> *Soc.* Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
>
> *Pro.* Certainly not.
>
> *Soc.* Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?
>
> *Pro.* Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
>
> *Soc.* Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
>
> *Pro.* I should.
>
> *Soc.* But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
>
> *Pro.* Certainly.
>
> *Soc.* And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or "pulmo marinus" [a type of jellyfish]. Could this be otherwise?
>
> *Pro.* No.

(Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], 586–87)

See Note 40.1 Plato and Note 97.18 Protarchus.

97.7–8 *argumentum ad hominem*] Latin for "argument from attacking the person," which is a rhetorical strategy, usually resulting in a fallacious argument, in which some (typically unappealing or unpopular) characteristic of a person is used to suggest that an argument put forth by that person is faulty and should be rejected. The fallacy results when the criticized personal characteristic is irrelevant to the content of the argument. The strategy may not result in a fallacy when the criticized personal characteristic is relevant to the content of the argument.

97.18 Protarchus] Character in Plato's *Philebus*, who along with the title character maintains that the good is pleasure against the character of Socrates, who maintains that the good is knowledge. The character Protarchus is distinct from and unrelated to the Epicurean philosopher Protarchus of Bargylia, who lived three centuries after Plato. See Note 40.1 Plato and Note 97.3–7 Plato's argument . . . the oyster. . . answer instinctively, No!

97.28 "Free Man's Religion"] The reference appears to be to "The Free Man's Worship," the second essay of Russell's *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 59–70, which was first published in *The Independent Review* 1 (December 1903): 415–24. An article titled "Free Man's Religion" does not appear to have been published by Russell, though two authors in addition to Santayana attribute a publication with this title to Russell: J. C. Hardwick, "The Tension which Creates Religion," *The Quest: A Quarterly Review* 13, no. 1 (October 1921): 73; and Raymond Bernard Cattell, *Psychology and Social Progress: Mankind and Destiny from the Standpoint of a Scientist* (London: C. W. Daniel, 1933), 220. In "The Free Man's Worship," Russell wrote, "To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship" (Russell, *Philosophical Essays* [1910], 69). The essay also appeared as "A Free Man's Worship" in *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917), a collection of Russell's essays that included other titles from *Philosophical Essays.* Over 20 years after its original publication, an admiring reader of Russell's essay privately published a bound reprint of "A Free Man's Worship," with a new preface by Russell. In this preface, Russell acknowledged that if he were again to write on the same theme, he would "use somewhat different words . . . , but I see no reason to think that they would be better words. Fundamentally, my view of man's place in the cosmos remains unchanged" ("Preface," *A Free Man's Worship: With a Special Preface* [Portland, ME: T. B. Mosher, 1923], ix). Russell further commented that

> the fundamental attitude recommended in A Free Man's Worship, which was the one that I strove to maintain, appears to me in retrospect the one which I should still wish to preserve. . . . There are, however, two points in regard to which, if I were writing now I should wish to introduce some modification. The first of these concerns materialism; the second concerns the scope of the notions of good and evil. (Russell, "Preface," *A Free Man's Worship* [1923], x–xi).

Six years later, Russell wrote another preface for a new printing of *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*. In this preface he wrote:

> "A Free Man's Worship" . . . depend[s] upon a metaphysic which is more platonic than that which I now believe in. I no longer regard good and evil as objective entities wholly independent of human desires, nor can I find an emotional refuge in the realm of essence with the same intellectual confidence which I once felt. (Bertrand Russell, "Preface," *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1929], v)

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.29–31 "if I am . . . the only good."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 46. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.31–34 "Most people. . . is simply good."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," *Philosophical Essays*, 47. The original, including the elided text, reads:

> Everybody judges that some sorts of communities are better than others; and most people who affirm that when they say a thing is good they mean merely that they desire it, would admit that it is better two people's desires should be satisfied than only one person's. In some such way people fail to carry out the doctrine that there is no such concept as *good*; and if there is such a concept, then what is good is not good *for me* or *for you*, but is simply good.

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.34–39 "It is, indeed . . . *B* may be."] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," *Philosophical Essays*, 47–48. Santayana's quotation substitutes the word "question" for "maxim"; the original clause reads: "since it is irrelevant to the general maxim who A and B may be." See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 114.21–24 "It is so . . . affect the question."

98.16–17 *sub specie boni.*] Latin for "under the aspect of the good." Typically, this phrase is used to express the notion that intended actions are performed with a conscious aim understood to be good (regardless of how confused or mistaken that understanding actually may be). More generally, it may indicate the perspective with which something can be understood as good.

SHELLEY: OR THE POETIC VALUE OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

103.22 Matthew Arnold,] (1822–1888) English poet, essayist, and critic of culture and society. As a school inspector, he traveled widely in both rural and urban areas of England, and in Europe at the request of Parliament. He also lectured in poetry at Oxford, being the first professor to do so in English rather than Latin. Arnold decried the contemporaneous exaltation of material culture and mediocrity and supported a return to classical education, culture, and morality, albeit in the light of his own liberal understandings. Arnold's best-known works include the poem "Dover Beach," in *New Poems* (London: Macmillan, 1867); his series "Essays in Criticism" (1865/1888); and *Culture and Anarchy* (1869). Arnold critiqued Shelley and his poetry in *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), specifically citing a recently published biography by Edward Dowden (*The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* 1886) and the posthumous edition of Shelley's poems edited by Mary Shelley (*The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* 1839). See Note 103.25–26 "a beautiful and . . . ineffectual angel, ...

103.25–26 "a beautiful and . . . ineffectual angel, beating his wings in a luminous void in vain."] At the end of an essay on Shelley published in January 1888, Matthew Arnold wrote that "in poetry, no less than in life, he is 'a beautiful *and ineffectual* angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain'" (emphasis in original). Arnold is quoting from the end of his own 1881 essay on Byron, in which he compared Shelley unfavorably to Wordsworth and Byron ("Shelley," *Nineteenth Century* 23 [January 1888]: 23–39; "Byron," *Macmillan's Magazine* 43 [March 1881]: 367–77, taken from the preface to *Poetry of Byron: Chosen and Arranged by Matthew Arnold* [Macmillan, 1881]; both essays were reprinted in *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* [1888]). See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold, and see Santayana's response to this critique of Shelley at 113.15–23; see also 116.17–117.2 and Note 116.17 Matthew Arnold said . . . .

103.26–27 Shelley was not a classic,] Matthew Arnold wrote, in reference to the editions of Shelley's poems published after the 1839 edition edited by Mary Shelley: "The text of the poems has in some places been mended since; but Shelley is not a classic, whose various readings are to be noted with earnest attention" (*Essays in Criticism: Second Series* [1888], 206). Arnold expands on the term "classic" in "The Study of Poetry," the first essay in this anthology. See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.

103.28 *sale,*] dirty, nasty, filthy, foul; indecent, obscene; squalid (French); a *sale bête* is a "dirty dog," in the sense of an untrustworthy person. In *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), Arnold connects the two terms: "I used the French word *bête* for a letter of Shelley's; for the world in which we find him I can only use another French word, *sale*" (237). Arnold goes on to exemplify that world by describing "[William] Godwin's house of sordid horror" as well as Shelley's friends and family.

104.1 *bête.*] An animal or beast, and, by extension, a fool; as an adjective, stupid or nonsensical (French). In *Essays in Criticism* (1881), Arnold defines *bête* as "a word expressing blank defect of intelligence" (70). In *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), Arnold uses *bête* to describe Shelley's letter to his wife Harriet, inviting her to stay with him and Mary Godwin: "It is *bête* from what is the signal, the disastrous want and weakness of Shelley, with all his fine intellectual gifts—his utter deficiency in humour" (231).

104.30–31 that other revolution . . . which began at Bethlehem;] Bethlehem is a town in Israel, about five miles south of Jerusalem, invoked as the birthplace of Jesus (Matthew 2:1, John 7:42) and thus literally the cradle of Christianity ("that other revolution"). Luke 2:8–14 recounts that an angel announced the birth of Jesus as savior: "And the angel said unto them, Fear not: for behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign unto you; Ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger" (Luke 2:10–12). Luke 2:4 explains that "city of David" is another name for Bethlehem; 1 Samuel 17:12 identifies David's father as an "Ephratite of Bethlehemjudah [Bethlehem in Judea]."

106.35 liberty, equality, and fraternity;] Translation of "liberté, égalité, et fraternité." These words, first associated by François Fénelon (1651–1715), became a common slogan in France beginning with the French Revolution (see https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/symbols-of-the-republic/article/liberty-equality-fraternity). See Note 4.8 Fénelon and Note 6.38 French Revolution.

106.37 Plato's *Republic.*] An ideal state imagined by Socrates in Plato's dialogue *The Republic.* In the dialogue, Socrates and his companions try to determine the nature of justice. Though they are seeking justice in the human soul, they decide first to observe it in the state, because justice is presumed easier to find on a larger scale. They trace the development of society from an idyllic, rustic setting through a corrupt, luxurious state to the ideal republic that embodies justice (*Republic* 368e–369a). In the ideal republic, justice consists in a harmonious organization of the classes of wise guardians, soldiers, and producers. In the individual, justice consists of the harmony of the parts of the soul: reason, spirit, and appetite, which correspond to the three social classes (*Republic* 427c–445e).

Socrates goes on to argue that justice is better than injustice for both the state and the individual.

107.10 *Hellas*] A lyrical drama written by Shelley in the fall of 1821 and published in the spring of 1822, inspired by the Greek insurrection against the Ottoman Empire (1821–30). The insurrection was widely supported by democratic sympathizers throughout Europe, as well as "Philhellenes" such as Lord Byron. Shelley's play is loosely based on Aeschylus's *The Persians*, which dramatized the defeat in antiquity of Xerxes and his army by the Greeks.

107.11 Ahasuerus:] A character in *Hellas* who is consulted by the Ottoman sultan. Ahasuerus is identified by the character Hassan as a Jew who has existed since ancient times:

> Some say that this is he whom the great prophet
> Jesus, the son of Joseph, for his mockery,
> Mocked with the curse of immortality.
> Some feign that he is Enoch: others dream
> He was pre-adamite and has survived
> Cycles of generation and of ruin. (*Hellas,* 149–154)

The first description is that of the "Wandering Jew." As Shelley explains in the words of the character Hassan, the Wandering Jew is a legendary character who, for his disdain of Jesus's suffering on the way to the crucifixion, is condemned to roam the earth for eternity. The Wandering Jew appears in several of Shelley's other works, notably *Queen Mab,* though the descriptions and ascribed talents of this personage vary widely.

Enoch is listed in Genesis 5 as the seventh of ten antediluvian patriarchs. The formulaic recitation of the lives of the other nine patriarchs ends with "and he died." Exceptionally, that of Enoch ends "and he was not, for God took him" (Genesis 5:21). This cryptic text was taken to signify that Enoch ascended alive to heaven: "By faith Enoch was translated that he should not see death" (Hebrews 11:5a). The extrabiblical but well-known Book of Enoch and some later Jewish literature continue the theme of Enoch as a prophet of apocalypse, arguably alive or existing in heaven.

The third possibility mentioned by Hassan is that Ahasuerus is "pre-adamite," that is, from before the creation of "adam" ("[a hu]man"; Genesis 1:27, 2:7). Philo seems to have been the first to write about the concept of an "original man" (*De Allegoris Legum* I:xii). This in turn is related to the Hebrew legend of *adam qadmon* ("primordial man/Adam"), who in some traditions is said to have existed before all creation (Genesis Rabbah 8).

In the previous speech, Mahmud notes of Ahasuerus that "his tribe/Dream and are wise interpreters of dreams" [lines 135–136]. In the Old Testament, Joseph has prophetic dreams about himself and his family (Genesis 37:5–10) and interprets dreams (Genesis 40:8–13, 16–19; 41:17–32). Daniel interprets a vision that is arguably a dream (5:24–28), and recounts his own "dream and visions" (chapters 7, 8, 10–12; the quotation is from 7:1), during each of which one of the creatures in the vision interprets the dream to Daniel.

In this context, the name Ahasuerus for the Wandering Jew is particularly ironic: the non-Jewish and likely legendary King Ahasuerus in the book of Esther has been identified with the historical King Xerxes, while in *Hellas* it is Ahasuerus who convinces the Sultan Mahmud—the parallel to Xerxes in *The Persians*—to abandon his fight against the Greeks.

107.12–21 "this whole . . . itself to be."] Shelley, *Hellas*. From a speech of Ahasuerus to Mahmud. Mahmud has requested the counsel of Ahasuerus, whom he calls "an adept in the difficult lore of Greek and Frank philosophy" (741–42):

> this Whole
> Of suns, and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers,
> With all the silent or tempestuous workings
> By which they have been, are, or cease to be,
> Is but a vision;—all that it inherits
> Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams;
> Thought is its cradle and its grave, nor less
> The Future and the Past are idle shadows
> Of Thought's eternal flight—they have no being:
> Nought is but that which feels itself to be.
> (*Hellas,* 776–84)

107.29 "the gathered rays which are reality,"] The quotation is from Shelley, *Prometheus Unbound,* Act III, Scene 3, line 53, published in *Prometheus Unbound, A Lyrical Drama in Four Acts, With Other Poems* (London: C and J Ollier, 1820), 105. See Note 107.32–33 "lovely apparitions . . . rapt poesy."

107.32–33 "lovely apparitions . . . rapt poesy."] The quotation is from Shelley, *Prometheus Unbound,* Act III, Scene 3, lines 49–55. The entire quotation, with the elided text (which includes the quotation immediately previous) reads as follows:

> Lovely apparitions, dim at first,
> Then radiant, as the mind, arising bright
> From the embrace of beauty, whence the forms
> Of which these are the phantoms, casts on them
> The gathered rays which are reality,
> Shall visit us, the progeny immortal
> Of Painting, Sculpture, and rapt Poesy, (49–55)

and continues:

> And arts, tho' unimagined, yet to be. (56)

Santayana reproduces the text faithfully other than regularizing capitalization. See also Note 107.29 "the gathered rays which are reality."

107.35 Hegelian idealism] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), German philosopher, born in Stuttgart. Traditionally, Hegelian philosophy is interpreted as an absolute idealism in which human history is understood as the coming to consciousness of Absolute Spirit or God. In other words, the mind of God becomes actual or self-conscious through the development of human consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved through the dialectical interaction of spirit and matter in history and results in the realization of universal rational order. Hegel's cosmography according to this traditional interpretation is rational and pantheistic. As a result of the varying interpretations Hegel's philosophy invites, its influence has been both extensive and complicated. Hegel's most famous works are *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807), *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*The Science of Logic*, 1812–16), and *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*Philosophy of Right,* 1821). Santayana's personal library included editions of all three of these works, with the first and third titles in the original German. See also Note 11.15 Hegel.

108.16 *Cloud*] "The Cloud," a poem written by Shelley in late 1819 or early 1820 and published together with *Prometheus Unbound* in the latter year. The poem describes the never-ending cycles of nature.

108.16 *West Wind*] "Ode to the West Wind," written by Shelley in 1819 and also included in the collection with *Prometheus Unbound.* This poem describes nature in the changing seasons, ending with the often-quoted line "If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?"

108.16 *Witch of the Atlas*] "The Witch of Atlas," written by Shelley in 1820 and published in *Posthumous Poems* (London: John and Henry L. Hunt, 1824). In this long poem (78 stanzas) Shelley tells the convoluted story of an immortal "lady-witch," daughter of one of the Atlantides and living on Atlas's mountain, and her interactions with characters from Greek and Egyptian mythology and with humans. Midways in the poem, this "wizard lady" creates a winged hermaphroditic creature, which rests insensible until she summons it by the word "Hermaphroditus" to be her companion. The idea of a created humanoid summoned by a word is similar to that of the Jewish legend of the golem, briefly mentioned in an 1808 article on folklore by Jacob Grimm (1785–1863), and also to the creature in Mary Shelley's 1818 novel *Frankenstein*.

108.17 *bataille des fleurs*] Literally "battle of flowers," *Bataille des Fleurs* has been part of the celebration of Carnival in Nice since 1876. Originated to showcase and support local horticulture, *Bataille des Fleurs* is a parade featuring flower-covered floats portraying the theme of that year's Carnival; costumed riders on the floats toss flowers to massed spectators who fight to retrieve them. Santayana compares the image of being bombarded by flowers during *Bataille des Fleurs* to the barrage of loosely related images evoked by Shelley's poems.

108.21 Francis Thompson's] Francis Thompson (1859–1907), English poet, essayist, and Catholic mystic, born in Lancashire. Thompson excelled as a student in subjects that interested him and did poorly in those that did not. Pressured to study medicine, he failed the degree exam multiple times. Making a bare living through odd jobs and self-medicating for his chronic poor health, Thompson became addicted to opium and was for a time homeless, but continued to write poetry and essays that were published and admired. While recovering from his addiction, he wrote numerous poems and *Shelley, An Essay,* in 1889. Thompson's essay on Shelley was not published until after his death (*The Dublin Review,* July 1908); Santayana's library included an edition of the essay published by Scribner's in 1909. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

108.23–26 "He gets between . . . in his song."] Quotes part of Francis Thompson's description of Shelley's poem "The Cloud" in *Shelley, an Essay* (1909). The entire description is as follows:

> Coming to Shelley's poetry, we peep over the wild mask of revolutionary metaphysics, and we see the winsome face of the child. Perhaps none of his poems is more purely and typically Shelleian than *The Cloud*, and it is interesting to note how essentially it springs from the faculty of make-believe. The same thing is conspicuous, though less purely conspicuous, throughout his singing; it is the child's faculty of make-believe raised to the n^{th} power. He is still at play, save only that his play is such as manhood stops to watch, and his playthings are those which the gods give their children. The universe is his box of toys. He dabbles his fingers in the day-fall. He is gold-dusty with tumbling amidst the stars. He makes bright mischief with the moon. The meteors nuzzle their

> noses in his hand. He teases into growling the kennelled thunder, and laughs at the shaking of its fiery chain. He dances in and out of the gates of heaven: its floor is littered with his broken fancies. He runs wild over the fields of ether. He chases the rolling world. He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song. (Thompson, *Shelley, An Essay*, 45–46)

See Note 14.22 Shelley and Note 108.21 Francis Thompson's.

108.29 Elysian] Refers to Elysium or the Elysian Fields, an afterworld first described in Homer's *Odyssey* 4.563ff, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), 79 as a paradise in which the inhabitants enjoyed a life of leisure similar to that of the gods. Originally, Elysium was regarded as reserved for the distinguished few, but later literature suggested that anyone who had lived a good life was admitted to Elysium (see, for example, Virgil's *Aeneid* 6.637, trans. Robert Fitzgerald [New York: Vintage Books, 1984], 186).

108.33–35 *Sensitive Plant* . . . "It loves even . . . not, the beautiful."] "The Sensitive Plant" is another of Shelley's 1820 poems collected with *Prometheus Unbound*. Written when Shelley and his wife Mary were mourning the death of a child, it describes a garden and the woman who tends it, comparing the seasonal cycle of growth and withering to human birth, death, and decay. Prominent in the garden is mimosa, grown primarily as a curiosity and called "sensitive plant" because it droops when touched. Unlike the other plants in the garden, it has neither beauty nor scent:

> For the Sensitive Plant has no bright flower;
> Radiance and odour are not its dower;
> It loves, even like Love, its deep heart is full,
> It desires what it has not, the Beautiful! (74–77)

108.37 mincing rhymesters,] This seems to be a reference to Shelley's 1819 poem "Peter Bell the Third," written under the alias of "Miching Mallecho" (a phrase in *Hamlet,* Act 3, Scene 2, alluding to mischief). The poem is one of many parodies of English Romantic poet William Wordsworth's (1770–1850) much-derided poem *Peter Bell, A Tale in Verse* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1819). In "Part Third: Hell" Shelley begins,

> "Hell is a city much like London" (147)

and continues:

> There are mincing women, mewing,
> (Like cats, who *amant miserè*)
> Of their own virtue, and pursuing
> Their gentler sisters to that ruin
>
> Without which--what were chastity?
> Lawyers--judges--old hobnobbers
> Are there--bailiffs--chancellors--
> Bishops--great and little robbers--
> Rhymesters--pamphleteers--stock-jobbers--
> Men of glory in the wars,-- (182–91)

109.5–10 “The joy, the . . . its own wind!”] Spoken by The Earth in *Prometheus Unbound,* Act 4. Santayana reproduces the text exactly other than small differences in punctuation and capitalization; these also vary by edition of Shelley’s work.

109.17 *Cenci,*] Shelley’s *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts* (London: C and J Ollier, 1819) deals with the story of a noble family of sixteenth-century Rome led by a criminally vicious and abusive man who was murdered by his victimized family after they found no relief from authorities. The family was subsequently punished by the Church: the man’s daughter, older son, and their stepmother (the man’s second wife, referred to by Shelley in the Preface by the archaism of “mother-in-law”) were executed, and a younger son was sentenced to galley slavery, though he was released a year later. Shelley gave the following account in the preface to the play:

> A manuscript was communicated to me during my travels in Italy, which was copied from the archives of the Cenci Palace at Rome and contains a detailed account of the horrors which ended in the extinction of one of the noblest and richest families of that city, during the Pontificate of Clement VIII, in the year 1599. The story is that an old man, having spent his life in debauchery and wickedness, conceived at length an implacable hatred towards his children; which showed itself towards one daughter under the form of an incestuous passion, aggravated by every circumstance of cruelty and violence. This daughter, after long and vain attempts to escape from what she considered a perpetual contamination both of body and mind, at length plotted with her mother-in-law and brother to murder their common tyrant. The young maiden who was urged to this tremendous deed by an impulse which overpowered its horror was evidently a most gentle and amiable being, a creature formed to adorn and be admired, and thus violently thwarted from her nature by the necessity of circumstance and opinion. The deed was quickly discovered, and, in spite of the most earnest prayers made

> to the Pope by the highest persons in Rome, the criminals were put to death. The old man had during his life repeatedly bought his pardon from the Pope for capital crimes of the most enormous and unspeakable kind at the price of a hundred thousand crowns; the death therefore of his victims can scarcely be accounted for by the love of justice. The Pope, among other motives for severity, probably felt that whoever killed the Count Cenci deprived his treasury of a certain and copious source of revenue. (The Papal Government formerly took the most extraordinary precautions against the publicity of facts which offer so tragical a demonstration of its own wickedness and weakness; so that the communication of the manuscript had become, until very lately, a matter of some difficulty.) Such a story, if told so as to present to the reader all the feelings of those who once acted it, their hopes and fears, their confidences and misgivings, their various interests, passions, and opinions, acting upon and with each other yet all conspiring to one tremendous end, would be as a light to make apparent some of the most dark and secret caverns of the human heart. (Percy Bysshe Shelley, *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts*, London: Reeves & Turner, 1886, 2)

Shelley described his artistic approach to the story of the Cenci:

> The person who would treat such a subject must increase the ideal and diminish the actual horror of the events, so that the pleasure which arises from the poetry which exists in these tempestuous sufferings and crimes may mitigate the pain of the contemplation of the moral deformity from which they spring. There must also be nothing attempted to make the exhibition subservient to what is vulgarly termed a moral purpose. The highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of the drama is the teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in proportion to the possession of which knowledge every human being is wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind. (Shelley, *The Cenci*, 4).

See also Note 24.29 Inquisition.

109.20 *Skylark,*] Shelley, “To a Skylark,” another of the poems collected with *Prometheus Unbound.* According to Mary Shelley, this poem was inspired by hearing a skylark as she and Shelley were walking. Shelley compares the song of the skylark to a wide variety of beauties in nature and mythology, saying that the poet’s art is minor by comparison. “To a Skylark” is often compared thematically to John Keats’s (1795–1821) “Ode to a Nightingale,” which had a similar inspiration and was written and published at nearly the same time, but there seems to be no direct connection between the two.

109.20 *Epipsychidion,*] This major work by Shelley, subtitled *Verses Addressed to the Noble and Unfortunate Lady Emilia V– Now Imprisoned in the Convent at –* (London: C and J Ollier, 1821) was inspired by his infatuation with Countess Teresa Emilia Viviani, a 19-year-old with whom the Shelleys were friendly. ("Epipsychidion" means "concerning a little soul".) At the time the young woman was in a convent boarding school and regarded herself as being imprisoned there at the instigation of a jealous stepmother until her family could marry her off (Stopford A. Brooke, "Introduction," *Epipsychidion* (Reeves and Turner, 1887). The poem ranges through varieties of love, from platonic and courtly through romantic and sexual, with Shelley espousing free love.

109.21 *Prometheus.*] *Prometheus Unbound*, a four-act drama based on the legend of Prometheus, a Greek Titan (pre-Olympian god) of fire, who gave fire as a gift to humanity and as a result was punished by Zeus by being chained to a rock and having his liver torn out daily by birds of prey. Shelley's work was inspired by *Prometheia*, a series of plays attributed to Aeschylus, but with the major plot difference that instead of Prometheus and Zeus reconciling, in Shelley's version Prometheus is freed when Zeus falls from power. See Note 28.22 Prometheus.

110.3–5 standing aghast, like a Philistine . . . traditional order.] Likely an allusion to Judges 14–16, stories in which the legendarily strong Samson kills increasing numbers of Israel's Philistine enemies, ending with his final act of pulling down an entire building upon himself and thousands of Philistines celebrating his capture (Judges 16:23–30).

111.18 the Israelites in exile,] Notably, the prophet Ezekiel, even as he chastises his compatriots as deserving exile because of their sins, promises a better future: comparing Israel to sheep who were neglected by shepherds but whom God will bring to good pasture and care for (Ezekiel 34), promising literal and figurative fruitfulness (36:8–12, 21–38), promising hope and restoration with the image of resurrection from dry bones (37:1–14) and reunion of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah (37:15–28).

111.18 St. John the Baptist in the desert,] Matthew introduces this hope together with John the Baptist: "In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judaea, and saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matthew 3:1–2). Luke 3:6 promises that "all flesh shall see the salvation of God." For John the Baptist, see Note 27.11 St. John the Baptist.

111.20 "This day thou . . . me in paradise."] Luke 23:43b; this is Jesus's response to the repentant thief crucified alongside him who pleads, "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom" (Luke 23:42).

111.22 *Adonais*] *Adonais: An Elegy on the Death of John Keats, Author of* Endymion, Hyperion *etc.* (Pisa: Didot, 1821). In this pastoral elegy, Shelley describes Adonais, who represents Keats, as being mourned by "mighty mother" Urania and other characters from Greek mythology, by poetic terms (for just a few, "Splendours, and Glooms, and glimmering incarnations of Hopes and Fears, and twilight Phantasies" [*Adonais*, 13]), and by nature, but also by poets of times past (Thomas Chatterton, Philip Sidney, and the Roman poet Lucan). Shelley attributed Keats's death in large part to a scathing review of *Endymion*, which he alludes to in *Adonais* as a dart and as poison. The name Adonais is an adaptation of Adonis, a Greek god of beauty about whom elegies were written.

111.32–33 "life, like a . . . radiance of eternity."] *Adonais*, 462–63. Without Santayana's insertion, the text reads "Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, / Stains the white radiance of eternity."

111.36–37 he hoped, like the old Hebrews, for a paradise on earth.] Santayana may be referring to the prophecy in Isaiah 2:1–4 of a time when everyone will follow "the God of Jacob" and there will be no more war, and the image of the "peaceable kingdom" in Isaiah 11–12.

112.1–4 "that mankind had . . . of his system."] This is taken from Mary Shelley's note to *Prometheus Unbound* in *The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* ed. Mary Shelley, Vol. 2 (London: Edward Moxon, 1839), 133. In the Oxford edition as well as in the original posthumous collection by Mary Shelley, the quotation reads, "That man could be so perfectionized as to be able to expel evil from his own nature, and from the greater part of the creation, ..." Santayana omitted the following text between the two quotations: "It is not my part in these notes to notice the arguments that have been urged against this opinion, but to mention the fact that he [Shelley] entertained it, and was indeed attached to it with fervent enthusiasm."

112.6 cosmic extension of the Fall conceived by St. Augustine;] The Roman Catholic doctrine that the sin of Adam and Eve corrupted all of creation, and thus their salvation would restore all of creation. For Augustine, see Note 21.23 "this wicked world."

112.39 "Beautiful idealisms of moral excellence."] In the Preface to *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley writes,

> My purpose has hitherto been simply to familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware that, until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles of moral

> conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of his happiness. Should I live to accomplish what I purpose, that is, produce a systematical history of what appear to me to be the genuine elements of human society, let not the advocates of injustice and superstition flatter themselves that I should take Æschylus rather than Plato as my model.

113.10–12 “had no care . . . and abstruse truth.”] This quotation is from Mary Shelley, “Note on Poems Written in 1818,” *The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* ed. Mary Shelley, Vol. 3 (London: Edward Moxon, 1839), 159. It appears in the context of her request that Shelley complete his previously discarded poem “Rosalind and Helen.”

114.15–16 The world we have always with us, but such spirits we have not always.] Allusion to a sentiment found several places in the Gospels: in the words of Jesus, “For ye have the poor always with you, but me ye have not always” (Matthew 26:11), with almost identical wording in John 12:8 and a close parallel in Mark 14:7.

114.21–24 “It is so . . . affect the question.”] The “contemporary of ours” is Bertrand Russell, and the quotation is from “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 47–48. See Note 97.34–39 “It is, indeed . . . *B* may be.”

114.25 love your neighbour as yourself,] Leviticus 19:18 states, “Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.” Matthew 22:39b and Mark 12:31a cite “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” as the second-greatest commandment.

115.13–20 “All killing insects . . . ill, was innocent.”] The quotation is from “The Sensitive Plant,” 155–62. The poem goes on to illustrate “this inevitable tragedy”:

> This fairest creature from earliest Spring
> Thus moved through the garden ministering
> All the sweet season of Summertide,
> And ere the first leaf looked brown – she died! (171–74)

See Note 108.33–35 *Sensitive Plant.*

116.3 all is not vanity] Allusion to Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 1:14b: "Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity"; "Behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit."

116.3–4 nor night in his blindness.] Not as exact a scriptural reference as the preceding, but consonant with the biblical use of the term "blindness" in a spiritual as well as in a physical sense. The most salient verse is Isaiah 42:16a–c: "And I will bring the blind by a way that they knew not; I will lead them in paths that they have not known: I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things straight."

116.17 Matthew Arnold said that Shelley was not quite sane;] The reference is to "Shelley," *Essays in Criticism,* Second Series, 408: "The man Shelley, in very truth, is not entirely sane, and Shelley's poetry is not entirely sane either." See Note 103.25–26 "a beautiful and . . . void in vain."

116.21–22 a Platonic soul just fallen from the Empyrean;] Allusion to Dante, *Paradiso,* Canto 4, 28–39: "You are given further cause for perplexity, by the souls returning to the stars, in Plato's doctrine. . . . He of the Seraphim nearest to God, Moses, Samuel, John, either one [St. John the Apostle or St. John the Divine], you may choose, and Mary, none of them take their places in any different Heaven than the spirits who appeared to you just now, nor do they have more years or less of existence. But all beautify the first sphere, the Empyrean, and share sweet life, but differently, by feeling the eternal spirit more, or less" (Dante, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso* Cantos 1–7, trans. A. S. Kline; retrieved August 19, 2021 from https://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Italian/DantPar1to7.php#anchor_Toc64099821). "The appearance of a certain Saint in a certain moving Sphere is a *sign* of his or her position in the graded hierarchy of the Empyrean, or Unmoved Heaven, in which all the Saints have their real abode. A Saint who appears to Dante in the Lunar Sphere, for example, has a lower position in the Empyrean than one who appears in the Sphere of Jupiter" (J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato* [London: Macmillan and Co., 1905], 166n).

116.25–26 If children did not see visions,] Paraphrases Joel 2:28: "And it shall come to pass afterward that I will pour out My Spirit on all flesh; Your sons and daughters shall prophesy. Your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions." Acts 2:17 is a parallel verse: "And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams."

116.38–39 to develop things æsthetic after their own kind;] A deliberate parallel of language in the creation narrative in Genesis, for example: “And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good” (Genesis 1:12).

117.26 his friend Hogg,] Thomas Jefferson Hogg (1792–1862), British barrister and writer. Hogg and Shelley met at Oxford in 1810, where they found common ground in atheism and free thinking and in support of free love. Both were expelled after refusing to confirm or deny authorship of an anonymous pamphlet, *Necessity of Atheism*, but continued their friendship throughout Shelley’s life. Besides his legal work, Hogg wrote fiction, poetry, and articles on Greek literature, but is best known for his biographical works “Shelley at Oxford” (*New Monthly Magazine,* 1833) and the unfinished *The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley* (London: Edward Moxon, 1858).

117.26–29 “I never could discern . . . an intense abhorrence of persecution.”] Hogg, *The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley,* Vol. 2 (London: Edward Moxon, 1858), 458. The quotation without elisions reads:

> I never could discern in him any more than two fixed principles. The first was a strong, irrepressible love of liberty; of liberty in the abstract, and somewhat after the pattern of the ancient republics, without reference to the English constitution, respecting which he knew little and cared nothing, heeding it not at all. The second was an equally ardent love of toleration of all opinions, but more especially of religious opinions; of toleration, complete, entire, universal, unlimited; and, as a deduction and corollary from which latter principle, he felt an intense abhorrence of persecution of every kind, public or private.

In excerpting this passage, Santayana omitted the word “fixed.”

118.3–4 sin of Adam,] Also known as “original sin,” this is the Christian doctrine that human beings are, when conceived, already sinners. This inherent sin means, for Catholic theologians, that humans have lost the sanctifying grace of God as a result of the Fall of Man, which occurred when Adam disobeyed God’s prohibition against eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2–3). The notion of original sin has no textual basis in the Old Testament, but only in pseudepigraphal books (such as *Apocalypse of Baruch* 23:4, 54:15 and *4 Ezra* 3:21–26). Scriptural support is primarily found in the Epistles of Paul: “Wherefore, as by one man [namely, Adam] sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned” (Romans 5:12). The doctrine gained significance as the Christian

Church struggled to counter Gnostic doctrines of a dualism of good and evil. Christian doctrine maintained that creation was good and that evil was introduced by Adam. The doctrine was significant also for the Christian belief in the freedom of the will. Augustine believed that Adam's sin was passed on by strong sexual desire, which weakens but does not destroy freedom of the will. See Note 21.23 "this wicked world."

118.4 Artaxerxes;] Likely refers to the Artaxerxes king of Persia mentioned in Ezra 4 as promulgating decrees. This may be the same person as Artaxerxes I (reigned 465–424 BC) or Artaxerxes II (reigned 404–358 BC), kings of the Achaemenid Empire in Persia.

118.7–25 "I never was . . . for its eternity."] *Epipsychidion*, lines 149–63, 169–73 (415). Forman, Vol. 2 (374–75), explains how the word "in" ("it is in the code") is justified for inclusion by most editors. Apparently this version without "in" appears only in a fragment, and most editions follow Mary Shelley's 1821 edition. However, Woodberry (*The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, 1894, vol. 3, 472) gives this as a variant in an 1839 printing. Santayana cannot be quoting the fragment, since his quotation includes "crowd" rather than "world" and "With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe," rather than "with one sad friend and many a jealous foe":

> I never was attached to that great sect,
> Whose doctrine is, that each one should select
> Out of the crowd a mistress or a friend,
> And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend
> To cold oblivion, though it is in the code
> Of modern morals, and the beaten road
> Which those poor slaves with weary footsteps tread,
> Who travel to their home among the dead
> By the broad highway of the world, and so
> With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe,
> The dreariest and the longest journey go.
>
> True Love in this differs from gold and clay,
> That to divide is not to take away.
> Love is like understanding, that grows bright,
> Gazing on many truths; 'tis like thy light,
> Imagination! which from earth and sky,
> And from the depths of human fantasy,
> As from a thousand prisms and mirrors, fills
> The Universe with glorious beams, and kills
> Error, the worm, with many a sun-like arrow

> Of its reverberated lightning. Narrow
> The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates,
> The life that wears, the spirit that creates
> One object, and one form, and builds thereby
> A sepulchre for its eternity.

118.27–28 his first wife] Harriet Westbrook (1795–1815), a school friend of Shelley's sisters. They married when Shelley was 19 and she was 16. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

118.31 his best friend] Thomas Jefferson Hogg. In contrast to Santayana's assertion, some sources suggest that Shelley encouraged Hogg to pursue a sexual relationship with Harriet Westbrook Shelley, who was horrified by the idea. See Note 117.26 his friend Hogg.

118.34 his second wife] Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin (1797–1851), an author in her own right, best known for *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus* (1818). She encouraged Shelley in his writing and edited and annotated several posthumous editions of his works. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

118.35–36 the waves of Platonic enthusiasm for other ladies] To name just one, Countess Teresa Emilia Viviani. See Note 109.21 *Epipsychidion.*

119.11–12 and even of Goethe, when Goethe really loved:] The title character of Goethe's *Faust* seduces and abandons Gretchen, who inadvertently poisons her mother in order to be alone with Faust and then drowns their illegitimate child. At the end of *Faust, Part 1,* Faust finally realizes his love for Gretchen, who has been sentenced to death for her crimes. He attempts to help her escape, but she insists on meeting her deserved fate.

119.14–17 "I have been . . . did not die."] Quotes letters of January 6 and January 3, 1811 published in Shelley, *Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley to Thomas Jefferson Hogg,* vol. 1 (London: privately printed, 1897), 39; 30–31.

119.18 "And did not marry!"] Shelley's expression of suicidal thoughts in the letters quoted above followed the rejection of his marriage proposal by his cousin Harriet Grove (1791–1867), with whom he had a romantic relationship. Both of Shelley's subsequent marriages were volatile, involving financial hardship and legal troubles as well as physical and emotional infidelity. See Note 14.22 Shelley and Note 119.14–17 "I have been . . . did not die."

119.20 Shelley called himself an atheist in his youth;] Over and above his likely authorship of *The Necessity of Atheism,* Shelley left several entries in guest registers at prominent sites in which he declared himself (in Greek) to be an

"Atheist. Lover of humanity. Democrat." See Graham Henderson, "Hotel Register in which Shelley Declared Himself to be an Atheist: Found" (July 28, 2016; retrieved August 21, 2021 from http://www.grahamhenderson.ca/blog/Day/7/Year/hotel-register-in-which-shelley-declared-himself-to-be-an-atheist-found) and related posts, and see Note 14.22 Shelley.

119.26 *Paradiso*] "Paradise" or "Heaven," the third section of Dante's *Divina Commedia* (*The Divine Comedy*). See Note 24.18 Dante.

119.27 *Inferno*] "Hell," the first section of Dante's *Divina Commedia* (*The Divine Comedy*). See Note 24.18 Dante.

120.3–10 "To suffer . . . and free."] Quotes *Prometheus Unbound,* Act 4, lines 570–77 (268):

> To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
> To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
>   To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
> To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates
> From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
>   Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
> This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
> Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free.

120.15–34 "The pure spirit . . . dead live there."] Shelley, *Adonais*, stanzas 38, lines 338–41; 39, 343–46; 42, 370–72; 43, 379–80; 44, 388–93, 395 (440–41). See Note 111.22 *Adonais.*

121.20–21 Literature, according to Matthew Arnold, should be criticism of life,] Quotes Arnold, "Joubert," in *Essays in Criticism* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1865), 249.

121.33–34 persons who can grow as old as Matthew Arnold,] Santayana may have intended this in a metaphorical sense; Arnold lived to the respectable but hardly unusual age of 65. See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.

122.1 "arts, though unimagined, yet to be."] Quotes *Prometheus Unbound,* Act 3, Scene 3, line 56 (247).

123.7–12 "Must be . . . of time."] Quotes *Hellas,* lines 1002–7 (475). See Note 161.13 *Hellas.*

123.21 this world of blood and mire.] The second century pseudepigraphal book *Apocalypse* (or *Revelation*) *of Peter*, line 30, describes usurers as being punished "in a lake of pitch and blood and mire," but in hell, not in "this world."

123.34–35 the epitaph which a clear-sighted friend wrote upon his tomb: *cor cordium,* the heart of hearts.] British novelist and adventurer Edward John Trelawny (1792–1881), who arranged for the funeral and the burial of Shelley's ashes, ordered a grave marker inscribed with Shelley's name, followed by COR CORDIUM, Shelley's birth and death dates, and a quotation from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* ("Two Epitaphs," Harrison S. Morris, *Bulletin and Review of the Keats-Shelley Memorial, Rome* 2 [1913], 55–56).

THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

125.19 Indians] The original inhabitants of the Americas, i.e., Native Americans.

125.20 wrestling with the Lord.] Genesis 32:24–30 tells the story of Jacob wrestling with an opponent who represents God, as indicated by the bestowal of a new name: "Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed" (Genesis 32:28).

125.20–21 the race was tried . . . memories.] Allusion to Hebrews 12:6–11, beginning "For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth."

125.21–22 old wine in new bottles:] "And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish. But new wine must be put into new bottles; and both are preserved. No man also having drunk old wine straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better" (Luke 5:37–39). The parable indicates that new wine, still in the process of fermenting, may break old bottles (or, in some translations, wineskins) that have been weakened by use and age; similarly, new ways of thinking may initially be rejected, sometimes even violently, before they are fully understood and assimilated. By contrast, old wine, representing the wisdom that comes with history and experience, can be safely stored and enjoyed in new bottles—the young America.

126.20 Bernard Shaw] George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950), Irish playwright and critic; also well known as an advocate of social reform and later as a member of the Fabian Society. Only one of Shaw's books was found in Santayana's library, *The Adventures of the Black Girl in Her Search for God* (London: Constable, 1932); Santayana wrote in a 9 January 1933 letter to Daniel Cory that it had "amusing turns, but as a whole it is trash" (*LGS,* 5:4).

126.21 America is a hundred years behind the times.] Santayana's source for this remark is uncertain. An indirect reference appears in Archibald Henderson, *George Bernard Shaw: His Life and Works* (Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company, 1911), attributing to Shaw the opinion that America is "fifty years behind England, and a hundred years behind Europe, in art, literature, science, religion, and government—in a word, in civilization." (Henderson, "Preface to the American Edition" [September 4, 1911], xv–xvi).

127.2 the Calvinism of Calvin,] John Calvin (1509–1564), French theologian and pastor, whose writings and preaching started a Protestant movement called Calvinism by its opponents. (Its adherents refer to it as the Reformed tradition or church.) Major points of Calvinist doctrine include the authority of the Bible, rejection of all sacraments except baptism and communion, and predestination, the view that all are irredeemably sinful and that God mercifully has elected some believers to be saved. Many early immigrants to the New England and mid-Atlantic colonies, such as Puritans, French Huguenots, and Scotch–Irish Presbyterians, held Calvinist beliefs.

127.2 Jonathan Edwards;] (1703–1758), American clergyman and theologian; known as the founder of the Calvinistic "New England Theology," or American Puritanism. Only one book of Edwards's writings was found in Santayana's library, an anthology (*Representative Selections* [New York: American Book Co., 1935]) with 271 marginalia (*MARG,* 1:229–35).

127.9 Cardinal Newman;] John Henry Newman (1801–1890), an English theologian who converted from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism. He wrote a popular autobiography, *Apologia pro vita sua* (1864), which explained his views.

127.10 Carlyle] Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), a Scottish historian and essayist. He studied at the University of Edinburgh to enter the clergy, but his doubts prevented ordination. As a young man he translated Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1824) and wrote *Life of Schiller* (1825). In 1833–34 he published his popular humorous essay *Sartor Resartus,* which mixed German philosophy and autobiography as it examined spiritual crises and social concerns of the times. After difficult financial times, Carlyle won acclaim and success with the 1837 publication of his three-volume *The French Revolution.* As a well-known writer and social critic, he influenced John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin, Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Carlyle could not reconcile himself with Calvinistic Presbyterian doctrines, but in *Sartor Resartus* (1836) he nevertheless affirms confidence in a beneficent universe.

127.10–11 Professor Royce,] Josiah Royce (1855–1916), professor of philosophy at Harvard University. Royce was the most prominent American proponent of absolute idealism, in which God was conceived as an impersonal, all-encompassing consciousness or Absolute Knower. Royce advised Santayana in his PhD thesis (*PP,* 389) and recommended that Santayana teach at Harvard. Santayana corresponded with Royce from 1892 to 1896 and profiled him in *Persons and Places* (*PP,* 234) and *Character and Opinion in the United States* (*COUS,* 97–138). Santayana's library included Royce's *The World and the Individual* (2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1899), with extensive marginalia. See also Note 46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer.

128.5 Franklin] Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), statesman, printer, and inventor, known for the folksy, democratic virtue ethic expressed in publications such as *Poor Richard's Almanack* (1733–58). In a 5 November 1930 letter to Herbert Wallace Schneider, after reading his book *The Puritan Mind* (New York: Waterloo, 1930), Santayana wrote this regarding Franklin's relation to Puritanism: "Franklin's maxims cover the interest in success natural to any able and vigorous person beginning at the bottom and feeling his capacity to reach the top. The austerity of it seems rather that of a mediaeval burgher than of a puritan" (*LGS,* 4:210–11). See also Santayana's marginal remarks on Schneider's book in *MARG,* 2:226–28.

128.19–22 Nature, in the words of Emerson, . . . æsthetically.] In *Nature* (1844), Ralph Waldo Emerson describes several aspects of nature that benefit humanity, including commodity, beauty, language, and discipline. See also Note 129.7 Emerson.

128.27–28 that saying of Jonathan Edwards, that men are naturally God's enemies!] "Men naturally GOD's Enemies" is the title of an August 1736 sermon by Edwards (Sermon 7 in Samuel Hopkins, *The life and character of the late Reverend Mr. Jonathan Edwards, president of the College at New-Jersey. Together with a number of his sermons on various important subjects* [Boston: S. Kneeland, 1765], 104–17).

129.6 Poe,] Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849), American short story writer, poet, and critic. In a 7 June 1932 letter to Henry Ward Abbot, Santayana wrote, "I felt there was something of the consecrated spirit about him, although very meagrely fed by tradition or learning or experience of the larger world: it was puerile love, puerile sorrow, and puerile love of beauty. . . . and as a prophet of romanticism what could he say to a person who fed, by day and by night, on Shelley and Leopardi and Alfred de Musset?" (*LGS*, 4:342).

129.6 Hawthorne,] Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864), American novelist and short story writer. His works include *Twice-told Tales*, *The Scarlet Letter*, *The House of the Seven Gables*, and *The Marble Faun.* His novels deal with the gloomy, brooding spirit of Puritanism. Hawthorne is known for his creation of dark atmosphere, his symbolism, and his blend of realistic detail and romantic theme.

129.7 Emerson] Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) American philosopher and poet. He was one of the founders of the Transcendental Club, which gave rise to transcendentalism in the United States. Santayana wrote of Emerson in

Chapter 8 of *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion,* “If we ask ourselves what was Emerson’s relation to the scientific and religious movements of his time, and what place he may claim in the history of opinion, we must answer that he belonged very little to the past, very little to the present, and almost wholly to that abstract sphere into which mystical or philosophic aspiration has carried a few men in all ages. The religious tradition in which he was reared was that of Puritanism, but of a Puritanism which, retaining its moral intensity and metaphysical abstraction, had minimised its doctrinal expression and become Unitarian” (*IPR*, 138). See Note 130.4 Transcendentalism.

130.4 Transcendentalism] Transcendentalism was a movement among liberal New England Unitarians who emphasized the importance of human effort and piety towards Nature. Ralph Waldo Emerson, among others, traced its origins to German idealism:

> It is well known to most of my audience, that the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them *Transcendental* forms. The extraordinary profoundness and precision of that man’s thinking have given vogue to his nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that extent, that whatever belongs to the class of intuitive thought, is popularly called at the present day *Transcendental.*
>
> Although, as we have said, there is no pure Transcendentalist, yet the tendency to respect the intuitions, and to give them, at least in our creed, all authority over our experience, has deeply colored the conversation and poetry of the present day; and the history of genius and of religion in these times, though impure, and as yet not incarnated in any powerful individual, will be the history of this tendency.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist” (1842); first published in *Nature, an essay and lectures on the times* (1844) (available at https://emersoncentral.com/texts/nature-addresses-lectures/lectures/the-transcendentalist/). See Note 32.27 German idealism.

130.6 romanticism.] Philosophical romanticism rebelled against Enlightenment ideals of order, uniformity, and rational control, espousing instead spontaneity, variety, subjectivity, freedom of imagination and emotional expression, and the superiority of nature over culture. Accordingly, romanticism is not an easily definable, coherent school of philosophy with clear dogmas; and it may be better characterized as a perspective, sentiment, or conviction than an explicit doctrine. Historically, it has roots in Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) philosophy. Kant's belief in free will and commitment to faith appealed to later romantic philosophers. However, his more significant though inadvertent contribution was his distinction between reason and understanding, the elaboration of which Kant intended to curb metaphysical excesses of misapplied reason and acknowledge the understanding, along with the senses, as the source of empirical knowledge. Romantic philosophers reversed the significance of the terms, denigrating the understanding for distorting knowledge through abstraction and approving reason as the proper approach to essential knowledge of reality. Representative romantic philosophers include Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) brought romantic philosophy to England and was read approvingly by Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) in the United States. Santayana also included Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) as the "last prophet" of the "heroic romantic school" (*EGP*, 65). Santayana distinguished Schelling and Emerson from other romantic philosophers because, according to his interpretation, they tended toward naturalism and recognized something existing apart from the subjective ego (*EGP*, 65), though elsewhere he explicitly characterized Emerson as a romantic (*TPP*, 5). Santayana regarded romanticism and the form it took in German idealism as philosophical egotism, marked by "subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals" (*EGP*, 6). He characterized romantic philosophy as accepting "passionately the aims suggested to it by sentiment or impulse. It despises prudence and flouts the understanding" (*EGP*, 13). Santayana acknowledged that Hegel might seem to prize objectivity, exempting him from Santayana's charge of egotism, but he maintained that the "philosophy of Hegel is . . . subjective and all its realism is but a pose and a tone wilfully assumed" (*EGP,* 86). Santayana's criticisms of philosophical romanticism appear throughout his works, but *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910) and *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915) both include sustained criticisms of romanticism. Santayana's personal library included Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* (*Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794]), trans. A. E. Kroeger, (Philadelphia, 1868); Anna Boynton Thompson, *The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895); Benedetto Croce, *Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel* (*What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel*) (Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1910); Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*), ed. Johannes Schulze (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) and *The Logic of Hegel* (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,* 1817–1843), trans. William Wallace (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1874); Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Friend* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1899) and *The Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890); Van Wyck Brooks, *Emerson and Others* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1927); and Newton Dillaway, *Prophet of America: Emerson and the Problems of Today* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 11.15 Hegel; Note 49.19 German idealism; for Fichte, Note 66.10 Fichtean; and Note 129.7 Emerson.

131.18–19 Kant came . . . make room for faith,] This statement comes from the 1787 "Preface to the Second Edition" of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is quoted as "I had, therefore, to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith" in George Trumbull Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Nature, Limits, and Validity of Human Cognitive Faculty* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 84. Ladd does not indicate which translation he cites.

Santayana owned three translations of the Kant work into English as well as two editions in the original German. One translation owned by Santayana reads: "I had therefore to remove *knowledge,* in order to make room for *belief*" (Kant, "Preface to the Second Edition" [1787], *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. F. Max Müller, second ed., revised [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922], 700; italics in original). Santayana's copy of the revised second edition of the Müller translation was published in 1900, but the first edition (London, Macmillan and Co., 1881) has the identical wording (452). Another translation owned by Santayana renders the passage slightly differently: "I must, therefore, abolish *knowledge,* to make room for *belief*" (*Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1901], 33–34; italics in original). The third translation in Santayana's library, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics,* trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, third ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1883), does not include Kant's prefaces to the first and second editions.

132.4 self-trust.] Emerson describes self-trust in his essay "Self-Reliance" (R. W. Emerson, *Essays* [First Series] [Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1841]).

132.19–20 the habits and training . . .those of a preacher.] Emerson earned a degree from Harvard Divinity School and was an ordained Unitarian minister, serving as pastor of Boston's Second Church for three years while increasingly finding that ministry incompatible with his personal beliefs.

132.34–35 Bertrand Russell has observed . . . desire to reach it.] "If little truth has been attained in philosophy, the reason is chiefly that few philosophers have wished to attain truth" ("Pragmatism," *Philosophical Essays* [Longman's: New York, 1910], 99).

134.35 humorists,] At the time that Santayana was writing, well-known humorists who had spent considerable time in California included Josh Billings (pen name of Henry Wheeler Shaw, 1818–1885), Artemus Ward (pen name of Charles Farrar Browne, 1834–1867) and Mark Twain (pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens, 1835–1910). See Note 135.16 Mark Twain.

135.16 Mark Twain] Pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens (1835–1910), self-educated printer, riverboat pilot, journalist, writer, and humorist. His best-known works include novels *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1876) and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884). In a 8 December 1950 letter to Clemens's grandson Cyril Coniston Clemens, Santayana wrote, "I have never read a word of Mark Twains books, but remember The Jumping Frog that my half-brother, Robert Sturgis, had learned by heart at the English High School in Boston, about the year 1870" (*LGS,* 8:308). Eventually, Cyril Clemens persuaded Santayana to read *Tom Sawyer Abroad and Other Stories, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The Prince and the Pauper,* and *Mark Twain's Autobiography,* all of which were found in Santayana's library.

135.16 "I was born of poor but dishonest parents,"] Although frequently ascribed to Mark Twain, this exact quotation has not been located in his writings. In a speech at a dinner held by the journal *The Aldine* in 1872, Twain quipped, "When I was fourteen, . . . I was living with my parents, who were very poor and correspondingly honest" ("Dinner Speech," *Mark Twain Speaking,* ed. Paul Fatout [Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1976], 67; Clemens was 11 when his father died). Claiming "poor but dishonest parents" was a common trope of the time. The London comedian and actor John Lawrence Toole (1830–1906) "was born, as he sometimes jokingly says, 'of poor but dishonest parents, you know,' in the year 1831" ("J. L. Toole" in Anonymous, *Cartoon Portraits and Biographical Sketches of Men of the Day* [London: Tinsley Brothers, 1873], 22. Amy Strachey begins her article "The Training of Housewives" with the exact phrase used by Santayana, which she calls "a paraphrase of the remark made by one of Offenbach's Blind Beggars" (*The Cornhill Magazine* 4, no. 22 [April 1898], 530). In Jules Moinaux's original libretto for *Les Deux Aveugles* (*The Two Blind Men*), the character Giraffier describes himself as "Né des parents auvergnats, mais honnêtes" ("Born of parents from the Auvergne, but honest") (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 2. People from the Auvergne have the reputation of being penny-pinching (as a response to poverty) and unwelcoming. There is no mention of poor or dishonest parents in H. B. Farine's English-language libretto *The Blind Beggars* (London: Metzler & Co., 1872).

135.22 Walt Whitman.] Full name Walter Whitman (1819–1892), American journalist and poet, noted for writing on controversial topics including politics and sexuality and considered one of America's most influential poets. His best-known works include "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd" (1865), an elegy on the death of President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), and his anthology of poems *Leaves of Grass,* which he revised and expanded multiple times, from twelve poems in a self-published edition in 1855 to nearly four hundred poems in his final edition in 1892. Santayana called Whitman a barbarian in his essay "The Poetry of Barbarism" (*IPR,* 109–14); yet he also composed two poems subtitled "After Walt Whitman", "Had I the Choice" and "You tides with ceaseless swell" (*Complete Poems,* 404–5, 410–11).

136.3 Stoics] Greek and Roman philosophers who propagated a doctrine that elevated virtue and counseled indifference to worldly concerns. Stoicism was a movement in ancient philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium (334–262 BC), who came to Athens in 313 BC. The name of the movement comes from the Greek word στοά, a kind of colonnade or porch with a roof and a rear wall. Zeno was said to frequent the Stoa Poecile so much that his followers became known as Stoics. The movement is divided into three periods: Early, Middle, and Late or Roman Stoicism. Figures in Early Stoicism include Zeno, Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 BC), and Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280–c. 206 BC). Figures of Middle Stoicism include Panaetius of Rhodes (185–c. 110 BC) and Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–c. 51 BC). Figures of Late Stoicism include Seneca (c. 4 BC–AD 65), Epictetus (c. AD 50–c. 138), and Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180). Stoics were monists whose theology reflected their physics: God is the power that forms all things and harmonizes the relationship of all creation. For Stoicism, there is no distinction between God and the universe.

136.5 Bohemia] Bohemia is a region of the present-day Czech Republic. However, Santayana is here using the term figuratively to refer collectively to socially unconventional, artistic people. This usage comes from a nineteenth-century French practice of associating nonconformist artists living in low-rent districts with the Romani people, who were called *bohémiens* on the supposition that they had immigrated from Bohemia. This terminology has been immortalized in Giacomo Puccini's (1858–1924) 1895 opera *La bohème* (*The bohemian woman*), which tells the story of the relationships and survival strategies of a poor seamstress and her equally impoverished artist friends.

136.24 Swedenborgian household] Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) was a Swedish scientist and mystic who wrote many theological works. He claimed to converse with angels in his dreams and in daily life. These visitations convinced him that God wanted him to reform Christian doctrine and he spent the later part of his life attempting to do so. According to his philosophy, for example, Jesus was a great human being, but Swedenborg rejected the doctrine of atonement. His major works include *Arcana Coelestia* (1756) and *Divine Love and Wisdom* (1763), which may be the most comprehensive explanation of his philosophy. After his death, a number of religious groups began promoting his teachings in Great Britain and North America. Notable followers of Swedenborg's teachings included the English poet William Blake (1757–1827), the Irish poet William Butler Yeats (1865–1939), and William James's father, Henry James Sr. (1811–1882). See Note 8.18 William James.

137.21–22 The lame, the halt, the blind,] In Luke 14:13 and 14:21, Jesus encourages inviting "the poor, [and] the maimed, [and] the lame [halt], [and] the blind" to feasts, even though these people are not in a position to reciprocate or otherwise benefit their host, in order to be blessed and to participate in the kingdom of God (Luke 14:14–15, 24).

137.22 those speaking with tongues] Interpreted here as people who are not otherwise understood. In some, but not all, New Testament passages that mention speaking in tongues, people who hear others speaking in tongues are able to understand them. See also Note 68.39–69.1 translate me into a thousand tongues!

139.20 *a posteriori*] Latin for "from the latter"; reasoning from effects to presumed causes; alternatively, things only knowable from experience.

139.24–27 "There shall be news . . . . there shall be news in heaven!"] James's "obscure friend" is the American sometime farmer, inventor, philosopher, and prolific writer Benjamin Paul Blood (1832–1919). William James wrote an article on Blood ("A Pluralistic Mystic," *Hibbert Journal* 8, no. 4 [July 1910], 739–59) in which he quotes "a poetic apostrophe of Mr. Blood's to freedom," beginning:

> Let it ne'er be known.
> If in some book of the Inevitable,
> Dog-eared and stale, the future stands engrossed
> E'en as the past. There shall be news in heaven,
> And questions in the courts thereof; and chance
> Shall have its fling, e'en at the [ermined] bench. (754n)

William James, *Memories and Studies* (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1911) 402.

139.34 Eternal vigilance is the price of knowledge;] This well-known statement by Santayana draws on the well-known phrase "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," often inaccurately attributed to Thomas Jefferson.

140.1–2 the visions . . . influential things about him.] This comes from *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), the publication of a series of lectures that James delivered at Oxford University. In the table of contents, the point is summarized as "The type of vision is the important thing in a philosopher." In the text, it reads as follows:

> Let me repeat once more that a man's vision is the great fact about him. Who cares for Carlyle's reasons, or Schopenhauer's, or Spencer's ? A philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it. (20)

140.7 *"écraser l'infâme."*] French; literally, to crush the infamous. Voltaire frequently used the phrase in his works and letters, encouraging his readers to fight against abuses of power by kings and the Roman Catholic church. See Note 4.7 Voltaire.

140.9–12 Book of Ecclesiastes . . . there is nothing new] Ecclesiastes 1:9 states, "There is no new thing under the sun."

140.14–16 to the blinking little child . . . new all day.] Santayana describes this childlike perspective similarly in *Reason in Common Sense*:

> In the first stage of life the mind is frivolous and easily distracted; it misses progress by failing in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and barbarians, in whom instinct has learned nothing from experience. (*LR1*, 172)

Also, in the Bible, Lamentations 3:23a refers to God's mercies, saying, "They are new every morning."

140.35 the moon is sister to the sun,] In *Reason in Religion,* Santayana describes some of the mythology surrounding Apollo, as a god and personification of the sun: "At first he is the sky's child, and has the moon for twin sister" (*LR3*, 41).

141.25 Sir William Hamilton] (1788–1856), 9th Baronet of Preston, Scottish lawyer and philosopher. Hamilton studied medicine, law, and philosophy at the University of Glasgow and Oxford, and served as Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh from 1836 until his death. His knowledge of both the Common Sense philosophy tradition of Thomas Reid (1710–1796) and of German philosophy was critical in developing the Scottish philosophical tradition and brought him international renown: "In the United States Hamilton was highly regarded until late in the 19th century" (Gordon Graham, "Sir William Hamilton [1788–1856]," Institute for the Study of

Scottish Philosophy [Sioux Falls, SD: University of Sioux Falls, 2021], retrieved August 31, 2021 from http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/sir-william-hamilton/), comporting with Santayana's view that Hamilton belonged to the previous generation.

143.3–5 A Californian whom . . . what they are.] The individual has not been identified, but in a letter of 15 August 1911, Santayana writes, "I am struck in California by the deep and almost religious affection which people have for nature, and by the sensitiveness they show to its influences. . . . It is a relief from business and the genteel tradition" (*LGS,* 2:45–46).

142.23 when she destroys . . . momentary spasm.] At 5:12 a.m. on 18 April 1906, about three hundred miles of the San Andreas fault ruptured in an earthquake with an estimated magnitude of 7.9 on the Richter scale and extreme intensity centered in the San Francisco Bay area. The earthquake and ensuing fire destroyed about 80 percent of the buildings in San Francisco, with an estimated three thousand lives lost and hundreds of thousands left homeless. About half of the evacuees found refuge in Berkeley and other cities across the Bay, which suffered lesser though still significant damage.

Chronology of the Life and Work of George Santayana

Adapted and abridged from William G. Holzberger, “Chronology,” *The Letters of George Santayana,* 1:443–60.

1849 Josefina Borrás (c. 1826–1912), George Santayana’s mother, marries George Sturgis (1817–1857) of Boston, aboard a British warship in Manila Bay.

1857 George Sturgis dies in Manila at age forty.

1862 Josefina Borrás Sturgis marries Agustín Santayana (1814–1893) in Madrid.

1863 George Santayana born on 16 December at No. 69, Calle Ancha de San Bernardo, Madrid.

1864 Santayana christened Jorge Agustín Nicolás on 1 January in parish church of San Marcos, Madrid.

1868 (or 1869) Santayana’s mother, with daughters Susana and Josephine, moves to Boston, to honor her first husband’s wish that his children be raised in America (her son Robert had moved to Boston as a 13-year-old in 1867); Santayana remains with his father in Spain.

1872 Santayana and his father travel to America in June; his father returns to Ávila several months later.

1882 Santayana graduates from Boston Latin School; attends Harvard College in autumn.

1883 Santayana visits his father in Spain for first time since coming to America. Advised by William James at Harvard not to pursue philosophy.

1885 Santayana meets John Francis (“Frank”) Stanley, 2nd Earl Russell and elder brother of Bertrand Russell, who becomes a close friend.

1886 Santayana’s Bachelor of Arts degree is awarded *summa cum laude* and *in absentia*. Santayana begins study in Germany.

1889 Santayana completes dissertation on “Lotze’s System of Philosophy” under direction of Josiah Royce; awarded Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees by Harvard University; begins as Instructor in Philosophy at Harvard.

1893 Santayana’s father dies at age 79 during summer in Ávila; Santayana’s student and friend Warwick Potter dies in October; at the end of this year Santayana undergoes his *metanoia* or fundamental change of heart, resulting in renunciation of the world. Spends a year at Cambridge University; appears in court in October to testify on behalf of Frank Russell, defending against charges by his estranged wife.

1897 Santayana resumes teaching at Harvard; lives with his mother.

1898 Santayana promoted from instructor to assistant professor.

1899 *Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy* published.

1900 *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* published.

1904 Santayana sails from New York to Plymouth, England, in mid-July; visits Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.

1905 Visits Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Germany, England, Spain, and France. While still abroad, Santayana invited by Harvard to become Hyde Lecturer at the Sorbonne for 1905–6. First four volumes of *The Life of Reason; or, the Phases of Human Progress* published.

1906 Fifth volume of *The Life of Reason* published. Santayana returns to America in September; resumes teaching at Harvard.

1907 Santayana promoted from assistant professor to full professor.

1910 *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe* published as first volume in the series Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature.

1911 In April Santayana delivers his final lecture at Harvard. Travels to Wisconsin and California.

1912 Santayana departs America for the last time on 24 January. Mother dies on 5 February. Takes an extended holiday through Italy from September–November, finishing in Florence, Italy, where he stays with his friends, the Berensons.

1913 *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* published in January while Santayana is in Monte Carlo. Travels to Brussels from 3–6 July to visit Baron Albert von Westenholz. Following this trip, the two men lose contact until 1920 because of the war.

1914 World War I breaks out; Santayana remains in England, with his home base in Oxford, until April 1919.

1915 *Egotism in German Philosophy* published (published in London in 1916). Santayana moves to 22 Beaumont Street, Oxford, England, which becomes his permanent residence during the war.

1919 Santayana leaves Oxford for London in April. In June, Santayana leaves England for the first time since 1914. He travels to Paris and resides at Charles Strong's apartment from 26 June to 26 November.

1920 Santayana begins spending winters in Rome; continues to summer in Paris, Ávila, Glion, at Lake Geneva, or Cortina d'Ampezzo. *Character and Opinion in the United States* published. "Three Proofs of Realism" published in *Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problems of Knowledge.*

1922 *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* published. Revised second edition of the five books of *The Life of Reason* published.

1923 “The Unknowable” delivered as the Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford in October. *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and the last collection of Santayana’s poetry to appear during his lifetime, *Poems: Selected by the Author and Revised*, are published in May and April respectively.

1925 *Dialogues in Limbo* published during the summer.

1927 Santayana meets Daniel Cory (age 22), who will become his assistant and friend. *Platonism and the Spiritual Life* published in April. *The Realm of Essence: Book First of Realms of Being* published in November.

1928 Santayana declines offer of the Norton Chair of Poetry at Harvard for 1928–29. Half-sister Susana dies in Ávila, on 10 February, at age 77.

1930 Half-sister Josephine dies in Ávila, on 15 October, at age 77. *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being* published in September.

1931 *The Genteel Tradition at Bay* published at the beginning of the year. In December, Santayana declines offer to become the William James Professor of Philosophy at Harvard.

1932 Santayana attends a philosophical congress commemorating the tercentenary of Spinoza’s birth, held at The Hague on 6–10 September; delivers a lecture on “Ultimate Religion.” Attends a meeting in London to commemorate the tercentenary of John Locke’s birth; on 19 October, delivers an address on “Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense.”

1933 *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* published.

1935 *The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel* published in London in October (published in New York in 1936).

1936 *The Last Puritan* becomes a Book-of-the-Month Club bestseller.

1937 *The Realm of Truth: Book Third of Realms of Being* published in London in October (published in New York in 1938).

1938 First book-length biography published: *George Santayana*, by George Washburne Howgate.

1939 World War II breaks out in Europe; Santayana, denied a long-term visa by Swiss officials, decides to remain in Italy.

1940 *The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being* published. *The Philosophy of George Santayana* published in December.

1941 Santayana moves into a nursing home operated by the Blue Sisters of the Little Company of Mary, an order of Roman Catholic Irish nuns.

1944 *Persons and Places* published in December; becomes a bestseller.

1945 *The Middle Span* published. Santayana awarded the Nicholas Murray Butler Medal by Columbia University.

1946 *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels; or, God in Man: A Critical Essay* published.

1948 *Dialogues in Limbo, With Three New Dialogues* published.

1951 *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government* published.

1952 On 4 June, Santayana falls on the steps of the Spanish Consulate in Rome; his injuries include three broken ribs and a bleeding head wound. The physician also finds patches of pneumonia on his lungs, but is amazed by Santayana's recovery. Santayana continues working until increasing blindness and illness make further labor impossible. On 26 September, Santayana dies of stomach cancer. On 30 September, his body is interred in the Tomb of the Spaniards.

1953 *My Host the World* published. *The Posthumous Poems*, together with two early plays, published as *The Poet's Testament: Poems and Two Plays.*

1955 *The Letters of George Santayana*, a selection of two hundred and ninety-six letters to eighty-six recipients (edited by Daniel Cory) published.

Textual Commentary

TEXTUAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR *THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA*

THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA AND EDITORIAL SCHOLARSHIP

The volumes of *The Works of George Santayana* are unmodernized, critical editions of George Santayana's writings. This scholarly edition is "unmodernized" because it retains original and idiosyncratic punctuation, spelling, capitalization, and word division in order to reflect the full intent of the author as well as the initial texture of the work; it is "critical" because it allows the exercise of editorial judgment in making corrections, changes, and choices among authoritative readings. The goal of the editors is to produce texts that accurately represent Santayana's final intentions regarding his works while recording all evidence on which editorial decisions have been based.

Except for the *Letters* and *Marginalia* volumes, *The Works of George Santayana* typically consist of materials composed by Santayana that he intended for publication and dissemination in a printed form. For these writings there may exist a holograph manuscript, a typescript, printers' proofs, two or more editions, and multiple impressions of editions. In such cases of needing to consider so many types of text, the term "critical editing" indicates the task of comparing these various forms in order to ascertain and perpetuate the author's settled intention regarding his work. In the absence of the holograph manuscript, the most authorial form (designated "copy-text") is normally the document that is closest to the author's hand. Two independent sight or machine comparisons are performed against the copy-text for each discovered successive form of the text found to have been produced by Santayana or published during his lifetime.

Editorial judgments are based on an assessment of all available evidence manifest in Santayana's works, letters, annotations, and other authorial material. The editors study this evidence to identify all of the forms of the text over which Santayana is known to (or can reasonably be assumed to) have exercised authorial control. They then compare (or "collate") all of these relevant forms of the text and account for any divergence, whether substantive or accidental, from the earliest surviving version of the text. When completed, this procedure enables scholars, using the information presented in the editorial apparatus, to recover readings of the documents used in preparing the text and to evaluate the editorial judgments made in establishing the critical text.

TEXTUAL THEORY

The central editorial decision for unmodernized, critical editions is the choice of copy-text, the document on which a critical text is based. The texts for *The Works of George Santayana* are constructed according to the theory of copy-text first formulated by Sir Walter Greg,[1] which continues to be a model for recent texts on scholarly editing.[2] Greg distinguishes between substantives (variants in the words themselves) and accidentals (variants in punctuation, spelling, capitalization, word division, paragraphing, and devices of emphasis). This is a pragmatic distinction used to account for the known behavior of authors and of intermediaries involved in publishing a work. In practice, authors tend to regard accidentals as less important than substantives. In proofreading, they concentrate on the fidelity of the words and more freely permit or overlook changes in formal matters made by typists, copy editors, and compositors. Simply stated, Greg maintains that the copy-text should be the most authoritative source of accidentals and that unless clear and certain evidence indicates otherwise that source will be the document closest to the author's unmediated hand, i.e., the fair-copy manuscript, or, when a manuscript does not exist, the typed or printed document that is closest to it.

Santayana always produced a handwritten manuscript, usually after earlier drafts (pre-copy-text forms). The holograph manuscripts of some of his later writings were given to a typist[3] and the typescript was corrected by Santayana. Because a typescript may contain errors in accidentals that Santayana overlooked, the fair-copy manuscript best represents Santayana's preferred use of accidentals, even when a corrected typescript is extant. Hence, in *The Works of George Santayana* the fair-copy manuscript, when extant, is the copy-text unless there is clear authorial evidence to indicate otherwise. When a manuscript remains unlocated, the surviving form closest to it is chosen as the copy-text. This may be the typescript, or, lacking the typescript, proofs (ideally a set read and marked by Santayana). Where none of the authorial or presswork stages have been located, the first printing of the first edition will stand as copy-text.

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[1] Walter Greg, "The Rationale of Copy-Text," *Studies in Bibliography* 3 (1950–51): 19–36, reprinted in *The Collected Papers of Sir Walter W. Greg,* ed. J. C. Maxwell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 374–91. Guidelines for the application of this method were taken from Fredson Bowers, "Textual Criticism," in *The Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, 2nd ed., ed. James Thorpe (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1970), 29–54, and the *Statement of Editorial Principles and Procedures: A Working Manual for Editing Nineteenth-Century American Texts,* rev. ed., prepared by the Center for Editions of American Authors (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1972). Two exceptional essays on the art of modern scholarly editing that have been very helpful to the editors of this critical edition are by G. Thomas Tanselle: "Greg's Theory of Copy-Text and the Editing of American Literature," *Studies in Bibliography* 28 (1975): 167–229, and "Some Principles for Editorial Apparatus," *Studies in Bibliography* 25 (1972): 41–88.

[2] See for example William Proctor Williams and Craig S. Abbott, *An Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies,* 4th ed. (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2009).

[3] Evelyn Tindall, an Englishwoman employed at the British Legation to the Holy See in Rome, began typing Santayana's handwritten manuscripts late in 1933, beginning with his novel, *The Last Puritan* (1935), and made typescripts of all of Santayana's subsequent work through *Dominations and Powers* (1950).

Critical editions are eclectic in that readings may be adopted from subsequent authorially revised or corrected versions, or from corrections made by Santayana's successive editors. The authority for accidentals is the copy-text; variants in the accidentals of subsequent presswork or later editions must be rejected, except on the rare occasion where (1) there is direct evidence of authorial revision, or (2) the variant corrects an obvious error (such as spelling or capitalization) that the author would want corrected. Consistent idiosyncrasies in Santayana's spelling and punctuation preferences represent an important aspect of his style, and will not be emended. However, the authority for substantive variants may shift to later impressions (printings) or editions known to be revised by Santayana. Such variants may be authoritative, and where the evidence is compelling they will be emended into the copy-text. This practice is based on the existence of evidence of authorial revision in later editions or from evidence in the correspondence. But even when such evidence exists, some substantives may have been altered by other persons and overlooked by Santayana; these substantives—often the result of compositorial (typesetting) error and editorial styling—are not authoritative and the copy-text forms retain their authority.[4] All editorial emendations to the copy-text are recorded (and the sources of emended readings identified) in the editorial apparatus located at the end of each volume.

GENEALOGY OF THE TEXT

Establishing critical texts thus requires the utmost scholarly rigor. The relative authority of each textual document and the relationships among these documents are determined by establishing a genealogy of each text. This process involves locating all relevant forms of the texts and collating them to prepare tables of variants that can be used to delineate the development of and the relationships among the texts.

All material bearing on the history of the text must be examined. This analysis includes items related to the publication of the work (such as letters, publishers' files, and printers' ledgers), outside sources quoted by Santayana in the text itself, and every text that has *prima facie* authority (such as pre-copy-text forms, fair-copy manuscripts, and all impressions of all editions of the work prior to the death of the author).

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[4] G. Thomas Tanselle, "Textual Scholarship," *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures,* ed. Joseph Gibaldi (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1981), 40.

One of the first tasks of the editors of the Santayana Edition, therefore, is to locate all extant materials which pertain to any of Santayana's published works. Santayana's papers are located in several repositories within the United States as well as other countries. Major repositories include: Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; The Bodleian Library, Oxford University; Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Boston Public Library; Butler Library, Columbia University; The Library of Congress; William R. Perkins Library, Duke University; Lauinger Library, Georgetown University; The Houghton Library, Harvard University; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Libraries; Rockefeller Archive Center; Morris Library, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; Temple University Libraries; Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin; Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia at Charlottesville; and the University of Waterloo, Ontario.

In addition to the above, over one hundred institutions and several individuals have papers, particularly correspondence, written by Santayana. Well over three thousand letters are known to exist, many housed in libraries and archives throughout the United States, Europe, and Japan, and others are in the possession of family members such as David Bidwell, the Sturgis family, and the Sastre family in Spain. Fortunately, the majority of the library of books and papers once in Santayana's personal possession, which are full of his handwritten annotations, are concentrated in repositories at Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Texas, and Waterloo.

The major collections of Santayana's papers from which the Edition has drawn information specifically for publication of the critical edition of *Winds of Doctrine* are as follows:

- Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds J. M. Dent & Sons Records, 1834-1986, which includes correspondence between Santayana and Joseph Malaby Dent, the publisher of the first edition of *Winds of Doctrine.*

- Special Collections at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University holds the original books used by Santayana in preparing the manuscript of *Little Essays: Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana,* including material from a January 1913 printing of *Winds of Doctrine.*

The Santayana Edition has acquired photocopies of all known Santayana material from the various repositories and individuals. Copies of primary and secondary source materials and dissertations are available in the office of the Edition for staff research and use by other scholars.

To determine the authority of all documents containing the text for previously published works of George Santayana, all true editions (distinct typesettings) are collected and collated, and their variants are recorded in a table of historical collations.[5] Each variant is studied to determine whether it is an authorial revision or the result of other factors, such as house styling or type damage. If there is evidence that Santayana revised an edition, the editors must distinguish between his revisions and non-authorial impositions or errors, such as those introduced by copy editors or compositors. As each printing or impression of a single edition also may have been revised by Santayana, the editors collect and collate the first and last impressions of each edition to locate possible authorial variants. When variants are found, the intermediate impressions (if any) are studied to determine when the variants were introduced and whether they are authorial. Eventually, all impressions are collated to insure that no other readings were altered and then restored within the interim impressions. Such variants would not surface in the initial collation of first and last impressions, but would nonetheless need to be recorded and evaluated.

The chronological order and relationship of editions and impressions are determined by internal as well as external evidence. Printing records or publishers' statements in the printed volume may indicate separate impressions, and correspondence sometimes provides clues to the existence of new printings of an edition. Lacking such external evidence, the editors may distinguish between otherwise apparently identical impressions by internal evidence, such as wear and deterioration of the plates. Variants between impressions may be discovered by extensive collation of copies of the edition collected from disparate regions in which the work was marketed.

When the genealogy of the text has been established and the relationships of all textual documents have been determined, the editors choose the document that will serve as copy-text. Greg's theory of copy-text, described above, is the basis for this choice.

Textual information presented in four lists following the "Textual Commentary" constitutes the evidence for and record of editorial decisions upon which the text of the critical edition is based. The first three of these lists concern editorial decisions; the fourth is a historical record. The editorial apparatus for this volume records editorial decisions in (1) the "Discussions of Adopted Readings," (2) the "List of Emendations," and (3) the "Report of Line-End Hyphenation." A fourth section, the "List of Variants," permits the reader to compare the critical text with all variant readings in every other possibly authoritative text. The editorial apparatus enables the reader to reconstruct the copy-text and to evaluate judgments made by the editors in establishing the text of the critical edition. For a description of the entire editorial appendix, see page 147.

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[5] All editions of Santayana's works are listed in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880–1980,* edited by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. and John Jones (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982). Corrections and annual updates of the checklist are in *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* (see links to electronic archives of the *Bulletin* at https://www.ulib.iupui.edu/digitalcollections/Santayana).

PRODUCING THE CRITICAL EDITION

Transcribing, editing, and typesetting the copy-text(s) to reproduce a critical text as accurately as possible is the primary goal of the Santayana Edition. This reproduction of *The Works of George Santayana* is, therefore, done electronically and, beginning with Volume VII, *The Life of Reason,* the books are produced with Adobe InDesign, a commercial electronic typesetting program. First the text is carefully transcribed (a literal transcription indicating internal variants is produced if the copy-text is the holograph manuscript or a typescript corrected by Santayana). As part of the initial transcription, the editors identify the various text elements (chapter headings, subheadings, marginal notes, standard paragraphs, extracts, poetry lines, footnotes, and the like), each of which is rendered visually distinctive with the help of InDesign, making systematic use of the program's template features. Each transcription then receives at least two independent sight collations against the copy-text to ensure its accuracy.[6] Various software programs aid the editors in locating, counting, and compiling material needed in making editorial decisions. For example, searching the digital files can indicate Santayana's usage and spelling of problematic words, identify patterns of punctuation and spelling, and find all line-end hyphens in the copy-text.

In addition to the copy-text, the front matter, textual commentary, notes, apparatus, and index are compiled and organized using a variety of software programs. These files are converted to InDesign format and the pages produced are proofed twice for accuracy and checked against the text as necessary. Use of the InDesign desktop publishing program enables the editors to send proofed pages to The MIT Press for printing. Before the book is printed, the editors check the digital proofs from the publisher.

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[6] The term "sight collation" refers to the process of comparing two versions of a text "by eye"; that is, collating (comparing) a handwritten version against a typewritten version, or comparing two different editions (necessarily involving two different settings of type). The various editorial terms used in this commentary, including "edition," "impression," "printing," "issue," "state," etc., follow the definitions found in Fredson Bowers, *Principles of Bibliographical Description* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949): 379–426.

The desktop typesetting employed in *The Works of George Santayana* greatly facilitates the editing and publication processes because it maintains the accuracy of the textual record, keeping it free from the errors or alterations almost invariably arising from rekeying a document. In having direct control over the printing process, then, the editors also safeguard the integrity of the critical edition text.

Description and Development of the Text of *Winds of Doctrine*

Composition History

Santayana's letters prior to the publication of *Winds of Doctrine* indicate that he was researching the topics in this volume's essays as early as 1907, when he took notice of the publication of Bergson's *L'évolution créatrice* while disparaging Bergson's philosophy: "I have no doubt it is most ingenious and contains good thinking in his private categories; but since I saw Bergson I have no serious interest in his productions."[7] In a 5 February 1908 letter to Horace Meyer Kallen, Santayana expanded on his criticism of Bergson:

> I thought him a great man, one of those whom we admire without feeling called upon to agree or disagree, since they seem to be above controversy, like the poets. But when I saw Bergson, and felt what his inspiration was, that he was a little cowed advocate of irrational prejudices and stubborn misunderstandings, feigning and acting the part of an impartial, subtle, liberal thinker–then all the charm vanished even from his written words, and I hear the cracked voice of the sectary and the whine of the reactionary in every syllable....[8]

Santayana may well have met Bergson while in France during the winter of 1905–6 delivering the Hyde Lectures, hosted by the Collège de France, where Bergson was chair of the Department of Modern Philosophy.[9] Santayana had attempted several essays about Bergson's philosophy without publishing them,[10] but by April 1912 had started the essay that appeared in *Winds of Doctrine*,[11] finishing it in August 1912.[12] Santayana's negative inclination toward Bergson was confirmed by his reading of Julien Benda's *Le Bergsonisme* (1912); he wrote to Kallen that it relieved him of any concern that he had been too severe in his criticism[13] and even led him to change "one or two complimentary epithets ... into epithets of a sour-sweet quality, in deference to Benda's criticism of the same, which opened my eyes."[14]

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[7] 23 June 1907 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 1:368).

[8] *LGS*, 1:378.

[9] *PP*, 411–12.

[10] Santayana wrote, "the essay on Bergson is only a selection of reams that I had written about him" (6 December 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow; *LGS*, 2:111).

[11] 8 April 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong; *LGS*, 2:86–87.

In July 1907, Santayana had just started reading John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards:

> I found Calvin's Institutes awaiting me here – in a German translation which sounds like a pious, warm, hearty sermon of the seventeenth century – and I have devoted these two mornings to it – reading in bed, where I have my chocolate, in a manner that I fear is incongruous, voluptuous, and inspired of Satan. I am learning something nevertheless, and am delighted that the idea of reading Jonathan Edwards and Calvin came into my head, as it is opening a new world to me, at least, a much clearer and more genuine vista into a vague old world I had always heard about. "Righteousness" – almost the opposite of rational "justice" – will always be a clearer concept for me henceforth.[15]

The only book by Edwards found in Santayana's library was a 1935 printing of *Representative Selections*,[16] so it is not clear which of Edwards's writings Santayana may have read between 1907 and his delivery of the lecture "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" in 1911.

Already in 1908, Santayana had read an article sent to him by Bertrand Russell about pragmatism;[17] this was most likely a draft of the article Russell published in *The Edinburgh Review* following the publication of James's *Pragmatism*, in which Russell surveyed the history of pragmatist thought up to that time.[18] Russell's essay was later included as chapter 4 in *Philosophical Essays*,[19] the book to which Santayana responded in his articles in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,*

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[12] 4 August 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:95–96); 3 September 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:97).

[13] 7 April 1913 to Horace Meyer Kallen (*LGS*, 2:128).

[14] 11 November 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:105).

[15] 17 July 1907 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS,* 1:370).

[16] Jonathan Edwards, *Representative Selections* (New York: American Book Co., 1935).

[17] 6 July 1908 to Bertrand Arthur William Russell (*LGS*, 1:386).

[18] Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism," *The Edinburgh Review* 209, no. 428 (April 1909): 363–88; William James, *Pragmatism* (London: Longmans, 1907).

[19] Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, 1910).

and Scientific Methods;[20] Santayana's own overview of James's philosophy was not completed until after James's death.[21]

> It is rather late to thank you for your "Philosophical Essays", but you may soon see unmistakable evidence of the great interest I have taken in them, as I am writing an elaborate review – in three articles – for the Whited Sepulchre – which is what we call the Columbia "Journal of Philosophy, etc". You will not expect me to agree with you in everything, but, whatever you may think of my ideas, I always feel that yours, and Moore's too, make for the sort of reconstruction in philosophy which I should welcome. It is a great bond to dislike the same things, and dislike is perhaps a deeper indication of our real nature than explicit affections, since the latter may be effects of circumstances, while dislike is a reaction against them.[22]

Like Russell (see the preface to *Philosophical Essays,* page vi), Santayana had great personal respect for William James, but little regard for pragmatism as a philosophy:

> You may be quite right in thinking that I agree almost entirely with what James means: but I often hate what he says. If he gave up subjectivism, indeterminism, and ghosts there would be little in "pragmatism", as it would then stand, that I could object to.[23]

In March 1909, Santayana was preparing for two lectures in July on "the religious situation in Catholic countries before the parsons that come to the summer school" by reading "Loisy, Tyrrell, Paul Sabatier (who is a Protestant, but a great friend of the 'Modernists') as well as the Pope's Encyclical 'Pascendi' and other documents."[24] About modernism itself, he wrote:

> Quite apart from my lectures, which will have to be very superficial, the subject interests me in itself. I believe I have always been a "modernist"; only it never crossed my mind that such an attitude was compatible with being a practical Catholic, much less a priest. How can they be so blind?[25]

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[20] Santayana's review of Russell's *Philosophical Essays* was first published as a series of three articles in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* whose editor was Harvard (1908) graduate Wendell T. Bush, a professor at Columbia University (2 January 1911 to Wendell T. Bush). Santayana's articles were published as "Russell's Philosophical Essays": I. "The Study of Essence" 8, no. 3 (2 February 1911), 57–63; II. "The Critique of Pragmatism" 8, no. 5 (2 March 1911), 113–24; and III. "Hypostatic Ethics" 8, no. 16 (3 August 1911), 421–32.

[21] "William James," Chapter 3 in *COUS*, 64–96.

[22] 15 January 1911 to Bertrand Arthur William Russell (*LGS*, 2:28).

[23] 5 February 1908 to Horace Meyer Kallen (*LGS*, 1:378).

[24] 18 March 1909 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 1:402); on 19 April 1909 he wrote that the lectures were to be delivered on July 8 and 9 (*LGS*, 1:404).

[25] 18 March 1909 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 1:402)

Santayana's essay on Shelley began as a lecture inspired by the discussions in a poetry club he hosted in 1910–11, "a group of young men who came on Wednesday afternoons to have a cup of tea and read Shelley aloud."[26]

Before leaving for California in June, Santayana delivered the lecture on Shelley at least four times, at Bowdoin College, Columbia University, Bryn Mawr College, and Williams College.[27] He gave the final lecture on Shelley in October, "in Montreal—and probably for the last time, so that it would be as well, perhaps, to publish it. But where?"[28]

Between November 1911 and March 1912, Santayana sent the manuscript for the Shelley essay to J. M. Dent, a publisher in London. On 20 March 1912 he first mentions the idea of putting it "in a book with some other articles," and then on 2 April 1912 he states that he hoped to "get out a book of essays, including the Shelley, in the autumn ... a volume which Dent is to publish in London."[29]

In December 1910, Santayana had accepted an invitation to lecture for six weeks the following summer at the University of California, Berkeley. In a letter to his sister Susan, he said that the lectures "will be mere shortened versions of those I give here [at Harvard], and will involve no preparation";[30] however, the exact content of this lecture series is unknown.

After finishing the regular lecture series at Berkeley, Santayana moved to the University Club in San Francisco, where he delivered an additional lecture on Saturday, 26 August: "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy."[31] Santayana's audience seems to have been unimpressed:

> My lecture went off rather cheerlessly. They say Professor Rieber behind me on the platform was visibly distressed at my attempted witticisms. Several persons afterwards put their heads together and said it had been all

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[26] 16 May 1911 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:37); see also *PP*, 175.

[27] 25 April [1911] to [Sara or Grace] Norton (*LGS*, 2:34); 29 April 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:35); 16 May 1911 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:37).

[28] The lecture in Montreal was possibly at McGill University, considering Santayana's remarks about being among "ultra-British Scotch-Canadians" (7 December 1911 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre [*LGS*, 2:63]; 20 October 1911 to Mary Potter Bush [*LGS*, 2:54]).

[29] 24 November 1911 to Mary Potter Bush (*LGS*, 2:60); 20 March 1912 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:81); 2 April 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow (*LGS*, 2:84).

[30] 23 December 1910 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:25).

[31] The lecture was later published in the *University of California Chronicle* 13 (1911): 357–80 and in *Winds of Doctrine* as chapter 6 (*WD*, 125–43).

> rhetoric, and that, if you stripped the rhetoric off, what you found was a plain Atheist.[32]

Overall, Santayana's feelings about his trip to California were mixed: "I liked the Californian country, but the people I saw seemed cheap"; "In retrospect, my summer in California seems rather dismal; the people are too hopelessly commonplace and artificial."[33]

> The Summer School at Berkeley (now over) has not been very agreeable on the whole – the farce of it is too marked. But there have been pleasant moments, and San Francisco has a delighted climate (better than Berkeley) and the Bay is comparable to Naples or Constantinople. I also like the air of the people – except the academic set, which is worse than at Cambridge. The whole country from the Rockies west is fine and noble, and ought eventually to have a chastening influence on the inhabitants.[34]

One bright spot for Santayana was the opportunity to see *The Green Knight,* a play written by Porter Garnett and presented by the Bohemian Club of San Francisco on 12 August 1911.[35] He later thanked Garnett "for the absolutely unmatched opportunities you have given me of seeing what is best in Californian life. I shall never forget the Grove, and The Green Knight."[36]

Santayana's journey to California had begun around June 15th, passing first through Wisconsin to deliver lectures at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, as he had done the previous year.[37] Santayana departed California on 27 August 1911, "going by Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, the Grand Canyon, and Boston," stopping along the way in Chicago, which he had also visited the previous year.[38] He stayed in Cambridge until January 1912, leaving for England shortly before his mother died in February.[39]

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[32] Charles Henry Rieber (Ph.D., 1900) was a former student of Santayana's whose wife, Winifred Smith Rieber, had previously painted oil sketches of Santayana (10 October 1908). Charles Rieber was at this time dean of the summer sessions at the University of California, Berkeley (20 August 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong; 27 August 1911 to Mary Potter Bush).

[33] 14 October 1911 to Sydney Allan Friede (*LGS*, 2:54); 13 September 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:52).

[34] 10 August 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:44)

[35] *The Green Knight: A Vision* (San Francisco: The Bohemian Club, 1911).

[36] 15 August 1911 to Porter Garnett (*LGS*. 2:46).

[37] 16 May 1911 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:37); 1 July 1911 to Horace Meyer Kallen (*LGS*, 2:42); 1 March 1910 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:7).

[38] 10 August 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:44); 22 August 1911 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:47); 6 September 1911 to Henry James III (*LGS*, 2:50); 1 March 1910 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:7); 6 April 1910 to William Morton Payne (*LGS*, 2:11).

[39] 29 January 1912 and 6 February 1912 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:68–69).

By August 1912, Santayana had selected the title *Winds of Doctrine* for the new book and stated that "the California address" would be included; he had also finished revising the chapters on modernism, Bergson, and Russell.[40] On 3 September 1912, Santayana wrote to Strong,

> I was giving the last touches to my book – at last in the publisher's hands – on which I had been working terribly hard (for me).... I have been very happy, especially when I felt the book was getting on. It certainly has cost me very great pains, and now we shall see what people say of it.[41]

Santayana repeatedly mentions the difficulty of finishing the book, "by making a great effort (for I wasn't very well)" and that it "was a terrible piece of work getting it off, and took me all summer."[42]

Santayana describes working on the Shelley, Bergson, and modernism essays as "revising and rearranging old stuff," which "is harder than composing afresh from the beginning."[43] By contrast, the first essay is mentioned only in August 1912, and the tone of the essay itself suggests it was written as an introductory chapter only after the decision in April 1912 on the contents of the book.[44]

Santayana finished reading the first proofs for the whole book on 22 October and saw page proofs sometime in November, so that by 6 December it was said to be in press.[45]

PUBLICATION HISTORY

Winds of Doctrine was first published by British publisher J. M. Dent & Sons, printed at The Temple Press, Letchworth. The Temple Press was set up by Joseph Malaby Dent in 1906 to produce books for The Everyman's Library, envisioned as a series of inexpensive reprints of classics, but the press also produced other Dent books. Santayana had first worked with Dent in 1910 while writing the introduction to Dent's edition of *Ethics and "De intellectus emendatione"* by Benedict de Spinoza (London: Dent, 1910), and he eventually also published *Egotism in German Philosophy* with Dent (1916). Although Santayana considered publishing other books with Dent—such as *Little Essays* and *Dominations and Powers*—*Winds* and *Egotism* remained the only ones.[46]

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[40] 2 August 1912 to George Herbert Palmer (*LGS*, 2:93–94); 4 August 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:95–96).

[41] 3 September 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:97).

[42] 30 November 1912 to Elizabeth Stephens Fish Potter (*LGS*, 2:107); 6 December 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow (*LGS*, 2:111).

[43] 6 December 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow (*LGS*, 2:111).

[44] 4 August 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:96); 2 April 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow (*LGS*, 2:84).

[45] 22 October 1912 to Susan Sturgis de Sastre (*LGS*, 2:102); 8 November 1912 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 2:103); 6 December 1912 to Mary Williams Winslow (*LGS*, 2:111); 10 December 1912 to Horace Meyer Kallen (*LGS*, 2:112).

In March 1913, Santayana stated that the "shape and size" of Dent's edition were "not altogether agreeable," but later (in 1917 and 1919) expressed his satisfaction with the binding and the form.[47]

Dent arranged with Charles Scribner's and Sons for an American edition using the same typesetting. Santayana wrote to Scribner's that he had actually intended to let them publish *Winds of Doctrine*, but "circumstances made it impossible."[48]

Winds of Doctrine was generally well received, and Santayana wrote letters specifically responding to praise from Arthur Davison Ficke (Harvard class of 1904) and Oliver Wendell Holmes (Harvard class of 1861), who were regular correspondents. Upon hearing that *The Harvard Monthly* had devoted a special issue to *Winds of Doctrine,*[49] Santayana seemed humbled, though he was most gratified "to see that I have so many friends among the young wits at Harvard, that they read and talk over my books, and that some of them remember their old teacher with affection."[50]

In 1923, Joseph Dent asked Santayana to approve a new edition of *Winds of Doctrine* with an introduction, since Dent had exhausted its stock from the earlier printings.[51] In reply, Santayana expressed his intent to revise parts of the book:

> There are parts of that book that can stand, and have a permanent interest: others, especially the essay on Russell are already out of date. I should be glad to revise the whole, cutting out or condensing most of the Russell article and parts of the Bergson, thus reducing them to what I conceive to be their real importance: and to balance those omissions, I might add a chapter on Freud, and a few pages to the first essay, to carry the survey over the war. It would thus make a fair commentary on my own times, which might have a permanent interest.[52]

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[46] 5 July 1910 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS,* 2:14); 27 June 1950 to Ira Detrich Cardiff (*LGS*, 8:266); 9 March 1919 to Logan Pearsall Smith (*LGS*, 2:342); 19 September 1919 to Joseph Malaby Dent.

[47] 6 March 1913 to Charles Augustus Strong; 8 July 1917 to Logan Pearsall Smith (*LGS,* 2:278); 9 March 1919 to Logan Pearsall Smith (*LGS,* 2:342).

[48] 16 March 1913 to Charles Scribner's Sons (*LGS,* 2:125).

[49] Cyril B. Harris, ed., *The Harvard Monthly* 56, no. 2 (April 1913).

[50] 18 July 1913 to Arthur Davison Ficke (*LGS,* 2:136); 21 January 1914 to Oliver Wendell Holmes (*LGS,* 2:166); 22 April 1913 to Scofield Thayer (*LGS,* 2:130-31).

[51] 5 February 1923 letter from Joseph Malaby Dent to George Santayana (unpublished letter in folder 4310, J. M. Dent & Sons Records #11043, Rare Book Collection, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).

[52] 12 February 1923 to Joseph Malaby Dent (*LGS,* 3:126).

However, in the same letter, Santayana asked to postpone a new edition for "a year or two" while he worked on his "system of philosophy" (*Scepticism and Animal Faith, Realms of Being*). Finally, in 1926, after Joseph Dent's death, his son Hugh Dent issued a so-called second edition with a new preface but no revisions. Possibly because of the good reception for *Winds of Doctrine*, Santayana also considered the possibility of publishing a "New Winds of Doctrine," but nothing ever came of it.[53]

EDITIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

The first printing features the Dent logo embossed on the front cover and "J•M•DENT & SONS•LD" on the bottom of the spine. Other copies examined by the Editors show "Scribner's" on the spine, including those listing Dent on the first line of the title page. The title page in all the copies examined includes red printing for the main title, "Winds of Doctrine", and for the first listed publisher's imprint. In the case where only one publisher's imprint is shown, it is in red.

The title pages for printings of the first edition variously credit Dent, Scribner's, or both (one listed below the other, with the first in red ink). All of the first impression title pages bear both Dent and Scribner's imprints with either listed first, whereas later impressions may bear either or both. The first impression, first printing, is marked "First Printed in 1913"; the second impression is marked "First Edition January 1913 / Reprinted July 1913"; the third impression is marked "First Edition February 1913 / Reprinted July 1913, / September 1913"; the fourth impression is marked "First Edition February 1913 / Reprinted July 1913; / September 1913; / November 1914".

The first state of the text has a plain-text insignia for the press, "The Temple Press, Printers, Letchworth", on the final page, whereas in 1926 the insignia is a reproduction of an engraved graphic logo.

The 1926 printing is marked "First Edition 1913 / Reprinted 1913 (twice), 1914 / 1926". The copies of this printing examined by the Editors each show only one publisher's imprint, and the copyright page for each shows "Printed in Great Britain." Due to the addition of the preface, the signature marks shift, starting with this impression.

The 1926 impression included a new preface but no revisions, and thus was not a true second edition.[54] The actual second edition of the contents was reset and published by Scribner's in two separate volumes of their Triton Edition, the Shelley essay in volume II (1936) and the rest in volume VII (1937).

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[53] 16 May 1926 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 3:278); 1 August 1926 to Otto Kyllmann (*LGS,* 3:285); 11 August 1926 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS,* 3:287).

[54] 1 August 1926 to Otto Kyllmann (*LGS,* 3:285); 16 May 1926 to Charles Augustus Strong (*LGS*, 3:278).

The 1940 printing has a new copyright page with "Made in Great Britain at The Temple Press Letchworth", both publisher's imprints, then "First Published 1913 / Reprinted four times / New Edition 1940". The insignia for The Temple Press is not found at the end of this printing, although the signature marks are the same as in the 1926 impression.

The different press runs for the first edition can be distinguished by certain anomalies in printing, such as diminished periods or commas, as well as broken or obscured type at the ends of lines. These variations in print quality are not noted in the list of variants.

Although the book was typeset and first published by Dent using The Temple Press, only the Scribner's manufacturing records are extant. The Scribner's manufacturing records show 2,115 copies of the first impression printed and bound, with 1,865 in the first two years (February 1913 through December 1914) and an additional 250 after the end of the war (October 1919 to November 1921). For the 1926 impression, 1,040 were ordered initially and an additional 1,050 were produced over the following thirteen years, for a total of 4,205 copies of the American edition issued during Santayana's lifetime. The American edition has official publication dates of 29 March 1913 and 15 October 1926, with print runs up until 1949 and the last bound volumes sent out on April 20. The production numbers for the Scribner's press and bindery correspond except for one anomalous binding order in 1931 for 71 books, possibly using pages already prepared in Great Britain and sent to Scribner's to be bound for an American issue.

SUBSEQUENT AUTHORIAL INTENTIONS

Santayana expressed interest in revising *Winds of Doctrine*, but never authorized major revisions. He also told correspondents such as Logan Pearsall Smith and Otto Kyllmann that he was considering compiling another anthology of essays which he tentatively called *New Winds of Doctrine,* but ultimately he turned away from this idea to concentrate on other books.

During Santayana's lifetime, parts of *Winds of Doctrine* were translated into Italian, but there is no evidence that Santayana was involved in this work or reviewed the translation.[55] Excerpts from *Winds of Doctrine* were also included in an anthology prepared by Ira Cardiff, but Santayana was not directly involved in the selection or editing.[56]

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[55] Chapters I, III, IV, and VI were included in *Il pensiero americano e altri saggi,* trans. Carlo Coardi (Milan: Valentino Bompiani, 1939), 9–36; 193–248; 251–99; 64–96. See 25 March 1941 letter to Daniel Cory (*LGS,* 7:23).

HISTORICAL COLLATION

At least two independent sight collations were completed for all distinct typesettings of the text. One set of collations was performed by a team of readers including an assistant editor and staff, and the second set by the textual editor and assistants reading both as a team and individually. The combination of team and individual sight collations provides a valuable safeguard against oversights possible in collations confined to a single method.

In the process of obtaining copies for collations, the Editors examined the following physical copies: Scribner's/Dent January 1913, Dent/Scribner's January 1913, Dent/Scribner's July 1913, Dent/Scribner's September 1913, Dent/Scribner's November 1914, Scribner's 1926, and Dent/Scribner's 1940.

Also, the Editors examined Logan Pearsall Smith's copy of a Dent/Scribner's 1913 first impression, which he had sent to Santayana with sections marked to extract for *Little Essays.* Santayana then marked it up further and cut out the pages which were later used to construct a manuscript for setting copy for *Little Essays;* these items are held at Georgetown University.

The Editors examined scans of a first impression, first printing marked Dent/Scribner's; a first impression, first printing marked Scribner's/Dent; a September 1913 Dent/Scribner's impression; two November 1914 Dent/Scribner's impressions; a Dent 1926 impression; a Scribner's 1926 impression; and a Dent/Scribner's 1940 impression.

Sight collations for *Winds of Doctrine* included reading the standard for collation[57] (first edition, first issue, Dent/Scribner's 1913) against the second Scribner's edition, included in the Triton edition, volumes II and VII (1936/1937); the discarded portion (GSC_D) of the 1913 impression used for compiling *Little Essays: Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana;* the portion of the 1913 impression that was used to create setting copy for *Little Essays* (GSC_{LE}); and the printed edition of *Little Essays* (*LE*).

Because two of the essays in this volume ("The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell," chapter IV, and "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy," chapter VI) were previously published, scans of the earlier publications were compared to the standard for collation.

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[56] Ira D. Cardiff, ed., *Atoms of Thought: An Anthology of Thoughts From George Santayana* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950).

[57] The terms "standard for collation" and "collation standard" are merely methodological designations and have no authorial significance. They refer to the earliest form of the text that can easily be read against all other forms of the text during the collation process. The text designated as the standard for collation may very well become the copy-text, but that determination cannot be made until collations are complete.

The sigla for this volume do not differentiate between the successive editions and impressions labeled Dent, Scribner's, Dent/Scribner's, and Scribner's/Dent. Evidence indicates that the American (Scribner's) printings were simultaneous re-issues of the British (Dent) printings. In his letters, Santayana consistently referred to Dent as owning the copyright to the contents of *Winds of Doctrine,* and referred correspondents to Dent on inquiries regarding reprints.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CRITICAL TEXT FOR *WINDS OF DOCTRINE*

CHOICE OF COPY-TEXT

The earliest surviving form of *Winds of Doctrine* in its entirety is the first edition, first issue; neither holograph manuscript nor stages of presswork have been located for the texts.

Two of the chapters, chapter IV and chapter VI, were previously published. However, based on the composition history, all of the variants noted between the earlier publications and *Winds of Doctrine* are considered to be authorial revisions in order to prepare scholarly articles for mass-market book publication.

Santayana's correspondence indicates that he was revising the entire book up to the time he sent manuscript to the press, and then he later reviewed initial proofs and page proofs. Therefore, the copy-text for the work as a whole is the first state of the first printed edition, lacking extant setting copy or marked-up page proofs.

EMENDATION POLICY: DETERMINATIONS INVOLVING POST-COPY-TEXT READINGS

Only five emendations have been made to the copy-text, all of which first appeared in the July 1913 impression and were preserved in subsequent versions of the text.

The copy-text (*A*) serves as the authority for the vast majority of words and punctuation. The later impressions, re-issues, and the second edition (B^{1936} and B^{1937}) of *Winds of Doctrine* have no independent authority, but represent potential sources of emendation by virtue of the successive states of textual variation that these published forms contain.

However, for the Triton Edition, the type was completely reset and the format was changed. There is no evidence of Santayana's direct involvement in creating the setting copy or in checking page proofs; and the only significant variants, aside from the corrections initially introduced in the July 1913 impression, are three compositor errors.

The author's holograph revisions across Logan Pearsall Smith's disassembled copy (GSC_D and GSC_{LE}), which are mingled with Smith's marks, represent a subsequent and distinct authorial intention—the *Little Essays* project of 1920.

The editors take a conservative approach in editing the copy-text: a reading adopted from any source other than the copy-text is justified only by the certainty or great likelihood that it is a revision by Santayana. Obvious grammatical and spelling errors (those that fall outside of Santayana's known idiosyncratic preferences) and compositorial errors are also corrected by emendation. The text of the critical edition adheres to the copy-text accidentals except where there is compelling evidence to justify emendation. Substantives are emended when a corresponding reading in another version of the text reflects Santayana's clear intention or, in those instances where the copy-text is a published form (book or article), when the editors judge that in the process of printing and publishing the work an unauthorial alteration (for example, a misprint) occurred. Santayana's occasional misquotations within the text are not corrected, however; to do so would risk obscuring some particular significance that these misquotations might have in the text (all quotations are correctly rendered, or variants are described, in the present volume's "Notes to the Text"). The sigla used in the emendations list identify the source text of the emended reading; an emendation originating with the editors of the present edition is identified by the siglum *CE* (critical edition). All emendations in the copy-text, both in substantives and in accidentals, are recorded in the "List of Emendations" in the "Editorial Appendix."

Discussions of Adopted Readings

Below are the substantive variants discovered through collation with pre-copy-text forms. Because Santayana worked diligently to prepare all of the essays in *Winds of Doctrine* for book publication, these changes are considered to be authorial. They are presented here because of their potential scholarly interest.

Dent January 1913 v. *Journal of Philosophy,* 2 March 1911 ("The Critique of Pragmatism") – Substantive Variants

82 [*not present*] **]** many emotional impulses…almost every quarter [¶] It is not… altogether final. RPE_2 (114.6–35)

84 [*not present*] **]** the habit…misunderstood my intention." RPE_2 (116.25–33)

84 [*not present*] **]** This may be…our own knowledge. RPE_2 (116.37–43)

86 [*not present*] **]** Rather than admit…reacting upon. RPE_2 (118.28–31)

Dent January 1913 v. *Journal of Philosophy,* 3 August 1911 ("Hypostatic Ethics") – Substantive Variants

94n.16–18 vital. Plato attributes a single vital direction and a single moral source to the cosmos. This is what determines and narrows that scope of the true good; for the true good is that relevant to nature. Plato **]** vital. The narrowly determinate scope of the good recognized by Plato is a consequence of a single vital direction and of the single moral source attributed by him to the cosmos. Plato RPE_3 (432.45–433.43)

97 [*not present*] **]** Another appeal to the…is in serious danger of stultifying it. RPE_3 (427.3–428.13)

98.4 locus in which **]** locus, or the "organic unity," in which RPE_3 (428.31)

98.7 compared save as **]** compared, nor organic unities determined, save as RPE_3 (428.34–35)

98.23 suppress the tragic good called ferocity, **]** address the "organic unity" called ferocity, RPE_3 (429.7–8)

101.29–30 personal life. [*not present*]. What **]** personal life. It is also…For this relief much thanks. What RPE_3 (432.3–7)

DENT JANUARY 1913 V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CHRONICLE, OCTOBER 1911 – SUBSTANTIVE VARIANTS

129.30 save a new emphasis] save a selection or a new emphasis *GT* (362.34–35)

134.27–28 The winds and clouds come to minister to the solitary ego.] [*not present*] *GT* (369)

137.29 passionately hungry] emotionally hungry *GT* (373.1)

138.33–34 more materialistic the pragmatist's theory] more materialistically we interpret the pragmatist theory *GT* (374.16–17)

138.34 of the mind] of what the mind *GT* (374.17)

138.35 his theory] our theory *GT* (374.18)

142.6 was making.] was putting up. *GT* (378.28–29)

142.22–23 been pre-established. Much less can you feel it when she destroys your labour of years in a momentary spasm. You] been preëestablished. You *GT* (379.7)

142.33 the relativity] the finitude *GT* (379.19)

143.6 are which] are from which *GT* (379.33–34)

143.18 itself that] itself, your tyrant from the cradle to the grave, that *GT* (380.12–13)

List of Emendations

This list records all changes made in the copy-text by the present editors. Critical edition readings are listed to the left of the lemma bracket; to the right of the bracket is the first appearance of the emended reading, followed by a semicolon; then the rejected copy-text reading and its symbol, as well as intermediate variant readings when they exist. See “List of Variants” for all post-copy-text variants (page 331). For discussion of emendations marked with an asterisk (*), see “Discussions of Adopted Readings” (page 325). The tilde (~) stands for the word or words cited to the left of the lemma bracket and indicates that a punctuation mark is emended. The caret (‸) indicates the absence of a punctuation mark. (See page 149 for “Editorial Sigla and Symbols.”)

42.6 agoraphobia] A^{1913} (July 1913); agorophobia *A*

46.37 combination] A^{1913} (July 1913); conbination *A*

52.29 its] A^{1913} (July 1913); it *A*

74.3 made up for by] A^{1913} (July 1913); made up by *A*

113.8 worldling] A^{1913} (July 1913); worlding *A*

Report of Line-End Hyphenation

I. Copy-Text List

The following are the editorially established forms of possible compounds which were hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text.

4.12–13 all-permeating

10.12 counter-current

11.36 unpatented

13.16 non-human

15.31 freehold

23.35 prison-walls

25.22 blamelessness

27.2 deep-rooted

32.9 well-fed

34.11 bridegroom

36.9 old-fashioned

37.18–19 double-minded

39.9 undercurrent

40.21 stepping-stone

44.17 workmanship

48.16 inorganic

49.23–24 generalship

52.39–53.1 stumbling-point

62.17 outgrown

64.26 immovable

65.10 self-reversing

66n3.1 non-existence

68.29 devitalises

86.35 self-consciousness

92.5 self-denial

96.30 self-criticism

131.36 undismayed

136.16 nineteenth

141.6 dislodged

141.9 insidious

141.26 disproved

142.22 pre-established

II. Critical Edition List

In quotations from the present critical edition, no line-end hyphens are to be retained except the following:

4.12-13 all-permeating

37.18-19 double-minded

51.35–36 day-dream

52.6–7 self-congruous

52.39–53.1 stumbling-point

78.6–7 second-best

111.26–27 angel-like

114.34–35 ill-will

132.7–8 world-builder

142.28–29 non-human

List of Variants

This list is a historical record of the variants in the authorized forms of *Winds of Doctrine.* Copy-text readings are listed to the left of the lemma bracket, along with the page and line numbers of the corresponding text in the critical edition; variant readings are listed to the right. The tilde (~) stands in for words to the left of the lemma bracket that are omitted from the collated text and the caret (‸) stands in for the absence of a punctuation mark. (See page 149 for "Editorial Sigla and Symbols.")

42.6 agorophobia] agoraphobia $A^{1913-1914}$ A^{1926} A^{1940} B^{1936}
46.37 conbination] combination $A^{1913-1914}$ A^{1926} A^{1940} B^{1936}
52.29 it] its $A^{1913-1914}$ A^{1926} A^{1940} B^{1936}
74.3 made up ~ by] made up for by $A^{1913-1914}$ A^{1926} A^{1940} B^{1936}
113.8 worlding] worldling $A^{1913-1914}$ A^{1926} A^{1940} B^{1937}

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